October 1973 Ramadan War

The SC

Feb 13, 2012
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The strategic_deception plan for the October War...full details

■ Did you know that Egypt has succeeded in deceiving the entire world, including the Soviets, and completely blinded them from watching and expecting a comprehensive war to reclaim the land with hundreds of thousands of soldiers and thousands of armored vehicles?... And that despite the genius of hundreds of strategic deception plans in all fields and at all levels, which do not... Entire volumes could be enumerated... This ingenious Egyptian plan remains the largest deception plan undertaken by the history-defying army to enter into a war that was impossible to carry out in the first place... And the greatest deception plan was to rewrite the military and strategic sciences again without the knowledge of the entire world... .. When the war broke out, the Israelis faced battles and tactics that they had not studied or expected to exist in the first place or that it was possible for them to occur?

■ Did you know that all military and strategic sciences in all Eastern or Western military scientific schools have agreed on the impossibility of simply starting a war on the Egyptian side using old defensive weapons in light of the overwhelming superiority in quantity and quality in favor of the Israelis?... This led to the fulfillment of Sadat’s word. The genius who summarized all of this in a sentence of four words.... “They saw... but were not aware.”...

• Military and strategic science around the world have then been rewritten again based on what the Egyptians did.

✪ For example:

◆ How were we able to import crossing equipment from portable bridges and then transport it to the front without the enemy’s knowledge..???

● The answer was to import twice the required quantity and leave it in the port of Alexandria, lying negligently for two full days near the vehicles of a contracting and foundation company transporting civil supplies. After two days, army vehicles transported only the excess quantity to the Helwan suburb and covered it with camouflage nets, while the contracting company’s vehicles transported the quantity. necessary to cross to their positions on the front.

◆ Weapons that are missing from artillery ammunition, RPG ammunition, Scud missiles, and launcher missiles... How do we import them without the knowledge of Israel and the West, who control and are aware of every ant in the global arms markets?

● The answer came: As for the artillery ammunition, it was taken from the Algerian army after a maneuver was launched between Egypt and Algeria on Egyptian territory. Algeria purchased the ammunition on its behalf, and after the maneuver, the Algerian forces left, leaving those ammunition in Egypt. This was done, of course, with special intelligence cooperation with Egypt.

● As for the Scud missiles, they were transported from Russia with special cooperation with the KGB, and without the Russian ship crews themselves knowing what was in their stores other than some civilian administrative tasks.

◆ As for aircraft bombs?

● The phosphorus bomb was manufactured locally in the Armed Forces factories, with a special blackout on the project by the Egyptian Military Intelligence and Military Security Service.

◆ As for the giant German pumps that were used to open the gaps in the berm

● It was purchased through Libya with a special agreement with Colonel Muammar Gaddafi, and after it arrived in Libyan territory, his cousin, Ahmed Gaddaf Al-Dam, transported it to Egypt in vegetable transport trucks belonging to his company (this company was created specifically for this purpose), which used to go to Libya with Egyptian vegetables and fruits and returns loaded with pumps and hoses necessary for crossing.

◆ Plan to evacuate government hospitals to receive the wounded and war-injured.

● When the date of the October War in 1973 approached, among the preparations required for the war was the necessity of finding and providing many places in the hospitals of the Ministry of Health and university hospitals in Cairo and the cities close to them to receive the war wounded. In those days, the hospitals of the armed forces were not in this number and in this state of readiness that we know. Now... but...
Simply taking that step was enough to attract the attention of the enemy and his eyes scattered among us. If the enemy knew that we were preparing to fight, we would have lost the most important part of war, which is... the element of surprise.

•• So what was the solution....??!!!

● Here the men relied on an innovative method, which is to let your enemy see everything but without understanding anything..

● One of the conscripted doctors (who held the rank of reserve officer in the Medical Services Department) was assigned, after careful investigation, to be returned to his primary work at Al-Demirdash Hospital (after it was reported that he had been exempted from service due to his unfitness), and two weeks after his return to work, this doctor announced that he had discovered The presence of gas gangrene bacteria in an operating room at Demerdash Hospital. A sample was sent - after fabricating it, of course - to the Ministry’s laboratories, which confirmed the result of the sample. For those who do not know, the presence of such a deadly and highly contagious microbe in any hospital immediately requires closing the hospital for a period It took between two weeks and a month to completely sterilize it... Therefore, a decision was made to close the hospital immediately to sterilize it, and all patients were removed from it... And the Egyptian newspapers that love scandals came out with this information, with questions about whether there was contamination in other hospitals?... So it was examined. All hospitals, and discoveries continued in many hospitals, with the results coming that there were 12 other contaminated hospitals... and the world rose and did not stop... and the Egyptian press poured out its anger on the Minister of Health and on the leaders of the state’s medical system... and several interrogations were presented against them in the People’s Assembly, and students demanded... Many people called for the minister to be dismissed.. even though the matter was nothing more than a mere hoax that none of the leaders of the Ministry of Health (except for the minister) knew anything about..

● Of course, the uproar reached Israel, and newspapers there began to ridicule the deteriorating medical level in Egypt and the primitive and dilapidated medical system.... The enemy swallowed the bait well..

• Under the nose and eyes of Israel and the entire world, and in a noisy and even scandalous atmosphere, most of Cairo’s hospitals were evacuated of their sick residents under the pretext of sterilization.. while the truth of the matter was that the state was preparing to receive the war wounded when the zero hour arrived.. It is worth noting that the fabricated medical reports were All of them were made by the Egyptian General Intelligence Service.

◆ Lighting equipment and electric flashlights.. With the battles and widespread obligatory darkness, flashlights had to be present with every soldier and officer, and the question was: How do we import all this huge number of flashlights without drawing the enemy’s attention to them..??? If we import it officially and publicly, the enemy will know our intention and discover our goal

● The solution: one of the smugglers met a young Bedouin man who was well-versed in the desert roads, and they agreed with the Bedouin to smuggle a quantity of car spare parts. The operation succeeded, which prompted him to make another deal in which they agreed to smuggle a huge shipment of flashlights under the pretext that the Egyptian market needed them due to the frequent There was a power outage, and despite their extreme caution, the police uncovered the operation and confiscated the shipment, but the smuggler managed to escape under mysterious circumstances, while the Bedouin was arrested. In an effort to camouflage it, the government released the shipment of lamps in stores and consumer complexes, but what he did not know was At the time, it was known that this smuggler was none other than one of the General Intelligence men in one of the most important operations of this great apparatus, and the story of this officer is well known.

◆ Food supplies... How can we import additional quantities of basic food supplies without attracting the attention of the enemy?

● The trick was to spread a rumor that the winter rains had flooded the wheat silos, causing our wheat stock to deteriorate and become infected with fungi. This was widely announced in the newspapers, and it was also announced that the government would destroy all infected wheat stocks. It was natural for Egypt to resort to importing wheat. Additional shipments of wheat to replace the infected wheat that was (ostensibly) destroyed...

● As for the rest of the basic types of food supplies (sugar - oil - legumes - soap, etc.), successive news was leaked in the newspapers about major fires in the warehouses of the food complexes, and fake fires were created, photographed, and published in the newspapers, so that was sufficient justification for importing quantities of supplies. Other alternatives without raising any suspicions.

◆ How was the Bab al-Mandab Strait closed and controlled by Egyptian naval vessels heading and stationing there without arousing the enemy’s suspicion?

● A small piece of news was published in September 1973, about three Egyptian naval vessels heading to one of the Pakistani ports to carry out repairs and regular maintenance work. Indeed, the three vessels moved to the port of Aden and there they spent a week, then they were ordered to go to one of the Somali ports for a visit. An official mission took another week to visit some Somali ports, then the three pieces returned again to Aden, and there the code signal came to them on the evening of October 5, 1973, to head to specific locations at the “Bab al-Mandab Strait” in complete secrecy at points that would allow them to follow the movement of all ships. Passing through the Red Sea by radar and inspecting them, and preventing Israeli ships from crossing the Bab al-Mandab Strait throughout the siege.

◆ Tanks.. How can we transfer tanks to the front lines from the front without the enemy knowing or arousing his suspicions..???

● The answer: The main workshops for repairing vehicles were moved to the front lines of the front, and convoys of tanks lined up in long queues openly under the pretext of having suffered malfunctions, as if they were going to the workshop for repair, with crossing times chosen other than when the satellite passed over the areas through which the tanks passed.. as well. Successive maneuvers and the plan for wooden tanks that surprised the Jews with the real tanks..

◆ Concerning the satellites, all transit equipment, ammunition, and tactical missions were transferred under the sight of dozens of satellites, with an extremely complex and ingenious deception plan.... where success was achieved in the most complex intelligence missions ever to bring up the paths of all satellites, whether Soviet. Or American or Western, from their home, then calculating their speed, paths, and timing of their passage over Egyptian territory to calculate the timing and location of the blind spots with great accuracy, which was applied to the maps of the entire front, so the missions were transported according to very precise paths, roads, and timings, measured by the minute and the second.... The accuracy of the coordinates on the ground was such that they were calculated in meters and centimeters for weeks along the length and width of the front.

