I think current USA elite loves butterfly effects, they come from Wall St. They love to hide themselves and their intentions, JewAmerican elite.
But it's each time harder to hide their intentions in Middle East.
Hormuz strait is the perfect world place to make a catastrophic butterfly effect to whole world.
And Israel the perfect idiot to trigger it, making provocations to Iran.
In case of a war, tens or even hundreds of billions would be pumped into the American economy and it is not hard to guess who'd benefits the most: The entities associated with the Military Industrial Complex. Just like in case of the two decades long Afghan war, just like in case of the ongoing Russia-Ukraine war, most money actually ends up in America!!
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I think this NY Times 'analysis' is missing one crucial point: Israel, or specifically Netanyahu, WANTS an escalation to the point of a regional war. A bully in a schoolyard can keep punching someone; the target can only plan for so long that the bully would tire out but if the bully keeps punching then patience can run out.
Through nearly 10 months of intense war with Hamas in Gaza, Israel has fought a parallel, slower-paced conflict with Hamas’s allies across the Middle East in which all sides have risked major escalation but ultimately avoided dragging the region into a bigger, multi-front war.
The attacks on two of Israel’s leading foes on Tuesday and Wednesday have created one of the biggest challenges to that equilibrium since the fighting began in October.
Israel’s Tuesday night strike on Fuad Shukr, a senior Hezbollah commander in Beirut, was the first time during this war that Israel has targeted such an influential Hezbollah leader in Lebanon’s capital. Hours later, the killing in Iran of Hamas’s political leader, Ismail Haniyeh, was considered the most brazen breach of Iran’s defenses since October.
Taken together, the seniority of the targets, the sensitive location of the strikes and their near simultaneity were viewed as a particularly provocative escalation that has left the region fearing an even bigger response from Iran and its regional proxies, including Hezbollah, the Houthis in Yemen and militias in Iraq. The scale of that reaction could determine whether the low-level regional battle between Israel and the Iranian alliance tips into a full-scale, all-out conflict.
Some analysts said the killing of Mr. Haniyeh, Hamas’s top negotiator, also made a cease-fire deal in Gaza less likely in the immediate future. Israelis hoped that the killing of such an influential leader would eventually help break Hamas’s resolve, making the group more willing to compromise in the long term. But others said that the organization was unlikely to be seriously affected by Mr. Haniyeh’s death.
Despite his title as Hamas’s political leader, Mr. Haniyeh is replaceable, said Joost Hiltermann, the Middle East and North Africa program director for the International Crisis Group.
“Hamas will survive,” he said. “They have plenty of other leaders.”
Analysts also said that both Iran and Hezbollah had reasons to respond in ways that make all-out war less likely. For Iran, the attack on its soil was embarrassing but not catastrophic because it targeted a foreign guest rather than senior Iranian officials, according to Andreas Krieg, an expert on the Middle East at King’s College, London.
“I don’t think necessarily that the Iranians’ strategic calculus has changed,” Mr. Krieg said.
“Iran will have to respond in some way,” he said. “But it’s not a turning point.”
Hezbollah faces more pressure to react than Iran because the strike on Beirut hit one of its own commanders, rather than one of its allies, according to Michael Stephens, a non-resident expert on the Middle East at the Foreign Policy Research Institute, a Philadelphia-based research organization. But it is by no means clear that Mr. Haniyeh’s death in Iran will change Hezbollah’s calculations in Lebanon, Mr. Stephens said.
“We need to be very clear and very careful about how we conflate the two issues,” Mr. Stephens said. “Over the past nine months, Hezbollah has repeatedly shown that what happens to Hamas is not related to Hezbollah’s strategic imperatives. That doesn’t mean there won’t be conflict. I just think the route to getting there is more complex than it seems.”
Past experiences show that de-escalation is still possible. In January, Israeli strikes killed a senior Hamas leader in Hezbollah’s stronghold in Beirut, leading to fears that Hezbollah would mount a particularly fierce response on Hamas’s behalf. Days later, Hezbollah instead chose what was construed as a largely symbolic response, firing a barrage of rockets at an Israeli army base that caused little damaged.
