Mechanised Divisions Pakistan Army

[Signalian]

Some time back a member asked me if there are any armour regiments in Pakistan Army's mechanised divisions so i have some info to share.

Pakistan Army has 2 Mechanised Divisions, 25th Mechanised Division and 26th Mechanised Divisions. The 17th and 14th still carry the designation of Infantry Divisions.

Theoretically the 25th and 26th are mechanised divisions but in fact these 2 divisions are heavily armoured and have more strength (in infantry) than even 1st Armoured and 6th Armoured Divisions of Pakistan Army. The reason the 25th and 26th Mechanised Divisions are called Mechanised because naming them Armoured Divisions will cause concern to India as well as to USA that:

1. PA has stationed an Armoured Division (26th Mechanised Div) near to border in Bahawalpur, Southern Punjab. Placing an armoured division next to border is the intent of attacking an enemy otherwise armoured assets considered as offensive forces are not kept next to borders. This is another reason why the 6th Armoured Division is placed in Gujranwala and not in Sialkot, whereas its main area of action is considered to be Sialkot region.

2. PA will have 4 Armoured Divisions (1st and 6th, 25th and 26th) while IA has 3 Armoured Divisions and this will cause further alarm in India and bring pressure from USA to downsize strength. This is why the V-Corps has a few Independent Armoured Brigades and it is considered that V-Corps Armoured assets will be used under one HQ in war as an Armoured Division.

PA's Mechanised Division:

A Brigade: Armoured Regiment + Armoured Regiment + Mechanised Infantry Battalion.

B Brigade: Armoured Regiment + Armoured Regiment + Mechanised Infantry Battalion.

C Brigade: Armoured Regiment + Mechanised Infantry Battalion + Mechanised Infantry Battalion.

Thats 5 X Armoured Regiments and 4 X Mechanised Infantry Battalions in one Mechanised Division. I havent included Support Brigades and Divisional troops. Each Mechanised Infantry Battalion has 50 APC.

Those who consider that Rahim yar Khan is an area where IA CSD can succeed should keep in mind that the whole stretch is protected by a Division which has 220 MBT at its disposal. plus an Independent Armoured Brigade having 88 MBT.

 

[Signalian]

@Quwa

I meant aerial transport in general.

PA's working horse is Mi-17 and although its a medium lift heli, PAA undertakes multiple sorties to deliver a heavier payload, otherwise not just Z-8, but there are other heavy lift options as well from USA/China/Turkey. Considering the mindset, if PAA goes for a heavy lift heli, they will be bought in fewer numbers. Its better to go for light/recon helis which can be bought more in number. There is a serious shortage of helicopters in PA. From smaller ones like Little Bird MH-6/MD500 for which PAA got Fennec/ecureuil to fulfil the role, then there are multiple types of medium ones like Mi-17, Puma, Bell,AW139 series and finally there is no heavy lift heli.

For deployment purposes, these helis are attached to different HQs and units, mostly temporarily. Any piece of equipment cannot show its full potential unless its deployed correctly. What to talk about maintenance when there are different types already. Take AW139 for example, its used for
SAR, Utility, transport including VIP transport roles but they are just 7 or so in number, basically very few. How can the heli commit to these 4 roles in a sustaining manner ? when the time for maintenance, overhaul, repair etc comes, some will be out of action for days.

The terrain in Pakistan is formed of mountains, plains, deserts, hills, etc, and at most places there are no roads on which transport can be run 24 hours, some roads are narrow, some can support 1-5 Ton trucks, where as the terrain near LOC is impassable for vehicles at many points. More importantly, any QRF force should have an airborne component, say like FC which is spread all over the province and all it has got are Hiluxs and maybe M-113 can come in if required. The MRAPs stand as base guardians. MRAPs are again short in number.

