Analysis: TTP Activity in KPK mapped from Jan 2023 to Present day "The Afghan Connection"

[RescueRanger]

Part 1: Internal security from Advanced Persistent threats from non-state actors:

In the above map I have mapped the known UNHCR refugee camps inside Pakistan along with areas from previous IBOs and TA's that suggest known T-e-J and TTP networks are active. I have also mapped the most recent number of armed attacks against Pakistan Security facilities. What makes this mapping most important is the critical piece in the puzzle and that is the Thikar Province, Afghanistan (I have marked its boundary and highlighted in Blue) more on this province and its importance later in the thread:

I have also mapped the locations where all senior TTP leaders have met their end inside Afghanistan starting from 2019 to present day:

Incident tracker as updated using available reports from ISPR/GOP/Local LEA:

• 29th August 2019, Qari Saifullah Mehsud, the leader of Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan's Qari Hussain Suicide Brigade, was sent to hell in Khost, Afghanistan.
• 10th January 2022, TTP senior commander & spokesperson Khalid Balti alias Muhammad Khurasani was sent to hell in Nangarhar, Afghanistan.
• 7th August 2022 Mualana Uqabi Bajauri, a key Tehrik-e-Taliban Commander, was killed in a "landmine blast" and sent to hell in Kunar, Afghanistan.
• 8th August 2022, the leader of the Jamat-Ul-Ahrar, Omar Khaled Khorasani, was sent to hell in Paktika Province, Afghanistan.
• 27th October 2022, a TTP commander, known as "Asadullah Pehelwan", was sent to hell in Kandahar province.
• 29 September 2022, TTP leader Akhtar Khalil was sent to hell in Nangarhar, Afghanistan.
• 10th September 2023, Badshah Khan Mehsud, considered to be the right-hand man and extremely close confidante of the TTP Chief, Mufti Noor Wali Mehsud was injured in Paktika province of Afghanistan.
• 8th October 2023, A top commander of the TTP from Lakki Marwat, Tipu Gul Marwat, was sent to hell in Kunar, Afghanistan.
• 11th October 2023, A senior TTP terrorist commander Atiqur Rehman aka Tipu Gul Marwat, was sent to hell in Kunar, Afghanistan.
• 23rd October 2023, TTP commander Chamtu Waziristani was sent to hell by unidentified gunmen along with 3 other terrorists in Khost province, Afghanistan.
• 5th November 2023, Fazal Ameen, a prominent TTP commander who had prior associations with Lashkar-e-Islam and subsequently joined TTP and JuA, was blown to smithereens in Marko, Nangarhar province, Afghanistan.

Suspected Belligerents:

• Haqqani Network
• TTP
• TeJ Pakistan (TTP)
• Tehreek e Lashkar e Islam (See Quetta Shura)
• Jamat-Ul-Ahrar
• Mufti Noor Wali Mehsud Brigade
• Miranshah Shura
• Quetta Shura
• Peshawar Shura
• Loyalists of Adnan Rashid (Ansar-Al Anseer / TTP)

Recent activity inside Pakistan:

6th November 2023: 4 Pakistani Army soldiers including Lt. Col were martyred during an IBO in Khyber today.

6th November 2023: Two police constables were injured when their check post in D.I. Khan came under sustained gunfire lasting 1 hour.

4th November 2023 Attack on MM Alam Base Mianwali:

3rd November 2023, attack in D.I. Khan.

30th October 2023, Parachinar and Khurram clashes - 30 casualties

18th October 2023 Warsak Road, Peshawar, one police constable killed during at attack on a Police Check post:

7th October 2023, Parachinar assault on a police patrol resulted in the death of one constable and injuries to the driver:

Captured child suicide bomber with live vest July 2023:

Jan 2023 attacker on Police check post in Takhta Beg, Jamrud was identified as Sheikh Malang, AKA: Astana Gul, a terrorist Afghan with links to Jalalabad Shura.

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Now revisiting the Afghan Connection:
Yasir Parakay Senior TTP commander is seen in Kabul (Since been eliminated)

Known Afghan terrorists who have joined the TTP: Form Tikhar Province, Afghanistan

The May 2023 attacker was non other than an Afghan university student who had been operating deep inside Pakistan (sent straight to HELL)

TTP lieutenants can be seen in this video alongside an Afghan Government vehicle

TTP leadership seen here in an Afghan MI-17

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Finally if the above was not enough to under the tacit support the TTP enjoys from the Afghan Taliban: In a recently released video Hamid Khurasani commander Afghan Taliban wished Mehsud group success by stating "May Allah grant our brethren who are engaged in combat under Mehsud (Noor Wali Mehsud) and others (opposing the Pakistani establishment) the opportunity to hoist the banner of the Islamic Emirate in Islamabad one day."

