PAF J-10CE News, Updates and Discussion

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This is not enough .... Think it as a basic difference between the state craft if India and Pakistan .....

In Pakistan Army General could take initiatives and could influence the other segments and arms of administration for the decision of war.

In India it's "civilian pressure groups based on certain Ideology" who influence the defense forces and administration for the initiation of war.

Armed forces of India are not the "main player" in the game of Enmity and ideological hatred against Pakistan it's the political forces and civil influential groups.

Therefore we have to deal with them and have present the scale of destruction caused by us to the Indian armed forces to those groups and political parties to create the deterrence otherwise , after regular interval we would face the Indian imposed limited war and world would become habitual of these limited wars.

There will be no Deterrence in South Asia if India keep imposing limited war at their will and under requirements of their domestic theater
Before we go again down this road, how do you define deterrence?
These are abstract and subjective concepts and for me, deterrence was established when India wanted cease fire even against wishes of their public. It was simply because the decision makers saw they can't surpass Pakistan's conventional military capabilities.
Those satellite photos are just for consumption of masses. As I said, every intelligence agency and government of world knows the damage dealt by both sides, and Pakistan came out on top Alhamdulilah.

Now, the question about showing evidence to people can't be answered here I guess. A lot of emotions involved in it and we often digress from topic because of personal feelings instead of ground realities.
Personally, I think it is ok to give India an offramp to de-escalate by hitting their targets but not rubbing it in Modi's face. The Induan public may not believe us but the great powers have seen Pakistan is far more responsible and India is quite an irrational nuclear power. Previously, it was the other way around and everyone was buying Jaishankar's propaganda of Pakistan a terrorist state.
 
I cannot accurately express certain technical terms in English. I will use another example instead.

Apple phones and Android phones can communicate and interact with each other on the same network. You can think of this as a common network.

However, there are specific communication modes between Apple phones. These communications are limited to two Apple phones. You can think of this as another type of network.

The situation with the PAF is similar to this phenomenon.

When two J-10CE fighter jets are conducting formation operations, they directly share a lot of avionics system information with each other, such as radar systems, fire control systems, IRST, etc. The J-10CE fighter jet can also directly share a lot of information with the JF-17 series fighter jets. A large amount of data can be exchanged between them.

The same situation occurs between two F-16s.

However, the PAF's J-10CE cannot establish this kind of communication network with the F-16. They can only communicate a small amount of data through public channels or AEW&C. This data flow is insufficient to create a formation combat advantage. Of course, if you consider two fighter jets flying together as formation combat, then you can ignore my point.

The same situation exists with:

The IAF's Rafale and Su-30MKI fighter jets, including the Tejas. These three aircraft cannot achieve this type of communication capability with each other.

The original Su-27/Su-30/Su-35 fighter jets that China imported from Russia initially also lacked this communication capability with other Chinese fighter jets. It was only after we independently reverse-engineered certain systems and installed separate modules that we were able to achieve some of these functions, albeit with limitations.

There's another interesting phenomenon. Due to technical issues, the F-35 fighter jet cannot directly exchange high-bandwidth data with the F-22 fighter jet. They need to communicate through an AEW&C or other communication facilities. It is said that the F-22 is undergoing upgrades to address this issue, but the outcome is still unclear.
You are right and I think the confusion started from the point that F-16 is completely outside the PAF network.
It can communicate with Chinese systems via a 3rd party, may it be an AEWACS or a ground agency.
So, I agree that it is not talking directly to J-10C but it is doing the job for us by transmission of required data and network is complete for PAF operations.
 
SOM is a full generation ahead of RAAD. Different leagues. Also, you can not use raad for conventional strikes as it’s nuclear configured. Using raad in a conventional war sends nuclear signaling which creates confusion as the Indians wouldn’t know if it’s nuke tipped or not.

It’s also why you couldn’t use any of your frontline missiles as they were marketed as nuclear capable. It’s why soon after the war, you created a rocket force.

Raad is not nuclear only. Weve gone over this before but theres probably hundreds of raads by this point and only a dozen or so wouldve had nuclear warheads. Raad is still a very terrifying weapon for indians because its terrain hugging and LO
 
I cannot accurately express certain technical terms in English. I will use another example instead.

Apple phones and Android phones can communicate and interact with each other on the same network. You can think of this as a common network.

However, there are specific communication modes between Apple phones. These communications are limited to two Apple phones. You can think of this as another type of network.