Then there is a constant requirement of drones for surveillance. TTP walks on a road, plants an IED and vanishes. There is nobody monitoring that road. Next day Hilux comes carrying troops and destruction occurs. Hilux takes the blame. Then in case of QRF, a drone can guide the QRF to exact location especially if QRF is a LMG equipped AH-6 little bird type of heli, Its nimble, it faster than a vehicle on road, it can traverse hills, streams, broken road easily as it flies above all that. In reality, a new convoy of Hiluxs, JMRs and trucks will be formed which will reach the scene as QRF. Imagine the speed of this QRF, its disappointing.

Even if the QRF is M-113 , it still has to travel at road speeds. SSG has even used M-113 during breaches. At this point would rappelling into a building be completely out of question, or how about a sniper station in heli, not just taking out the enemy but also monitoring and reporting the movement from air, just like an unarmed drone.


Its a long story, I can go on and on, but in reality the progress is slow at a snails pace. LEA/Troops are dying but helis are very less, so are MRAPs and APCs.

 

[Quwa]

@Quwa

I meant aerial transport in general.

PA's working horse is Mi-17 and although its a medium lift heli, PAA undertakes multiple sorties to deliver a heavier payload, otherwise not just Z-8, but there are other heavy lift options as well from USA/China/Turkey. Considering the mindset, if PAA goes for a heavy lift heli, they will be bought in fewer numbers. Its better to go for light/recon helis which can be bought more in number. There is a serious shortage of helicopters in PA. From smaller ones like Little Bird MH-6/MD500 for which PAA got Fennec/ecureuil to fulfil the role, then there are multiple types of medium ones like Mi-17, Puma, Bell,AW139 series and finally there is no heavy lift heli.

For deployment purposes, these helis are attached to different HQs and units, mostly temporarily. Any piece of equipment cannot show its full potential unless its deployed correctly. What to talk about maintenance when there are different types already. Take AW139 for example, its used for
SAR, Utility, transport including VIP transport roles but they are just 7 or so in number, basically very few. How can the heli commit to these 4 roles in a sustaining manner ? when the time for maintenance, overhaul, repair etc comes, some will be out of action for days.

The terrain in Pakistan is formed of mountains, plains, deserts, hills, etc, and at most places there are no roads on which transport can be run 24 hours, some roads are narrow, some can support 1-5 Ton trucks, where as the terrain near LOC is impassable for vehicles at many points. More importantly, any QRF force should have an airborne component, say like FC which is spread all over the province and all it has got are Hiluxs and maybe M-113 can come in if required. The MRAPs stand as base guardians. MRAPs are again short in number.

Then there is a constant requirement of drones for surveillance. TTP walks on a road, plants an IED and vanishes. There is nobody monitoring that road. Next day Hilux comes carrying troops and destruction occurs. Hilux takes the blame. Then in case of QRF, a drone can guide the QRF to exact location especially if QRF is a LMG equipped AH-6 little bird type of heli, Its nimble, it faster than a vehicle on road, it can traverse hills, streams, broken road easily as it flies above all that. In reality, a new convoy of Hiluxs, JMRs and trucks will be formed which will reach the scene as QRF. Imagine the speed of this QRF, its disappointing.

Even if the QRF is M-113 , it still has to travel at road speeds. SSG has even used M-113 during breaches. At this point would rappelling into a building be completely out of question, or how about a sniper station in heli, not just taking out the enemy but also monitoring and reporting the movement from air, just like an unarmed drone.


Its a long story, I can go on and on, but in reality the progress is slow at a snails pace. LEA/Troops are dying but helis are very less, so are MRAPs and APCs.

I think there's value in investing in a relatively large rotary-lift capability, not just for COIN/CT, but generally.

We should approach this as an industrial investment akin to the JF-17. It may seem that the requirement is too limited or niche to sustain such an effort, but one can take steps to reduce the overhead and increase scale. Basically, we can pursue a common engine-rotor-transmission platform between both the utility/lift and attack helicopter capability; this is where the Turkish T625 and T629 combination would be prudent.

