RescueRanger
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- Sep 20, 2008
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On the morning of 21st of Feb, 2011 in the city of Lahore Pakistan, a white Honda Civic bearing registration plate LEC 5545 was witnessed by members of the public ramming and shooting two young men on a motorcycle, the driver is then said to have raced down on the wrong side of Queens Road being chased by traffic police officers on motorcycles, the white Honda Civic then strikes an oncoming vehicle and with the help of large number of the public was detained and subsequently arrested.
[Image 1: Map of route]
This map shows his residence at Scotch Corner, Upper mall Road, his direction of travel down Canal Road up Jail Road, where he is seen on CCTV withdrawing funds from an ATM, he is then seen entering his vehicle, before witnesses claim the shootout occurred on the traffic light. After the shooting, he proceeds to travel up Queens road before being arrested.
An interview of eye witnesses on the scene.
Further press coverage of the incident:
[Image 2: A screen grab of the motorcycle ]
It came to light during his arrest that the driver of said car was a foreign national who informed officers he was an employee of the US Embassy and had diplomatic immunity:
What is less known is that during all this another white Toyota Landcrusier bearing false Islamabad registration plate was seen to be racing down Mall Road in the direction of Rail Road, the vehicle then jumped the median before colliding with a motorcylist and it was detained by the public, the driver was a Pakistani National working for the US Embassy and gave his name as Ibad-Ul-Eman. It is believed this vehicle was sent to rescue the occupant of the white Honda Civic but failed in its mission.
[Image 3: A photograph of the Honda Civic involved in the incident. ]
[Image 4: A photograph of the Honda Civic involved in the incident. ]
However it wasn't just the manner of the arrest or the driver's nationality that caught the media attention, it was what the driver had in his possession that raised eyebrows:
[Image 5: A press handout of equipment seized from Davis' person during the search of his vehicle ]
In his possession Davis had a number of questionable items namely:
A subsequent grainy mobile phone footage is released to the media showing the interview of the suspect, he gives his name as Raymond Davis and provides a US DOD ID Card along with an ID Badge issued by the Lahore US consulate.
This entire incident created a diplomatic incident between Islamabad and Washington DC and whilst Davis was released eventually after some backdoor deals were made and blood money paid to the parents of the victims, it left a rather foul taste in the mouths of all concerned.
It would later transpire that Raymond Davis was in fact a contractor for the CIA working for the Human Terrain Team in Afghanistan and Pakistan. [1] The rest as we say is history, however this sordid saga did not start or end with the capture of this Jason Bourne character. The arrest of Davis brought the spotlight firmly on PMC(Private Military Companies) operating in Pakistan through various contracts with the US embassy.
Whilst the US Military intervention may have been exposed in the past few years, this is a program that may have existed under our very noses for at least 20/30 years, perhaps even more. Let us examine the work of a consortium unknown to people outside certain circles. BINGOsmc: Balochistan International NGO Security Management Consortium? For those who don't know what it's function was:
In early 2004, a group of 10 international agencies based in Quetta, Balochistan formed a consortium to act as a security network and meet periodically to exchange security information and analysis.
An NGO security advisor was already established to support NGOs, based in Islamabad. However, INGOs raised concerns regarding the effectiveness of this initiative particularly as, at that time, most security incidents and concerns were focused in Balochistan Province.
While the establishment of Balochistan INGO Consortium (BINGO) initially improved the level of security information available, it became evident to BINGO members that additional security support was needed due to the marked differences in security capacity and experience amongst INGOs operating out of Quetta.
In May 2004, the BINGO Security Management Support pilot project was established. This was funded by DG ECHO, with Concern as the host agency and focal point for the donor, and Mercy Corps providing additional support in terms of administration and accommodation.
The BINGO Consortium convened a Security Management Committee, consisting of five members of the consortium, to oversee the Security Management Support project and supervise and monitor the activities of the Security Management Advisory team.
The Security Management Advisory team, made up of an international Security Management Advisor and two national Security Officers, were tasked with a wide range of security support activities including:
information gathering, analysis and reporting on incidents that could impact
upon the security of the operating environment of the INGOs programmes in
Balochistan;
Below is a sample of a detailed intelligence report generated by a INGO in Pakistan -2009:
In August 2005 the Pakistani authorities ordered the BINGO consortium to close and terminate all activities.
Looking at BINGO, it has access to combined staff power of Concern, Care Af/Pak, Mercy Corps etc. It's major role of Grass Roots Intelligence Gathering, Authoring Sit Reps and Impact Assessments. Considering that INGOs operate in remote corners of Pakistan and that their personnel "social mobilizers" carry considerable clout with the locals, can speak the language and blend in no problem, it is easy for them to gather intel and bring back 1st hand information for their managers (handlers).