The situation with the PAF is similar to this phenomenon.

When two J-10CE fighter jets are conducting formation operations, they directly share a lot of avionics system information with each other, such as radar systems, fire control systems, IRST, etc. The J-10CE fighter jet can also directly share a lot of information with the JF-17 series fighter jets. A large amount of data can be exchanged between them.

The same situation occurs between two F-16s.

However, the PAF's J-10CE cannot establish this kind of communication network with the F-16. They can only communicate a small amount of data through public channels or AEW&C. This data flow is insufficient to create a formation combat advantage. Of course, if you consider two fighter jets flying together as formation combat, then you can ignore my point.

The same situation exists with:

The IAF's Rafale and Su-30MKI fighter jets, including the Tejas. These three aircraft cannot achieve this type of communication capability with each other.

The original Su-27/Su-30/Su-35 fighter jets that China imported from Russia initially also lacked this communication capability with other Chinese fighter jets. It was only after we independently reverse-engineered certain systems and installed separate modules that we were able to achieve some of these functions, albeit with limitations.

There's another interesting phenomenon. Due to technical issues, the F-35 fighter jet cannot directly exchange high-bandwidth data with the F-22 fighter jet. They need to communicate through an AEW&C or other communication facilities. It is said that the F-22 is undergoing upgrades to address this issue, but the outcome is still unclear.
That’s a very good analogy, and I agree with the core of what you’re saying.

You’re absolutely right that there are different layers of networking, and they are not equivalent.

What you describe between two J-10CEs (or J-10CE <> JF-17) is deep, intra-family fusion: high-bandwidth, low-latency sharing of raw or near-raw avionics data, radar tracks, fire-control quality data, sensor states, etc. That kind of tight coupling cannot and will not exist between J-10CEs and F-16s. The same limitation exists between Rafale <> Su-30MKI <> Mirage 2000 <> Tejas in the IAF, and historically existed in China’s own early Su-27/30 integration, as you correctly note.

So on that point, you’re correct: F-16s cannot participate in the same formation-level combat fusion as Chinese-origin platforms. That advantage remains exclusive to the J-10/JF-17 ecosystem.

Where I’d slightly qualify your conclusion is this:
formation-level fusion is not the only way to generate operational advantage.

Modern NC warfare is layered:

1. Inner layer: tight formation fusion (what you describe)
2. Outer layer: C2-level coordination via AEW&C and command nodes

The F-16s operate almost entirely in the outer layer, not the inner one.

That means F-16s do not enhance close formation combat synergy with J-10CEs, agreed. But they do contribute meaningfully at the battlespace level by:

1. adding shooters,
2. increasing sensor diversity,
3. expanding WEZ depth,

and increasing ambiguity for the adversary about where the actual firing node is.

This is similar to your F-22 / F-35 example. The lack of direct high-bandwidth exchange does not make them operationally independent, it just means the integration happens through AEW&C and C2 gateways rather than jet-to-jet fusion.

So I think we’re actually aligned on fundamentals:

Deep fusion = limited to same-origin platforms (you’re 100% right)

Operational coherence = still achievable across different origins

The F-16s don’t strengthen Pakistan’s inner formation combat capability. They strengthen the outer NC envelope, density, redundancy, and engagement geometry.

That’s why the concern isn’t “F-16 vs J-10CE,” but how many networked nodes Pakistan can bring to bear in the same battlespace, even if they’re not all sharing the same avionics backbone.

Your Apple analogy is good, I’d just add that AirDrop is not required to win the campaign if the cloud-level coordination already constrains the opponent.

That’s the distinction I’d make.
 
Therefore we have to deal with them and have present the scale of destruction caused by us to the Indian armed forces to those groups and political parties to create the deterrence otherwise , after regular interval we would face the Indian imposed limited war and world would become habitual of these limited wars.

I agree with what you have mentioned, however, I want to play out a hypothetical here i.e. let's suppose the damage was done - would releasing the satellite imagery or any other kind of evidence - lowered (or increased) the appetite for revenge war amongst the Indian population with 100% certainty?

Since, we couldn't be sure of it, isn't it then a strategically risk aversive bet - where the Indian population is settled down (for now) while their leadership is put in a precarious situation (knowing the capability of their adversary) and perhaps forced to re-think their narrative against Pakistan?