The T625 is a 6-ton utility helicopter. It can carry around 12 troops, though I expect the external sling load might be relatively limited (around 1,500 kg if not less). However, if we manufacture and sustain (MRO) this locally, we could potentially acquire a relatively large number of the long-term to support the PAA's broader utility needs. You can pair this with the T629 attack helicopter, which uses the same engine, transmission, and rotor tech, providing a higher degree of commonality between the two models.

Turkiye is making progress in indigenizing the critical inputs (especially the engine). I'm confident there can be an avenue to manufacture both types in Pakistan provided the PAA issues a large long-term order. I don't think Turkish Aerospace would confer the work to PAC; rather, if the PAA commits to several hundred units over a 10-15-year period, Turkish Aerospace could invest in Pakistan and set up its own facilities here (providing an offset that could leverage Pakistani labour and inputs, and lead to subcontracting work to our private sector).

Ideally, a standardization drive could also steer the PN, PAF, LEAs, MoI, and others to acquire the same type.

T625


T629

 

[Signalian]

I think there's value in investing in a relatively large rotary-lift capability, not just for COIN/CT, but generally.

We should approach this as an industrial investment akin to the JF-17. It may seem that the requirement is too limited or niche to sustain such an effort, but one can take steps to reduce the overhead and increase scale. Basically, we can pursue a common engine-rotor-transmission platform between both the utility/lift and attack helicopter capability; this is where the Turkish T625 and T629 combination would be prudent.

The T625 is a 6-ton utility helicopter. It can carry around 12 troops, though I expect the external sling load might be relatively limited (around 1,500 kg if not less). However, if we manufacture and sustain (MRO) this locally, we could potentially acquire a relatively large number of the long-term to support the PAA's broader utility needs. You can pair this with the T629 attack helicopter, which uses the same engine, transmission, and rotor tech, providing a higher degree of commonality between the two models.

Turkiye is making progress in indigenizing the critical inputs (especially the engine). I'm confident there can be an avenue to manufacture both types in Pakistan provided the PAA issues a large long-term order. I don't think Turkish Aerospace would confer the work to PAC; rather, if the PAA commits to several hundred units over a 10-15-year period, Turkish Aerospace could invest in Pakistan and set up its own facilities here (providing an offset that could leverage Pakistani labour and inputs, and lead to subcontracting work to our private sector).

Ideally, a standardization drive could also steer the PN, PAF, LEAs, MoI, and others to acquire the same type.

T625
View attachment 857

T629
View attachment 858

You and I approach an issue differently and thats what required on the forum.

Lets look at the psyche of the forces. For PAF, a fighter aircraft is the bread and butter of the Airforce, without a fighter, the AirForce is rendered useless. And the monumental concern for PAF since its inception is getting a reliable fighter. The saga of Sabres, then the embargo. Finding refuge in F-6s to build numbers while hoping for Mirage manufacturing which never worked out. Then another embargo hit magnet aka F-16 and the relief of numbers in F-7. They were desperate and JFT had to be born.

For PA, its the MBT, then APC and lastly the big guns-howitzers. It almost ends there. Rest are support weapons so procured in small numbers, like AH-1s to start with. Look at Pumas which are still not replaced. The most rugged is Mi-17 while the newer ones are all European like Fennecs and AW-139s. If gunships were such a priority like JFT was for PAF, the Z-10s would have joined PAA before J-10 was inducted in PAF. You tell me what is PA waiting for in case of gunships? Why is the delay in acquiring gunship acceptable ? The AH-1s are past their life. They are not being thrown in COIN yet they will be the ones deployed if war occurs tomorrow while IAF fields AH-64s.

While Military may have options of JV and local manufacturing yet been 75 years and maybe there is some sort of hope with Turks. The Chinese managed to reverse engineer AS365 Dauphin and produce Z-9. Its an average product but used as firstline combat system in PN.