Note the new "Chain of Command" in the TTP:

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We have seen evidence of the Afghan Taliban facilitating the cross border incursions by TTP and affiliates even going as far as providing safe-heavens, weapons, equipment and even the use of the Afghan Mi17's for transportation of terrorists and weaponry. A terrorist group cannot launch massive cross-border attacks involving a significant number of terrorists inside Pakistan without the support and approval of the Taliban regime. If these doubts have any substance, this is tantamount to declaring war against a state.

 

[RescueRanger]

Part 2: Domestic security posture and wider counter-terrorism strategy

Whilst my above analysis is focused on the threat emanating from across the border, this is by no means an excuse to not consider the ever present malaise of extremism and extremism narratives in our own country for which there is a fertile domestic audience, it is therefore vital to have a multi pronged approach to this problem one which looks at the immediate needs of security and one that works to counter extremist violence and extremist narratives though education, dialogue, opportunities and inclusion.

To examine the issue of domestic terrorism and extremism narratives we must first come to a consensus that terrorism is mainly driven by ideology which is nurtured by people who exploit communities or groups who feel they have lost a sense of agency or feel disillusioned and disenfranchised. To counter the menace of terrorism what you need is a cultural change, this comes initially through a deep dive study into the drivers of terrorism.

Borum's Four-Stage Model of the Terrorist Mindset

Despite the noise, we do have a good understanding of the drivers that cause people to move from "disillusioned and disenfranchised" to "disgruntled" through to the "activist" stage - this is the stage where you need to counter the toxic narrative though a number of confidence building measures in the community which can range from inclusion in the democratic process and to build a sense of "ownership" for the communities and a unified identity.

What is required now is for the larger public to understand the "bigger picture" which is a working strategy which needs to consist of education, information, communication, prevention, protection, engagement and enforcement. Fighting ideas with guns and bombs never works in the long run. What is needed is to starve the vipers of their pool of potential recruits by wining hearts and minds and changing the sense of "us against them" narrative.

We need to re-examine our COIN strategy in line with the established "three pillars" of COIN and to do this we need to look at the present conflict ecosystem.

We understand the security and political motivators behind insurgency in Pakistan, we need to start addressing the economic drivers behind the present situation, and work hard for narrative building around counter-ideology, counter-sanctuary and motivation.

What some members here are choosing to ignore either due to ignorance or arrogance by dismissing the relevance of removing Afghans from Pakistan is Kilcullen's strategy on counter insurgency spheres. Kilcullen argues that the conflict ecosystem comprises of the following:

View attachment 1008

1. Sphere of civilian control and spheres of influence: the civilian population and the influential groups [see PTM et.al], the force behind influence and "clash of civilizations" comes from
1a. Population stereotypes: Entity Stereotypes [see ethnocentrism]
1b. Human cognition: beliefs, values and interests [validation of stereotypes and building of "filter bubbles"].
1c Education and lack thereof

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Aarhus model argues that these issues mentioned in [1] and the mindset o [clash of civilization/Orientalism] is then capitalized on by 2:
2. actors including: Insurgents, hostile non-state actors
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We need to counter narrative building by hostile non-state actors and persistent threat actors at the first two stages of the Borum Model:

To counter this we need to focus on revisiting the counterinsurgency doctrine and how we deal with countering violent extremism [CVE]

To help achieve this we need a better understanding and narrative building around "us/them" mindset.

Whilst we have a good understanding of commentators such as Bushra Gohar Mariam Solamankhil, lets just examine closely one popular Pashtun opinionator on SM:

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A closer examination of the popular hashtag #AfghanRefueesInPakistan and visualizing the shares and content across multiple platforms shows us engagement and content is driven by a few accounts and retweeted by bots:
View attachment 1009
View attachment 1010
View attachment 1011
To counter this anti-state narrative building by we need educated, informed and unified counter-narrative campaign on SM beyond that provided by the likes of Pro-Pakistan Army SM accounts and opinionators, I propose that patriotic Pakistanis focus on developing accounts similar to NAFO:

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Education, Education, Education:
We need to adopt a holistic approach to internal security, This is achieved through what is called ICE: Information, Communication, Education - this can be audio, visual, written or communicated through social mobilizers like the polio education scheme, After all terrorism and violent extremism is no different to any other pandemic.

The key here is "Early intervention" "Early Engagement" and "Public Cooperation":
View attachment 1012
Only through achieving community "buy-in" and active participation can you counter the menace of terrorism, deny terrorists the funding, freedom of movement and space to share their toxic ideology with a powerful full spectrum counter-terrorism and CVE (Countering Violent Extremism) strategy.

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Such a program requires a broad spectrum of input from professionals from all walks of life ranging from humanitarians, community activists, educators, academics, legal professionals, health care (including mental health) professionals, law enforcement, military, and policy makers.

