Signalian
THINK TANK: CONSULTANT
- Aug 18, 2015
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There is a requirement for a strike mission to include an Electronic Attack aircrafts('s) to ensure mission success and survivability of all aircrafts taking part in that mission.
Just a bird's eye view why an EA aircraft is necessary to escort a strike package entering enemy's airspace and making it back in one piece.
In a general scenario, if the attack is going to be carried out by 4-6 PAF's strike aircrafts, at least 1-2 EA aircraft could support them. The enemy Radar detects them and then attempts to starts tracking them as they enter the enemy air space. The receivers of the EA aircarft pick up the radiations from the Radar and starts sampling them to bring up a counter measure. So assuming that S-400 radar is tracking PAF's aircraft, where as the mission is not taking out the S-400 missile battery or S-400 Radar, but taking out any other strategic target. And its not just S-400 radar but other IAF ground based radars as well as IAF Mig-29's or SU30 MKI on CAP. This is where PAF's EA aircraft will provide cover to PAF's strike aircraft (this scenario was seen on 27th Feb through Falcon DA-20 which you mentioned before). In this assumption PAF's EA aircraft is not Falcon DA-20 but either JF-17 or F-16, armed with ECM/ECCM pods. So PAF's EA aircraft starts sending out effective radiated power on IAF's radar, whichever is conceived to be the biggest threat (strong signal level, enough to send a missile towards PAF aircrafts). So two ways to go around that:
1. Stand Off: stay away and direct jammer towards that Radar.
2. Go in: keep flying towards the radar (if it comes in the way or along the way of the target) and barrage with Electromagnetic energy.
Photo: J-10C Equipped for Air Defence Suppression with YJ-91 and PL-10 Missiles
The IAF Radar (or any Radar for that matter) will not have the same power and signal strength in all of its coverage area or coverage radius. The power will be reduced in certain areas, such as on edges of the coverage radius. So as PAF's aircrafts fly towards it, it has more chances of detection, targeting and locking on to PAF's aircraft. Other factors are RCS of PAF aircraft, weather conditions, altitude at which PAF aircraft are flying etc. I have not come to S-400 missiles as yet, as that would be a DEAD (basically destroy IAF's radar and if possible batteries) mission, and this current scenario is part of a SEAD mission (suppress IAF radar's and jamming ability).
So if PAF EA aircraft cannot fully jam the Radar, it could still provide enough cover to strike aircraft to weaken the signal from Radar in the area where PAF aircraft are flying so the IAF Radar cannot lock on to PAF aircraft. IAF Radar would know that something is happening in that area and the radar is being jammed, so IAF may vector in Migs or SU30MKI's to investigate, but the threat of a SAM lock would have dried down mostly. It also depends on the amount of time that PAF aircraft stay in IAF airspace, strike and leave. PAF EA aircraft will be the first to go in and last one to leave IAF airspace and land in PAF airbase.
When jamming comes to mind, its like a fight between jammer and radar, like if u see Star war movies or cartoons, pointing swords and rays coming of swords and the one with more power wins. Its in a way like that but not entirely because jamming has many types. PAF EA aircraft has to do the following things in a high threat environment when IAF radar or IAF aircraft are trying to Jam or target or lock on to PAF strike fighters:
1. Deny IAF jamming attempts
2. Deceive IAF jamming by counter jamming (or ECCM)
3. Degrade IAF jamming, detecting, tracking, targeting attempts.
PAF EA can do 1 or all 3 of the above. Its a cat and mouse game. IAF Radar sends in Freq A (as example), PAF EA aircraft's DRFM memorizes (stores) that and re-transmits back, then IAF Radar jumps to Freq B, PAF EA aircraft memorizes and sends back, so on and so forth. A constant endeavor from both sides. Then IAF Radar tries to lock on PAF's strike aircraft, their RWR and other related sensors light up, so PAF EA aircraft starts creating false/misleading targets OR denies/delays/confuses locking onto PAF's strike aircraft by re-transmitting same frequency. IAF S-400 Radar will pick up whether these decoys has "skin returns" or not, and it will pick up those false targets as decoys. Therefore PAF EA aircraft will use DRFM's coherent jamming technique by creating slight variations in transmitted frequency to create doppler errors for IAF's S-400 Radar. IAF Radar will increase power, proving its location which will be picked up and marked by PAF EA aircraft and relayed back (if data transfers are enabled). Since the IAF's S-400 Radar will have more power available to it (logically), therefore PAF EA aircraft will start jamming its side lobes, instead of main lobe of radar beam tracking PAF's aicrfats, as it will reduce radar coverage area to lock on to PAF aicrafts. This will force S-400 Radar to enable its function of "side lobe jamming canceler" or side lobe blanker to counter PAF EA aircrfat's side lobe jamming. This could reduce some power from the main lobe of IAF Radar so PAF EA aircraft will shift to noise jamming or deception jamming to prevent a lock-on again. This is all going to happen with-in seconds.
Now if PAF EA aircraft was employing MALD's (just google it.. for those who dont know) or UAV's as decoys, or even as jamming support, the S-400 Radar will pick up multiple targets. A capability which I am not sure if PAF has or not currently.
Moving on, IAF's Migs and SU30's: One of the main aims of PAF EA aircraft is to deny a lock on by IAF's S-400 Radar and once IAF's Migs and SU30MKIs reach the scenario, it will continue to do so in air combat now. It will start jamming IAF Migs and SU30MKI's radar to prevent a lock on. In an ideal world, IAF aicrafts should not catch up with PAF's strike package of strike aicrafts and EA aicrafts. But if it does then the main threat are AAM's whose seeker once activated is very very difficult to jam or break lock. AAM has a vision or radar coverage area of its own. BVR AAM"s have narrow but long coverage areas, IR or short range AAM's have wide but short coverage areas. Either towed decoy would help or breaking 90 degrees to get out of field of vision of BVR AAM could possible save PAF's aircrafts.
Falcon DA-20 cannot go into enemy airspace and PAF has 2-3 of them, losing 1 would be a major loss for PAF. Neither would PAF send across AWACs into enemy air space. I don't see any pylons on them for carrying SEAD equipment or even self defense. It's best to have 1 aircraft perform both roles, instead of cluttering up air space with different platforms for different roles.
For strike role, F-16 could be the main strike platform along with Mirages or JF-17. It has the bells and whistles already installed and capable of delivering any goods. In current PAF fighters, 12 F-16C's have the largest combat radius, followed by F-16D's and F-16A MLU's. Although JF-17 has been assigned ARM's, F-16 is much more capable in every sense.
F-16s EW Equipment
Some information on current EW/Jammer systems installed on PAF's F-16's.
1. ALQ-211 V(4) AIDEWS [F-16 Block 52+] (18 in service)
The system is composed of two basic systems:
a) Advanced threat Radar Warning Receivers (RWR)
This system has following components:
1. Line Replaceable Unit(LRU) Receiver Processor
2. Receive Antenna
3. Amplifier
4. Electrical assembly
5. Cockpit Display unit.
b) Advanced threat radar Jammer with Electronic Countermeasures
This system has following components:
1. Line Replaceable Unit(LRU) Advanced Countermeasures unit
2. Radio Frequency Switch Assembly
3. LRU High power receive Transmit
4. Transmit Antenna
The basic functions are :
1. Improving aircrew Situational Awareness and threat warning
2. Employment of active electronic jamming countermeasures
3. Expending countermeasures (i.e., chaff)
This system reduces the ability of threat radars to track the aircraft and it reduces (but not eliminates) the ability of radar‑guided threat systems to shoot the aircraft. The Radar warning sub-system, which can operate separately from the RF countermeasures portion, provides excellent situational awareness, rapidly detecting, identifying, and providing accurate relative bearing to threat radar systems which helps in SEAD missions. It defeats pulse, Pulse Doppler(PD) and continuous wave (CW) threat radars having full frequency Coverage having a wide band receiver. The pod based system enhances Electronic warfare capability.
ALQ-211 enables air crews to download local order of battle threat information, along with on-board, real-time links to other intelligence systems to enable the aircrew accesses to an updated threat lay-down, Exelis officials say. Maneuvering during the mission, the ALQ-211s sensitive receiver and threat identification processing helps the air crew assess threats, identify enemy emitters, and pinpoint their locations beyond lethal range. The system samples the RF environment, and integrates RF, infrared, and laser threat data to provide the air crew with a consolidated picture of dangerous areas.