● The Egyptian army succeeded in implementing its plan. The cars were transporting missions on routes and timings when satellites did not pass... and returned with structural loads at the same time as the satellites passed... so that the scene would be depicted showing the Egyptian army withdrawing its missions from the front and not the other way around - even though it was the opposite. It is correct - and all those complex calculations of drawing maps, placing coordinates with their times on maps, and matching them on the ground were done in the absence of electronic computers or a “GPS” system, but rather with a pencil, a T-ruler, and a primitive surveyor telescope on the ground.

✪ Thus, everything was done in the open and under the enemy’s eyes and ears, so that the eternal strategy was achieved..

“Let your enemy see and hear everything, but understand nothing.”


In the October 1973 Ramadan war.. New methods were defined for the first time in warfare:

- The way an individual soldier confronts a tank with anti-armor was the first time used in a war.
- Likewise, the theory of missile walls to repel air forces was applied for the first time in the October War.
- Also, hitting large frigates by anti-ship missiles from small missile boats was the first time this was done and led to the sinking the destroyer Eilat by the Egyptian boats.
- In fact, the Egyptians applied most modern warfare methods for the first time during this war

The Sinking of the Eilat | The First Battle Fought With Ship-to-Ship Missiles​

From different sources

The SC

Feb 13, 2012
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With radio silence and under the guise of going to Pakistan, the Egyptian Navy besieges Israel.

Among the successes of the Egyptian strategic deception plan that preceded the October War, the Egyptian naval forces succeeded in infiltrating Bab al-Mandab and taking control of it completely and with absolute secrecy, in a major surprise to Israel that caused the halting and prevention of any ship heading to the Israeli ports on the Red Sea, where thousands of tons of oil were arriving for Israel as well. About hundreds of other commercial ships.

Some elements of Egyptian deception in the Navy:

  1. Arranging maintenance contracts with Pakistan to send Egyptian ships and submarines there for maintenance, which was approved by Pakistan and was broadcast publicly.
  2. Arrangement with Yemen and Sudan to receive some Egyptian ships and submarines in Port Sudan and the port of Aden as a friendship visit during the trip.
  3. Egypt announced that there would be a visit by the Romanian Minister of Defense to Egypt on October 8, and the detailed visit program was announced (it was canceled after the declaration of war).
  4. The Ministry of Defense announced the possibility of naval officers submitting requests to perform Umrah.
  5. Demobilization of a large number of reserve soldiers.
  6. Radio silence for Egyptian units while moving on October 1 to avoid enemy spying operations.
A code signal was sent over the radio on the day of the war to naval vessels to stop all ships heading to Israel, and Israel did not succeed in breaching the blockade until the end of the war.

Results of the siege:

Red Sea: Complete closure of Bab al-Mandab to ships heading from and to Israel until the end of the war. This included the interception of 200 commercial ships. In addition to deploying mines in the Gulf of Suez to prevent Israel from transporting oil from Sinai to the port of Eilat.

The Mediterranean: Egypt sent warships, including submarines and destroyers, and deployed mines near Cyprus and in the area between Malta and the Libyan coast to intercept Israeli ships. This resulted in a threat to a large part of Israeli trade in the Mediterranean.


The SC

Feb 13, 2012
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A bold interview with former Egyptian President Mubarak with an Israeli broadcaster

The Israeli broadcaster at minute 3:40 tells Mubarak that the October War was a disaster for the Israelis, while it was a great victory for the people of Egypt.

It is noteworthy that the Sinai represented a strategic depth for Israel in any future war, as Israel is a country with a narrow area and needs strategic depth, and the Sinai constitutes an excellent depth for Israel to give its internal front a geographical expansion that protects it from easy targeting during any future conflict.

It is noteworthy that the Israeli army transferred the Israeli settlers in iron cages in a severe insult to the image of Israel and its people, after they refused to be evacuated because of their love for the land of Sinai.


It is noteworthy that until the ceasefire, Egypt continued to control Bab al-Mandab and impose a blockade of the Red Sea on Israel. Many do not know that after Egypt promised to lift the naval blockade after the talks began, and when Israel wanted to confirm the Egyptian promise, it sent an Israeli ship accompanied by an American frigate, perhaps for fear of an Egyptian ambush.

The SC

Feb 13, 2012
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The Shamel Plan

Vulnerability elimination plans - the comprehensive plan

If the Israeli force led by three generals, Sharon, Adan, and Magen, was able to reach the outskirts of Ismailia in the north and Suez in the south, thus encircling the Third Army.
Sharon failed to enter Ismailia on October 22 due to the valor of the Egyptian thunderbolts and paratroopers who were assigned the role of defending Ismailia.
Due to the good prediction of Major General Abdel Moneim Khalil, the new commander of the Second Army, of the attack axes and his focus on defending those axes,
Sharon did not attempt again to attack Ismailia after the Thunderbolt forces, especially the 139th Thunderbolt Group, led by Brigadier General Osama Ibrahim, inflicted heavy losses on him.
As for General Adan and his successor, General Magen, they set out with their armored divisions towards Suez to occupy it after he listened to the advice of General Barlev, the actual commander of the Israeli Southern Command, who gave him the choice ((If it is Beersheba, then advance, but if it is Stalingrad, then do not advance) ((that is, if it is an occupation... Suez is as simple as the occupation of Beersheba in 1948, then let it advance. However, if it is as stubborn and solid as Stalingrad, then do not advance.

Adan expected that Suez would be like Beersheba, so his tanks advanced, waving Moroccan and Algerian flags, to deceive any resistance force in the city. Despite the violent aerial bombardment of Suez on the 22nd and 23rd, the Popular Resistance Forces, aided by units from the 19th Infantry Division specialized in hunting tanks, were able to repel the Israeli incursion into the city. All axes, Israeli tanks suffered heavy losses, and dozens of Israeli paratroopers were also killed in fierce battles between buildings and inside them. It was a battle from street to street and from building to building.

After the failure of his attack, Adan confirmed that Suez was not Beersheba and was not Stalingrad. Rather, Suez placed its name in a new location for a valiant city whose people rose up with its army soldiers to defend it and prevent its fall.

After the failure of the fall of Ismailia and Suez.


With complete impartiality, we can confirm that the Israeli forces had placed themselves, starting on October 25, in a military situation that was fatal to them in all respects. They had no solution but to remain steadfast in their position and begin a battle of patience, endurance, and attrition, which means continuing in a state of long military mobilization, which is... Which meant weakening the Israeli economy even more.

Israeli military situation:

1-The Israeli forces lost the strength of the attack, and were forced to stop because there were no targets towards which they could advance to achieve a military or media goal.
2- The Israeli forces occupy an area much larger than the size of the forces actually present inside the breach, which means that they do not have complete control over all areas. This leads to the ease of infiltration of the Egyptian Thunderbolt elements into the heart of the Israeli forces’ camps and cutting off their vital supply lines, which is what happened in the period from The first of November 73 until January 74.
3- The Israeli forces are breathing through a narrow corridor 10 kilometers wide in the Deversoir area, which is the only land corridor leading to the forces inside the Al-Thaghra area, which is an incorrect situation.
4- The Israeli forces cannot advance towards Cairo to the west due to the presence of the 4th Armored Division, and they cannot advance towards Ismailia to the north due to the presence of the Ismailia Canal as a natural obstacle. In front of them are shock forces and paratroopers trained to hunt tanks, and they cannot advance south along the Red Sea because there are no tactical or strategic objectives. It has a mission in the south other than the city of Hurghada, which is approximately two hundred kilometers away and does not represent any strategic or military importance.
5- The Israeli forces suffer from the length of their supply lines, which extend from the bowl on the central axis for a very long distance to the breach, and these lines are vulnerable to being cut by the forces of the 16th Infantry Division east of the canal.

Status of the Egyptian forces:

If the Egyptian forces had suffered, starting on October 14, from the wrong decisions of the General Command ((from the decision to develop the wrong attack through the wrong handling of the loophole)).
The period from October 14 to 25 was a period of confusion, but after the Israeli forces stopped and carried out their goals and failed to occupy Ismailia and Suez, the Egyptian leadership began to make correct decisions, which were represented in the following:
1- Withdrawing the leadership and personnel of the 21st Armored Division, without tanks, to the west again, and reassembling the division in the Abu Sultan area again (as Lieutenant General Saad Al-Shazly wanted on October 17).
2- The second-line air defense wall recoils and continues to function successfully despite the losses.
3- Withdrawing tank acquisition groups from the east and reconstructing them under the command of the Second Army.
4- Reconstitution of the 23rd Mechanized Infantry Division and the 6th Mechanized Infantry Division again, based on Soviet supplies that began to arrive effectively after the fighting ended on October 25.
5- Regrouping the Fourth Armored Division within the Third Field Army under general command immediately after the name of the Third Army forces east of the canal was changed to the name Badr Forces.
6- Mobilizing a new infantry division, consisting of a Moroccan infantry brigade and a mixed infantry brigade consisting of Sudanese, Emirati, Palestinian, and Kuwaiti brigades, placing it within the scope of the Third Army and supporting it with the necessary artillery.
7- Reinforcing the 16th Infantry Division east of the canal, after the losses it suffered in fierce battles on October 15, 16, and 17.
8- Placing the Algerian armored brigade on the Suez road to repel any Israeli attack towards Cairo.