Where was this "intel" going, no one know's to this day. Think i am a conspiracy nut, just look at the type of talent that had worked with BINGOSMC in the past:
Bob Lidstone - Canada | LinkedIn
Now look at similar offshoots in Afghanistan:
ANSO
Here is a sample ANSO Report: http://www.ngosafety.org/store/files/ANSO Q3 2012.pdf
^
The above is designed, managed and run by NGOs to gather and analyse security information in Afghanistan, it's international off shoot in INSO: International NGO Safety Organisation :: INSO HOME ( much wider objective).
Coming back to Pakistan, we fail to respect the security challenges faced by foreign intelligence assets infiltrating well meaning "humanitarian agencies", for example: almost every respectable aid agency carries hand held GPS (excellent for geo caching), iridium based telephone systems (can bypass Pakistanis cellular and fixed line networks), due to their nature of work have access to highly detailed OS 1:25000 maps and detailed zonal, tribal, political, and maps at the UC level.
Another example of a foreign intelligence cell busted by the Intelligence Agencies in Pakistan: Colonel among three Germans held
Pakistan based map makers Alhasan Systems Private Limited carries out GIS work for various INGOs from 2005 to present date, here is an example of a highly detailed UC map complete with data sets:
They have a level of trust within the community and a large workforce in the field that speaks the language and can blend in without investing a lot of money in training, acclimatization, mobilization etc.
Finally, In 2011 the then Interior Minister Ch Nisar claimed that Pakistani intelligence had credible information that upto 1000 foreign intelligence operatives had come to Islamabad under the pretext of aid workers or INGO consultants[2]
So now we come to the issue of the Private Security companies/Security Contractors, Pakistan was big business for PSC/PMC's and why not, since 2001 Pakistan has been a profitable country for PSC and Logistics companies, with the private security industry valued at around $60 Million US, that is one big pie.
Sadly following the controversial arrest and detention of a US contractor in Lahore, the establishment has made difficult for expatriate security contractors and foreign security companies operating in the country.
This subsequently led to heads rolling and the first of many on the chopping block was a BW and it's on ground partner Pakistani based security company InterRisk:
Owner of Inter Risk Security Company re-arrested | AAJ News
( You can read more on the whole fiasco here: Alex Constantine's Blacklist: DynCorp Sub-Contractor Inter-Risk was Behind the Oct. 10th Suicide Bombing of Pakistan's Army HQ)
This was closely followed by several small set up's based in Karachi, Lahore and one shoddy little number running out of Shami Road, Peshawar. major player Pax Mondial: Pax Mondial — Solutions for an evolving world
After several complaints lodged by the security services, Paxmondial's Pakistan office was forcibly closed at the hands of the Securities & Exchange Commission:
http://www.secp.gov.pk/orders/pdf/orders-2012/Order_PAX_MONDIAL_PAKISTAN.PDF
This was followed a quick fire round of pressure from the establishment on various outfits that led to the departure of all the British Security contractors in Pakistan: US security contractors survive, UK firms pack up | Latest news, Breaking news, Pakistan News, World news, business, sport and multimedia | DAWN.COM
In November 2012 the Giant of Global Security G4S also announced the closure of its Pakistan office and the sale of it's assets to Wackenhut Pvt Limited AKA: SMS Pathfinder Limited (Run by Major (R) Ikram Sehgal).
