It is worth noting that Hezbollah forces only managed to shoot down one air platform during the conflict. They shot down a CH-53 with an anti-tank missile. Reports of an Israeli F-16 being shot down on July 17 were established as a partial rocket ignition caused by strikes on a Zelzal rocket launcher. Hezbollah may have had a few MANPADS in its inventory, but there were no confirmed reports of substantial use. With the IAF capable of striking from 15,000 feet and lacking a high-altitude air defense system, there was nothing Hezbollah could do.
In comparison, Syrian air defenses fared much better. On July 29, they managed to shoot down an Israeli Heron UAV that was attempting to “target” Syrian refueling convoys. After a few decades of air defense ineptitude, the Syrians can congratulate themselves; although this did not stop the IAF from conducting low-flying flights over the Syrian presidential palaces as a reminder of its military capabilities. Three other Israeli air platforms were lost, two AH-64s in a collision and one AH-64D to what appears to be Israeli artillery fire.
These minor losses confirm that Hezbollah was unable to interdict massive Israeli airmobile advances or even prevent strike or reconnaissance operations. Considering that Iran has deployed a number of highly prestigious weapons systems in southern Lebanon, it can be assumed that they have also deployed their most effective air defense systems. This poor performance would put pressure on Iran to acquire S-300s and Tors, because it appears to confirm that their Chinese and/or domestically supplied air defense systems have been ineffective against Elbit’s range of airborne electronic warfare products.
What I see from the lessons learned from the 2006 war, Israel learned a lot from its operational failures, for example, Israel's inability to neutralize Hezbollah's C2 and communication nodes. Israel partly nullified this capability of Hezbollah before the 2024 airstrikes, it was the first thing Israel did, disrupting/nullifying Hezbollah's C2 and communication nodes by attacking via pagers. In 2006, Hezbollah was using 1950's era analog VHF radios from Iranian Electronic Industries, the Tadiran jammers were not able to break Hezbollah's command and control.
