Security of Pakistani Nuclear Assets - Interview of Director, SPD Pakistani NCA

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Migrated Article | Original Author: EagleEyes

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Pakistan's Nuclear Controls

• 10 member National Command Authority in charge of all Nuclear Facilities
  
  
• The president will be the authority’s chairman and the prime minister its vice-chairman. The authority will include ministers of foreign affairs, defence, interior, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee, chiefs of army, navy and air force, and director-general of the Strategic Plans Division. The director-general of the Strategic Plans Division will be the authority’s secretary.
  
  
• Standard "Two Man Rule" to authenticate access to nuclear release codes.
  
  
• Nuclear Warheads "De-mated" from missiles or bomb casings, and components are to be put into operation only with the consent of a National Command Authority.
  
  
• Pakistan has developed its own version of "Permissive Action Links," or PALs, a sophisticated type of lock the U.S. uses to prevent unauthorized launching.
  
  
• A comprehensive, intrusive Personnel Reliability System (along the lines of one in the US) that monitors employees, before, during and after employment.
  
  
• A ten thousand member Security Force, led by a two star General, dedicated to guarding the Nuclear facilities.
  
  
• Possible "phony bunkers and dummy warheads" to deter raids, by internal and external threats.
  
  
• Possibly between 100 to 200 nuclear warheads (Number of Missile Delivery Systems unknown)

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Pakistan’s nukes are safe, study by US fellow
By Mariana Baabar

ISLAMABAD: The implications of unrest in Pakistan for nuclear security in theory means that its nuclear weapons could be vulnerable to theft, illicit transfer or unintentional use if the army's discipline and command control structure faltered.

This assessment has been made by Alex Stolar who is a Herbert Scoville Jr Peace Fellow with the Stimson Center's South Asia Programme.

In his paper Stolar says that the bad news is that Pakistan's domestic unrest will continue and grow worse without the restoration of a representative government, and that extremists have many ways to further destabilize Pakistan.

Are Pakistan's bombs safe? In theory, Pakistan's nuclear weapons could be vulnerable to theft, illicit transfer, or unintentional use if the army's discipline and command and control structure faltered.

Concerns about the security of Pakistan's weapons are greatest in the West when Pakistani politics enters a rough patch and during leadership changes.

Unfortunately, unfounded fears about Pakistan's nuclear weapons have obscured more pressing threats. Radiological terrorism in Pakistan, as elsewhere, is possible. To conduct an act of radiological terrorism, extremists would need to fashion a radiological dispersal device (RDD) that consists of little more than conventional explosives and radiological materials that can be found in laboratories and hospitals. Though an RDD would cause few deaths, it could contaminate a large swath of land and stretch Pakistan's emergency response capabilities. Fortunately, these worst-case scenarios are highly unlikely. Pakistan has been through worse passages of political unrest. Intimidation, politically driven violence, and sectarian strife are all too common in Pakistani politics. If past experience is any guide, the current unrest will not lead to anarchy or chaos in Pakistan. The vast majority of Pakistanis desire a moderate and stable state, and the army has an institutional interest to prevent the breakdown of national authority and cohesion. Pakistan's weapons were secure during previous periods of political instability, and they are likely to remain the most protected national assets during the current unrest. There are no signs of a breakdown in command and control in the Pakistan Army.

After the security leakages associated with A Q Khan, Pakistan's military leadership took important steps to establish improved safety and security practices. Pakistan's military authorities and civilian leaders also established a robust nuclear command and control structure after testing weapons in 1998. Today, the military's Strategic Plans Division devotes over 8,000 men, mostly undercover, to protecting Pakistan's weapons and fissile material. The Pakistani military is a highly capable and professional force. It is highly improbable that it would hand over its crown jewels to individuals or organizations that it cannot control during this period of unrest.

It is equally unlikely that terrorist would be able to steal Pakistani nuclear weapons or fissile material. It is true that the fiat of the Pakistani state is being challenged throughout Pakistan, and especially in the tribal regions bordering Afghanistan. In the most troubled regions, police and military forces are struggling to maintain order. However, the installations that house Pakistan's nuclear weapons and fissile material, as would be expected, are heavily guarded and among the most secure facilities in all of Pakistan.

Similarly, fears that the current unrest could lead to a takeover of the Pakistani government by extremists are also misplaced. Religious parties are an important element of Pakistani society, but their political clout remains limited. It is unlikely that religious parties could engineer a takeover of the Pakistani government, as they lack both the popular support and the military power that would be required. The political power of religious parties would be further diminished if General Pervez Musharraf would remove the shackles from the two major political parties in Pakistan that do not define themselves in religious terms.

Extremists, however, need not resort to RDDs to wreak havoc and instill fear. As recent bombings have illustrated, detonating conventional explosives in a crowded area suffices to cause extraordinary suffering.

With each bombing, President Musharraf's vision of an enlightened and moderate Pakistan seems more illusive. The unraveling of Musharraf's vision of enlightened moderation was not unpredictable. For far too long, Musharraf has avoided making hard choices on the most pressing problems which confront Pakistan-on madrasa reform, militancy in Kashmir, the resurgence of the Taliban, and democracy.

Musharraf is now entering a critical period, and he faces very difficult choices about his future and the future of Pakistan. While most alarmist predictions about the security of Pakistan's nuclear weapons are unlikely to materialize, instability is likely to increase unless Musharraf redirects the Pakistani ship of state.

http://www.thenews.com.pk/daily_detail.asp?id=57458

 

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U.S. Secretly Aids Pakistan in Guarding Nuclear Arms

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By DAVID E. SANGER and WILLIAM J. BROAD
Published: November 18, 2007

WASHINGTON, Nov. 17 Over the past six years, the Bush administration has spent almost $100 million on a highly classified program to help Gen. Pervez Musharraf, Pakistans president, secure his countrys nuclear weapons, according to current and former senior administration officials.
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Haraz N. Ghanbari/Associated Press

Mike Mullen, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, said Thursday that he was confident about Pakistani security.
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Musharraf Refuses to Say When Emergency Will End (November 18, 2007)
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But with the future of that countrys leadership in doubt, debate is intensifying about whether Washington has done enough to help protect the warheads and laboratories, and whether Pakistans reluctance to reveal critical details about its arsenal has undercut the effectiveness of the continuing security effort.

The aid, buried in secret portions of the federal budget, paid for the training of Pakistani personnel in the United States and the construction of a nuclear security training center in Pakistan, a facility that American officials say is nowhere near completion, even though it was supposed to be in operation this year.