Please note that I'm not asserting that damage was done, I'm taking a hypothetical based on the assumption that "if damage was done"
 
You are right and I think the confusion started from the point that F-16 is completely outside the PAF network.
It can communicate with Chinese systems via a 3rd party, may it be an AEWACS or a ground agency.
So, I agree that it is not talking directly to J-10C but it is doing the job for us by transmission of required data and network is complete for PAF operations.

@Michael @HRK - to put simply the Target and Track data from the F-16s own radar can't be shared via an intermediate AEWAC node onto a J-10 without massively degrading the quality and detail of the data (and vice versa). I hope that's a simplistic enough and accurate summary.

OTOH, Target and Track data from AEWAC's radar can be shared b/w the two platforms without degrading the quality of the data.
 
That’s a very good analogy, and I agree with the core of what you’re saying.

You’re absolutely right that there are different layers of networking, and they are not equivalent.

What you describe between two J-10CEs (or J-10CE <> JF-17) is deep, intra-family fusion: high-bandwidth, low-latency sharing of raw or near-raw avionics data, radar tracks, fire-control quality data, sensor states, etc. That kind of tight coupling cannot and will not exist between J-10CEs and F-16s. The same limitation exists between Rafale <> Su-30MKI <> Mirage 2000 <> Tejas in the IAF, and historically existed in China’s own early Su-27/30 integration, as you correctly note.

So on that point, you’re correct: F-16s cannot participate in the same formation-level combat fusion as Chinese-origin platforms. That advantage remains exclusive to the J-10/JF-17 ecosystem.

Where I’d slightly qualify your conclusion is this:
formation-level fusion is not the only way to generate operational advantage.

Modern NC warfare is layered:

1. Inner layer: tight formation fusion (what you describe)
2. Outer layer: C2-level coordination via AEW&C and command nodes

The F-16s operate almost entirely in the outer layer, not the inner one.

That means F-16s do not enhance close formation combat synergy with J-10CEs, agreed. But they do contribute meaningfully at the battlespace level by:

1. adding shooters,
2. increasing sensor diversity,
3. expanding WEZ depth,

and increasing ambiguity for the adversary about where the actual firing node is.

This is similar to your F-22 / F-35 example. The lack of direct high-bandwidth exchange does not make them operationally independent, it just means the integration happens through AEW&C and C2 gateways rather than jet-to-jet fusion.

So I think we’re actually aligned on fundamentals:

Deep fusion = limited to same-origin platforms (you’re 100% right)

Operational coherence = still achievable across different origins

The F-16s don’t strengthen Pakistan’s inner formation combat capability. They strengthen the outer NC envelope, density, redundancy, and engagement geometry.

That’s why the concern isn’t “F-16 vs J-10CE,” but how many networked nodes Pakistan can bring to bear in the same battlespace, even if they’re not all sharing the same avionics backbone.

Your Apple analogy is good, I’d just add that AirDrop is not required to win the campaign if the cloud-level coordination already constrains the opponent.

That’s the distinction I’d make.
Currently, many advanced fighter jets and early warning aircraft are equipped with CEC antennas. This is a combat system based on a near-field communication system. You can learn more about its capabilities.

According to official announcements, various new weapons and equipment recently commissioned by China, including fighter jets, warships, UAVs, AEW&C aircraft, and armored vehicles, all possess this communication capability. We have also observed this antenna on the PLA Navy's newly commissioned KJ-600 AEW&C aircraft.

This is the true power of networked warfare. Do you think the PAF's F-16s and J-10CEs can achieve this capability?
 
F16 is becoming a handicap as it cannot seamlessly integrate with other proprietary dlinks. We cannot integrate newer weapons such as ALBMs, AR missiles etc. US will not release such newer weapons and nor will it allow us to integrate our own.. We could get the weapons from Turkey but would US allow us to integrate on our F16s. The other big factor is that we are not allowed to use the F16 for offensive operations on the eastern border…
 
F16 is becoming a handicap as it cannot seamlessly integrate with other proprietary dlinks. We cannot integrate newer weapons such as ALBMs, AR missiles etc. US will not release such newer weapons and nor will it allow us to integrate our own.. We could get the weapons from Turkey but would US allow us to integrate on our F16s. The other big factor is that we are not allowed to use the F16 for offensive operations on the eastern border…
F 16 are useful for another couple of decades...they will replace mirages of Pakistan.
 
