Royal Saudi Arabian Strategic Missile Force
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The SC
INT'L MOD
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The Crocodile Program and Details of the Deal
In early 2022, a secret Saudi program to obtain new ballistic missiles from China, codenamed "Crocodile" (Crocodile), was revealed. This name first appeared in a report by the American website The Intercept, in which it was revealed that the Saudi government plans to import a batch of Chinese ballistic missiles no later than the end of May 2022 as part of this secret program. This report caused an uproar in Washington, especially since it coincided with tension in Saudi-American relations against the backdrop of oil issues and Riyadh's rapprochement with Beijing.
According to US intelligence sources quoted in the reports, the type of missiles included in the "Alligator" deal has not been publicly disclosed. Riyadh and Beijing have officially remained silent, while leaks have merely said that a shipment of ballistic missiles will head from China to the kingdom as part of a secret defense cooperation that worries Washington. This ambiguity prompted CIA Director William Burns to make an urgent visit to Riyadh in April 2022 to meet secretly with Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman. During that meeting, considered the first of its kind between the CIA president and Prince Mohammed bin Salman, Burns urged the Saudi leadership not to proceed with purchasing advanced Chinese weapons. He also discussed Washington's concerns about Riyadh's rapprochement with Beijing (including the idea of selling oil in Chinese yuan) and its impact on American influence. But it appears that the Saudi decision was taken as part of a broader strategy to diversify sources of armament and achieve greater strategic independence, even if this led to dissatisfaction with the American ally.
However, the details of the "Crocodile" deal remain unclear. To date, neither Riyadh nor Beijing have officially announced any new contracts for ballistic missiles. The original Intercept report merely referred to a secret missile program without mentioning the types. A 2025 report by the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) also indicated that it is unclear whether import plans under the Crocodile program have actually been implemented. All observers know is that Saudi Arabia has been quietly modernizing and expanding its missile forces since the late 2010s.
Types of Chinese missiles likely in the deal :
Given the history of the Kingdom's armament with Chinese missiles and recent aerial photographs and reports, the most prominent Chinese ballistic missiles nominated to be part of the "Alligator" deal can be listed below:
Dongfeng-21 (DF-21) new versions (MRBM) Solid Fuel
Dongfeng-26 (DF-26) (IRBM) It is believed to be one of the strong candidates in the deal. Its maximum range is estimated at about 3,000 to 4,000 kilometers_Maneuvering warheads _Solid Fuel
Dongfeng-31/31A (DF-31): It is an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) that runs on solid fuel, and is considered one of the latest things that Saudi Arabia might consider acquiring. The DF-31 has a range of about 8,000 km, and the upgraded version DF-31A can reach about 11,000 km. This missile is designed to carry nuclear warheads as it can carry a thermonuclear warhead with a capacity of approximately 1 megaton or up to three small MIRV nuclear warheads (each with a power of 20-150 kilotons). The DF-31 is mobile (mounted on heavy transport trucks), which increases its survival, maneuverability and invisibility. The name of this missile was raised in the context of the Alligator program through unconfirmed reports indicating that Saudi Arabia may have sought to obtain China's latest intercontinental ballistic missile. If this is true, it will constitute a huge shift in Riyadh's missile capabilities, as it will provide it with the ability to strike targets on a global level, not just a regional one..
https://carnegieendowment.org/middle-east/diwan/2022/01/going-ballistic?lang=en
Other possible missiles:
Besides the above, there is less common speculation that Saudi Arabia may also be interested in newer Chinese missiles such as the DF-17 (a medium-range missile equipped with a hypersonic glide vehicle) or developing domestic versions in cooperation with China. The DF-17 has a range of about 1,800-2,500 km and can carry a warhead that slides at hypersonic speed at low altitudes, making it difficult to intercept. Possessing such an advanced weapon will give Riyadh offensive capabilities that exceed traditional defenses.
Riyadh's strategic motives:
Saudi Arabia's moves to enhance its missile capabilities - including the "Alligator" deal - come within a comprehensive vision to enhance strategic deterrence. (which includes short-, medium-, and long-range missiles)
Riyadh realized that having a deterrent missile force with the same momentum would strike a balance with its opponents; Ballistic missiles are capable of reaching the opponent when the Air Force is unable to do so for tactical or political reasons. The presence of a missile arsenal also complicates the enemy's calculations, as it imposes on him the possibility of receiving costly strikes in response to any aggression.