A raft of equipment from helicopters to night-vision goggles to nuclear detection equipment was given to Pakistan to help secure its nuclear material, its warheads, and the laboratories that were the site of the worst known case of nuclear proliferation in the atomic age.

While American officials say that they believe the arsenal is safe at the moment, and that they take at face value Pakistani assurances that security is vastly improved, in many cases the Pakistani government has been reluctant to show American officials how or where the gear is actually used.

That is because the Pakistanis do not want to reveal the locations of their weapons or the amount or type of new bomb-grade fuel the country is now producing.

The American program was created after the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks, when the Bush administration debated whether to share with Pakistan one of the crown jewels of American nuclear protection technology, known as permissive action links, or PALS, a system used to keep a weapon from detonating without proper codes and authorizations.

In the end, despite past federal aid to France and Russia on delicate points of nuclear security, the administration decided that it could not share the system with the Pakistanis because of legal restrictions.

In addition, the Pakistanis were suspicious that any American-made technology in their warheads could include a secret kill switch, enabling the Americans to turn off their weapons.

While many nuclear experts in the federal government favored offering the PALS system because they considered Pakistans arsenal among the worlds most vulnerable to terrorist groups, some administration officials feared that sharing the technology would teach Pakistan too much about American weaponry. The same concern kept the Clinton administration from sharing the technology with China in the early 1990s.

The New York Times has known details of the secret program for more than three years, based on interviews with a range of American officials and nuclear experts, some of whom were concerned that Pakistans arsenal remained vulnerable. The newspaper agreed to delay publication of the article after considering a request from the Bush administration, which argued that premature disclosure could hurt the effort to secure the weapons.

Since then, some elements of the program have been discussed in the Pakistani news media and in a presentation late last year by the leader of Pakistans nuclear safety effort, Lt. Gen. Khalid Kidwai, who acknowledged receiving international help as he sought to assure Washington that all of the holes in Pakistans nuclear security infrastructure had been sealed.

The Times told the administration last week that it was reopening its examination of the program in light of those disclosures and the current instability in Pakistan. Early this week, the White House withdrew its request that publication be withheld, though it was unwilling to discuss details of the program.

In recent days, American officials have expressed confidence that Pakistans nuclear arsenal is well secured. I dont see any indication right now that security of those weapons is in jeopardy, but clearly we are very watchful, as we should be, Adm. Mike Mullen, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, told a Pentagon news conference on Thursday.

Admiral Mullens carefully chosen words, a senior administration official said, were based on two separate intelligence assessments issued this month that had been summarized in briefings to Mr. Bush. Both concluded that Pakistans nuclear arsenal was safe under current conditions, and one also looked at laboratories and came to the same conclusion.

Still, the Pakistani governments reluctance to provide access has limited efforts to assess the situation. In particular, some American experts say they have less ability to look into the nuclear laboratories where highly enriched uranium is produced including the laboratory named for Abdul Qadeer Khan, the man who sold Pakistans nuclear technology to Iran, North Korea and Libya.

The secret program was designed by the Energy Department and the State Department, and it drew heavily from the effort over the past decade to secure nuclear weapons, stockpiles and materials in Russia and other former Soviet states. Much of the money for Pakistan was spent on physical security, like fencing and surveillance systems, and equipment for tracking nuclear material if it left secure areas.
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Related
Musharraf Refuses to Say When Emergency Will End (November 18, 2007)
Bush Failed to See Musharrafs Faults, Critics Contend (November 18, 2007)

But while Pakistan is formally considered a major non-NATO ally, the program has been hindered by a deep suspicion among Pakistans military that the secret goal of the United States was to gather intelligence about how to locate and, if necessary, disable Pakistans arsenal, which is the pride of the country.

Everything has taken far longer than it should, a former official involved in the program said in a recent interview, and you are never sure what you really accomplished.

So far, the amount the United States has spent on the classified nuclear security program, less than $100 million, amounts to slightly less than one percent of the roughly $10 billion in known American aid to Pakistan since the Sept. 11 attacks. Most of that money has gone for assistance in counterterrorism activities against the Taliban and Al Qaeda.

The debate over sharing nuclear security technology began just before then-Secretary of State Colin L. Powell was sent to Islamabad after the Sept. 11 attacks, as the United States was preparing to invade Afghanistan.

There were a lot of people who feared that once we headed into Afghanistan, the Taliban would be looking for these weapons, said a senior official who was involved. But a legal analysis found that aiding Pakistans nuclear weapons program even if it was just with protective gear would violate both international and American law.

General Musharraf, in his memoir, In the Line of Fire, published last year, did not discuss any equipment, training or technology offered then, but wrote: We were put under immense pressure by the United States regarding our nuclear and missile arsenal. The Americans concerns were based on two grounds. First, at this time they were not very sure of my job security, and they dreaded the possibility that an extremist successor government might get its hands on our strategic nuclear arsenal. Second, they doubted our ability to safeguard our assets.

General Musharraf was more specific in an interview two years ago for a Times documentary, Nuclear Jihad: Can Terrorists Get the Bomb? Asked about the equipment and training provided by Washington, he said, Frankly, I really dont know the details. But he added: This is an extremely sensitive matter in Pakistan. We dont allow any foreign intrusion in our facilities. But, at the same time, we guarantee that the custodial arrangements that we brought about and implemented are already the best in the world.

Now that concern about General Musharrafs ability to remain in power has been rekindled, so has the debate inside and outside the Bush administration about how much the program accomplished, and what it left unaccomplished. A second phase of the program, which would provide more equipment, helicopters and safety devices, is already being discussed in the administration, but its dimensions have not been determined.

Harold M. Agnew, a former director of the Los Alamos weapons laboratory, which designed most of the United States nuclear arms, argued that recent federal reluctance to share warhead security technology was making the world more dangerous.

Lawyers say its classified, Dr. Agnew said in an interview. Thats nonsense. We should share this technology. Anybody who joins the club should be helped to get this.

Whether its India or Pakistan or China or Iran, he added, the most important thing is that you want to make sure there is no unauthorized use. You want to make sure that the guys who have their hands on the weapons cant use them without proper authorization.

In the past, officials say, the United States has shared ideas but not technologies about how to make the safeguards that lie at the heart of American weapons security. The system hinges on what is essentially a switch in the firing circuit that requires the would-be user to enter a numeric code that starts a timer for the weapons arming and detonation.