We could get the weapons from Turkey but would US allow us to integrate on our F16s. The other big factor is that we are not allowed to use the F16 for offensive operations on the eastern border…

To integrate Turkish weapons you'd need the Turkish MGB/OFP package - technical block. And Turkey has been sanctioned to manage any US origin LM systems or weapons as a third-party, so political block.

We are allowed for offensive operations on Eastern Border in an officially declared war. The problem however is the limited weapons capability on F-16s currently.
 
These are abstract and subjective concepts and for me, deterrence was established when India wanted cease fire even against wishes of their public. It was simply because the decision makers saw they can't surpass Pakistan's conventional military capabilities.
Those satellite photos are just for consumption of masses. As I said, every intelligence agency and government of world knows the damage dealt by both sides, and Pakistan came out on top Alhamdulilah.
sorry but literally in what world...

If anything was seen, it was that Pakistans conventional deterrence failed...heck, even its nuclear deterrence failed.

India came in, launched strikes on civillian targets, for which they lost a few jets, but overwhelmingly realised pakistan was spineless and unable to deal any damage back. They know they can do this over, and over again, and us on the other hand, we will launch a couple of MLRS for domestic consumption, fabricate some stories and give our population a lollipop.

If you think this was a success on our part, im guessing you can probably spin 71' into a success too. Think about it, dhaka is the third most polluted city in the world... by losing it in '71, we won because we dont have to deal with its pollution.

We took widespread hits to our airfields, to our civillian infrastructure and we lost men. We lost the ability to deter India conventionally and on the nuclear front. Our response was weak and did NO damage in any meaningful capacity. The Indians walked away knowing we can basically do whatever and Pakistan is so cucked they wont be able to hit back.

We could not even launch whole MLRS salvo's for god sake. We did not launch a single cruise missile, which we all know we just dont have enough of. Pakistan is in a dire position and you all are here spinning rumours into a victory lol. God help us if this mindset is instilled into the brass too...which i fear it may be
 
sorry but literally in what world...

If anything was seen, it was that Pakistans conventional deterrence failed...heck, even its nuclear deterrence failed.

India came in, launched strikes on civillian targets, for which they lost a few jets, but overwhelmingly realised pakistan was spineless and unable to deal any damage back. They know they can do this over, and over again, and us on the other hand, we will launch a couple of MLRS for domestic consumption, fabricate some stories and give our population a lollipop.

If you think this was a success on our part, im guessing you can probably spin 71' into a success too. Think about it, dhaka is the third most polluted city in the world... by losing it in '71, we won because we dont have to deal with its pollution.

We took widespread hits to our airfields, to our civillian infrastructure and we lost men. We lost the ability to deter India conventionally and on the nuclear front. Our response was weak and did NO damage in any meaningful capacity. The Indians walked away knowing we can basically do whatever and Pakistan is so cucked they wont be able to hit back.

We could not even launch whole MLRS salvo's for god sake. We did not launch a single cruise missile, which we all know we just dont have enough of. Pakistan is in a dire position and you all are here spinning rumours into a victory lol. God help us if this mindset is instilled into the brass too...which i fear it may be
The retaliatory response was very underwhelming and weak, from all the publicly available information you can say it was even a failure and India shone through.

However one thing to pause on, despite all the loud noise from India following May, the terror attack in Dehli India has restrained itself from conducting a similar strike. So a few things could be at play here such as strategic reasons as it could be diplomatic suicide, Indian economy is suffering from tarrifs and maybe Pak did enough to make them think twice.

This buys time, Pak needs get its act together. In the future the response needs to be more deadly and hurtful to India.
 
Currently, many advanced fighter jets and early warning aircraft are equipped with CEC antennas. This is a combat system based on a near-field communication system. You can learn more about its capabilities.

According to official announcements, various new weapons and equipment recently commissioned by China, including fighter jets, warships, UAVs, AEW&C aircraft, and armored vehicles, all possess this communication capability. We have also observed this antenna on the PLA Navy's newly commissioned KJ-600 AEW&C aircraft.

This is the true power of networked warfare. Do you think the PAF's F-16s and J-10CEs can achieve this capability?
A small technical clarification first, because terminology matters.

CEC (Cooperative Engagement Capability) is not a near-field communication system. It is a high-capacity, low-latency sensor-netting architecture that allows fire-control–quality tracks to be shared across platforms so one node can engage using another node’s sensor data as if it were its own. In NATO/US terms, this is very high-end Level-4 interoperability, normally restricted to platforms inside a single sovereign architecture.