One successful model that I would like to seem adopted in Pakistan is the UK's CONTEST counter-terrorism strategy:
View attachment 1013
To give citizens a stake in countering terrorism both at the prevent and protect stage Pakistan should consider a program in-line with the popular "First Observer" scheme in the USA:

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TLDR:
We need to start differentiating between what constitutes "Anti-Terrorism" where force is used and "Counter-Terrorism" where a wider holistic strategy is used, one is like a panadol capsule and provides limited immediate pain relief, the other is like a consultation with a competent doctor that examines the full health of the patient and provides a tailored treatment plan. Ultimately, Information, Education and Communication are just as vital to our counterinsurgency efforts as bombs and bullets.

--End--

 

[Signalian]

Awesome thread.

Allow me to provide details of PAA and PAF assets that could be used, could have been used till now to take out TTP strongholds within Afghanistan. With drone surveillance inside Afghanistan, the Pakistan Armed Forces could have intercepted and targeted these 40 members of TTP before they surrendered. It seems there is some sort of a deal in place between Afghanistan and Pakistan which is why Pakistan isn't sending aircrafts and deploying drones over and inside Afghanistan.

Pakistan Army Aviation Combat Squadrons:

Army Aviation Corps Bahawalpur Squadron- CH-4B

404th Army Aviation Combat Group
31st Army Aviation Combat Squadron - AH-1F
33rd Army Aviation Combat Squadron - AH-1F
35th Army Aviation Combat Squadron - AH-1F

202nd Army Aviation Group
4th Army Aviation Squadron - Mi-35M

Even if most of AH-1Fs are grounded, some will be in serviceable condition which can fly near durand line and vector in on tangos when the UAVs point them out. Similarly, Mi-35s can be deployed for minimal SF Ops in air assault scenario where SSG needs to land on ground. Its a pity that Z-10 is still not inducted.

Pakistan Air Force Combat Squadrons:

No. 1 UAV Flight - NESCOM Burraq & GIDS Shahpar/-2
Unknown UAV Flight - Wing Loong II UCAV
Unknown UAV Flight - Bayratkar TB2 UCAV

No. 28 Squadron - PAF Base Samungli - JF-17A
No. 26 Squadron - PAF Base Peshawar - JF-17A
No. 50 Squadron - PAF Base Rafiqui - Mirage 5PA

PAF can spare at least 2 x JFT squadrons out of 5 squadrons and the much boasted biggest squadron of Mirage, the 50th Squadron, is said to deploy all types of Mirages so unless there is an escalation with India, PAF should be able to spare 3 x combat squadrons for taking out TTP hideouts inside Afghanistan. The drone operations should be standard daily operations since the cost value of deploying and operating a drone is much cheaper than that of an aircraft.

 

[RescueRanger]

Awesome thread.

Allow me to provide details of PAA and PAF assets that could be used, could have been used till now to take out TTP strongholds within Afghanistan. With drone surveillance inside Afghanistan, the Pakistan Armed Forces could have intercepted and targeted these 40 members of TTP before they surrendered. It seems there is some sort of a deal in place between Afghanistan and Pakistan which is why Pakistan isn't sending aircrafts and deploying drones over and inside Afghanistan.

Pakistan Army Aviation Combat Squadrons:

Army Aviation Corps Bahawalpur Squadron- CH-4B

404th Army Aviation Combat Group
31st Army Aviation Combat Squadron - AH-1F
33rd Army Aviation Combat Squadron - AH-1F
35th Army Aviation Combat Squadron - AH-1F

202nd Army Aviation Group
4th Army Aviation Squadron - Mi-35M

Even if most of AH-1Fs are grounded, some will be in serviceable condition which can fly near durand line and vector in on tangos when the UAVs point them out. Similarly, Mi-35s can be deployed for minimal SF Ops in air assault scenario where SSG needs to land on ground. Its a pity that Z-10 is still not inducted.

Pakistan Air Force Combat Squadrons:

No. 1 UAV Flight - NESCOM Burraq & GIDS Shahpar/-2
Unknown UAV Flight - Wing Loong II UCAV
Unknown UAV Flight - Bayratkar TB2 UCAV

No. 28 Squadron - PAF Base Samungli - JF-17A
No. 26 Squadron - PAF Base Peshawar - JF-17A
No. 50 Squadron - PAF Base Rafiqui - Mirage 5PA

PAF can spare at least 2 x JFT squadrons out of 5 squadrons and the much boasted biggest squadron of Mirage, the 50th Squadron, is said to deploy all types of Mirages so unless there is an escalation with India, PAF should be able to spare 3 x combat squadrons for taking out TTP hideouts inside Afghanistan. The drone operations should be standard daily operations since the cost value of deploying and operating a drone is much cheaper than that of an aircraft.

Thank you sir for your valued input, it is greatly appreciated.