Most switches disable themselves if the sequence of numbers entered turns out to be incorrect in a fixed number of tries, much like a bank ATM does. In some cases, the disabled link sets off a small explosion in the warhead to render it useless. Delicate design details involve how to bury the link deep inside a weapon to keep terrorists or enemies from disabling the safeguard.
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Related
Musharraf Refuses to Say When Emergency Will End (November 18, 2007)
Bush Failed to See Musharrafs Faults, Critics Contend (November 18, 2007)

The most famous case of nuclear idea sharing involves France. Starting in the early 1970s, the United States government began a series of highly secretive discussions with French scientists to help them improve the countrys warheads.

A potential impediment to such sharing was the 1968 Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, which bars cooperation between nations on weapons technology.

To get around such legal prohibitions, Washington came up with a system of negative guidance, sometimes called 20 questions, as detailed in a 1989 article in Foreign Policy. The system let United States scientists listen to French descriptions of warhead approaches and give guidance about whether the French were on the right track.

Nuclear experts say sharing also took place after the cold war when the United States worried about the security of Russian nuclear arms and facilities. In that case, both countries declassified warhead information to expedite the transfer of safety and security information, according to federal nuclear scientists.

But in the case of China, which has possessed nuclear weapons since the 1960s and is a signatory to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, the Clinton administration decided that sharing PALS would be too risky. Experts inside the administration feared the technology would improve the Chinese warheads, and could give the Chinese insights into how American systems worked.

Officials said Washington debated sharing security techniques with Pakistan on at least two occasions right after it detonated its first nuclear arms in 1998, and after the terrorist attack on the United States in 2001.

The debates pitted atomic scientists who favored technical sharing against federal officials at such places as the State Department who ruled that the transfers were illegal under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and under United States law.

In the 1998 case, the Clinton administration still hoped it could roll back Pakistans nuclear program, forcing it to give up the weapons it had developed. That hope, never seen as very realistic, has been entirely given up by the Bush administration.

The nuclear proliferation conducted by Mr. Khan, the Pakistani metallurgist who built a huge network to spread Pakistani technology, convinced the Pakistanis that they needed better protections.

Among the places in the world that we have to make sure we have done the maximum we can do, Pakistan is at the top of the list, said John E. McLaughlin, who served as deputy director of the Central Intelligence Agency at the time, and played a crucial role in the intelligence collection that led to Mr. Khans downfall.

I am confident of two things, he added. That the Pakistanis are very serious about securing this material, but also that someone in Pakistan is very intent on getting their hands on it.

U.S. Secretly Aids Pakistan in Guarding Nuclear Arms - New York Times

 

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Inside Pakistan's Drive To Guard Its A-Bombs


http://online.wsj.com/public/article...095207239.html

By PETER WONACOTT

November 29, 2007; Page A1

RAWALPINDI, Pakistan -- Inside Pakistan's nuclear program, scientists are allowed to grow long beards, pray five times a day and vote for this country's conservative Islamist politicians. Religious zeal doesn't bar them from working in top-secret weapons facilities.

But religious extremism does. It's up to the program's internal watchdog, a security division authorized to snoop on its employees, to determine the difference -- and drive out those who breach the boundaries.

In an interview, a top security official for Pakistan's nuclear program outlined a multilayered system put in place over the past two years to try to avoid the kind of devastating lapses uncovered in recent years. A series of rogue scientists were found to have sold secrets or met with al Qaeda leaders, finally spurring a screening-and-surveillance program along the lines the U.S. uses -- but with a greater focus on weeding out an increasingly religious generation of would-be scientists and engineers.

With the regime of Gen. Pervez Musharraf wobbling, the eyes of the world have refocused on the security of the atomic arsenal of Pakistan, long regarded as the most politically unstable of nuclear powers. Mr. Musharraf's move yesterday to relinquish his military leadership provided at least momentary calm. But worries that weapons technology or materials might leak out remain amid Pakistan's continuing turmoil.

Pakistani officials say the most far-reaching change in their nuclear-security web is the Personnel Reliability Program, named after its model in the U.S. It involves a battery of checks aimed at rooting out human foibles such as lust, greed or depression that might lead one to betray national secrets. Like the security methods of other nuclear powers, the new Pakistani program delves into personal finances, political views and sexual histories.

But it probes most deeply into degrees of religious fervor. One employee recently was booted from the nuclear program for passing out political pamphlets of an ultraconservative Islamic party and being observed coaxing colleagues into joining him at a local mosque for party rallies, said the security official, a two-star general who declined to be identified, citing the sensitive nature of his job. Even though the employee did nothing illegal, his behavior was deemed too disturbing.

"We don't mind people being religious," said the general, sitting in a spartan office behind a code-locked door in a military compound, outside Pakistan's capital Islamabad. "But we don't want people with extreme thoughts." Security officials try to draw a line at people who are inclined to force their religious beliefs upon others, especially in the workplace; urging colleagues to attend Islamist political rallies is seen as less acceptable than quietly taking a break from work to pray.

The attempt to strike this delicate balance, between allowing faith and excluding fundamentalism, is all the more difficult in a time of upheaval for this Muslim nation of 160 million people. Since July, Pakistan has been hard hit by an escalation in extremist violence, with an Islamist insurgency spreading from the lawless border area with Afghanistan -- widely believed to be the home of Osama bin Laden -- to Pakistan's major cities. That was one of the reasons President Musharraf gave for declaring a state of emergency Nov. 3, but the attacks haven't abated. Just last weekend, suicide bombers struck this heavily guarded garrison city, killing 35. Yesterday, Mr. Musharraf turned over control of the military to a handpicked successor; today, he is to be sworn in as a civilian president.

Rising Tide

Many experts say it is unlikely that Islamist militants would be able to penetrate Pakistan's nuclear establishment or to steal weapons. They see a bigger threat in a rising tide of young people inclined to be more religiously conservative -- and, spurred by the U.S.-led invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan after the terrorist attacks of Sept. 11, 2001, more anti-American. That includes the college campuses that are most likely to supply recruits to the nuclear program.

"You can improve physical security by building high walls and establishing a well-guarded perimeter. It's much harder to defend against insiders," says Robert Einhorn, a senior adviser at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, and a former assistant secretary of state for weapons nonproliferation.

Within Pakistan, a strong contingent opposing any nuclear weapons questions whether the recent attempts to improve the government's security screening are enough. Critics say religious conservatism gripping the applicant pool makes it too difficult to discern potentially dangerous zealots. "It's a source of worry that the secret institutions are seized with religious fervor," says Pervez Hoodbhoy, chairman of the physics department at Quaid-e-Azam University, a large source of scientists for Pakistan's nuclear program.

Pakistan's allies, including the U.S., have expressed public confidence in the nation's controls. "I'd like to be very clear," Navy Adm. Michael G. Mullen, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, told reporters earlier this month in Washington. "I don't see any indication right now that security of those weapons is in jeopardy."