When the air crew encounters a threat emission, the ALQ-211 determines how far away it is by analyzing the threat ID, lethality, mode of operation, and its changing angle of arrival to the aircraft. This helps pilots re-plan missions to avoid threats, if necessary, and use terrain masking to avoid detection and navigate away from danger. The system also can hand off threat locations for later targeting. If an aircraft is in lethal range, the ALQ-211 can break missile lock through RF countermeasures and deploys chaff and flares, as well as coordinates the response for laser and IR threats.
2. ALQ-131 [F-16 Block 15 MLU] (21 in service)
Jamming Modes available:
a) Noise Jamming
b) Deception Jamming
The ALQ-131 ECM Pod is modular in design containing various electronic receivers, antennas, and powerful transmitters designed to alter the flight path of an incoming enemy missile. This modular pod-mounted system can be configured to cope with a range of threats, spread over one to five frequency bands, by selecting individual modules for inclusion in the pod, to handle threats. The pod can be reprogrammed to match the expected threat. It is designed to deceive radar, sonar, and other detection systems.
It can be used defensively to alter the path of the incoming missile (by working to confuse the missile and guide it away from F-16), or offensively by denying an enemy the ability to get targeting information and by radar jamming both defensive and offensive threats. It's an electronics countermeasures pod that can make the enemy’s radar see multiple targets, or even make the F-16 seem to disappear on enemy radar or move about randomly.
3. ALQ-213 Electronic Warfare Management Systems (60 in service)
It is composed of following components:
a) EW Management Unit
b) Tactical Data Unit
c) Defensive Aids controller
d) Remote Control Panel
e) Advanced Threat Display
The ALQ-213 is the is a system that integrates and controls a wide variety of equipment while providing flexible integration of multiple combinations of sensors and countermeasures systems:
1. RF, UV, IR, Acoustic
2. LASER warning receivers
3. Chaff/Flare
4. Direct IR Counter Measures
5. Towed Decoy (ALE-50)
6. RWR
7. RF Jammer
8. Missile warning sensors
9. Hostile Fire Indicator
4. AN/ALQ-231 Central EW System (F-16 A/B MLU unconfirmed)
AN/ALQ-231 has Communication Jamming ability. It is a precision Electronic Warfare (EW) pod designed to provide an Electronic Attack (EA) capability against communication targets.
It is the first weapon system to include the Electronic Warfare Services Architecture (EWSA) capability. This allows the weapon to not only be controlled from within the host platforms cockpit, but also via a tactical secure radio network. Basically, it can be controlled from the cockpit or by a ground operator.
In one mode, the pilot can operate a set program but in networked mode, troops on the ground can selectively conduct jamming to jam particular bands. This allows for the weapon to be hosted on non-traditional EW platforms while not requiring additional training or workload on the part of the platforms aircrew.
The Data Link which is Link-16, is very hard to copy.
It is highly ECM-resistant, hard to de-crypt, has extended LOS, can act as relay, and different functional areas in avionics like Surveillance, Air Control,Fighter to Fighter com and Others as required. Link-16 gives different commands for different functions in air combat which continuously helps the pilot through its automated system.
It has a "netting" function, which secures communication between a selected group of aircraft only and these "nets" can be different for different groups of aircrafts. Plus the "net" can handle all types of different aircrafts be it fighter or maritime or EW or surveillance, making a group. It is like pairing and de-pairing aircrafts. Net-1 of 4 aircrafts cannot communicate with Net-2 of 5 aircrafts of the same formation or squadron. This makes mission profiles very confidential with in the same group. Enemy has to jam all all "nets" to make jamming effective on data links, but the system senses and alarms the controller, who changes the comm settings thus "net" for the whole group. This way not just 1 aircraft, but the whole formation remains secure and pilots don't have to worry individually about jamming attack or ECM attack on the aircraft they are flying.
The IAF Mig-21 shot down on 27th Feb didn't have such functions, it wasn't under the cover of a function like group "net". It was isolated through jamming and shot down.