Now the only approved companies operating in Pakistan are the following:
RSM Consulting: RSM Consulting ( US Embassy Contract)
Tripple Canopy: Triple Canopy | Secure Success (US State Dept Contract)
SallyPort: KSI-Services | KSI ( Unknown: Capacity Building)
Dyncorp: DynCorp International - We Serve Today For a Better Tomorrow (US State Dept Contract, Air Logistics)
Catalyst: Catalyst Services - Services (Construction, Housing & Life Support Services to State Dept)
"Grey" Companies Operating in Pakistan: These are companies that have bypassed the legal framework by piggybacking on other company NOC's or are using legal loop holes to market themselves as "risk management" & "reputation management" companies. However they don't have the same foot print or risk profile as other US PSC/PMC:
Hill & Associates: Hill & Associates ( Offices in Khi: SECP DATA: The Official Website of SECP)
Salamanaca: A worldwide Due Diligence, Risk Management and Maritime Security firm specialising in Forensic Accounting and Corporate Security (Office in Karachi: Not in SECP Database)
Field Security Services: http://fieldsecurityservices.com/ ( Office in Karachi: SECP Data: The Official Website of SECP) However please note that this company is piggybacking off the NOC of Sky Guards Pvt Limited (a Pakistani Company) seem to be one and the same concern: The Official Website of SECP
I should mention 2012 there was a proposed bill to curtail the emergence of US/UK and other private security companies, this was called the FSA Bill and was submitted to the NA for passing into law, however all traces of this text was deleted from the internet, being the crafty little fox i am here is a copy of your reference:
FSA Proposed Bill 2012
Other companies operation in Pakistan via "local" partners:
Swiss Security Team stationed at Swiss Embassy and ECHO Office in Partnership with Bagrani Brothers Pvt Limited
US Embassy/USAID/John Snow Research Institute(formerly PAIMAN) via (Unknown Contractor) via Haris Enterprises Pvt Limited
Locally out of the 200+ private security companies in Pakistan only 9 have signed the "International Code of Conduct on Private Security"
https://www.icoca.ch/en/membership?private_security_companies[companies]=companies&area_of_operation=all&headquarter_country=174&keywords=&op=Search&view_type=map&form_build_id=form-4kZNwqq8kkJFsj1nduk6xA2YvT9MQQqejL1FGRavTYU&form_id=_search_for_members_filter_form#search_for_members_list
Chines PMCs in Pakistan:
China Overseas Security Group (Belt and Road Initiative/CPEC) via Askari Guards
China Security and Protection Group (Belt and Road Initiative/CPEC) via Askari Guards
Frontier Services Group (Belt and Road initiative/CPEC) via Askari Guards
References / Further reading:
[1] https://info.publicintelligence.net/humanterrainhandbook.pdf
[2] https://tribune.com.pk/story/917804/over-1000-hostile-spies-visited-pakistan-under-ingo-guise-nisar/
--end--
[Image 1: Map of route]
This map shows his residence at Scotch Corner, Upper mall Road, his direction of travel down Canal Road up Jail Road, where he is seen on CCTV withdrawing funds from an ATM, he is then seen entering his vehicle, before witnesses claim the shootout occurred on the traffic light. After the shooting, he proceeds to travel up Queens road before being arrested.
An interview of eye witnesses on the scene.
Further press coverage of the incident:
[Image 2: A screen grab of the motorcycle ]
It came to light during his arrest that the driver of said car was a foreign national who informed officers he was an employee of the US Embassy and had diplomatic immunity:
What is less known is that during all this another white Toyota Landcrusier bearing false Islamabad registration plate was seen to be racing down Mall Road in the direction of Rail Road, the vehicle then jumped the median before colliding with a motorcylist and it was detained by the public, the driver was a Pakistani National working for the US Embassy and gave his name as Ibad-Ul-Eman. It is believed this vehicle was sent to rescue the occupant of the white Honda Civic but failed in its mission.
[Image 3: A photograph of the Honda Civic involved in the incident. ]
[Image 4: A photograph of the Honda Civic involved in the incident. ]
However it wasn't just the manner of the arrest or the driver's nationality that caught the media attention, it was what the driver had in his possession that raised eyebrows:
[Image 5: A press handout of equipment seized from Davis' person during the search of his vehicle ]
In his possession Davis had a number of questionable items namely:
- 1 Glock 17 Pistol with 7 spare magazines and 105 rounds of 9mm ammunition.
- 2 Armalite magazines with 60 rounds of ammunition
- 2 x Garmin GSM Map 67A handheld GPS devices with way-points saved for various parts of Lahore and KPK.
- 1 Car charger and spare batteries for both
- 3 Calyume light sticks, 1 Infared White, 1 Red and 1 high intensity green
- 1 Thuraya Handheld Satellite Phone
- 1 ICOMM PMR handset with spare batteries
- 1 nokia phone with Pakistani sim card
- 1 black nylon pouch containing an IFAK (Individual First Aid Kit) which contained hemoclot (a special dressing used to stem bleeding), various sizes of trauma bandages, an Nasophyrengeal airway (demonstrating he had some militatry medical training) and various other first aid equipment.
- 3 flashlights, one fitted with an IR filter
- A covert bullet proof vest which was found in the trunk of the car
- Various documents from the US government and various OS maps of Pakistan and KPK.
A subsequent grainy mobile phone footage is released to the media showing the interview of the suspect, he gives his name as Raymond Davis and provides a US DOD ID Card along with an ID Badge issued by the Lahore US consulate.
