Irfan Baloch
THINK TANK: CONSULTANT
summary of Article
both are deobandi , graduated from the same Madrasahs , share the same ideology with the only difference of which side of Durand line they were born.
For years, Pakistan framed the problem as one of capacity: a weak Afghan state, porous borders, and non-state actors operating beyond control. That argument no longer holds. The Taliban today are the state in Afghanistan. They control territory, command fighters, and enforce their writ with far greater cohesion than the previous Kabul government ever could. Yet, the TTP continues to operate freely from Afghan soil. That is not a failure of governance — it is a matter of choice.
The reality is uncomfortable. The Taliban see the TTP not as a liability, but as a strategic asset. A pressure valve. A card to be played when relations with Pakistan sour. This relationship is rooted in shared history — years of fighting side by side against NATO forces — and reinforced by ideological overlap. Expecting the Taliban to decisively turn on the TTP is like expecting them to dismantle a part of their own past.
Pakistan, on the other hand, finds itself trapped in a reactive cycle. Airstrikes, diplomatic démarches, border closures — all signal intent, but none have delivered a sustained shift in Taliban behaviour. Why? Because the core assumption is flawed. You cannot coerce a partner into abandoning an asset they still find useful.
What makes the situation more dangerous today is not just the persistence of TTP sanctuaries, but their evolution. This is no longer a ragtag insurgency. Access to advanced weapons left behind after the US withdrawal, combined with improved tactics and possible adoption of drone warfare, has made the TTP more lethal and more confident. Each attack is not just an act of terror — it is a signal that the balance on the ground is shifting.
The Taliban, meanwhile, are playing a risky double game. On one side, they seek international legitimacy and economic engagement. On the other, they continue to host and tolerate groups that undermine regional stability. they dont want to see TTP change sides and go in the lap of Daesh that are competing with TTA for the control of Afghanistan and beyond.
There is also a broader regional cost. A resurgent TTP threatens not just Pakistan’s internal security, but also projects like CPEC, raising alarms in Beijing. Iran and Russia, too, have little appetite for another wave of militant spillover. Yet, as long as the Taliban calculate that the benefits of keeping the TTP outweigh the costs, little will change.
Pakistan must therefore rethink its approach. The issue is not just cross-border militancy — it is the strategic mindset in Kabul. Managing symptoms through periodic strikes will not resolve a problem that is fundamentally political and ideological.
The uncomfortable conclusion is this:
The TTP is both the Taliban’s leverage today and their liability tomorrow.
both are deobandi , graduated from the same Madrasahs , share the same ideology with the only difference of which side of Durand line they were born.
For years, Pakistan framed the problem as one of capacity: a weak Afghan state, porous borders, and non-state actors operating beyond control. That argument no longer holds. The Taliban today are the state in Afghanistan. They control territory, command fighters, and enforce their writ with far greater cohesion than the previous Kabul government ever could. Yet, the TTP continues to operate freely from Afghan soil. That is not a failure of governance — it is a matter of choice.
The reality is uncomfortable. The Taliban see the TTP not as a liability, but as a strategic asset. A pressure valve. A card to be played when relations with Pakistan sour. This relationship is rooted in shared history — years of fighting side by side against NATO forces — and reinforced by ideological overlap. Expecting the Taliban to decisively turn on the TTP is like expecting them to dismantle a part of their own past.
Pakistan, on the other hand, finds itself trapped in a reactive cycle. Airstrikes, diplomatic démarches, border closures — all signal intent, but none have delivered a sustained shift in Taliban behaviour. Why? Because the core assumption is flawed. You cannot coerce a partner into abandoning an asset they still find useful.
What makes the situation more dangerous today is not just the persistence of TTP sanctuaries, but their evolution. This is no longer a ragtag insurgency. Access to advanced weapons left behind after the US withdrawal, combined with improved tactics and possible adoption of drone warfare, has made the TTP more lethal and more confident. Each attack is not just an act of terror — it is a signal that the balance on the ground is shifting.
The Taliban, meanwhile, are playing a risky double game. On one side, they seek international legitimacy and economic engagement. On the other, they continue to host and tolerate groups that undermine regional stability. they dont want to see TTP change sides and go in the lap of Daesh that are competing with TTA for the control of Afghanistan and beyond.
There is also a broader regional cost. A resurgent TTP threatens not just Pakistan’s internal security, but also projects like CPEC, raising alarms in Beijing. Iran and Russia, too, have little appetite for another wave of militant spillover. Yet, as long as the Taliban calculate that the benefits of keeping the TTP outweigh the costs, little will change.
Pakistan must therefore rethink its approach. The issue is not just cross-border militancy — it is the strategic mindset in Kabul. Managing symptoms through periodic strikes will not resolve a problem that is fundamentally political and ideological.
The uncomfortable conclusion is this:
The TTP is both the Taliban’s leverage today and their liability tomorrow.