PAF's F-16's were secured under the "net" function of Link-16 through correspondence with AWAC's Erieye and EW DA-20 of 24th 'Blinders' Squadron. F-16 Pilots weren't concerned to fight of the ECM or jamming attack (if any), the Link-16 was doing it for them for the most part, rest by DA-20 and other pods carried by F-16 itself.
Link-16 has a handover function which is securely passes information from ship to AWACS to another maritime aircraft to fighter aircraft.
The Data links started with Link-1 then Link 4, then Link 11 and Link-14, but the advancements in Link-16 and that F-16 and EriEye along with Falcon DA-20 used by PAF all use Link-16 makes a very potent data link network in the air.
Each country optimises its LINK-16 based on the testing of their navigation aids (NAVAIDS) and Link-16, so frequency clearance agreement (FAC) can differ from United States Possessions (US&P) certifications. There are also three types of MSG (message services) which are customised by the country which uses Link-16. These are country specific:
1. J28.x
2. J29.x
3. J30.x
The purpose/usage of above three messages is defined by the user country. These messages are processed by mission computer. Here 'J' means Link-16. Then 28,29,30 are message labels. 'x' can be 0,1,2,3 etc and is the the sub-label which is defined for the purpose based on the user country's requirement. As an example J3.7 is EW product information derived from EM sources but remains common for all countries. Apart from that it comes down to two more things, signal processing (e.g. LPI through FH) and cyber security (encryption techniques) of Link-16. Rafale and Mirage-2000 already have Link-16 capability. Turkey and Greece both use F-16s and while Greece also operates Mirage-2000s. I haven't come across any issue of Link-16 breach through jamming or otherwise between Turkey and Greece. If the case is such that PAF detects Link-16 getting hacked or breached and finds out that Israel is helping India for this purpose, then PAF will not only hand over proofs to US, but this will bring a bad reputation for US systems worldwide. Jamming itself is based on many factors, there could be ways to jam an E/O pod, but they have their own limitations however the adversary must have correct set of jamming equipment since these are passive in nature like IRST.
Now when any member here starts hating F-16 since its sanction prone, well F-16 is a match to IAF's aircrafts due to the capabilities that it brings with itself.
The future could be Link-22.
Just a bird's eye view why an EA aircraft is necessary to escort a strike package entering enemy's airspace and making it back in one piece.
In a general scenario, if the attack is going to be carried out by 4-6 PAF's strike aircrafts, at least 1-2 EA aircraft could support them. The enemy Radar detects them and then attempts to starts tracking them as they enter the enemy air space. The receivers of the EA aircarft pick up the radiations from the Radar and starts sampling them to bring up a counter measure. So assuming that S-400 radar is tracking PAF's aircraft, where as the mission is not taking out the S-400 missile battery or S-400 Radar, but taking out any other strategic target. And its not just S-400 radar but other IAF ground based radars as well as IAF Mig-29's or SU30 MKI on CAP. This is where PAF's EA aircraft will provide cover to PAF's strike aircraft (this scenario was seen on 27th Feb through Falcon DA-20 which you mentioned before). In this assumption PAF's EA aircraft is not Falcon DA-20 but either JF-17 or F-16, armed with ECM/ECCM pods. So PAF's EA aircraft starts sending out effective radiated power on IAF's radar, whichever is conceived to be the biggest threat (strong signal level, enough to send a missile towards PAF aircrafts). So two ways to go around that:
1. Stand Off: stay away and direct jammer towards that Radar.
2. Go in: keep flying towards the radar (if it comes in the way or along the way of the target) and barrage with Electromagnetic energy.
Photo: J-10C Equipped for Air Defence Suppression with YJ-91 and PL-10 Missiles
The IAF Radar (or any Radar for that matter) will not have the same power and signal strength in all of its coverage area or coverage radius. The power will be reduced in certain areas, such as on edges of the coverage radius. So as PAF's aircrafts fly towards it, it has more chances of detection, targeting and locking on to PAF's aircraft. Other factors are RCS of PAF aircraft, weather conditions, altitude at which PAF aircraft are flying etc. I have not come to S-400 missiles as yet, as that would be a DEAD (basically destroy IAF's radar and if possible batteries) mission, and this current scenario is part of a SEAD mission (suppress IAF radar's and jamming ability).