You’re correct that China is fielding CEC-like capabilities across fighters, AEW&C, naval units, UAVs, and ground forces, and that this represents the highest tier of networked warfare. The appearance of such antennas on platforms like KJ-600 strongly suggests a PLA-wide push toward deep, cross-domain sensor fusion.

To your question: can PAF F-16s and J-10CEs achieve this capability? The answer is no, not in the full CEC sense, and especially not across origins. CEC-level integration requires shared data models, synchronised timing, extremely low latency, trusted fire-control data exchange, and common weapon-release authorities. There is no realistic path for US-origin F-16s and Chinese-origin J-10CEs to share fire-control–quality data or function as interchangeable sensors and shooters in a single CEC mesh. That level of fusion would be prohibited by both US and Chinese technology-control regimes.

However, that does not mean the system stops at aircraft.

Ground-based systems absolutely interlink and play a critical role, but again at a different layer. In Pakistan’s case, ground-based sensors, IADS elements, and national C2 nodes contribute at the operational C4ISR layer, not the platform-fusion layer. They:

a) feed tracks into the common operational picture,
b) perform multi-sensor correlation and track validation,
c) support battlespace management and engagement coordination,
d) and provide persistence and redundancy that airborne platforms alone cannot.

This is still network-enabled warfare, just not CEC. The distinction is:

1. CEC -> platform-level sensor-shooter fusion (shared fire-control data)
2. C2-centric NC warfare -> system-of-systems coordination (tasking, cueing, timing)

Pakistan operates primarily in the second model. AEW&C platforms and ground-based C2 act as gateways, correlating data from different networks (airborne and ground, Link-16 and Link-17) and issuing sanitised tasking without exposing raw sensor data or internal avionics states.

So to answer directly:

1. PAF F-16s, J-10CEs, and ground-based systems cannot form a single CEC-style sensor-shooter mesh.
2. They can, and do, operate coherently at the operational C4ISR level, with ground systems providing depth, persistence, and resilience to the network.

CEC is the highest rung of networked warfare, but it is not the only rung that matters. Pakistan’s architecture emphasises system-level coherence across air and ground, rather than platform-level fusion across origins. That is a different design choice, not an absence of networking.

That distinction is critical when comparing architectures rather than individual technologies.
 
However one thing to pause on, despite all the loud noise from India following May, the terror attack in Dehli India has restrained itself from conducting a similar strike. So a few things could be at play here such as strategic reasons as it could be diplomatic suicide, Indian economy is suffering from tarrifs and maybe Pak did enough to make them think twice.
or it just wasnt linked to pak... unless you want to attribute every terrorist attack to pak then idk
 
Before we go again down this road, how do you define deterrence?
These are abstract and subjective concepts and for me, deterrence was established when India wanted cease fire even against wishes of their public. It was simply because the decision makers saw they can't surpass Pakistan's conventional military capabilities.

Those satellite photos are just for consumption of masses. As I said, every intelligence agency and government of world knows the damage dealt by both sides, and Pakistan came out on top Alhamdulilah.

Now, the question about showing evidence to people can't be answered here I guess. A lot of emotions involved in it and we often digress from topic because of personal feelings instead of ground realities.
Personally, I think it is ok to give India an offramp to de-escalate by hitting their targets but not rubbing it in Modi's face. The Induan public may not believe us but the great powers have seen Pakistan is far more responsible and India is quite an irrational nuclear power. Previously, it was the other way around and everyone was buying Jaishankar's propaganda of Pakistan a terrorist state.
Sir, you are confusing Deterrence with Compellence. Pakistan had to compel India to be on the table after deterrence failed. Deterrence means that enemy will not initiate any sort of hostalities at all. We maintained deterrence in 2001 stand-off. In 2008 stand-off. But since 2019, our conventional deterrence has failed twice in last 6 years alone. Now, this argument of compellance is also questionable here as we have no clear answer who and why this offramp took place. Both sides claim that other side asked for offramp.
For a moment if we buy this "not rubbing it in Modi's face" argument, it was ok 7 months ago, what's stopping PAF now? Why no satellite image, weapon feed, or post strike images/video exists? This question is critical because like of Air Crd (R) Khalid Chishti made claims that in 4-5 hours of 10th May PAF threw more ordinance on Indians than it could in 17 days of 1965 war. Now, after such claims, is it illogical to ask for just couple of images to confirm these claims?
 
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