Riyadh's possession of modern long-range ballistic missiles aims to make anyone in the region thinking of attacking Saudi Arabia an expensive and costly endeavor. Officials and experts have stated that these Saudi missiles with conventional warheads serve as a strategic deterrent that prevents opponents from escalating, even if they are not actually used. It is noteworthy that Saudi Arabia has not resorted to launching any of its ballistic missiles in the Yemen war or other regional conflicts so far, which indicates that its role is more deterrent than direct combat. It is a power card that emerges from the shadows in existential crises, not in every limited clash.
Conclusion:
The "Alligator" ballistic missile deal between Saudi Arabia and China represents a milestone in the Kingdom's armament path and missile program. It is an extension of its predecessors in the 1980s and 2000s, but with greater technical and strategic momentum, and comes in light of regional geostrategic transformations (the escalation of regional missile threats) and international (the intensification of American-Chinese competition).
From Riyadh's perspective, this deal provides a necessary strengthening of Saudi Arabia's deterrence force and ensures its ability to protect its security in a turbulent environment.
From Beijing's perspective, the missile partnership strengthens China's "soft" influence in the Gulf by building capabilities rather than sending militaries, and opens an important market for its defense industry.
Ultimately, the "Crocodile" deal reveals how Saudi Arabia balances the great powers to achieve its security interests, and how building a local missile force has become an essential pillar of its comprehensive defense strategy alongside the air force and technological superiority in other fields. It is a clear Saudi message that missile deterrence has become an integral element of the Gulf security equation, today and tomorrow.
In early 2022, a secret Saudi program to obtain new ballistic missiles from China, codenamed "Crocodile" (Crocodile), was revealed. This name first appeared in a report by the American website The Intercept, in which it was revealed that the Saudi government plans to import a batch of Chinese ballistic missiles no later than the end of May 2022 as part of this secret program. This report caused an uproar in Washington, especially since it coincided with tension in Saudi-American relations against the backdrop of oil issues and Riyadh's rapprochement with Beijing.
According to US intelligence sources quoted in the reports, the type of missiles included in the "Alligator" deal has not been publicly disclosed. Riyadh and Beijing have officially remained silent, while leaks have merely said that a shipment of ballistic missiles will head from China to the kingdom as part of a secret defense cooperation that worries Washington. This ambiguity prompted CIA Director William Burns to make an urgent visit to Riyadh in April 2022 to meet secretly with Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman. During that meeting, considered the first of its kind between the CIA president and Prince Mohammed bin Salman, Burns urged the Saudi leadership not to proceed with purchasing advanced Chinese weapons. He also discussed Washington's concerns about Riyadh's rapprochement with Beijing (including the idea of selling oil in Chinese yuan) and its impact on American influence. But it appears that the Saudi decision was taken as part of a broader strategy to diversify sources of armament and achieve greater strategic independence, even if this led to dissatisfaction with the American ally.
However, the details of the "Crocodile" deal remain unclear. To date, neither Riyadh nor Beijing have officially announced any new contracts for ballistic missiles. The original Intercept report merely referred to a secret missile program without mentioning the types. A 2025 report by the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) also indicated that it is unclear whether import plans under the Crocodile program have actually been implemented. All observers know is that Saudi Arabia has been quietly modernizing and expanding its missile forces since the late 2010s.