This entire incident created a diplomatic incident between Islamabad and Washington DC and whilst Davis was released eventually after some backdoor deals were made and blood money paid to the parents of the victims, it left a rather foul taste in the mouths of all concerned.
It would later transpire that Raymond Davis was in fact a contractor for the CIA working for the Human Terrain Team in Afghanistan and Pakistan. [1] The rest as we say is history, however this sordid saga did not start or end with the capture of this Jason Bourne character. The arrest of Davis brought the spotlight firmly on PMC(Private Military Companies) operating in Pakistan through various contracts with the US embassy.
Whilst the US Military intervention may have been exposed in the past few years, this is a program that may have existed under our very noses for at least 20/30 years, perhaps even more. Let us examine the work of a consortium unknown to people outside certain circles. BINGOsmc: Balochistan International NGO Security Management Consortium? For those who don't know what it's function was:
In early 2004, a group of 10 international agencies based in Quetta, Balochistan formed a consortium to act as a security network and meet periodically to exchange security information and analysis.
An NGO security advisor was already established to support NGOs, based in Islamabad. However, INGOs raised concerns regarding the effectiveness of this initiative particularly as, at that time, most security incidents and concerns were focused in Balochistan Province.
While the establishment of Balochistan INGO Consortium (BINGO) initially improved the level of security information available, it became evident to BINGO members that additional security support was needed due to the marked differences in security capacity and experience amongst INGOs operating out of Quetta.
In May 2004, the BINGO Security Management Support pilot project was established. This was funded by DG ECHO, with Concern as the host agency and focal point for the donor, and Mercy Corps providing additional support in terms of administration and accommodation.
The BINGO Consortium convened a Security Management Committee, consisting of five members of the consortium, to oversee the Security Management Support project and supervise and monitor the activities of the Security Management Advisory team.
The Security Management Advisory team, made up of an international Security Management Advisor and two national Security Officers, were tasked with a wide range of security support activities including:
information gathering, analysis and reporting on incidents that could impact
upon the security of the operating environment of the INGOs programmes in
Balochistan;
- Coordinating security advice, information and arrangements with other relevant actors such as UNSECOORD personnel, government authorities and international representations;
- assessing security in different sites within the areas of operation and potential programme areas of the INGOs in Balochistan; and
- upgrading security management through the provision of training and technical advice.
Below is a sample of a detailed intelligence report generated by a INGO in Pakistan -2009:
In August 2005 the Pakistani authorities ordered the BINGO consortium to close and terminate all activities.
Looking at BINGO, it has access to combined staff power of Concern, Care Af/Pak, Mercy Corps etc. It's major role of Grass Roots Intelligence Gathering, Authoring Sit Reps and Impact Assessments. Considering that INGOs operate in remote corners of Pakistan and that their personnel "social mobilizers" carry considerable clout with the locals, can speak the language and blend in no problem, it is easy for them to gather intel and bring back 1st hand information for their managers (handlers).
Where was this "intel" going, no one know's to this day. Think i am a conspiracy nut, just look at the type of talent that had worked with BINGOSMC in the past:
Bob Lidstone - Canada | LinkedIn
Now look at similar offshoots in Afghanistan:
ANSO
Here is a sample ANSO Report: http://www.ngosafety.org/store/files/ANSO Q3 2012.pdf
^
The above is designed, managed and run by NGOs to gather and analyse security information in Afghanistan, it's international off shoot in INSO: International NGO Safety Organisation :: INSO HOME ( much wider objective).
Coming back to Pakistan, we fail to respect the security challenges faced by foreign intelligence assets infiltrating well meaning "humanitarian agencies", for example: almost every respectable aid agency carries hand held GPS (excellent for geo caching), iridium based telephone systems (can bypass Pakistanis cellular and fixed line networks), due to their nature of work have access to highly detailed OS 1:25000 maps and detailed zonal, tribal, political, and maps at the UC level.
Another example of a foreign intelligence cell busted by the Intelligence Agencies in Pakistan: Colonel among three Germans held
Pakistan based map makers Alhasan Systems Private Limited carries out GIS work for various INGOs from 2005 to present date, here is an example of a highly detailed UC map complete with data sets:
They have a level of trust within the community and a large workforce in the field that speaks the language and can blend in without investing a lot of money in training, acclimatization, mobilization etc.
Finally, In 2011 the then Interior Minister Ch Nisar claimed that Pakistani intelligence had credible information that upto 1000 foreign intelligence operatives had come to Islamabad under the pretext of aid workers or INGO consultants[2]
So now we come to the issue of the Private Security companies/Security Contractors, Pakistan was big business for PSC/PMC's and why not, since 2001 Pakistan has been a profitable country for PSC and Logistics companies, with the private security industry valued at around $60 Million US, that is one big pie.