So if PAF EA aircraft cannot fully jam the Radar, it could still provide enough cover to strike aircraft to weaken the signal from Radar in the area where PAF aircraft are flying so the IAF Radar cannot lock on to PAF aircraft. IAF Radar would know that something is happening in that area and the radar is being jammed, so IAF may vector in Migs or SU30MKI's to investigate, but the threat of a SAM lock would have dried down mostly. It also depends on the amount of time that PAF aircraft stay in IAF airspace, strike and leave. PAF EA aircraft will be the first to go in and last one to leave IAF airspace and land in PAF airbase.
When jamming comes to mind, its like a fight between jammer and radar, like if u see Star war movies or cartoons, pointing swords and rays coming of swords and the one with more power wins. Its in a way like that but not entirely because jamming has many types. PAF EA aircraft has to do the following things in a high threat environment when IAF radar or IAF aircraft are trying to Jam or target or lock on to PAF strike fighters:
1. Deny IAF jamming attempts
2. Deceive IAF jamming by counter jamming (or ECCM)
3. Degrade IAF jamming, detecting, tracking, targeting attempts.
PAF EA can do 1 or all 3 of the above. Its a cat and mouse game. IAF Radar sends in Freq A (as example), PAF EA aircraft's DRFM memorizes (stores) that and re-transmits back, then IAF Radar jumps to Freq B, PAF EA aircraft memorizes and sends back, so on and so forth. A constant endeavor from both sides. Then IAF Radar tries to lock on PAF's strike aircraft, their RWR and other related sensors light up, so PAF EA aircraft starts creating false/misleading targets OR denies/delays/confuses locking onto PAF's strike aircraft by re-transmitting same frequency. IAF S-400 Radar will pick up whether these decoys has "skin returns" or not, and it will pick up those false targets as decoys. Therefore PAF EA aircraft will use DRFM's coherent jamming technique by creating slight variations in transmitted frequency to create doppler errors for IAF's S-400 Radar. IAF Radar will increase power, proving its location which will be picked up and marked by PAF EA aircraft and relayed back (if data transfers are enabled). Since the IAF's S-400 Radar will have more power available to it (logically), therefore PAF EA aircraft will start jamming its side lobes, instead of main lobe of radar beam tracking PAF's aicrfats, as it will reduce radar coverage area to lock on to PAF aicrafts. This will force S-400 Radar to enable its function of "side lobe jamming canceler" or side lobe blanker to counter PAF EA aircrfat's side lobe jamming. This could reduce some power from the main lobe of IAF Radar so PAF EA aircraft will shift to noise jamming or deception jamming to prevent a lock-on again. This is all going to happen with-in seconds.
Now if PAF EA aircraft was employing MALD's (just google it.. for those who dont know) or UAV's as decoys, or even as jamming support, the S-400 Radar will pick up multiple targets. A capability which I am not sure if PAF has or not currently.
Moving on, IAF's Migs and SU30's: One of the main aims of PAF EA aircraft is to deny a lock on by IAF's S-400 Radar and once IAF's Migs and SU30MKIs reach the scenario, it will continue to do so in air combat now. It will start jamming IAF Migs and SU30MKI's radar to prevent a lock on. In an ideal world, IAF aicrafts should not catch up with PAF's strike package of strike aicrafts and EA aicrafts. But if it does then the main threat are AAM's whose seeker once activated is very very difficult to jam or break lock. AAM has a vision or radar coverage area of its own. BVR AAM"s have narrow but long coverage areas, IR or short range AAM's have wide but short coverage areas. Either towed decoy would help or breaking 90 degrees to get out of field of vision of BVR AAM could possible save PAF's aircrafts.
Falcon DA-20 cannot go into enemy airspace and PAF has 2-3 of them, losing 1 would be a major loss for PAF. Neither would PAF send across AWACs into enemy air space. I don't see any pylons on them for carrying SEAD equipment or even self defense. It's best to have 1 aircraft perform both roles, instead of cluttering up air space with different platforms for different roles.