Types of Chinese missiles likely in the deal :
Given the history of the Kingdom's armament with Chinese missiles and recent aerial photographs and reports, the most prominent Chinese ballistic missiles nominated to be part of the "Alligator" deal can be listed below:
Dongfeng-21 (DF-21) new versions (MRBM) Solid Fuel
Dongfeng-26 (DF-26) (IRBM) It is believed to be one of the strong candidates in the deal. Its maximum range is estimated at about 3,000 to 4,000 kilometers_Maneuvering warheads _Solid Fuel
Dongfeng-31/31A (DF-31): It is an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) that runs on solid fuel, and is considered one of the latest things that Saudi Arabia might consider acquiring. The DF-31 has a range of about 8,000 km, and the upgraded version DF-31A can reach about 11,000 km. This missile is designed to carry nuclear warheads as it can carry a thermonuclear warhead with a capacity of approximately 1 megaton or up to three small MIRV nuclear warheads (each with a power of 20-150 kilotons). The DF-31 is mobile (mounted on heavy transport trucks), which increases its survival, maneuverability and invisibility. The name of this missile was raised in the context of the Alligator program through unconfirmed reports indicating that Saudi Arabia may have sought to obtain China's latest intercontinental ballistic missile. If this is true, it will constitute a huge shift in Riyadh's missile capabilities, as it will provide it with the ability to strike targets on a global level, not just a regional one..
https://carnegieendowment.org/middle-east/diwan/2022/01/going-ballistic?lang=en
Other possible missiles:
Besides the above, there is less common speculation that Saudi Arabia may also be interested in newer Chinese missiles such as the DF-17 (a medium-range missile equipped with a hypersonic glide vehicle) or developing domestic versions in cooperation with China. The DF-17 has a range of about 1,800-2,500 km and can carry a warhead that slides at hypersonic speed at low altitudes, making it difficult to intercept. Possessing such an advanced weapon will give Riyadh offensive capabilities that exceed traditional defenses.
The Saudi strategy behind the deal and its role in deterrence and industrial development
Riyadh's strategic motives:
Saudi Arabia's moves to enhance its missile capabilities - including the "Alligator" deal - come within a comprehensive vision to enhance strategic deterrence. (which includes short-, medium-, and long-range missiles)
Riyadh realized that having a deterrent missile force with the same momentum would strike a balance with its opponents; Ballistic missiles are capable of reaching the opponent when the Air Force is unable to do so for tactical or political reasons. The presence of a missile arsenal also complicates the enemy's calculations, as it imposes on him the possibility of receiving costly strikes in response to any aggression.
Riyadh's possession of modern long-range ballistic missiles aims to make anyone in the region thinking of attacking Saudi Arabia an expensive and costly endeavor. Officials and experts have stated that these Saudi missiles with conventional warheads serve as a strategic deterrent that prevents opponents from escalating, even if they are not actually used. It is noteworthy that Saudi Arabia has not resorted to launching any of its ballistic missiles in the Yemen war or other regional conflicts so far, which indicates that its role is more deterrent than direct combat. It is a power card that emerges from the shadows in existential crises, not in every limited clash.
Conclusion:
The "Alligator" ballistic missile deal between Saudi Arabia and China represents a milestone in the Kingdom's armament path and missile program. It is an extension of its predecessors in the 1980s and 2000s, but with greater technical and strategic momentum, and comes in light of regional geostrategic transformations (the escalation of regional missile threats) and international (the intensification of American-Chinese competition).
From Riyadh's perspective, this deal provides a necessary strengthening of Saudi Arabia's deterrence force and ensures its ability to protect its security in a turbulent environment.
From Beijing's perspective, the missile partnership strengthens China's "soft" influence in the Gulf by building capabilities rather than sending militaries, and opens an important market for its defense industry.
Ultimately, the "Crocodile" deal reveals how Saudi Arabia balances the great powers to achieve its security interests, and how building a local missile force has become an essential pillar of its comprehensive defense strategy alongside the air force and technological superiority in other fields. It is a clear Saudi message that missile deterrence has become an integral element of the Gulf security equation, today and tomorrow.
_Arabia_
Trusted Member
Nukes, hydrogen bombs and a cobalt bomb (just in case we need our own Samson Option) is the need of the hour.
We have the missiles already (with many more to come) the uranium in house (5-10% of all the world's uranium reserves are found in KSA) and the political will should be there already. In fact from the very second that Israel received their nukes.
If need be, and we somehow don't yet have access to nuclear weapons, offer Pakistan, North Korea or China whatever it takes to build up a nuclear infrastructure within KSA.
I also hope that a future nuclear plant will be built in Haql (30 km distance from Eilat/Ilat and 51.5 km by road) just in case the Jews get any silly ideas.