But the U.S. has long had contingency plans in place under which American Special Forces operatives would deploy to Pakistan to secure nuclear-weapons sites in the event of an Islamic takeover. Some U.S. military and intelligence personnel fear that there may be additional weapons sites that the U.S. doesn't know about. "It's going to be some time before Pakistan overcomes the confidence deficit," says Mark Fitzpatrick, an arms-control specialist and senior fellow at the London-based International Institute for Strategic Studies.

Pakistan's nuclear arsenal is believed to contain about 50 warheads that, when mounted on missiles, are capable of striking anywhere in archrival India, according to the International Institute for Strategic Studies, which recently produced a report on the program's history. It also estimated the arsenal, kept at secret, commando-guarded locations, could be expanded significantly with Pakistan's stockpile of weapons-grade material.

Components and core materials are stored separately -- an additional security measure experts say is undertaken by both Pakistan and India. Those components are supposed to be put into operation only with the consent of a National Command Authority, comprising the country's top civilian and military leaders.

Pakistan has worked to advance its technical security along with its human checks, introducing fingerprint and iris scanners that are commonplace in other countries' nuclear programs. According to current and former Pakistani nuclear officials, Pakistan has developed its own version of "Permissive Action Links," or PALs, a sophisticated type of lock the U.S. uses to prevent unauthorized launching.

No country's program is immune from mishaps. Last month, the commander of a nuclear-powered U.S. Navy submarine was fired after failing to do safety checks and falsifying records to cover it up. In August, a B-52 bomber took off mistakenly carrying nuclear-tipped missiles. Both incidents caused embarrassment but no damage.

But Pakistan's past security breakdowns have eroded the credibility of its assurances that its program is in safe hands. In 2004, A.Q. Khan, who headed a national research laboratory named after him, was placed under house arrest for selling nuclear secrets and materials to North Korea, Iran and Libya -- making a personal fortune in the process. In late 2001, acting on tips from U.S. intelligence, Pakistan detained two of its retired nuclear scientists who had met with members of al Qaeda in Afghanistan, including Mr. bin Laden.
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Some analysts suspect Pakistan continues to buy weapons materials on the black market, in part because of trouble procuring supplies through legitimate channels. That suggests to some that at least parts of the procurement network engineered by Mr. Kahn, still widely considered a national hero, remain active -- despite Pakistan's assertions that it has been shut down.

The Bush administration has ruled out any plan to share nuclear technology with Pakistan, even as it seeks to complete such a pact for India's civilian power program. Nuclear suppliers have followed suit, denying some safety equipment that Pakistani nuclear officials say are meant for civilian use. For example, Pakistan hasn't been able to buy a system to monitor potentially problematic parts at its power reactors, say these officials.

Pakistan's current emphasis on security marks a shift from its early focus on acquiring technology, rather than safeguarding it. That stemmed from a race with India to build the bomb, which culminated in 1998, when both countries conducted a series of tit-for-tat nuclear tests.

More than two decades earlier, spurred by India's test of a nuclear device in 1974, Prime Minister Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto built up the nuclear program around a coterie of patriotic scientists, among them the metallurgist Mr. Khan. As the program advanced, Mr. Khan assumed an ever-more powerful role, rising to head his own laboratory that operated free of much -- if any -- government control. Mr. Khan eventually turned his attentions to selling the secrets to other countries, including Iran. Current and former army commanders maintain Mr. Khan acted within a tiny circle without their knowledge. General Mizra Aslam Beg, then chief of army staff, says he told an Iranian military delegation shopping for technology and material in the 1990s that he couldn't help: He advised them to get what they wanted "like us, through the underworld."

Weak Oversight

A major early problem was weak oversight from the civilian government. Mr. Bhutto's daughter, Benazir, helped craft Pakistan's nuclear policies on exports and deterrence, yet says she was mostly kept out of the loop by the country's intelligence services while she was prime minister. Her successor, Nawaz Sharif -- who like Ms. Bhutto recently returned to Pakistan to challenge Mr. Musharraf's rule -- didn't fare any better during his two terms in office. At a 1999 meeting with President Clinton in Washington, Mr. Sharif says in an interview, U.S. intelligence informed him that Pakistani military transport planes were carrying used nuclear centrifuges, which can be used to produce weapons-grade uranium, out of the country.

"No, no," Mr. Sharif recalls responding. "That couldn't happen." But before he could check out the allegations, he says, his government fell in Gen. Musharraf's military coup. A former director of the centrifuge program was later arrested.

Internal Investigation

Gen. Musharraf began to revamp Pakistan's nuclear bureaucracy. He established the National Command Authority and formalized the role of a secretariat, called the Strategic Plans Division, set up in 1998 to oversee the nuclear program's policies. Gen. Musharraf sidelined Mr. Khan, launched an internal investigation, and later publicly arrested him after the U.S. presented evidence of his misdeeds. When Mr. Khan confessed, however, Gen. Musharraf pardoned him. In ailing health, he still resides in his heavily guarded Islamabad home.

Just after the September 2001 terrorist attacks in the U.S., Pakistan's intelligence service detained two retired nuclear scientists who had met with senior members of al Qaeda, including Mr. bin Laden, during charity work in Afghanistan. One, Sultan Bashiruddin Mahmood, was a former director at the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission and a controversial Islamic scholar who had postulated that energy could be harnessed from fiery spirits called djinns.

Mr. Mahmood, who remains under house arrest, had sketched a rough diagram of a nuclear bomb for Mr. bin Laden during a meeting, Pakistani officials said. Pakistani intelligence agents later described the drawing as absurdly basic. But his unauthorized travel to Afghanistan highlighted gaping holes in the system. "Despite our proactive measures, it will haunt us," Air Commodore Khalid Banuri, a director in Pakistan's Strategic Plans Division, said of the bin Laden meeting. "I don't know for how many years."

When news surfaced of the meeting, Air Commodore Banuri was in the U.S. on a fellowship studying how Pakistan could apply a Personnel Reliability Program at home. Later, the U.S. decided to help, according to two former directors of Pakistan's Strategic Plans Division. "We want to learn from the West's best practices," says one of them, Feroz Khan, who also is a retired brigadier general. "Why shouldn't the U.S. share this with developing countries?" After years of sensitive exchanges, it took until 2005 for Pakistan to put in place the U.S.-style reliability program.

To hone its loyalty tests, Pakistan says it has departed from the U.S. program in significant ways. It focuses much less on drinking, for example, since consumption of alcohol is severely curtailed in Muslim Pakistan, and more on finances and religious beliefs.