In simple language, on the first of December 1973, the Egyptian forces were able to achieve balance for the Egyptian forces east and west of the canal and form a large armored and mechanized force west of the canal under the umbrella of the missile wall and with very short supply lines.

There is no clearer evidence of this than what Major General Kamal Hassan Ali, Director of the Armored Department said during the October War, to tell us in his memoirs about how the armored and mechanized divisions quickly regained their efficiency.
He says in his memoirs, “The Rides of a Lifetime - Secrets and Secrets of 70 Years of Egypt’s Life” on page 354.
((On October 26, I visited the 4th Armored Division, which was supplied with a large number of repaired tanks. I also visited the Algerian Armored Brigade, which was stationed on top of Mount Gharra, south of the breach. The view from the top of the mountain of the battlefield confirmed the possibility of destroying the Israeli forces inside the breach easily, as The width of the area through which the Israeli forces crossed in Defersoir was only 7 kilometers, and a committee from the American Congress visited the site on November 7, accompanied by Major General Saad Mamoun, and came away with the impression that confirmed the necessity of a peaceful settlement of this conflict, because the Israeli forces trapped inside the breach were now in a siege that was about to end. complete))
((On the seventh of November, I was visiting the units east of the canal, and I heard a statement by Moshe Dayan on Israeli radio, in which he said that Egypt had completed the push of the Fourth Field Army around the breach. I was very pleased with this statement, as the Fourth Army was in reality nothing but supplies received by the administration. Armored vehicles are constantly sent to the front to compensate for the losses of the fighting. After 94 tanks arrived in Egypt from Yugoslavia, ready for their crews to mount, we also received an armored brigade from Libya without personnel, in addition to the arrival of assault guns from Algeria. After Boumediene’s visit to the Soviet Union, 200 T-62 tanks arrived to us. It was allocated entirely to support the 21st Armored Division, as the remaining tanks of the 21st Division were left to support the bridgehead of the 16th Division. The 21st Division returned without tanks to its new positioning area, and its members were trained on the new T-62 tanks within just one week. Then the 21st Division was pushed to The front attacked again over the course of three days, and it raised dust more than 30 kilometers long, and the last day of its arrival was November 7, which coincided with Dayan’s statement that the Fourth Army had been completed around the breach)) In these lines we can fully understand the situation. The psychological state of the Israeli Defense Minister, who thought that re-equipping the 4th and 21st Armored Divisions was equivalent to equipping a new army called the 4th Army, which did not actually exist.

The plan Shamel and its evolution


Although the ceasefire actually took effect on October 25, 1973 and the United Nations forces began arriving in the region, the front was not calm at all, as Egyptian special forces carried out ambushes for supply vehicles.

Historian Gamal Hammad mentioned in his book War Battles on the Egyptian Front) that immediately after the Egyptian forces regained their balance after the failure of the Israeli forces to occupy Suez, a second war of attrition began that included 1,500 clashes and artillery bombardments in which forces from Algeria and Morocco participated with the Egyptian forces, and these clashes led to... To the following:

- 11 aircraft, 41 tanks, tracked vehicles, and 10 heavy machine guns were destroyed. - 36 bulldozers, engineering equipment, and passenger vehicles were destroyed. - The Israeli oil tanker (Serena) was seriously damaged. - A naval landing boat was sunk. - 187 Israeli personnel were killed, in addition to hundreds of wounded.

This occurred during 440 Egyptian offensive operations from the east and west of the canal.

The comprehensive planning and preparation for the plan went hand in hand with a brutal war of attrition, the undisputed heroes of which were the Thunderbolt men and the paratroopers who worked deep inside the enemy, and turned his life into hell to the point that reconnaissance and intelligence elements observed two things worthy of attention:
First: The Israeli forces deploy during the day and return to their camps at night for fear of night ambushes by the Saiqa forces, which made the Third Army’s secret supply patrols go very regularly, away from the convoys that are under the control of the United Nations and that Israel is trying to obstruct.

Second: A hysterical process of planting mines was monitored by the Israeli forces around their forces’ camps, and the rates of mine deployment are similar to what Rommel did after the Battle of El Alamein, which is a large percentage due to the extreme fear and terror of the Israeli forces inside the breach.

We return to the comprehensive plan drawn up by Major General Saad Mamoun to eliminate the breach, and Major General Abdel Moneim Wasel, Commander of the Third Army, participated in it. In his memoirs, starting on page 325, he informs us of new facts related to fundamental amendments to the plan before presenting it to the President:
Among them is closing the separation between the forces of the Second and Third Armies, east and west of the canal, which extends to 30 kilometers, the length of the Bitter Lakes, and defining the responsibilities of the commanders, to avoid the disadvantages of leaving that space empty east of the canal, which made the enemy exploit it with complete freedom.

According to the words of Major General Abdel Moneim Wasel, specific forces were deducted from the main forces, with the aim of besieging the enemy forces and preventing them from expanding in any direction, as follows:

1- The Moroccan brigade in the Bir Adib area on the Gulf of Suez to prevent the enemy from expanding south.
2- The Algerian Armored Brigade, along with the 6th Mechanized Brigade and the 339th Mechanized Battalion of the 113th Mechanized Brigade, occupy the second defensive zone of the Third Army from Jabal Ataqa to the 12th, 13th and 14th rounds.
3- The 18th Mechanized Brigade from the 21st Armored Division, along with the 182nd Parachute Brigade (some call it the 150th Brigade) and the 116th Mechanized Brigade, occupy the area east of Jabal Shabrawit to the south of Ismailia.

The "Operation Shamil 2" plan specified attacking the Israeli forces in the west from 5 specific axes:

The outcome of the battle can be deduced according to the conditions of the warring forces at that time
The first stage: liquidation of the Israeli forces west of the canal


1- The first direction is a strike from the right side of the bridgehead of the 16th Division (from the east) in a southwest direction, with the aim of closing and liquidating the penetration gap from the east. It is expected that this strike will be carried out by the 22nd Armored Brigade, which gradually caught up with the 16th Infantry Division from the 2nd Infantry Division in view of To embarrass the position of the 16th Infantry Division throughout the days of fighting in the breach.

Given that Israel expected such an attack, it was expected that it would not be 100% successful due to the presence of a large number of Israeli armored vehicles fighting in a life-or-death battle due to not closing the axis leading to the west of the canal, but it was likely that it would put the Egyptian forces in a much better position, to threaten The important Israeli supply hub, and then reducing or disrupting a large part of those supplies.


2- The second direction is a strike on the Abu Sultan axis, in the direction of Defersoir, to liquidate the gap base on which its supply is based from east to west (the scope of work of the Sharon Group). This battle is carried out by the 21st Armored Division, consisting of approximately 250 tanks, opposite the Sharon Armored Group, consisting of a number Almost similar, and it was expected that this would be a terribly bone-crushing battle as Sharon did not have the ability to maneuver his forces in that narrow area, so his defense would be in the confrontation with the Egyptian tanks heading to the main point of Defersoir to destroy the bridge and isolate the forces.

It was also planned that the Thunderbolt elements would put pressure on Sharon’s forces towards Ismailia to stabilize part of his forces to facilitate the mission of the 21st Armored Division. On the other hand, the 21st Division’s extensive knowledge of the expected battlefield would have been a factor in choosing the secondary attack axes to reach Objectives: Using the existing infantry units of the 18th Mechanized Brigade of the 21st Division to gain territory and hold on to it.

The 23rd Mechanical Division will be a second division of the 21st Armored Division to enhance its attack and intervene in the event of any emergency that requires it.

3- The third direction is a strike on the Geneva Road axis, in the direction of the Lesser Bitt er Lakes, to eliminate the forces present from Fayed to the Al-Janain area, and is carried out by the 3rd Mechanized Infantry Division with the aim of isolating General Sharon’s forces from the forces of General Adan and the forces of General Magen in the south, and given Due to the presence of dense agriculture in those areas, the 3rd Mechanized Division was chosen so that the infantry units could deploy in the agricultural areas and form protected defensive lines in the event of a counterattack from the south or the north. This mission would have been the easiest in the plan, as those areas were to be moved to. The Third Division had weak Israeli defense in that the area of land occupied by the Israeli forces was very large compared to the size of the forces present in it, so it was easy to avoid the locations of the Israeli forces and move in almost empty axes to achieve the goal of cutting off and isolating the Israeli forces from each other, and the General Magen are the forces present in that area. They are new forces that have not participated in many battles and have no experience on the ground.

4- The fourth direction is a strike on the Suez Road axis, Route 12 (the main strike), to liquidate the forces present from Shaloufa to Suez, and break the siege of Suez. It is carried out by the forces of the Fourth Armored Division directly confronting the Adan Division. It is also a bone-breaking battle, and its goal is propaganda. Lifting the siege on Suez.

It can be expected that the Fourth Armored Division might have been able to open a road to Suez and break the siege on it, but at the same time it cannot be claimed to be fully capable of destroying the Adan Fighting Division, expert in war and experienced in combat from the first day of combat.