Sadly following the controversial arrest and detention of a US contractor in Lahore, the establishment has made difficult for expatriate security contractors and foreign security companies operating in the country.
This subsequently led to heads rolling and the first of many on the chopping block was a BW and it's on ground partner Pakistani based security company InterRisk:
Owner of Inter Risk Security Company re-arrested | AAJ News
( You can read more on the whole fiasco here: Alex Constantine's Blacklist: DynCorp Sub-Contractor Inter-Risk was Behind the Oct. 10th Suicide Bombing of Pakistan's Army HQ)
This was closely followed by several small set up's based in Karachi, Lahore and one shoddy little number running out of Shami Road, Peshawar. major player Pax Mondial: Pax Mondial — Solutions for an evolving world
After several complaints lodged by the security services, Paxmondial's Pakistan office was forcibly closed at the hands of the Securities & Exchange Commission:
http://www.secp.gov.pk/orders/pdf/orders-2012/Order_PAX_MONDIAL_PAKISTAN.PDF
This was followed a quick fire round of pressure from the establishment on various outfits that led to the departure of all the British Security contractors in Pakistan: US security contractors survive, UK firms pack up | Latest news, Breaking news, Pakistan News, World news, business, sport and multimedia | DAWN.COM
In November 2012 the Giant of Global Security G4S also announced the closure of its Pakistan office and the sale of it's assets to Wackenhut Pvt Limited AKA: SMS Pathfinder Limited (Run by Major (R) Ikram Sehgal).
Now the only approved companies operating in Pakistan are the following:
RSM Consulting: RSM Consulting ( US Embassy Contract)
Tripple Canopy: Triple Canopy | Secure Success (US State Dept Contract)
SallyPort: KSI-Services | KSI ( Unknown: Capacity Building)
Dyncorp: DynCorp International - We Serve Today For a Better Tomorrow (US State Dept Contract, Air Logistics)
Catalyst: Catalyst Services - Services (Construction, Housing & Life Support Services to State Dept)
"Grey" Companies Operating in Pakistan: These are companies that have bypassed the legal framework by piggybacking on other company NOC's or are using legal loop holes to market themselves as "risk management" & "reputation management" companies. However they don't have the same foot print or risk profile as other US PSC/PMC:
Hill & Associates: Hill & Associates ( Offices in Khi: SECP DATA: The Official Website of SECP)
Salamanaca: A worldwide Due Diligence, Risk Management and Maritime Security firm specialising in Forensic Accounting and Corporate Security (Office in Karachi: Not in SECP Database)
Field Security Services: http://fieldsecurityservices.com/ ( Office in Karachi: SECP Data: The Official Website of SECP) However please note that this company is piggybacking off the NOC of Sky Guards Pvt Limited (a Pakistani Company) seem to be one and the same concern: The Official Website of SECP
I should mention 2012 there was a proposed bill to curtail the emergence of US/UK and other private security companies, this was called the FSA Bill and was submitted to the NA for passing into law, however all traces of this text was deleted from the internet, being the crafty little fox i am here is a copy of your reference:
FSA Proposed Bill 2012
Other companies operation in Pakistan via "local" partners:
Swiss Security Team stationed at Swiss Embassy and ECHO Office in Partnership with Bagrani Brothers Pvt Limited
US Embassy/USAID/John Snow Research Institute(formerly PAIMAN) via (Unknown Contractor) via Haris Enterprises Pvt Limited
Locally out of the 200+ private security companies in Pakistan only 9 have signed the "International Code of Conduct on Private Security"
https://www.icoca.ch/en/membership?private_security_companies[companies]=companies&area_of_operation=all&headquarter_country=174&keywords=&op=Search&view_type=map&form_build_id=form-4kZNwqq8kkJFsj1nduk6xA2YvT9MQQqejL1FGRavTYU&form_id=_search_for_members_filter_form#search_for_members_list
Chines PMCs in Pakistan:
China Overseas Security Group (Belt and Road Initiative/CPEC) via Askari Guards
China Security and Protection Group (Belt and Road Initiative/CPEC) via Askari Guards
Frontier Services Group (Belt and Road initiative/CPEC) via Askari Guards
References / Further reading:
[1] https://info.publicintelligence.net/humanterrainhandbook.pdf
[2] https://tribune.com.pk/story/917804/over-1000-hostile-spies-visited-pakistan-under-ingo-guise-nisar/
--end--