There are roughly 2000+ MBTs and maybe a higher number of APCs in PA, but you cant even see an Airborne/Air Assault Brigade (except SSG) in PA which actually requires dedicated allotment of helicopters. In the end, PAF will be using C-130s to drop troops wherever needed. Count the number of armored regiments, MIBs, LAT/HATs and then check if the Light Commando Battalions get any helis or not. There is 1 x LCB per Corps Command, so 9 or so LCBs are travelling around in 4x4s not helis.

 

[Quwa]

You and I approach an issue differently and thats what required on the forum.

Lets look at the psyche of the forces. For PAF, a fighter aircraft is the bread and butter of the Airforce, without a fighter, the AirForce is rendered useless. And the monumental concern for PAF since its inception is getting a reliable fighter. The saga of Sabres, then the embargo. Finding refuge in F-6s to build numbers while hoping for Mirage manufacturing which never worked out. Then another embargo hit magnet aka F-16 and the relief of numbers in F-7. They were desperate and JFT had to be born.

For PA, its the MBT, then APC and lastly the big guns-howitzers. It almost ends there. Rest are support weapons so procured in small numbers, like AH-1s to start with. Look at Pumas which are still not replaced. The most rugged is Mi-17 while the newer ones are all European like Fennecs and AW-139s. If gunships were such a priority like JFT was for PAF, the Z-10s would have joined PAA before J-10 was inducted in PAF. You tell me what is PA waiting for in case of gunships? Why is the delay in acquiring gunship acceptable ? The AH-1s are past their life. They are not being thrown in COIN yet they will be the ones deployed if war occurs tomorrow while IAF fields AH-64s.

While Military may have options of JV and local manufacturing yet been 75 years and maybe there is some sort of hope with Turks. The Chinese managed to reverse engineer AS365 Dauphin and produce Z-9. Its an average product but used as firstline combat system in PN.

There are roughly 2000+ MBTs and maybe a higher number of APCs in PA, but you cant even see an Airborne/Air Assault Brigade (except SSG) in PA which actually requires dedicated allotment of helicopters. In the end, PAF will be using C-130s to drop troops wherever needed. Count the number of armored regiments, MIBs, LAT/HATs and then check if the Light Commando Battalions get any helis or not. There is 1 x LCB per Corps Command, so 9 or so LCBs are travelling around in 4x4s not helis.

I think it's a combination of factors, such as:

• Lack of cohesive integration between policy, procurement, and production between the 3 service arms
• PA/PAF procurement tending to mirror the priorities of the Chief (more so PA, increasingly PAF)
• PA being a bigger beast, so buying X program will be a trade-off away from Y program

IMO, a lot of problems can be solved if there was a cohesive procurement strategy involving all 3 service arms. It's more cumbersome in that you're now dealing with 3X layers of decision-making, but seeing other countries, it tends to drive strong results over the long-term.

Turkiye established its SSB (Presidency of Defence Industries) to drive its indigenization efforts, but SSB also plays a role in managing procurement. So, each service arm would basically tell the SSB they are looking for "X" and, in turn, SSB does an analysis to find the most optimal procurement route accounting for both the service arm's needs as well as wider national interests.

So, SSB looks at every factor -- from the service arm's needs to indigenization goals to existing industry capacity -- and offers recommendations. For example, the Turkish Army wanted a new general purpose utility helicopter; SSB examined and came to the conclusion that the helicopter must (1) be manufactured locally, (2) support the needs of multiple service arms, and (3) involve offsets mandating the OEM to spend X back into Turkiye (investing, purchasing, etc.). With this in mind, the service arms got together and evaluated their options, and concluded the S-70i Black Hawk was the best bet; they signed a $3.5 billion USD contract for 109 Black Hawks, which will be co-produced by TAI and LM.