The newly formed infantry division, composed of an Algerian brigade and Kuwaiti and Sudanese units, is the second line of the Fourth Armored Division.

5- The fifth direction is a strike on the coastal axis parallel to the Gulf of Suez from south to north, to eliminate the forces located south of Suez and in Adabiya. It is a secondary strike carried out by the Moroccan brigade with the aim of opening a supply route south to the city of Suez, and also installing Israeli forces to secure the flank of the 4th Armored Division in its attack. It can be expected that this brigade will succeed in liberating the port of Adabiya and reaching the outskirts of the city of Suez from the south.

Comprehensive plan analysis:

* The plan is comprehensive and was developed on good foundations. There is a mobilization of forces in specific axes, and there is a concentration of the attack force in those axes, which increases the chances of its success in implementing the goals assigned to it.

* The well-trained Egyptian forces before the October War gained a huge amount of experience throughout the days of fighting, and with that experience they became forces experienced in mobile warfare, and knowledgeable of the Israeli tactics used.

* The Egyptian forces’ attack axes are short and their targets are close, well-known and well-studied, which means that the momentum of the attack will not require a small force to repel it, but rather large Israeli forces to stop any of the axes.

* Israel forgot the important military principle: “If you want to be strong everywhere, you will become weak everywhere.” That is, it neglected the principle of mobilizing forces. It is clear that the areas gained by the Israeli forces to reach Suez and Ismailia turned into an administrative and military burden. According to the Israeli leadership, the Israeli armored brigade, which is supposed to occupy a front line of up to ten kilometers, for example, has become tasked with being on a front line of twenty kilometers, which means that there will be separations between its battalions, which makes the strength of its repelling attack weaken by a third, so instead of repelling its approximately 100 tanks When an attack occurred in a certain sector, the repelling force was only thirty tanks.
Which means that the Israeli armored forces present in the breach, which consist of 3 operational groups, which consist of 6 armored brigades with a total of approximately 600 tanks, in addition to a parachute brigade and two mechanized brigades. These tanks, instead of being mobilized in a single confrontation to repel an Egyptian attack, necessitated securing the occupation areas. What is new is that these tanks are distributed over a large confrontation, which reduces their strength and the impact of their counterattacks.

* The comprehensive plan was based on exploiting the flaws in the Israeli military position. Closing the only escape route for the Israeli forces, represented by the stone bridge on the Suez Canal, was one of the priorities of the Egyptian plan, and for the Israeli forces to become hostages in the hands of the Egyptian forces and negotiate their surrender, as the division was assigned to that vital point. The 21st Armored Brigade and the 22nd Armored Brigade east of the canal, with full support from the Second Army’s artillery, Sa’iqa elements, and paratroopers.

Also, closing the narrow Israeli escape and supply corridor in Deversoir is very likely to make the rest of the Israeli forces not serious in fighting due to the lack of resources for fighting ((I would like to mention here that all the Israeli fuel and ammunition stores west of the canal were a target for the Egyptian Thunderbolt elements in the Second War of Attrition)) which It makes the stock of ammunition and fuel necessary for fighting completely dependent on supplies from the east of the canal.

* There is no indication of the timing of the attack, and it is believed that it would have been in the middle of the day to allow sufficient time during the day for the arrival of Egyptian tanks, which are not experienced in night fighting, to reach their objectives, and to exploit the night to deploy mechanized infantry and thunderbolt forces to ambush the Israeli forces expected to attack. By the next morning,

* The Egyptian aviation situation is much better than the Israeli aviation situation. Despite the large losses of the Egyptian aviation with the beginning of the breach and the technological backwardness of the Egyptian aircraft in quantity and quality, the presence of Egyptian airports near the front line ensures that these aircraft fly at a low altitude with a sufficient stock of fuel to stay above the target. It is not more than 3 minutes flight away from the nearest airport, which means a greater presence of Egyptian aircraft to support the ground forces.

* The rebound of the missile wall and its return to its usual danger in the second line, west of the canal, will enable the Egyptian ground forces to deal with the Israeli breach forces without heavy Israeli air intervention.

* Breaking the siege of Suez and opening the way for the Third Army has only a media and moral goal for the army and the Egyptian people.

Therefore, I think that pushing the 4th Armored Division to break the siege on Suez would be a very expected attack, and it is expected that General Adan would mobilize his tanks west of Suez to repel the 4th Division. It would have been a very terrible battle had it taken place, and the losses would have been high and incalculable, and in my own opinion, the division’s situation The fourth as a second formation to support the 3rd Mechanized Division in its attack towards Fayed to isolate General Adan’s division in the south and besieging it will be less dangerous, more beneficial and more surprising,
in the end

Why wasn't the plan implemented?

The US Secretary of State intervened forcefully to stop the implementation of that plan, and this is confirmed in his personal memoirs.

In Major General Kamal Hassan Ali’s book ((The Rides of a Lifetime - Secrets and Secrets of 70 Years of Egypt’s Life)) on page 334 he says
((And thus the Israeli loophole turned into a trap, so much so that when Kissinger came to Egypt on November 1, 1973, President Sadat summarized the situation to him, saying, “I have 800 tanks and Israel has 400 tanks, and I have one and a half missiles for every Israeli tank, and the Israelis are confined to the area of its width.” 6.5 kilometers east of the canal, and if we close it, the Israeli forces will be eliminated without question.

Kissinger responded that he knew the truth of the situation, and the Pentagon had provided him with satellite images showing the air defense wall regaining its effectiveness and pictures of the 800 tanks, cannons, etc.)

Among Kissinger's responses was: Do you think the American administration will let you do this?

If we studied that statement, we would realize that America is fully aware of the true situation of the Israeli forces west of the canal, which is:

1- Decreased morale of Israeli soldiers due to continuous losses and failure to achieve their goals from the breach.
2- Israel’s failure to bring the Third Army to its knees.
3- Israel tried to play the card that the Third Army was a hostage in its hands, and broadcast pictures of supply convoys moving to protect the United Nations forces, and published them as wishing Egypt these meager supplies out of a desire to break the morale of the Egyptian people, which did not happen and Israel failed in it.
4- Israel failed to occupy Suez and gain great media fame.
5- The time factor has become against Israel by all standards, as its forces are being exhausted day after day, and the Egyptian forces are regaining their cohesion west of the canal and turning into a large armored force threatening Israel.
6- The exit of the Israeli forces from the impasse of the breach has become an inevitable matter, but how??? How do the Israeli forces withdraw without losses, to continue promoting this false victory and this television battle?
7- The comprehensive implementation of the plan is sufficient to expose the Israeli forces to a major massacre west of the canal.

Therefore, the Jewish American Secretary of State Kissinger intervened, forcefully demanding that Egypt not implement that plan, but how?

Kissinger used the 101st kilometer meetings to conclude an initial disengagement agreement, followed by a second disengagement agreement, according to which Israeli forces withdrew completely from the west of the canal on January 14, 1974, over a period of only four days, to the east of the straits, 40 kilometers away from the main border of the Egyptian forces east of The canal, and in return, Egypt agreed to reduce the Egyptian forces east of the canal, as evidence I have good faith in future peace negotiations, and to open the Suez Canal, with Egypt not giving up on its military gains east of the canal.

Major General Moataz Al-Sharqawi says about the period of the siege, which lasted a full hundred days, that immediately after the announcement of the disengagement agreement and the withdrawal of the Israeli forces to the east of the canal, he saw hundreds of signal shots in the sky west of Suez. The Israelis fired all the signal shots - similar to fireworks - in the sky. The sky of the region rejoiced at their exit from the breach alive, and those fireworks coincided with hundreds of gunshots fired by the same soldiers into the sky along the breach area from Ismailia to Suez, which extended for long hours. They felt that they had been saved.

Is this the behavior of a cohesive military force besieging the Third Army? Or is it the behavior of psychologically defeated forces because they know the predicament they have been thrown into without awareness or study simply because of the media aura and propaganda glory of Israel's generals?

From Israel, we know that it does not give up an inch of land without compensation.

So why did the Israeli forces withdraw from the breach, and from the front line with the Second and Third Army east of the canal, to return to the east of the straits..????

In Major General Kamal Hassan Ali’s book, “The Rides of a Lifetime - Secrets and Mysteries of 70 Years of Egypt’s Life,” he summarizes for us the reason for Israel’s withdrawal from the point of view of a warrior and the director of the Armored Corps, meaning that he is one of those familiar with the smallest details of that difficult period in the history of the conflict:

"No one can claim that Israel accepted the second ceasefire on October 25 and then withdrew to the east of the straits because of its desire for peace. The truth is that Israel did not accept that except under the specter of threat inside the loophole trap.

The truth is that the breach and the Israeli enclave west of the canal did not fulfill the Israeli leaders’ hope of reversing the outcome of the war for many reasons, including that the declared Israeli losses reached 400 dead and 1,200 wounded, even though the reality of the matter was much greater than that........

Among the reasons also is that the Egyptian forces had the opportunity during the ceasefire period to reorganize their forces and supply them to the point that they became so strong that they did not allow the Israeli side to expand the gap or withdraw from it..........