We have the missiles already (with many more to come) the uranium in house (5-10% of all the world's uranium reserves are found in KSA) and the political will should be there already. In fact from the very second that Israel received their nukes.
If need be, and we somehow don't yet have access to nuclear weapons, offer Pakistan, North Korea or China whatever it takes to build up a nuclear infrastructure within KSA.
I also hope that a future nuclear plant will be built in Haql (30 km distance from Eilat/Ilat and 51.5 km by road) just in case the Jews get any silly ideas.
Pakistan Space Agency
Elite Member
Build your own.
No one is going to give you a handful of high-tech ballistic missiles if you don't have any plans to grow and enhance that arsenal. Otherwise, you will simply pay other countries to deploy their strategic weapons on your soil for a certain period of time which will not be in Saudi hands.
_Arabia_
Trusted Member
Have you been reading this thread in its entirety? I suggest you do because your comment confirms that you have not.
KSA already have a ballistic missile force and program. This already started in the 1980's with Chinese help. It has only been expanding ever since. It is highly secretive.
In fact way earlier, when Arabs (among Muslims) pioneered ballistic missile technology (the first to do so in the Muslim world - courtesy of former German Nazi scientists lured to Egypt, Syria and Iraq), decades prior, KSA was helping and financing those programs.
I have no fear whether or not KSA has capable missile tech that can reach all of our potential adversaries (in reality we have very few enemies that can pose an existential threat to us, outside of Israeli and US nukes (which goes for every other country on the planet), the need of the hour is to built nukes, hydrogen and cobalt bombs if not yet done.
It would be utterly foolish from the House of Saud not to have gained access to nuclear bombs from Pakistan alone given the heavy Saudi Arabian economic and political support for the Pakistani nuclear program (which is well-known). If this is not the case, I am afraid, that should the House of Saud lose their grip of the country, it would be their own undoing in this regard and naivety if not the case.
Pakistan Space Agency
Elite Member
What have they done with the Transfer of Technology?
Can you list indigenous Saudi ballistic missiles?
_Arabia_
Trusted Member
We cannot list anything other than what has already been listed in this thread because for one reason or another this branch of the Saudi Arabian military is top secret. All we have are foreign reports (CIA and others), satellite images of missile production sites in the mountains and deserts (see this thread), well-known (nowadays) KSA-China missile cooperation and imports (starting way back in the 1980's) and the occasional missiles shown in public (very rarely) during military parades or in closed off military sites.
We also know that KSA has been involved in helping the earliest Arab missile programs not long after WW2 (as I wrote) when the likes of Egypt (in particular) kickstarted this era in the Muslim world with the help of former German sicentists after WW2. KSA was heavily involved in the Iraqi missile program, Libyan one, Syrian one etc. One must be an idiot to believe that KSA did not gain anything from this and it was all done by blind solidarity with no returns at all.
See this thread from the beginning to the start. I remember covering many topics in this thread last time I around I was active on PDF.
@The SC has done a great job as well. There are also numerous Arab military forums online, some of the largest are
Arab Defense المنتدى العربي للدفاع والتسليح
كل ما يختص بعلوم الدفاع والشؤون العسكرية وانظمه التسليح والصفقات والمعارض العسكرية والتحاليل والدراسات العسكرية والجيوسياسية
defense-arab.com
as well as numerous Twitter profiles of individuals in the "know" but those are all in Arabic.
Personally I believe that KSA has access to nuclear weapons already (anything else would be very strange) and that this has been the case for a long time. Not long or simultaneously to the Pakistani nuclear weapons becoming public.
And I believe the US/Israel have been forced to accept this reality. Just like they both have accepted the Pakistani and North Korean reality in this regard.
If Iran was not this dumb and smarter (the leadership), they would/could have joined this club as well.
I still remember MbS openly saying that if Iran gets the bomb, KSA will as well. You don't say that if you don't have access to the bomb or willing to make one by all means necessary. And nukes are ancient tech, really not that difficult to make nowadays. Let alone a hydrogen bomb or a cobalt bomb.