Recruits are subject to a battery of background checks that can take up to a year. New employees are monitored for months before moving into sensitive areas. They may also be subjected to periodic psychological exams and reports from fellow workers.

For a handful of top scientists and military officials, life becomes a fishbowl of eavesdropped phone calls, tailed movements and monitored overseas travel, according to Feroz Khan, the former Strategic Plans Division director. Most top officials now are watched into retirement, usually while given undemanding advisory positions.

"The system knows how to distinguish who is a 'fundo' [fundamentalist] and who is simply pious," he says.

Pakistan's hardline Islamic parties have vigorously promoted the nation's nuclear program as a way for Muslim countries to combat American hegemony -- and don't share the government's concern about the kind of security lapses that alarm the U.S. In July, a senator for Pakistan's largest Islamic party, Jamaat-e-Islami, criticized the government's confinement of A.Q. Khan as "an act of cruelty against one of the greatest benefactors of Pakistan... just to appease the American administration."

At Quaid-e-Azam University, the nuclear critic Mr. Hoodbhoy says his students are more radical than a previous generation. They have come up through an education system that increasingly stresses Islamic ritual and come of age in a charged political environment. There's widespread sympathy for those fighting Americans in Afghanistan and Iraq, he adds, although most wouldn't want to live under a Taliban-like regime.

On campus, young women stroll in groups along shrub-lined pathways, cloaked head to toe in scarves and gowns. "The students aren't conscious that they've changed, but this new dress would've looked so odd 30 ago," says Prof. Hoodbhoy. "Even five years ago."

During lunch at the university, a group of graduate students huddle outside a physics classroom. One 22-year-old says he has applied for work at Khan Research Laboratories, known as KRL -- still named after the famous scientist despite his arrest.

The student says he's not particularly religious, praying twice a day. He does worry about the security program, though, and asks not to be identified, thinking that talking to a reporter might jeopardize his job chances. "I'm under observation," he explains.

The general who's a top security official says nuclear-program employees are well aware of the lines they can't cross. The electronics engineer who was fired for passing out pamphlets had been clearly warned, the general says, with an earlier job transfer out of a sensitive area. Today, security agents continue to keep an eye on the engineer, he adds. They know he's tutoring students in a small room off the side of his house.

--Jay Solomon contributed to this article.

 

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Updating with a few more articles that outline Pakistan's nuclear controls:

Crisis raises alarm over arsenal amid Pakistani turmoil, renewed concerns over nuclear weapons

By David Wood
Sun reporter
November 8, 2007
WASHINGTON


In striking ways, this is America's deepest worry: an Islamic nation in the world's most unstable region, home to al-Qaida's global headquarters, engaged in a shooting war with insurgents and radical terrorists, now beset with escalating political turmoil - and at the center of it all, an arsenal of nuclear bombs.

Pakistan's growing turbulence is raising fears that al-Qaida and allied Islamist extremist groups, which have had deep roots inside Pakistan's intelligence services, will renew their determination to acquire a nuclear device, or that control of Pakistan's prized nuclear arsenal could be seized as a bargaining tool by a political faction or be used as a threat in a conflict inside Pakistan or in the region.

"We will watch it quite closely," Army Lt. Gen. Carter F. Ham, director of operations for the Joint Chiefs of Staff, said yesterday. "Any time a nation that has nuclear weapons experiences a situation such as Pakistan is at present, that is a primary concern," he told reporters at the Pentagon, "and that's probably all I can say about that."

"This is a bad one," agreed Robert S. Norris, a nuclear weapons expert at the Natural Resources Defense Council.

Pakistan was thrown into a state of emergency Saturday when the president and military chief, Gen. Pervez Musharraf, suspended the constitution, shut down independent news media and arrested thousands as violent demonstrations erupted across the country.

Pakistan's estimated arsenal of between 45 and 60 nuclear weapons is controlled by a 10-man National Command Authority (NCA) headed by Musharraf, said Pakistani Brig. Gen. Naeem Salik, who retired two years ago as a senior officer within the NCA.

Pakistan's warheads "are kept under tight security. They are more than adequately guarded," Salik said in an interview yesterday. He said there is "a standard two-man rule" to authenticate access to nuclear release codes, a standard that is "universally" used by all nuclear weapons powers.

Salik, currently a visiting scholar at the Johns Hopkins University's School of Advanced International Studies, scoffed at the idea that the political crisis threatened the security of the nuclear arsenal. "A firecracker goes off, and the media starts jumping all over us," he said. "By the same analogy, when 9/11 happened, one could have asked what would become of America's nuclear weapons."

The United States counts Pakistan as a close ally in what President Bush terms "the global war on terror" and has provided $10.58 billion in mostly military aid. Even so, U.S. officials seemed unclear about the outcome of the current crisis.

A senior White House official, asked this week if it is "just a matter of time" until Musharraf is violently deposed, said: "You don't really know until it happens."

The White House declined yesterday to comment on Pakistan's nuclear weapons.

Military experts said U.S. options to intervene, if Pakistan's nuclear weapons are threatened or go missing, are limited. Any armed intervention would be met by stiff opposition from Pakistan's powerful military forces, said Dakota Wood, a retired Marine officer who is a senior analyst at the independent Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments in Washington.

By any measure, Pakistan is under considerable strain. Aside from the political crisis, Pakistani military units recently have suffered humiliating defeats in the Northwest Frontier Province against Taliban and al-Qaida forces, raising questions about morale within the armed forces under Musharraf's direction. Suicide bombings sweeping Pakistan in recent months have killed more than 600, according to the Pakistani government.

Since he seized control of Pakistan in 1999, Musharraf has survived at least four assassination attempts by Islamist radicals, most recently a week ago when a suicide bomber killed seven people in a blast near Musharraf's headquarters in Rawalpindi.

Amid this turmoil, U.S. officials and private analysts acknowledged that little is known about the security of Pakistan's nuclear arsenal, begun when Pakistan tested a nuclear device in 1998.

Pakistan's National Command Authority, which controls the arsenal, consists of the president and prime minister, the civilian heads of major ministries, the chairman of the joint chiefs of staff and other senior military officers. "They sit in times of crisis, they have the codes with them," Salik said. "It is a clear-cut and defined line of authority."

