Will Chinese Fighters Soon Take On a New Nuclear Role?
It would break historical pattern, but it may not be outlandish as you think.
BY
SÉBASTIEN ROBLIN
PUBLISHED: DEC 22, 2023 1:00 PM EST
Yang Wei, the chief designer of China’s J-20 stealth fighter, gave a talk in October discussing the U.S.’s B-21 Raider stealth bomber, which
made its first flight in November after being unveiled to the public a year ago.
His audience was at China’s Academy of Engineering Physics (CAEP)—also known as the 9th Institute—and the talk was a broad primer on the evolution of air warfare. It touched on the concept of
jet fighter generations, the
OODA decision-making loop, and so on.
Commentators have claimed that Yang dunked on the B-21, saying that it “couldn’t compare to us”—supposedly comparing it to the yet-to-be publicly unveiled
H-20 stealth bomber, in development by the Xi’an Aircraft Corporation andalso believed to be a nuclear-capable flying wing.
Unveiling of the first pre-production B-21 Raider stealth bomber in a ceremony at Plant 42 in Palmdale, California on December 2, 2022.
FREDERIC J. BROWN//Getty Images
But here’s the remark’s full context: “When [the B-21] was advertised, it was said that it would be developed using digital engineering and its research and development speed would be fast. But in fact, the first flight has been delayed for three years, and I don’t think it can compare to us.”
Yang also put up slides with screenshots from old U.S. reports, noting how the
B-21 would incorporate many already-developed components to reduces costs and R&D time to reinforce his point.
He was, therefore, comparing the speed of China’s military R&D cycles and adoption of digital tools (a technology he’s promoted as a senior director in China’s military aerospace industry) to that of the U.S. And in that comparison, he concluded that China could still develop new aircraft faster than the U.S. could.
This diss of the U.S. defense industry’s R&D and procurement processes isn’t exactly the “our plane is better than their plane” statement it’s been made out to be.
But the presentation’s actual bombshell came innocuously. Yang congratulated CAEP for celebrating its 65th anniversary, and noted that his organization—the Chengdu Aircraft Research & Design Institute, which does R&D for the Chengdu Aerospace Corporation (CAC or CAIG)—is now working closely with CAEP on a common project.
CAEP serves as China’s primary
nuclear weapons research and development organization, and happens to be based close to Chengdu in Mianyang.
Perhaps his words could be dismissed as a bureaucrat’s niceties about closer inter-departmental cooperation. But it sure sounds like Yang is implying that CAEP and CAC are, at a minimum, jointly studying and consulting on the process of equipping Chengdu-built fighters with nuclear arms—a capability heretofore absent from China’s fighter fleet.
Why China hasn’t put nukes on fighters
Chinese nuclear doctrine has historically been focused on strategic weapons for defensive deterrence and retaliation—as opposed to those primarily developed for ‘tactical’ use and warfighting benefits. That includes a professed No-First Strike policy and a comparatively small nuclear arsenal (albeit one that has been
rapidly growing in recent years).
Thus, while the U.S. Air Force deploys tactical nuclear gravity bombs on its multi-role fighters, China’s air-based nuclear deterrence has been based on
H-6 strategic bombers—with the exception of a small number of specially modified Q-5 attack jets in play during the 1970-80s.
In the 1970s, China modified a few of its Nanchang Q-5 ’Fantan’ supersonic attack jets (seen here in 1979) to carry nuclear weapons, cognizant that its H-6 jet bombers were unlikely to survive to target carrying nuclear gravity bombs.
Sovfoto//Getty Images
Even then, the PLA Air Force’s role in providing air-based nuclear deterrence is thought to have effectively lapsed for a period, before being resurrected around 2018. Currently, the 106th Bomber Brigade’s new H-6N bombers—armed with air-launched ballistic missiles—are though to constitute China’s air-based
nuclear deterrence and offer a regional standoff strike capability extending a few thousand miles. These bombers, distinguished by their protruding air-refueling probes, must rely on the reach of their missiles. The bombers themselves are too slow and easily detected to get close to enemy air defenses and fighters.
Andreas Rupprecht, an expert who has
published several books on Chinese military aviation, wrote to
PopMech that nuclear weapons “are under the control of the Central Military Commission and at least by what I know, no PLA Army Air Force base has the necessary infrastructure for nuclear weapons. Maybe at best, the 106th Bomber Brigade.”
Eventually, the H-20 should enter service and offer a longer-range penetrating strike capability. It should, theoretically, be stealthy enough to slip between air defenses and fly deeper into defended
airspace, extending its reach considerably.
A nuclear-capable upgrade to China’s J-20 stealth fighter?
Perhaps the simplest rationale for a nuclear-armed J-20 is to give the PLAAF a regional penetrating nuclear-strike capability while it waits for the H-20 to enter service.