The size of the Egyptian forces around the breach was five divisions, including two armored divisions and three mechanized divisions, so the comparison of forces was in our favor with a ratio of 1:3 in infantry, 1:6 in artillery, and 1:2.5 in tanks."

Documentary | A special episode on the "Devressoir gap"

The documentary film “Suez Resilience”

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The SC

Feb 13, 2012
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The Daily Telegraph newspaper

" Ariel Sharon " :

The Egyptians demonstrated the ability of their soldiers to fight, the ability of their officers to lead, and their ability to use the latest weapons.

The Egyptians took the initiative and were able to inflict the heaviest losses on the Israeli army. The fighting could have stopped at any moment, and our position was extremely bad. This would be a disaster for Israel and its reputation. For that, something had to be done, so I urged the leadership to agree to implement my plan to cross to the west. In Deversoir, America helped us by telling us that there was a gap between the Egyptian Second and Third Armies, and advised us to cross to the west, but I felt in the first days of this operation that building bridges to the west was a military mistake, as the Egyptian bombing was extremely violent, and we completely failed in besieging the Egyptian Third Army. We took advantage of the nearest opportunity to return to the East.
Until October 16, 1973, not a single soldier from my unit was spared from Egyptian soldiers’ bullets, and only two battalions remained of my forces, and I personally escaped death very miraculously.


Moshe Dayan

The Middle East war shattered the myth that the Israeli army cannot be resisted, and that the land occupied by Israel in 1967 constitutes a guarantee of its security.

"The Guardian" newspaper
The October War left Israel in a state of stupor and shock.

British magazine "The Economist".

On October 30, 1973, the American nuclear scientist Harrod Brown visited the combat zones and was astonished by the destruction and losses that befell the Israeli forces and modern American weapons. After a silent and sad scene, he said: We will enter a phase of research and development for all American weapons for no less than ten years. In all military industries in the world until the weapons destroyed by the Egyptian soldier are developed... What the Egyptian army did is a true miracle... The modern American M48 tanks were destroyed by infantrymen, and the Phantom planes were shot down with shoulder-mounted missiles... American tanks are torn between the turret and the body, and this area contains the tank’s hydraulic fluid. It is truly amazing and calls for a reconsideration of everything.

It has been proven that Israeli tanks were severely hit by Egyptian anti-tank missiles. The Egyptians destroyed about two hundred Israeli tanks in the first days of the war on the Suez front. The Egyptians also clearly excelled in the field of light-mobile anti-aircraft weapons, which succeeded in inflicting heavy losses on Israeli aircraft that were not expected. Not at all. In the first week of the war, a third of the Israeli aviation was destroyed, and then the percentage increased to half. The Israelis also failed to destroy the Egyptian military airports. The process of crossing to the eastern bank of the canal was extremely amazing, as none of the military experts expected it to take place to this extent. Which does not mention any losses.

From a study conducted by the US Department of Defense

All reports that reached Western sources indicated that the Egyptian army fought with stubbornness and enthusiasm. The leadership was at the level of the infantry battalions and the tanks were at a high level. The Arab General Command was also characterized by agility and intelligence. The most important technological development at the Egyptian and Arab level was the light weapons that were used effectively and efficiently. To protect advanced positions and troop concentrations against Israeli air and armored counter-attacks, the crossing of the canal confirmed that those forces had developed technologically, and these bold operations proved that the Egyptians were capable of achieving success and acting with discipline.

After October, the Arabs emerged for the first time as makers of history, and the Arab world became an important factor in achieving political balance in the region, and thus the balance of power that had clearly been disturbed before October was corrected.

Drew Middleton
An American expert in Middle Eastern affairs

The October War is one of the biggest modern surprises

"Raymond Aron"
French Zionist sociologist

The Middle East war has already changed many ideas about the balance between combat aircraft and air defense, and between tanks and artillery means to combat them. The control enjoyed by the Israeli air force has faced a serious challenge from Arab missiles, and the superiority of Israeli tanks in the battle has become subject to great doubt.

"Elber Yejaderkinet Hunt"
Deputy Director of the International Institute for Strategic Studies

I want to express my great admiration for the work accomplished by the Egyptian Armed Forces, coupled with my admiration for the progress that these forces have shown in the field. They fought at the highest level known in the era.

Yaakov Evin
Israeli writer

We lived for six years, from 1967 until 1973, in a fool's paradise or idiot's paradise.

The SC

Feb 13, 2012
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Officially: Egypt lifts the confidentiality of the files of the 1973 October War


Liquidation plan for the Deversoir gap..the Shamel Plan


A very secret and very dangerous document; An analysis by its author that the internal situation in Israel is on the verge of collapse after the outbreak of war.. Three-quarters of the Israeli people who are able to take arms have been summoned.

One of the documents published here mentioned Morocco’s king request to send their fighters with their equipment and to participate directly..

Part of the declassified docs is an important report on Egyptian armed forces combat activities and the status of Israeli military breakthrough (Deversoir gap) on the west flank of Suez Canal in the period between Oct. 25 to Jan. 25, 1974. The size of the Israeli troops west of the canal reached 7 brigades, including 574 tanks.The Israeli force on the west flank were working to fortify their positions, meaning they were in a defensive situation.Logistical support and supplies reaching to Israeli troops depended mainly on a stone bridge in Deversoir. They also used Fayed airport and Adabiya port in Suez to receive some supplies.- From Oct. 31 to Jan. 17: Egyptian Army conducted 439 Combat Operations against the Israeli troops on the west flank of the canal, shot down over 11 Israeli aircraft, including two UAVs, destroyed 41 tanks, 36 engineering equipment, damaged oil carrier and sank a landing ship, suppressed IDF air defenses and artillery.- The Egyptian military was planning and preparing to eliminate the Israeli ground breakthrough west of the canal, around 12 brigades, including 880 tank were mobilized to conduct this operation.- Through this plan, Egypt would have encircled the Israeli troops in the gap, destroy their stone bridgehead in Deversoir and cut off the supply routes and troops flow from the East, then the Egyptian forces on the confrontation line would have the upper hand in fighting the besieged Israeli troops.





The SC

Feb 13, 2012
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An Egyptian military report covering civilian casualties resulted from Israeli attacks during October 1973. Israeli Air Force conducted dozens of raids against civil targets, including farms, houses, vehicles, and infrastructure facilities.


Egyptian military documents revealed that the US had conducted at least two intelligence gathering flights during the first two weeks of October 1973 war, the well-known one that was carried out by SR-71 blackbird spy aircraft; military intel records saying an aerial target flew at altitude of 22 km and Mach 3 speed conducted recon flight over the canal flank, Cairo, and Qena.Another electronic reconsiance flight was presumably carried by unidentified US aircraft off Egypt's coast from Matrouh to Port Said.




The Egyptian Military Command ordered two navy destroyers, ENS El-Zafer and ENS El-Fateh to sail from Safaga to south Red Sea and anchor at Aden port in Yemen in August 1973, around two months before the war breakout.At that time, the Egyptian Navy was building up its force in southern Red Sea to impose a blockage on Israel from Bab al-Mandab Strait, preventing commercial ships, including oil tankers coming from Iran from reaching Israel.


Assessment of Egyptian Navy Combat Operations in October 1973 by the Chief of Egyptian Army Operations Authority:The Egyptian Navy fought in four major sea battales, thwarted 9 attacks, conducted four special operations, bombed 12 coastal target, attacked and sank three commercial ships for Israel, including an oil tanker.- Israeli Navy losses (damaged/destroyed): Total of 29 Israeli naval vessels; seven missile boats and a carrier for helicopters (?) destroyed, seven other vessels were damaged. Most notable that the Egyptian Navy vessels shot down around 12 aircraft and helicopters.The Egyptian Navy also imposed a full blockage on Israel from Bab al-Mandab and prevented any commercial ship heading to Israel from reaching the Red Sea.



Assessment Report of Egyptian Air Force/Air Defense Combat Operations in October 1973 by the Chief of Egyptian Army Operations Authority:- Egyptian Air Force conducted around 6200 flight, average 310 flight/dayEAF aircraft losses: 195 aircraft/ 36 helicoptersLimited range of Egyptian Air Force jets was a major problem Egyptian Air Force (EAF) got into 20 fighting, including six major air combat. - Israeli Air Force (IAF) conducted a total of 6196 flights- 93 Israeli Air Force aircraft were downed by the EAF.- Egyptian Air Defenses shot down 165 Israeli aircraft.Total Losses of IAF: 258 aircraft/jets/helicopters..



- Around 1/3 of Egyptian Air Force losses resulted from Friendly Fire by the Egyptian troops on the ground.
- Part of EAF losses were due to the limited flight range
- Egyptian Air Force flights reached sometimes to over 400 flights/ day (483 flights on Oct. 8).


There is a lot more..



Senior Member
Apr 21, 2021
The saddest part of the Yom Kippur war was the customary treachery of that fake King of a fake kingdom the so called King Hussein of Jordan, who betrayed his arab brethren by alerting Golda Meir of the impending attack. Wasn't the first time this clan was responsible for a monumental treachery that had a long lasting and devastating historical impact. His great grand father, the sharif of mecca had previously betrayed the Ottomans during WW1 and laid the foundation of all the chaotic mess in the ME ever since. May they both burn in hell for eternity.