Pakistan's nuclear stockpile is thought to consist mostly of aircraft bombs fitted for U.S.-supplied F-16 fighter bombers, though Pakistan has recently tested the Shaheen-II missile, which can carry a warhead about 1,500 miles. In addition, Pakistan operates at least one nuclear reactor producing weapons-grade plutonium and is building a second plutonium reactor at a site in the Punjab, surrounded by six antiaircraft missile batteries, according to the Natural Resources Defense Council, an environmental action organization that tracks U.S. and foreign nuclear weapons and facilities.

The nuclear warheads are separated or "de-mated" from the missiles or bomb casings that would carry them in an attack, said Hans Kristensen of the Federation of American Scientists, and might be stored in bunkers or a tunnel at the Sargodha air base and weapons complex west of Lahore near the Indian border.

Nuclear weapons security at these sites has been beefed up considerably in the past five years, spurred by revelations that from the 1980s through 2003, Pakistan's senior nuclear scientist, A.Q. Khan, and some of his top associates had provided nuclear weapons designs and material to North Korea, Libya and Iran.

Each Pakistani warhead is fitted with a permissive action link (PAL), a code-lock device that prevents unauthorized release of the weapon, Salik said. Pakistan has also set up a personnel reliability system of the type used by the United States to continually monitor the financial status, marital condition, mental health and other aspects of officials in the nuclear system to ensure they are not disloyal or vulnerable to bribery or blackmail. Also, Pakistan has a 10,000-member security force for its nuclear facilities, commanded by a two-star general.

Many safety issues have been discussed at joint U.S.-Pakistani conferences in the United States in recent years, including one in April sponsored by the nonprofit Partnership for Global Security, a Washington organization dedicated to improving nuclear security.

"The United States has been engaged with Pakistan on the question of nuclear security," said Kenneth N. Luongo, director of the organization. "It's not been widely publicized. The Pakistanis themselves have become quite serious about trying to provide assurances to the rest of the world that they're on the ball, and I think they've made some progress."

But Salik stressed that Pakistan has not accepted U.S. technical advice on PALs or any other aspect of its nuclear program. "We have developed our own systems," he said. "The problem is that people won't grant that we can produce PALs even if we can produce our own nuclear weapons."

 

[RescueRanger]

By: Anwar Iqbal


WASHINGTON, Dec 2: US-sponsored wargames that simulate capturing Pakistans nuclear weapons to prevent them from falling into wrong hands are having a negative impact, experts say.

On Sunday, The Washington Post carried a detailed report on such exercises, pointing out that the all such games came to the same conclusion: Pakistans cooperation -- particularly that of its military was crucial.

According to the Post, the US government has conducted several such games in recent years, examining various options and scenarios for Pakistans nuclear weapons: How many troops might be required for a military intervention in Pakistan? Could Pakistani nuclear bunkers be isolated by saturating the surrounding areas with tens of thousands of high-powered mines, dropped from the air and packed with anti-tank and anti-personnel munitions? Or might such a move only worsen the security of Pakistans arsenal?

Our best bet to secure Pakistans nuclear forces would be in a cooperative mode with the Pakistani military, not an adversarial one, Scott Sagan, a Stanford University expert on counter-proliferation told the Post.

Feroz Khan, a retired brigadier who until 2001 was the second-ranking officer in the Pakistani Strategic Plans Division, warned that holding wargames exploring the possibility of capturing Pakistans nuclear weapons might worsen the situation.

Such exercises, he said, antagonised Pakistanis and might encourage the government in Islamabad to take countermeasures. You might just want to remember Desert One, he added, referring to the botched US mission to rescue American hostages in Iran in 1980.

As a result of US government studies of the nuclear issue, Pakistani officials had come to believe a US intervention is a real threat now, Mr Khan said. The Pakistani military almost certainly had taken steps to forestall such a raid, he said, such as creating phony bunkers that contain dummy nuclear warheads. He estimated that Pakistans current arsenal now contained about 80 to 120 genuine warheads, roughly double the figure usually cited by outside experts.

Zia Mian, a Princeton University physicist and expert on nuclear proliferation in South Asia, agreed. It may actually make things worse, to attempt that sort of thing, he said. Among other negative repercussions, he predicted, any US effort to secure Pakistans nuclear arsenal would really increase anti-Americanism.

US intelligence officials and counter-proliferation experts, interviewed by the Post, however, insisted that an internal break up could allow religious extremists in Pakistan to grab some of the nuclear, not necessarily to use them but to wield them as a symbol of authority.

Robert B. Oakley, a former US ambassador to Pakistan, said that although US officials expressed confidence in the current security measures, the more they examined the risks, the more they realised that there were no good answers. Everybodys scrambling on this, Mr Oakley said.

One participant in last years game told the Post that there were no palatable ways to forcibly ensure the security of Pakistans nuclear weapons -- and that even studying scenarios for intervention could worsen the risks by undermining US-Pakistani cooperation.

Mr Sagan argued that mere contemplation of a US intervention might actually increase the chances of terrorists acquiring a nuclear warhead. He said that in a crisis, the Pakistani government might begin to move its nuclear weapons from secure but known sites to more secret but less-secure locations.

If Pakistan fears they may be attacked, he said, then the Pakistani military had an incentive to take them out of the bunkers and put them out in the countryside.

In such locations, Mr Sagan concluded, the weapons would be more vulnerable to capture by bad actors. It ironically increases the likelihood of terrorist seizure, said Mr Sagan, who in the past had advised the Pentagon on nuclear strategy.

He noted that Pakistan moved some of its arsenal in September 2001, when it feared it might be attacked. But Brig Khan said that Mr Sagans fears were misplaced. The weapons are in secure bunkers, with multiple levels of security, and active and passive measures to mask their presence, he said. And while he conceded that the Pakistani government moved some nuclear weapons in 2001, he said the shifts made the arsenal more secure, not less.
Impact of US wargames on Pakistan N-arms negative -DAWN - Top Stories; December 03, 2007

 

[RescueRanger]

President to head Command Authority

ISLAMABAD, Dec 13: President Pervez Musharraf on Thursday sanctioned the creation of the National Command Authority, authorising it to ensure security and safety of nuclear establishments, nuclear materials and to safeguard all information and technology related to the security and safety of the Strategic Organisation.

The ordinance, which comes into force with immediate effect, says the president will be the authoritys chairman and the prime minister its vice-chairman.

The National Command Authority will have complete command and control over research, development, production and use of nuclear and space technologies and other related applications in various fields and to provide for the safety and security of all personnel, facilities, information, installations or organisations and other activities or matters connected therewith

According to the ordinance, the authority will include ministers of foreign affairs, defence, interior, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee, chiefs of army, navy and air force, and director-general of the Strategic Plans Division. The director-general of the Strategic Plans Division will be the authoritys secretary.