The process took 4-5 years to go from idea to first helicopter, but Turkiye will experience the benefit for 30-40 years by having a common utility helicopter (easing logistics, streamlining maintenance overhead), local sustenance program (d-level MRO, GE T700 spare parts manufacturing, etc), and so on.

So, practically, I think the Pak Gov't and armed forces should form a similar entity. I think the MoDP was to play that function, but by being under the government, it's realistically toothless and doesn't do much other than be a record keeper.

Instead, I think we should create an SSB-like entity, but nest it under the CJCSC. So, now, the CJCSC is given an additional mandate to oversee the armed forces' procurement and production with strategic (i.e., tri-services) objectives in mind.

Returning to the helicopter example, this is how it'd pan out:

• GHQ concludes it needs air assault and air support capability at scale, e.g., provide each Corps with access to at least 1 combined air brigade with (my arbitrary numbers, you @Signalian can adjust) 12 attack helicopters, 15 utility helicopters, and 12 MALE UAVs. We have 9 Corps, so that would be a total of 108 attack helicopters, 135 utility helicopters, and 108 MALE UAVs.
  
  
• So, now, the PA goes to CJCSC and tells him, "we need 108 attack helicopters, 138 utility helicopters, and 108 MALE UAVs in the next 12-15 years."
  
  
• CJCSC then commissions his internal SSB-like entity to examine the requirement, and the SSB comes back saying, "NESCOM can supply the MALE UAVs, but it needs a $100 M investment to reach PA requirements. As for helicopters, we'll speak to the PN and PAF and see if they have a requirement for a technically similar solution."
  
  
• The PAF comes back and says, "We need 12 CSAR helicopters" and the PN says, "We need 12 large-sized utility helicopters, 28 medium-sized ASW/AShW helicopters." The SSB examines their requirements and concludes, "there's limited commonality between their requirements as the PAF needs a ECM/EW, and PN needs anti-salt-erosion-proofing, foldable rotors, weapons integration, etc."
  
  
• So, CJCSC excludes PAF and PN. It then conducts a feasibility study about potentially manufacturing the helicopters in Pakistan (i.e., upholding the local production policy). It asks Turkiye and China, "if we single-source a contract for 120 attack helicopters and 150 utility helicopters with you, will you (1) set-up manufacturing facilities in Pakistan, (2) source 51% of value in Pakistan via labor, inputs, etc, (3) integrate PAA-specified equipment, (4) carry out all maintenance, sustenance, etc., work in Pakistan?"
  
  
• Now, the Turks and Chinese enter the conversation with their respective offers. In addition to technical performance (which is to be evaluated by the PAA), the CJCSC will evaluate the overall industrial package. Once evaluations are done, the GHQ and CJCSC will convene to decide on who wins the potential $4-5 billion US contract. Now, the controversial part, the CJCSC will decide using GHQ input, but pick the best package in overall terms. The prospective winner will be asked to meet specific technical requirements, and then get the contract.
  
  
• Let's say the Turks win and they bring their T625 and T629 work to Pakistan. TAI invests in Pakistan by setting up its own assembly plant, and then finds Pakistani private sector companies to supply inputs. If those don't exist, then it further invests (with Pakistani private partners) to establish companies that can provide high-tech inputs.

Now, the question is, how do we protect the program of a previous PA COAS from a current COAS who wants to arbitrarily end it? This is where we need long-term strategic directives/policies that encompass more operational matters. In other words, the PA need for air assault and close air support must be written in stone, so to speak, and maintained. For the PAF, the JF-17 (i.e., the multirole fighter) is indispensable to its ability to do anything in war; perhaps, then, the PA does not yet consider aviation as an instrumental part of its ops, just a support asset?