The SC

Feb 13, 2012
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The October 1973 War is considered one of the wars that history will continue to talk about for a long time, as it was a comprehensive Egyptian military epic. The Egyptian miracle imposed itself at that time on all international media in general and American media in particular, despite Washington’s clear bias towards Israel, but the bias could not bear the shock of the surprise, so it was issued. The October Victory made headlines in various media outlets, and many world leaders commented on the war, and writers competed to record the various stages of the war, its results, and the scenes behind it. The following are the most prominent things published, written, and said in commemoration and commentary on the October Victory:

They said about the October War:

The media:

“The Arabs and Israelis are fighting on two fronts, and the Egyptians are crossing the Suez Canal, and intense battles are taking place.” The United States demands an end to the fighting, and Kissinger’s appeals to prevent the battles are in vain. "

The New York Times
October 7, 1973

“The Egyptians and Syrians demonstrate high efficiency, organization, and courage. The Arabs have achieved a precious victory that will have psychological effects. The Egyptians’ retention of the eastern bank of the canal is a huge and unparalleled victory that has shattered the Israelis’ illusions that the Arabs are not fit for war.”

Washington Post newspaper

“The Egyptians achieved a psychological victory over Israel. Egypt regained control of the Suez Canal...an unparalleled victory for Egypt.

Washington Post newspaper
October 8, 1973

“The war was the most fierce that had been waged since the 1948 war, and it was clear that they, the Israelis, lost the initiative in this war, and the Israeli army retreated due to the wide range of advanced weapons that were used in the war by the Arab coalition."

Reuters American Agency
October 11, 1973

“The October War was the only one of the four wars between the Arabs and Israel in which the Egyptians prevailed over the Israelis. The crossing of the Suez Canal was bold and ingenious by melting the giant defensive sand berms with high-pressure water hoses and erecting floating bridges. The commandos crossed the canal in open rubber boats."

American New Yorker magazine
October 11, 1973

“The Egyptians’ retention of the eastern bank of the canal is a huge and unparalleled victory, with which the Israelis’ illusions that the Arabs are not fit for war were shattered.”

The Washington Post
October 12, 1973

“Every passing day destroys the myths that have been built since Israel’s victory in 1967. There was a myth at first that said that Arabs are not warriors and that the Israeli is Superman, but the war proved the opposite.”

American Newsweek magazine
October 14, 1973

We were astonished by what we saw in front of us of debris spread across the desert sand of all types of equipment, including Israeli tanks, artillery, and vehicles. We also saw abandoned Israeli shoes and Egyptian laundry on the Bar Lev Line. Their leaders, including General Shlomo Gonen, commander of the southern front in Sinai, admitted this.

Reuters correspondent - Tel Aviv
October 9, 1973

“The Egyptian and Syrian forces caught the Israeli leadership naked, as a result of which the Israeli leadership was unable to mobilize sufficient reserve forces to confront the situation until three days later. Israeli public opinion was based on the belief that its intelligence services were the most efficient, and that its army was the strongest, and now "Public opinion in Israel wants to know exactly what happened and why. The question on every tongue in Tel Aviv now is why the Israeli leadership did not know about Egypt and Syria's plans in advance."

United Press correspondent - Tel Aviv
October 10, 1973

“The Israelis faced an opponent who was superior to them in every way and prepared for a long war of attrition. At the same time, Israel faced an opponent who was better trained and more skilled in leadership.”

Associated Press Tel Aviv correspondent
October 10, 1973

“The October War - when the Egyptian army stormed the Suez Canal and swept the Bar Lev Line - changed the course of history for Egypt and for the entire Middle East.”

British newspaper The Daily Telegraph

“The image presented by the international press of the Arab fighter after the 1967 war was an image full of negatives and gave the impression of the impossibility of a successful military confrontation by the Arabs against Israel’s military power. Accordingly, we can understand the extent of the change that occurred after the Arab fighter proved his presence and capabilities, and how the international press reported this change. On world public opinion.”

British newspaper The Times
October 1973

"The past week was a week of discipline and torture for Israel. It is clear that the Arab armies are fighting with strength, courage and determination. The Israelis were also filled with sadness and depression when they found that the war had cost them heavy losses and that the Egyptians and Syrians were not, as they were told, unable to fight."

Financial Times newspaper

“It is clear that the Arabs are fighting with unparalleled valor. It is certain that the violence of their fighting has a major role in their victories. At the same time, the Israelis are seized with a general feeling of depression upon their painful discovery, which cost them greatly, that the Egyptians and Syrians are not in fact helpless soldiers.” “Indications are that the Israelis were retreating along the line in front of the advancing Egyptian and Syrian forces.”

British newspaper The Times

“The prevailing feeling in Israel today is characterized by sadness and depression, and the number of prisoners of war returning from Egypt was more than expected, which means that many deaths occurred.”

British Jewish Chronicle newspaper
October 14, 1973

“It has become clear that the Israeli forces are not made up - as they thought - of invincible men. Israeli confidence after 1967 has reached the point of disgusting arrogance that does not tend toward compromise, and that this arrogance has evaporated in the October War, and this is evident from the statements made by Made by Israeli officials, including Moshe Dayan himself.

British newspaper Daily Sun

“Al-Ferdan, east of the Suez Canal, was one of the first sites captured by the Egyptian forces... and then the Egyptians achieved their greatest victories and regained their lands from the first day... and their faces showed signs of pride and victory over the Bar Lev Line, which collapsed in front of them, and thus the Israeli Bar Lev Line was gone irretrievably.”

British newspaper The Times

“This war erased the feeling of humiliation among the Arabs and wounded Israel’s pride.”

British newspaper Daily Mail

“The Egyptian Navy outperformed the Israeli Navy during the October War, especially in the field of missiles.”

French Defense Magazine

“Egypt, with seven thousand years of civilization behind it, is engaged in a long-term war with Israel, which fights today in order to live tomorrow, and then never thinks about what its condition may become in the relatively distant future.”

French newspaper Figaro

"The October War overthrew the theory of secure borders as understood by the rulers of Tel Aviv. It proved that Israel's security cannot be guaranteed by tanks and missiles, but rather by a just peace settlement agreed upon by the Arab countries."

French newspaper Le Monde

“It was truly an exaggeration of delusion on the part of the Israeli side to believe that the Arab countries would remain surrendered forever in the face of the occupation of their lands, and whatever the outcome of the battles, the Arabs achieved a victory and eliminated the prevailing image of them.”

French newspaper Le Monde

“General Yitzhak Rabin announced that his country has military plans to confront all possibilities, including the occupation of the North Pole, but it seems that the possibility of a sweeping Egyptian attack on the afternoon of October 6th was not included in the Israelis’ possibilities, and for this they paid a heavy price.”

German magazine Der Spiegel
October 11, 1973

“The struggle that the Arabs are waging against Israel is a just struggle. The Arabs are fighting in defense of their rights, and if a person fights in defense of his land against an aggressor, then he is waging a war of liberation. As for the war to continue occupying the land of others, it is blatant aggression.”

German newspaper Zeitung

“The Israeli soldiers fled the Bar Lev Line while they were catching their breath, their bodies covered with filth and their faces pale. Their remnants fled from the hell that the sweeping Egyptian attack opened upon them.”

Italian newspaper Anna Bella

“Before the October War, false feelings prevailed in the country, which was the feeling of our hawks of overwhelming military superiority, to the point that this belief led them to military reassurance in the form of, ‘We will cut them into pieces if they dare to raise a finger in our face.’”

Israeli newspaper Alhamshamar

“The October War created a concept that we did not seem to have known before (the war-weary), by which we mean those who have suffered from psychological trauma and are now spread out in hospitals and convalescent homes being treated in order to rid them of the effects left by the brutal war.. Israeli soldiers during that war knew for the first time Once in their lives, they experienced siege, isolation during fighting, the shame of captivity, and the fear of running out of ammunition.” .

Israeli newspaper Haaretz

“Until the day of the ceasefire on the Sinai front, we had not been able to harm the Egyptian army, and it is certain that even without reaching a cessation of fighting, we would not have succeeded in stopping or destroying the Egyptian army. Thus, it can be said that during our fourth war with the Arabs, we did not achieve "Something."

Israeli newspaper Haaretz

“Golda Meir admitted - in her speech after the October War - that she had thought about committing suicide.”

Israeli newspaper Yedioth Ahronoth

“During that war, Israeli soldiers knew, for the first time in their lives, the experience of siege, isolation during combat, the shame of captivity, and the fear of running out of ammunition.”

Israeli newspaper Haaretz

“The siren that sounded at ten minutes to two in the afternoon on October 6, 1973 represented more than just a warning to the citizens of Israel to go to the bunkers, as it was the shout that echoed when the dead person was buried. The dead person at that time was the first Israeli republic, and when the war ended. The countdown has begun again and a new history has begun. A quarter of a century after the establishment of the State of Israel, the pillars and foundations of ancient Israel have become rubble thrown on the side of the road.

Israeli newspaper Maariv

“This war represents a gaping wound in Israel’s national flesh.”

Israeli magazine Bahneh

“The Yom Kippur War represents a breaking point for Israeli society in many areas.”