The ordinance authorises the authority to ensure safety of serving or retired employees and to supervise, manage and coordinate the administration, management, control and audit of budget, programmes and projects of the strategic organisations.

The authority has been authorised to take measures regarding employees in respect of their movement, communication, privacy, assembly or association, in the public interest or in the interest of integrity, security or defence of Paksitan or friendly relations with foreign states and public order.

Under the ordinance, anyone who commits, attempts, abets or continues the breach of national security shall be liable to imprisonment for a term which may extend up to 25 years.

The employees of the National Command Authority will not be governed by the Industrial Relations Ordinance of 2002 and it overrides other laws like the Civil Servants Act of 1973 or the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission Ordinance of 1965, the Pakistan Space and Upper Atmosphere Research Commission Ordinance of 1981 or any other law or rules made there under for the time being in force and applicable to Strategic Organizations.

Save as provided under this ordinance, no order made or proceeding taken under this ordinance, rules or regulations made there under by the Competent Authority or any officer or authority authorised by it shall be called in question in any court or administrative tribunal and no injunction shall be granted by such court or tribunal in respect of any decision made or proceedings taken in pursuance of any power conferred by or under this Ordinance, rules or regulations made there under. APP
President to head Command Authority -DAWN - Top Stories; December 14, 2007

 

[RescueRanger]

Building Confidence in Pakistan’s Nuclear Security

Arms Control Association: Arms Control Today: Building Confidence in Pakistan’s Nuclear Security

Kenneth N. Luongo and Brig. Gen. (Ret.) Naeem Salik

Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf’s decision last month to declare a national emergency and suspend the constitution has ratcheted up concerns about the safety and security of that country’s nuclear arsenal. Pakistani officials have categorically rejected speculation that their grip on its nuclear assets is loose, with Musharraf stating that Pakistan’s nuclear weapons are under “total custodial controls.”[1] Concerns remain, however, including in Western governments, that political volatility could erode the security situation.

Nonetheless, nuclear security in Pakistan has evolved substantially during the past nine years, and although improvements are still needed, both physical security and operational procedures are now stronger.

Following Pakistan’s nuclear tests in 1998, the nuclear program emerged from the opaqueness that had surrounded it for the previous 25 years. Pakistani officials recognized that they had not been sufficiently transparent to alleviate concerns regarding proliferation threats from Pakistan and sought to convince the international community that they have taken adequate measures.

This led to the establishment of a central command-and-control system to manage nuclear infrastructure and strategic assets. The two most prominent creations were the National Command Authority (NCA), which began operation in March 1999, and the Strategic Plans Division (SPD), which was established as the permanent secretariat of the NCA, although the formal announcement in this regard came in February 2000.

The creation of the NCA and the SPD also were important in changing the mindset inside the Pakistani nuclear structure, especially among individuals and facilities that previously had operated autonomously or with minimal oversight or auditing. The actions of Abdul Qadeer Khan from the late 1980s through the 1990s that resulted in the transfer of sensitive technologies to Iran and Libya, among other activities, are an example of the flaws in the previous oversight system.

Islamabad also developed a nuclear doctrine and communication systems that were integrated with intelligence and reconnaissance efforts and brought under the NCA to provide command and control during any crisis. Existing export control regulations were augmented, and safety and security procedures were reviewed and strengthened.

Concerns About Pakistan’s Nuclear Security

Pakistani officials are aware that they have not completely alleviated international worries regarding the security of its nuclear arsenal. Four key concerns continue to exist regarding Pakistan’s nuclear program, some more acute than others:

• Nuclear assets or technology falling into the wrong hands. The Pakistani-Afghan border region is known to harbor al Qaeda and Taliban extremists, including possibly Osama Bin Laden. It is also suspected that some percentage of younger physicists and military personnel in Pakistan are more influenced by Islamic radicalism than previous generations. Two physicists from Pakistan with knowledge of the nuclear program, retired Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC) scientists Sultan Bashiruddin Mahmood and Abdul Majid, have admitted to speaking with Bin Laden, although they denied that any sensitive information was divulged. Also, the actions of Khan have been well documented. Steps have been taken to improve facility security and to screen personnel who work in the nuclear program more rigorously, but this is an ongoing challenge.

• Islamist takeover as a result of elections or collapse of government. At the heart of the current crisis in Pakistan is the question of political elections. A serious question is whether Islamic extremist groups and Islamist political parties could gain power in Pakistan through the election process. According to the International Crisis Group, “Poll after poll has found that if fair and free elections were held under constitutional protections and monitored by national and international observers, the result would be a moderate, pro-Western, anti-extremist government in Pakistan.”[2] Extremist Islamist parties have never won more than 11 percent of the total votes in a Pakistani election.[3] Questions have also been raised about the reliability of the Pakistani military, given the ethnic diversity that exists within its ranks. The military in Pakistan has become more ethnically diverse in recent decades and contains Baluchis, Pashtuns, Punjabis, and Sindhis. This has not been a cause for concern about potential factionalism as the troops are professionally trained and have proven to be cohesive in the current political crisis.

• Assassination attempt or elimination of key leaders leading to a loss of control of the nuclear program. Several attempts have been made on Musharraf’s life, all unsuccessful. The control system over nuclear assets, however, includes at least 10 senior officials, military and political, who are fully competent to assume responsibility for the nuclear weapons program. Ultimately, the political decision-makers control the budget and are responsible for the development and management of the nuclear program. Their actions are strongly guided by recommendations from the deep professional core of specialists that assist the political representatives with the management of the system.

• Secondary proliferation. The discovery of the Khan covert nuclear technology proliferation network revealed serious security weaknesses, but most of his activities predated the establishment of formal command-and-control mechanisms. In the wake of that scandal, Pakistani officials declared that they would never again let anyone transfer nuclear technology to any country or entity, and actions have been taken to control individuals and facilities in the nuclear complex better.

Nuclear Weapons Assets Authority

Many of these concerns have been eased by the establishment of the NCA and the SPD.

The National Command Authority (NCA)

The NCA was established to create an institutionalized command-and-control mechanism over Pakistan’s nuclear weapons programs. Responsibilities of the NCA include employment and deployment aspects of the nuclear force, coordination of activities of Pakistan’s strategic organizations, arms control and disarmament issues, and oversight of the implementation of export controls and safety and security of nuclear installations and materials.

The NCA has a three-tiered structure with two committees, the Employment Control Committee and the Developmental Control Committee, constituting one tier; the Strategic Plans Division (SPD) another tier; and the three services’ strategic forces commands the final tier.