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Michael
VIP Member
Public information:
In the late 1980s, China exported a batch of DF-3 ballistic missiles to Saudi Arabia. Since Saudi Arabia lacked the necessary capabilities at the time, China's Second Artillery Corps (the predecessor of the PLARF) formed a unit and entered Saudi Arabia under the name "Golden Wheel Project Company." They helped Saudi Arabia build military bases for the storage, command, deployment, and launch of DF-3 ballistic missiles, while also training personnel.
==========================================
It stands to reason that after completing their mission, this unit would return to China and disband.
But, this was not the case.
In 2016, at a meeting held by a Chinese official, the identity of a PLA major general attending the meeting was prominently listed as "Commander of the Golden Wheel Project Command Center."
In the PLA's latest organizational structure, this organization still exists and is directly under the PLARF headquarters. As for what they are doing, no one knows. Neither Chinese nor Saudi agencies with knowledge of the matter will reveal any information.
Pakistan Space Agency
Elite Member
So, are there no flight launches, test launches and training launches of ballistic missiles reported since the 1980s?We cannot list anything other than what has already been listed in this thread because for one reason or another this branch of the Saudi Arabian military is top secret. All we have are foreign reports (CIA and others), satellite images of missile production sites in the mountains and deserts (see this thread), well-known (nowadays) KSA-China missile cooperation and imports (starting way back in the 1980's) and the occasional missiles shown in public (very rarely) during military parades or in closed off military sites.
We also know that KSA has been involved in helping the earliest Arab missile programs not long after WW2 (as I wrote) when the likes of Egypt (in particular) kickstarted this era in the Muslim world with the help of former German sicentists after WW2. KSA was heavily involved in the Iraqi missile program, Libyan one, Syrian one etc. One must be an idiot to believe that KSA did not gain anything from this and it was all done by blind solidarity with no returns at all.
See this thread from the beginning to the start. I remember covering many topics in this thread last time I around I was active on PDF.
@The SC has done a great job as well. There are also numerous Arab military forums online, some of the largest are
Arab Defense المنتدى العربي للدفاع والتسليح
كل ما يختص بعلوم الدفاع والشؤون العسكرية وانظمه التسليح والصفقات والمعارض العسكرية والتحاليل والدراسات العسكرية والجيوسياسية
as well as numerous Twitter profiles of individuals in the "know" but those are all in Arabic.
Personally I believe that KSA has access to nuclear weapons already (anything else would be very strange) and that this has been the case for a long time. Not long or simultaneously to the Pakistani nuclear weapons becoming public.
And I believe the US/Israel have been forced to accept this reality. Just like they both have accepted the Pakistani and North Korean reality in this regard.
If Iran was not this dumb and smarter (the leadership), they would/could have joined this club as well.
I still remember MbS openly saying that if Iran gets the bomb, KSA will as well. You don't say that if you don't have access to the bomb or willing to make one by all means necessary. And nukes are ancient tech, really not that difficult to make nowadays. Let alone a hydrogen bomb or a cobalt bomb.
Whether a program is secret or not, regular missile tests are necessary to ensure they still work and/or if any improvements need to be tested.
Shags101
Trusted Member
Don’t necessarily disagree but if you only have a few dozen missiles or a little more than that not really something you want to fire off in tests let’s just assuming these are either for a first strike or a last resort option either way you want to have enough to strike anything of strategic importance
_Arabia_
Trusted Member
Missiles can easily be tested in underground facilities and by third-party states (China) or Pakistan.
There are numerous missile bases within KSA buried deep in mountains and in desert areas as well as closed off military cities all across KSA (north, east, central, south and west). Confirmed by numerous satellite images lately, as this very thread showcases.
As well as confirmed indigenous production within KSA.
Simply put, KSA has one of the most capable air forces and this is the primarily “attacking dog” in the Saudi Arabian military. Missiles on the other hand are the strategic offensive depth of KSA as they are likely tied to either the delivery of actual nukes or chemical weapons. Maybe in the future or already today, KSA has 1000’s of missiles that could be used in a conflict but anyhow you don’t win any wars or conflicts with serious adversaries by just using missiles.
Lastly the lack of direct tests in the open is probably due to political calculations and not to draw unwanted attention. Better left as it is (secrecy).
I wish that we could know more as amateur military enthusiasts. The level of secrecy is very frustrating.
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