Israeli magazine Bama Hanya

“..The October War undermined the self-confidence of the Israeli security elite...and caused, to a certain extent, the demolition of security assumptions on which the Israeli strategy was based for a long time, and thus some of the main elements in the theory of national security that crystallized in the first decade of the state’s establishment were changed by by this war” .

David Ben-Gurion - Israeli magazine Bahneh

Literary works:

Many writings were published in many parts of the world in the wake of the October 1973 War, including:

The following was stated in a book entitled “The Gun and the Olive Branch” by British journalist David Hirst:

“The October War was like an earthquake. For the first time in the history of Zionism, the Arabs tried and succeeded in imposing a fait accompli by force of arms. The setback was not just a military setback, but rather it struck all the psychological, diplomatic, and economic elements that make up the strength and vitality of any nation."

In the book “Painful Days in Israel” by the French writer Jean-Claude Gibout, he says:

At ten and six minutes in the morning of the first of December, David Ben-Gurion surrendered his soul in Ted Hashomer Hospital near Tel Aviv. David Ben-Gurion did not say anything before he died, except that he saw everything. It was possible for fate to spare this patient who suffered from a hemorrhage in the brain on November 18, 1973, during those last eight weeks of his life, but fate was cruel. It was the president’s awakening of the Israeli cabinet in his final days that made him witness the collapse of an entire world, and this world was his world. He saw, while in the heart of his colony in the Negev, Israel being crushed in days. A few days later, as a result of an earthquake more brutal than a fourth war, Israel began to fall sharply, and this time it fell from the lofty height of which it had been reassured.

In the book “The October Earthquake and the Yom Kippur War” by Zeev Schiff, an Israeli military commentator, the following is stated:

This is the first war for the Israeli army in which doctors treated many soldiers suffering from combat shock and in need of psychological treatment. There were those who forgot their names and these had to be transferred to hospitals. Israel was astonished by the success of the Arabs in surprising them in the Yom Kippur War and in achieving military successes. This war proved that Israel must re-evaluate the Arab warrior. This time, Israel paid a very heavy price. The October War shook Israel from the base to the top, and instead of overconfidence came doubts and questions surfaced: Are we living on our destruction forever? Is there a possibility of persevering in other wars?

The following was stated in the book “Israel: The End of the Myth” by Amnon Kapeliuk, an Israeli military commentator:

The British government says that the higher the ascent, the harsher the fall. On October 6, Israel fell from the top of the tower of tranquility and reassurance that it had built for itself. The shock, on the level of the illusions that preceded it, was strong and exciting, as if the Israelis had woken up from a long, beautiful dream in order to see a long list of The taken-for-granted principles, illusions and undisputed truths that they had believed in for many years were shaken and sometimes shattered by a new reality that was unexpected and incomprehensible to the majority of Israelis.

In his book “Where Is Israel Going,” Nahum Goldman, former head of the Jewish Agency, says:

One of the most important results of the October 1973 war is that it put an end to the myth of Israel confronting the Arabs. This war also cost Israel a heavy price, about five billion dollars, and brought about a radical change in the economic situation in the Israeli state, which moved from the state of prosperity it was experiencing a year ago, although this situation did not and was not based on solid foundations, as it turned out to be a very deep crisis that was more severe and dangerous than all previous crises. However, the most dangerous results were those that occurred on the psychological level. The Israelis’ confidence in their permanent superiority had ended, and their internal moral front had become enormously weak, and this is the most dangerous thing. It could be faced by the people, especially Israel.

In the book “Dereliction,” which was written by seven senior Israeli journalists: Yeshayahu Ben Porat, Yehontan Gefen, Uri Dan, Eitan Hever, Hezi Carmel, Eli Lindo, and Eli Tayor, the following was stated:

“The Egyptians fought in a suicidal manner. They came out towards us from a distance of a few meters and fired their light anti-tank guns at our tanks. They were not afraid of anything. After each shell, they actually rolled between the wheels and took cover under a bush on the side of the road, loading their guns with new bullets, despite the fact that a large number of Egyptian commandos were wounded.” However, their colleagues did not escape, but rather continued to wage a disruptive battle, a suicidal battle against the tanks, as if they were determined to pay with their lives to prevent the tanks from passing, and the armored soldiers were forced to engage in battle with them while they were firing from their machine guns from above the tanks. In fact, this had never happened to us before in any situation. We were never confronted before with soldiers of this type of valor and steadfastness.”

In the book “My Life” by Golda Meir, the former wartime prime minister, the following is stated:

It is not difficult for me to write about the October 1973 War (Yom Kippur War). This is how Meir began her talk in her book “My Life,” which was translated into “The Confessions of Golda Meir.” Then she resumed her words, “I will not write about the war - from a military perspective - as this is something I leave to others... But I will write about it as an overwhelming disaster and a nightmare that I experienced myself and that will always remain with me... If only it were that we did not receive warnings in a timely manner, but rather We were fighting on two fronts at the same time, and we were fighting enemies who had been preparing themselves to attack us for years." .... We were overwhelmingly outnumbered, whether in terms of weapons, tanks, aircraft or men... We were suffering from a deep psychological collapse... The shock was not only in the way the war began, but it was in the fact that most of our basic estimates... Prove her wrong. The probability in October was slim.

In the book “Self-Search” by former President Anwar Sadat:

At exactly two o'clock, the news arrived that our planes had crossed the Suez Canal and that 222 jet planes were flying faster than the speed of sound. They completed their first strike in exactly a third of an hour. Our losses were almost negligible. The airstrike was a complete and amazing success according to the planning we had made... it was amazing for us in the first place... the air strike achieved results exceeding 90% with losses of less than 2%... and it was amazing for Israel and all of the world, east and west... the Egyptian Air Force regained with this first strike everything we lost in the 1956 and 1967 wars. It paved the way for our armed forces after that to achieve that victory that restored our armed forces, our people, and our Arab nation’s full self-confidence, and the world’s confidence in us.

In the writing of “The Days Made in Israel” by Jean-Claude Gibouh:

Did Anwar Sadat imagine, when he launched his tanks and soldiers to cross the Suez Canal at two o’clock in the afternoon on October 6, that he was unleashing a powerful, terrible force that would change this world? Everything from Europe to America, from Asia to Africa, did not remain in its original state. It had been on it since the Yom Kippur War, but this horrific coup with regard to Israel took the form of a devastating earthquake, because the war that struck it was harsh on it on the battlefields, and then it was even more destructive than that on the people there, as they witnessed the death of a great dream that collapsed, and what they saw after that is a certain image of Israel that is disappearing forever...

At the official level:

We have fought and are fighting for the only peace that deserves to be described as peace, which is peace based on justice. Peace cannot be imposed, and de facto peace does not last or be established. We did not fight in order to attack the land of others, but rather to liberate our occupied land, and to find ways to restore the legitimate rights of the people of Palestine. We are not war adventurers... but rather we are peace seekers.

(President Anwar Sadat in his speech on October 16, 1973)

As a result of the October War, the world entered a new economic phase, and world conditions will not return to what they were before this war.

Pierre Messmer Prime Minister of France January 7, 1974

This is a difficult war. The armored battles are tough and the air battles are bitter. It is a war that is heavy in its days and heavy in its blood.

Moshe Dayan 48 hours after the war

"The October War was like an earthquake that Israel suffered, and what happened in this war removed the dust from our eyes and showed us what we had not seen before, and all of this led to a change in the mentality of the Israeli leaders.”

Moshe Dayan

The October War surprised us in a way we did not expect, and no foreign government warned us of the existence of any specific plans for any Arab attack.

Henry Kissinger
United States Secretary of State 12/28/1973

No one in this country realizes the number of times during the year 1973 that we received information from the same source stating that war would break out on one day or another without actually breaking out, and I will not say that this was fate.

Golda Meir Former Prime Minister of Israel

We talked too much before October 1973, and that was one of our problems. The Egyptians learned how to fight while we learned how to speak. They were patient and their statements were more realistic than ours. They announced the facts so completely that the outside world began to trust their words and statements.

Chaim Herzog Former Israeli president

October 6 is a revolution and not just a battle. The battle is a struggle that may end with victory or otherwise. But the revolution is a spiritual leap that extends in space and time until civilization is achieved. It is a symbol of man’s revolt against himself, his transcendence of his reality, his identification of his fears, and confrontation of the most violent and domineering forces of evil. .. The spirit of October is never extinguished, as it has opened a path without end for us.. Crossing is only the first leap in the stream of its challenges.

(Naguib Mahfouz)

"Since the sixth of October, the rhythm and pulse of life around us has changed after our armed forces crossed into Sinai. They crossed into the horizons of the future and left behind them all the darkness of despair, rupture and defeat, and began to draw a new map of modern Arab history."

(Youssef Al-Sibai)

We crossed the path of defeat by crossing into Sinai, and whatever the outcome of the battles, the most important thing is the leap. It has the meaning that Egypt is always Egypt. The world thinks it has slept, but its soul does not sleep, and if it sleeps for a while, it has a sigh and a roar and then rises. Egypt will remember this moment in its history with thanks, pride and gratitude. "

( Tawfeek Al Hakeem)

The October 1973 War left profound effects not only on the Middle East... as it dispelled a number of myths and illusions. The October War left its impact not only on Arab strategy, Israeli strategy, and military theories and techniques, but also on other factors such as morale, the use of certain weapons on the battlefield, the arms race in the Middle East, and the use of electronic devices.