That needs to change, and I'm not sure of how to do it within the framework of GHQ. Maybe, someone needs to convince GHQ that it's now time to "bring aviation into the fold" as a proper fighting arm like infantry, armour, and artillery. That way, it'd now make conceptual sense to provide each Corps at least one combined air brigade to provide CAS and amplify LCB ops (changing LCBs into air assault/airborne units). Thus, the Corps in KP and Baluchistan would have dedicated aviation capabilities for COIN/CT, while the Punjab and Sindh ones have CAS. You can also argue that the aviation assets are flexible; so, if COIN/CT is less of an issue, then the KP/Baluchistan air brigades can be temporarily transferred to the east-facing Corps in case of a full-scale war.

 

[Qureshi]

Chinese options seem to be better (attack - Z10ME/medium lift - Z20/heavy lift - Z8G/L), since they are more adaptable, have a more developed industrial line support, and can be combined with three services.

 

[Signalian]

I think it's a combination of factors, such as:

• Lack of cohesive integration between policy, procurement, and production between the 3 service arms
• PA/PAF procurement tending to mirror the priorities of the Chief (more so PA, increasingly PAF)
• PA being a bigger beast, so buying X program will be a trade-off away from Y program

IMO, a lot of problems can be solved if there was a cohesive procurement strategy involving all 3 service arms. It's more cumbersome in that you're now dealing with 3X layers of decision-making, but seeing other countries, it tends to drive strong results over the long-term.

Turkiye established its SSB (Presidency of Defence Industries) to drive its indigenization efforts, but SSB also plays a role in managing procurement. So, each service arm would basically tell the SSB they are looking for "X" and, in turn, SSB does an analysis to find the most optimal procurement route accounting for both the service arm's needs as well as wider national interests.

So, SSB looks at every factor -- from the service arm's needs to indigenization goals to existing industry capacity -- and offers recommendations. For example, the Turkish Army wanted a new general purpose utility helicopter; SSB examined and came to the conclusion that the helicopter must (1) be manufactured locally, (2) support the needs of multiple service arms, and (3) involve offsets mandating the OEM to spend X back into Turkiye (investing, purchasing, etc.). With this in mind, the service arms got together and evaluated their options, and concluded the S-70i Black Hawk was the best bet; they signed a $3.5 billion USD contract for 109 Black Hawks, which will be co-produced by TAI and LM.

The process took 4-5 years to go from idea to first helicopter, but Turkiye will experience the benefit for 30-40 years by having a common utility helicopter (easing logistics, streamlining maintenance overhead), local sustenance program (d-level MRO, GE T700 spare parts manufacturing, etc), and so on.

So, practically, I think the Pak Gov't and armed forces should form a similar entity. I think the MoDP was to play that function, but by being under the government, it's realistically toothless and doesn't do much other than be a record keeper.

Instead, I think we should create an SSB-like entity, but nest it under the CJCSC. So, now, the CJCSC is given an additional mandate to oversee the armed forces' procurement and production with strategic (i.e., tri-services) objectives in mind.

Returning to the helicopter example, this is how it'd pan out:

• GHQ concludes it needs air assault and air support capability at scale, e.g., provide each Corps with access to at least 1 combined air brigade with (my arbitrary numbers, you @Signalian can adjust) 12 attack helicopters, 15 utility helicopters, and 12 MALE UAVs. We have 9 Corps, so that would be a total of 108 attack helicopters, 135 utility helicopters, and 108 MALE UAVs.
  
  
• So, now, the PA goes to CJCSC and tells him, "we need 108 attack helicopters, 138 utility helicopters, and 108 MALE UAVs in the next 12-15 years."
  
  
• CJCSC then commissions his internal SSB-like entity to examine the requirement, and the SSB comes back saying, "NESCOM can supply the MALE UAVs, but it needs a $100 M investment to reach PA requirements. As for helicopters, we'll speak to the PN and PAF and see if they have a requirement for a technically similar solution."
  
  
• The PAF comes back and says, "We need 12 CSAR helicopters" and the PN says, "We need 12 large-sized utility helicopters, 28 medium-sized ASW/AShW helicopters." The SSB examines their requirements and concludes, "there's limited commonality between their requirements as the PAF needs a ECM/EW, and PN needs anti-salt-erosion-proofing, foldable rotors, weapons integration, etc."
  