Though H-6Ns are a viable means to a nuclear-delivery end, their standoff strikes can be detected while inbound, and are susceptible to countermeasures. Having a secondary air-based nuclear platform with the range and stealth for penetrating strikes could confound defenses and increase the odds of successfully striking, say, U.S. bases in
Guam or other relevant areas in the Western Pacific.
The J-20 is the most advanced fighter in PLAAF service. It’s also China’s only manned stealth jet, until the H-20 bomber and the lighter J-35 fighter enter service.
A J-20 overflew the Zhuhai Airshow in 2018 with its weapons bay open, revealing four long-range air-to-air missiles inside. Also one of the ’cheek’ side bays is open showing the smaller short-range missile within. A J-20 would need to fit any nuclear munitions carried in the main bay to preserve its stealth characteristics.
Nie//Wikimedia Commons
Admittedly, as a fighter first and foremost, the J-20 was designed with an emphasis on frontal-aspect stealth. As a trade-off, it has weaker side and rear-aspect stealth capabilities—a liability when flying on deep strikes that are potentially exposed to radars from those angles. But still, it’s probably more likely to successfully execute penetrating strikes than current non-stealth systems like the
JH-7 fighter-bomber.
Modifying
any plane for nuclear weapons requires the installation of special wiring. But a nuke for the J-20 would likely require the development of a new small
nuclear missile or bomb that can fit inside the J-20’s internal weapons bay, as munitions carried underwing would increase its radar cross section.
Alternative possibilities: nuclear J-10 or JF-17?
CAC is involved in the production of two other military jets that could plausibly carry nuclear weapons: the
JF-17 Thunder (for co-production with and use by Pakistan, and for export in small numbers to Nigeria and Myanmar) and the J-10 multi-role fighter. Both are short-range, non-stealth fighters unlikely to penetrate deeply into defended enemy airspace, and thus would primarily be useful for delivering strikes on targets near the frontline and border.
A JF-17 Thunder takes off at the Paris airshow in 2019. Co-produced by China and Pakistan, it’s based on a former U.S.-China project to retrofit a MiG-21 with F-16-style systems. 134 JF-17s and two-seat JF-17Bs serve in the Pakistani Air Force, with 50 on order. Eventually some are expected to take on a nuclear strike role armed with Ra’ad cruise missiles.
NurPhoto//Getty Images
The U.S. does assign a tactical nuclear role to its
F-16 jets, which are comparable to the J-10. But a more logical non-stealth candidate for that role would be China’s J-16 heavy fighter (built by the rival Shenyang Aircraft Corporation), which could carry a heavier nuclear payload over much greater distances than a J-10.
Again, though, ‘tactical’ nukes don’t fit with China’s known doctrine. But they do fit with Pakistan’s plans for the use of tactical nuclear weapons in a major ground war with India. And indeed, the JF-17 (which is co-produced in
Pakistan) has been seen fitted with Ra’ad air-launched cruise missiles that could deliver nuclear attacks. It’s believed that the JF-17 has been anointed to take on the nuclear-strike role currently held by Pakistan’s aging, French-built Mirages III and V jets.
Furthermore, a recent model suggests that a new-generation Taimoor missile is being considered for fitting on the JF-17.
But while Pakistan is clearly exploring a nuclear role for the JF-17, the extent to which Chinese support is involved or necessary is debatable. Nuclear capabilities are so sensitive, it’s likely Pakistan would have to handle the nuclear-wiring of JF-17s on its own—something it likely can do, given numerous other nuclear arms fielded by Islamabad.
A new aircraft with a nuclear role?
Yang’s remark could also have been referring to the studying of nuclear capability for an entirely new and heretofore unknown bomber, drone, or sixth-generation fighter under development by the Chengdu Aircraft Corporation.
Earlier in 2023, China’s AVIC conglomerate
showed concept art of a tailless sixth-generation fighter that could succeed the J-20. Furthermore, satellite photos revealed a curious tailless aircraft mockup (or demonstrator) at CAC’s institute 611 research facility.
A tailless design could improve all-aspect stealth, making such a plane into a much better penetrating bomber.
A new strike platform would not need to be manned—a
drone could be developed faster and more inexpensively. The U.S.’s mysterious RQ-180 drone, for instance, is believed to be a flying wing with a potential nuclear role.
A drone could also be controlled remotely via a two-seat
fighter to perform the high-risk penetration part of a nuclear strike mission. And indeed, China is reportedly
upgrading its two-seat J-20S fighter for this capability, known as manned-unmanned teaming (MUM-T). But again, a nuclear role for such drones would be a stretch beyond current practices.
All in all, it’s important to remember that Beijing hasn’t historically placed as much importance on tactical nuclear strikes as Russia or the U.S. Of course, however, policies can change abruptly, as was observed with China’s
surge in nuclear missile silo construction detected in 2021. The past does not always reveal the future.
It would break historical pattern, but it may not be outlandish as you think.
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