For strike role, F-16 could be the main strike platform along with Mirages or JF-17. It has the bells and whistles already installed and capable of delivering any goods. In current PAF fighters, 12 F-16C's have the largest combat radius, followed by F-16D's and F-16A MLU's. Although JF-17 has been assigned ARM's, F-16 is much more capable in every sense.
F-16s EW Equipment
Some information on current EW/Jammer systems installed on PAF's F-16's.
1. ALQ-211 V(4) AIDEWS [F-16 Block 52+] (18 in service)
The system is composed of two basic systems:
a) Advanced threat Radar Warning Receivers (RWR)
This system has following components:
1. Line Replaceable Unit(LRU) Receiver Processor
2. Receive Antenna
3. Amplifier
4. Electrical assembly
5. Cockpit Display unit.
b) Advanced threat radar Jammer with Electronic Countermeasures
This system has following components:
1. Line Replaceable Unit(LRU) Advanced Countermeasures unit
2. Radio Frequency Switch Assembly
3. LRU High power receive Transmit
4. Transmit Antenna
The basic functions are :
1. Improving aircrew Situational Awareness and threat warning
2. Employment of active electronic jamming countermeasures
3. Expending countermeasures (i.e., chaff)
This system reduces the ability of threat radars to track the aircraft and it reduces (but not eliminates) the ability of radar‑guided threat systems to shoot the aircraft. The Radar warning sub-system, which can operate separately from the RF countermeasures portion, provides excellent situational awareness, rapidly detecting, identifying, and providing accurate relative bearing to threat radar systems which helps in SEAD missions. It defeats pulse, Pulse Doppler(PD) and continuous wave (CW) threat radars having full frequency Coverage having a wide band receiver. The pod based system enhances Electronic warfare capability.
ALQ-211 enables air crews to download local order of battle threat information, along with on-board, real-time links to other intelligence systems to enable the aircrew accesses to an updated threat lay-down, Exelis officials say. Maneuvering during the mission, the ALQ-211s sensitive receiver and threat identification processing helps the air crew assess threats, identify enemy emitters, and pinpoint their locations beyond lethal range. The system samples the RF environment, and integrates RF, infrared, and laser threat data to provide the air crew with a consolidated picture of dangerous areas.
When the air crew encounters a threat emission, the ALQ-211 determines how far away it is by analyzing the threat ID, lethality, mode of operation, and its changing angle of arrival to the aircraft. This helps pilots re-plan missions to avoid threats, if necessary, and use terrain masking to avoid detection and navigate away from danger. The system also can hand off threat locations for later targeting. If an aircraft is in lethal range, the ALQ-211 can break missile lock through RF countermeasures and deploys chaff and flares, as well as coordinates the response for laser and IR threats.
2. ALQ-131 [F-16 Block 15 MLU] (21 in service)
Jamming Modes available:
a) Noise Jamming
b) Deception Jamming
The ALQ-131 ECM Pod is modular in design containing various electronic receivers, antennas, and powerful transmitters designed to alter the flight path of an incoming enemy missile. This modular pod-mounted system can be configured to cope with a range of threats, spread over one to five frequency bands, by selecting individual modules for inclusion in the pod, to handle threats. The pod can be reprogrammed to match the expected threat. It is designed to deceive radar, sonar, and other detection systems.
It can be used defensively to alter the path of the incoming missile (by working to confuse the missile and guide it away from F-16), or offensively by denying an enemy the ability to get targeting information and by radar jamming both defensive and offensive threats. It's an electronics countermeasures pod that can make the enemy’s radar see multiple targets, or even make the F-16 seem to disappear on enemy radar or move about randomly.
3. ALQ-213 Electronic Warfare Management Systems (60 in service)
It is composed of following components:
a) EW Management Unit
b) Tactical Data Unit
c) Defensive Aids controller
d) Remote Control Panel
e) Advanced Threat Display
The ALQ-213 is the is a system that integrates and controls a wide variety of equipment while providing flexible integration of multiple combinations of sensors and countermeasures systems:
1. RF, UV, IR, Acoustic
2. LASER warning receivers
3. Chaff/Flare
4. Direct IR Counter Measures
5. Towed Decoy (ALE-50)
6. RWR
7. RF Jammer
8. Missile warning sensors
9. Hostile Fire Indicator
4. AN/ALQ-231 Central EW System (F-16 A/B MLU unconfirmed)
AN/ALQ-231 has Communication Jamming ability. It is a precision Electronic Warfare (EW) pod designed to provide an Electronic Attack (EA) capability against communication targets.