  
• So, CJCSC excludes PAF and PN. It then conducts a feasibility study about potentially manufacturing the helicopters in Pakistan (i.e., upholding the local production policy). It asks Turkiye and China, "if we single-source a contract for 120 attack helicopters and 150 utility helicopters with you, will you (1) set-up manufacturing facilities in Pakistan, (2) source 51% of value in Pakistan via labor, inputs, etc, (3) integrate PAA-specified equipment, (4) carry out all maintenance, sustenance, etc., work in Pakistan?"
  
  
• Now, the Turks and Chinese enter the conversation with their respective offers. In addition to technical performance (which is to be evaluated by the PAA), the CJCSC will evaluate the overall industrial package. Once evaluations are done, the GHQ and CJCSC will convene to decide on who wins the potential $4-5 billion US contract. Now, the controversial part, the CJCSC will decide using GHQ input, but pick the best package in overall terms. The prospective winner will be asked to meet specific technical requirements, and then get the contract.
  
  
• Let's say the Turks win and they bring their T625 and T629 work to Pakistan. TAI invests in Pakistan by setting up its own assembly plant, and then finds Pakistani private sector companies to supply inputs. If those don't exist, then it further invests (with Pakistani private partners) to establish companies that can provide high-tech inputs.

Now, the question is, how do we protect the program of a previous PA COAS from a current COAS who wants to arbitrarily end it? This is where we need long-term strategic directives/policies that encompass more operational matters. In other words, the PA need for air assault and close air support must be written in stone, so to speak, and maintained. For the PAF, the JF-17 (i.e., the multirole fighter) is indispensable to its ability to do anything in war; perhaps, then, the PA does not yet consider aviation as an instrumental part of its ops, just a support asset?

That needs to change, and I'm not sure of how to do it within the framework of GHQ. Maybe, someone needs to convince GHQ that it's now time to "bring aviation into the fold" as a proper fighting arm like infantry, armour, and artillery. That way, it'd now make conceptual sense to provide each Corps at least one combined air brigade to provide CAS and amplify LCB ops (changing LCBs into air assault/airborne units). Thus, the Corps in KP and Baluchistan would have dedicated aviation capabilities for COIN/CT, while the Punjab and Sindh ones have CAS. You can also argue that the aviation assets are flexible; so, if COIN/CT is less of an issue, then the KP/Baluchistan air brigades can be temporarily transferred to the east-facing Corps in case of a full-scale war.

Just trying to make a point here without using much words.

Mechanized assets (MBTs/APCs) along with air assets(gunships)



Air cavalry supporting infantry.

 

[Quwa]

Just trying to make a point here without using much words.

Mechanized assets (MBTs/APCs) along with air assets(gunships)

View attachment 2917

Air cavalry supporting infantry.

View attachment 2918

I think...if we want to leverage air power at scale (which can support a conventional deterrence doctrine), we need to invest in large numbers of attack helicopters. Heck, I'd go a step further and push the PAF to start allocating JF-17 Block-Is for combined arms formations, especially as more J-10CEs and Block-IIIs enter service.

I also know from older literature that the PAA had intended to acquire up to 60 AH-1F/S (e.g., it had signed a contract for 40 units at the time the PAF ordered the Peace Gate IV F-16s).

However, being a policy person, I believe in taking a step back and trying to align as many elements as possible into one so as to drive cost savings and efficiencies. That's why I'm a supporter of building a common platform (engine + dynamic parts) for both attack and utility/transport.

Honestly, I still think the T629/T625 might be too lightweight for the PAA's needs. The 'optimal' design might be in the range of a 7-ton attack helicopter and an 8-9-ton transport/utility type. Of course, that's just me being an armchair Pakistani Robert McNamara.