Military expert Edgar Oblans
October 1975

The October War changed the political map of the Middle East, broke the state of stagnation, strengthened the position of the Arab countries, and also demonstrated the vital role that men can play under determined leadership.

Brigadier General Kenneth Hunt - Britain

The Egyptian Air Force has appeared at a high level in a way that was not expected at all... as the Egyptian pilots showed that they do not lack Boldness and courage, and the Arab ground crews also demonstrated their superior ability to operate and manage modern aviation squadrons such as (((MiG-21))) under difficult combat conditions.

Middleton's turn
Military expert

I didn't think we would suffer such aircraft losses.

Bidor Einrik
Israeli Skyhawk pilot

We were amazed by the excellent level of Egyptian pilots and their high combat efficiency.

Ori Yusuf Awar
Israeli first lieutenant pilot

The Israeli aviation is unable to achieve the success that the Israeli public expected before the war. It has become clear through the course of operations that official assurances about the ability of the Israeli Air Force to carry out rapid action against the Arabs in the event of renewed fighting were inaccurate claims...Egyptian forces are entering Sinai from everywhere, in every direction, and by all means. By helicopters, boats, and on foot... these forces fight fiercely and are armed with the latest weapons.

General Kalman
An Israeli commander in Sinai

The lessons learned from the October War relate more to the men and their abilities than to the machines they operate. The tremendous achievement achieved by the Egyptians is the genius and skill of the commanders and officers who trained and carried out an offensive operation that came as a complete surprise to the other party, even though it took place under their watch, and as a continuation of this it showed. The soldiers' high morale is impossible.

General Fara Hockley
Combat Development Director
In the British Army

The fourth round resulted in a complete disaster for Israel. The results of the battles and the repercussions that began to appear in Israel confirm the importance of the victories that ended the feeling of Israeli superiority and its invincible army and confirmed the competence and determination of the Arab fighter and the effectiveness of the weapon in his hand.

George Leslie
President of the Jewish organization in Strasbourg
On October 29, 1973

Moshe Dayan, the Israeli Defense Minister,
admitted in December 1973, that is, two months after the war, that it was like an earthquake that shook Israel. He wrote in his memoirs, saying, “We do not now have sufficient strength to push the Egyptians back again.” He stressed that Israeli leaders must admit that they are not stronger than the Egyptians, and the state of Israeli military superiority has ended forever, and the theory that confirms the defeat of the Arabs in hours if they fight Israel is considered a false theory.

Dayan wrote bitterly: “I misunderstood the ability of the Egyptian forces to build bridges and cross efficiently within a few hours the eastern bank of the canal, and I lost any hope of launching a counterattack.”

Golda Meir, Israeli Prime Minister, said in her memoirs that the October War was not just a major or terrible military event, but rather a tragedy that she lived with and would live with until death. She added, "I suddenly found myself facing the greatest threat to Israel since its founding. Fundamental beliefs that were deeply rooted in us on that day collapsed, including our absolute belief in our ability to prevent the Egyptians from crossing the Suez Canal."

Golda Meir pointed out that when she recalls those days, she remembers the horrific news that she received from the front and the losses that tore her heart apart. She says that she thought about suicide in the first days of the war because she declared before the October War that Egypt did not have the ability to wage it and did not have the leader who could make a decision to go to war, otherwise he will send his people to destruction!

Aharon Yariv, the former Israeli intelligence director, said in a symposium on the Yom Kippur War on September 16, 1974: “There is no doubt that the Arabs emerged victorious from the war, while we, in terms of image and feeling, emerged torn and weak. When Sadat was asked: Did you win the war? He replied: Look at what is happening in Israel after the war, you know the answer to this question.”

Ariel Sharon, commander of a reserve officer group during the October War of 1973, said in a television interview: I was on the front throughout all those terrible days, and after I repeatedly tried to convince them that they should not cross the canal, I carried out the attack and we paid the terrible price we paid. The movement to cross the canal was unnecessary, and here one of the major mistakes that prevailed on the front after the beginning of the war emerged, which was that the higher military level did not appreciate at the time that after crossing the canal with a large force like the one carried out by the Egyptians, it led to an increase in their morale and a decrease in ours. We suffered heavy losses, and I lost there about 300 dead in my division.

Nahum Goldman, former head of the Jewish Agency, pointed out in his book entitled “Where Is Israel Going” that one of the most important results of the October 1973 War was that it put an end to the myth of Israel confronting the Arabs, stressing that the most dangerous results were those that occurred on the psychological level, where it ended The Israelis' confidence in their permanent superiority.

Abba Eban, Israel’s foreign minister during the war, said in November 1973, “Many changes have occurred since October 6, so we should not exaggerate the issue of Israeli military superiority.”

Arwa Ben Ari, assistant commander of the Sinai Front in the Israeli army, said about what happened in the October War, “In the first hours of the Egyptian army’s attack, our feeling was frightening because we felt that we were getting smaller and the Egyptian army was getting bigger, and failure would open the way to Tel Aviv.”

Moshe Dayan, Israeli Minister of War..During the days of the war...on October 9, 1973: “Our aircraft are unable to penetrate the Egyptian air defense network without incurring heavy losses. On October 4, 1973: “Israel is now fighting a war the likes of which it has never fought before, whether in 1956 or in the six-day battles of 1967. This is a difficult war, the armored battles are harsh, and the air battles are bitter... It is a war heavy in its days and heavy in its blood.”

Commenting on the presence of new air defense weapons in Egypt, he said: The Israeli army knew that Egypt had these weapons, but the Egyptian Air Defense Forces used them with high efficiency is what we did not know.

The American Time magazine said in its January 24, 1974 issue that the Egyptian forces were able to use the first air defense system in history, and in a relatively short time they were able to shoot down 78 Israeli aircraft.

The late President Mohamed Anwar Sadat said: Zionism, with its racist claims and the logic of expansion through oppression, is nothing but a weak repetition of fascism and Nazism.

He also said: Peace is not terrorism, no matter how persistent it is in tyranny, and no matter how much the arrogance of power or the foolishness of power appears to it, that arrogance and that foolishness with which our enemy persists.

US Defense Chief James Schlesinger said about the war: The Israelis finally realized that their security cannot be achieved simply by maintaining military control.

Winston Churchill, the British Prime Minister, said: The Israeli defense apparatus itself was dissolved. The system required that mobilization be completed within 24 hours, and that fighters be sent to the battlefront within 48 hours.

Goldman Nahum: One of the most important results of the October 1973 war was that it put an end to the myth of Israel confronting the Arabs.

Andre Bouvre, said: The great success that the Arabs achieved in their attack on October lies in the fact that they achieved a tremendous psychological influence in the opponent’s camp and in the global sphere as well.

David Elazar, Chief of Staff of the Israeli Army, said: “There is no doubt that Sadat achieved his goal completely on the afternoon of October 6th, as he surprised Israel as if someone had dropped its pants.” This man was completely honest in what he said; The surprise - at the political, military, technical, professional, leadership and media levels - was beyond the level of people all over the world. Indeed, everything hidden inside Israel has been revealed, which it sought to conceal with the truth of Israeli civil and military society. It sought to convince the Arabs that it is the strongest, most knowledgeable, and greatest in the region, and that its army is invincible, and its air force will control every inch of Egyptian territory, and it is the one who will rule and manage the region in The future, and everyone must be under control, willingly or unwillingly, but October 1973 not only changed the course of history, but it ended all of these Israeli allegations and dreams, which, even if they were valid for others, were not valid for the people of Egypt.

Abraham Adan, the Israeli armored commander in the October War, said: “We found ourselves facing thousands of Egyptian infantry soldiers equipped with automatic and anti-tank weapons. We were in a ridiculous situation.”

Former Israeli intelligence director Aharon Yariv said: “The Arabs emerged victorious from the war, while we, in terms of image and feeling, emerged torn and weak.”

In a symposium on the Yom Kippur War in Jerusalem on September 16, 1974, Israeli General Yeshiya Javitch said that, as for Israel, in the end the war ended without us being able to break the Arab armies. We did not achieve victories, we were not able to break the Egyptian or Syrian army alike, and we did not succeed in restoring the army’s deterrent power. If we evaluate the achievements in light of the goals, we will find that the Arab victory was more decisive. I cannot help but acknowledge that the Arabs have accomplished a very large portion of their goals. They have proven that they are capable of overcoming the barrier of fear, going out to war, and fighting efficiently. They have also proven that they are capable of storming... Blocking the Suez Canal, and to our great regret, they took the canal from our hands by force of arms.

The SC

Feb 13, 2012
Country of Origin
Country of Residence
The ranking Lions of the October war victory..The hall responded with applause and tears. President Sisi ascended the podium and gave them a military salute


The SC

Feb 13, 2012
Country of Origin
Country of Residence

President Sisi honors a number of heroes of the glorious October War​


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