It is the first weapon system to include the Electronic Warfare Services Architecture (EWSA) capability. This allows the weapon to not only be controlled from within the host platforms cockpit, but also via a tactical secure radio network. Basically, it can be controlled from the cockpit or by a ground operator.
In one mode, the pilot can operate a set program but in networked mode, troops on the ground can selectively conduct jamming to jam particular bands. This allows for the weapon to be hosted on non-traditional EW platforms while not requiring additional training or workload on the part of the platforms aircrew.
The LINK 16
The Data Link which is Link-16, is very hard to copy.
It is highly ECM-resistant, hard to de-crypt, has extended LOS, can act as relay, and different functional areas in avionics like Surveillance, Air Control,Fighter to Fighter com and Others as required. Link-16 gives different commands for different functions in air combat which continuously helps the pilot through its automated system.
It has a "netting" function, which secures communication between a selected group of aircraft only and these "nets" can be different for different groups of aircrafts. Plus the "net" can handle all types of different aircrafts be it fighter or maritime or EW or surveillance, making a group. It is like pairing and de-pairing aircrafts. Net-1 of 4 aircrafts cannot communicate with Net-2 of 5 aircrafts of the same formation or squadron. This makes mission profiles very confidential with in the same group. Enemy has to jam all all "nets" to make jamming effective on data links, but the system senses and alarms the controller, who changes the comm settings thus "net" for the whole group. This way not just 1 aircraft, but the whole formation remains secure and pilots don't have to worry individually about jamming attack or ECM attack on the aircraft they are flying.
The IAF Mig-21 shot down on 27th Feb didn't have such functions, it wasn't under the cover of a function like group "net". It was isolated through jamming and shot down.
PAF's F-16's were secured under the "net" function of Link-16 through correspondence with AWAC's Erieye and EW DA-20 of 24th 'Blinders' Squadron. F-16 Pilots weren't concerned to fight of the ECM or jamming attack (if any), the Link-16 was doing it for them for the most part, rest by DA-20 and other pods carried by F-16 itself.
Link-16 has a handover function which is securely passes information from ship to AWACS to another maritime aircraft to fighter aircraft.
The Data links started with Link-1 then Link 4, then Link 11 and Link-14, but the advancements in Link-16 and that F-16 and EriEye along with Falcon DA-20 used by PAF all use Link-16 makes a very potent data link network in the air.
Each country optimises its LINK-16 based on the testing of their navigation aids (NAVAIDS) and Link-16, so frequency clearance agreement (FAC) can differ from United States Possessions (US&P) certifications. There are also three types of MSG (message services) which are customised by the country which uses Link-16. These are country specific:
1. J28.x
2. J29.x
3. J30.x
The purpose/usage of above three messages is defined by the user country. These messages are processed by mission computer. Here 'J' means Link-16. Then 28,29,30 are message labels. 'x' can be 0,1,2,3 etc and is the the sub-label which is defined for the purpose based on the user country's requirement. As an example J3.7 is EW product information derived from EM sources but remains common for all countries. Apart from that it comes down to two more things, signal processing (e.g. LPI through FH) and cyber security (encryption techniques) of Link-16. Rafale and Mirage-2000 already have Link-16 capability. Turkey and Greece both use F-16s and while Greece also operates Mirage-2000s. I haven't come across any issue of Link-16 breach through jamming or otherwise between Turkey and Greece. If the case is such that PAF detects Link-16 getting hacked or breached and finds out that Israel is helping India for this purpose, then PAF will not only hand over proofs to US, but this will bring a bad reputation for US systems worldwide. Jamming itself is based on many factors, there could be ways to jam an E/O pod, but they have their own limitations however the adversary must have correct set of jamming equipment since these are passive in nature like IRST.
Now when any member here starts hating F-16 since its sanction prone, well F-16 is a match to IAF's aircrafts due to the capabilities that it brings with itself.
The future could be Link-22.