The Employment Control Committee is the NCA’s main policymaking organ. It functions as a political-military committee. It has the president as its chairman, the prime minister as the vice chairman, and the foreign minister as its deputy chairman.

The Development Control Committee is a military-technical committee that translates the policy decisions taken by the Employment Control Committee into force goals and oversees their achievement by the strategic organizations.

The Strategic Plans Division (SPD)

The SPD is tasked with daily management of Pakistan’s strategic assets, liaising with all strategic organizations, and oversight of the budgetary and administrative aspects of these organizations. The SPD also oversees a security division of 9,000-10,000 personnel who are responsible for securing all strategic infrastructure.

The SPD itself has four main directorates. The Operations and Planning Directorate, as the name suggests, carries out the operational planning. The CCCCIISR (Computerized Command, Control, Communications, Information, Intelligence and Surveillance Directorate) is responsible for developing and maintaining strategic command and communication links. The Strategic Weapons Development Directorate carries out liaison with the strategic organizations, scrutinizes their budgetary demands, and carries out audits of funds. The Arms Control and Disarmament Affairs directorate provides policy recommendations on all arms control and disarmament issues and participates in relevant bilateral and multilateral nonproliferation discussions.

There are some subsidiary organizations, such as the Consultancy Directorate, comprised of technical experts who provide technical advice on all construction projects, and the Strategic Forces Communications Planning (SFCD) cell, comprising communications experts to assist the CCCCIISR directorate. The Security Division is by far the largest component in terms of number of personnel, and its primary responsibility is to provide internal and external security to all sensitive installations and sites.

The Services’ Strategic Forces Commands

The third tier of command comprises the three services’ strategic forces commands. The primary responsibility of these commands is to exercise technical, training, and administrative control over the strategic delivery systems. The operational control, however, rests with the NCA. The army strategic force command possesses ballistic and cruise missiles, while the air force strategic command has the aircraft capable of delivering nuclear weapons. The naval strategic force command was the last to be established, and there is no public information as to whether they already have nuclear delivery systems and weapons or whether this capability is still evolving.

Security of Nuclear Weapons Assets and Facilities

The number of Pakistani nuclear weapons and the size of its fissile material stockpiles are not known in detail. It has been estimated that Pakistan has enough fissile material for about 60 weapons and has produced about 1.3 metric tons of highly enriched uranium and slightly more than one-half ton of plutonium.[4] A number of steps have been taken to protect both the weapons and components in storage as well as nuclear facilities and stockpiles.

Nuclear Weapons Security
Pakistan can deliver its nuclear weapons either by aircraft or by surface-to-surface missiles. The weapons are believed to be kept separate from their delivery systems, with the nuclear cores removed from their detonators.[5] Some estimates claim that the weapons themselves may be scattered, at up to six separate locations.[6] It may be difficult to ascertain the number of actual weapon-storage sites, but nuclear weapons certainly would be dispersed at multiple sites.

Despite their disassembled status, General Khalid Kidwai, head of the SPD, has stated that the weapons could be assembled very quickly.[7] Although not originally equipped with permissive action links (PALs), which require the entry of a code before the weapon can explode, each Pakistani warhead is now fitted with this code-lock device, according to Samar Mubarakmand, one of Pakistan’s top nuclear officials and scientists in an interview with a private TV network in 2004.[8] The employment of PALs was publicly confirmed in November 2006 by General Kidwai.[9] In addition, Pakistan follows a two-man rule to authenticate the codes that call for the release of the weapons. It may in fact be a three-man procedure in some cases. Such authentication processes are standard in advanced nuclear-weapon states.

Fissile Material Protection, Control, and Accounting

Since 1998, the SPD has been responsible for conducting external audits on all nuclear inventories and implementing regular and surprise inspections at facilities. Any nuclear or radioactive materials that enters into the safeguarded system comes under the supervision of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), which monitors and tracks the movement of materials through the system until they are disposed.

Four of Pakistan’s nuclear facilities, the Karachi and Chashma-1 power reactors and the Pakistan Atomic Research Reactors I and II in Rawalpindi, currently operate under IAEA safeguards. Several key nuclear weapons-related facilities are not subject to IAEA inspections. One is the Khan Research Laboratory, where weapons-grade uranium is produced. Other uranium-related facilities not under safeguards are the enrichment facilities believed to be at Golra, Sihala, and Gadwal. The Pakistani government has never officially acknowledged the existence of these facilities, and it does not provide them on the list of facilities exchanged with India on January 1 every year. Plutonium-related facilities not subject to safeguards include the Khushab research reactor, which is estimated to have a capacity of about 50 megawatts, sufficient to produce the plutonium necessary for a few nuclear weapons per year, and New Laboratories, a plutonium-reprocessing plant.[10]

Sensitive Facility Perimeter Security

Perimeter security is an integral element of all nuclear installations, civilian or military. Central responsibility for the security and physical protection of nuclear facilities resides with the SPD. There is presently a multilayered approach to perimeter security:

• Inner perimeter. This has traditionally been the responsibility of the respective organizations, but the security in these facilities is now overseen by the elements of the coordinated security division of the SPD. This division is headed by a two-star general. These forces operate on a permanent basis and receive special training. Certain facilities are also protected by air defense elements and are designated as no-fly zones.

• Outer perimeter. Fencing has recently been strengthened at facilities, and new technologies and electronic sensors, including closed-circuit television cameras, have been installed.

• Third Tier. Counter-intelligence teams work on identifying external threats to facilities.

Transportation Security

Materials, such as spent nuclear fuel and high-activity radioactive sources are more difficult to defend from adversaries while in transit than when in fixed locations. The key concern in Pakistan is that armor-piercing weapons could penetrate transportation containers and release radioactive materials. Officials are therefore seeking to acquire additional specialized vehicles to prevent sabotage attempts. Pakistan ratified the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials (CPPNM) in October 2000 and is working to ensure it meets all the guidelines included in the convention, which covers domestic and international transportation of nuclear materials. Officials are also considering accession to the July 2005 amendments that are intended to strengthen the CPPNM.

Personnel Reliability Program (PRP)

The security clearance and screening processes of individuals for employment in the strategic organizations was a disjointed and fragmented process in the past that has now been consolidated through the institution of a personnel reliability program (PRP). This program covers all persons working in the sensitive areas of the nuclear system. The SPD has overall approval of key personnel and also retains information on all retired personnel. Since 2001, the personnel system has been strengthened and integrated into the nuclear establishment. Also, as the nuclear departments have grown, there is less of a sense of “family bonding” and more accountability. Any individual assigned to a strategic project or a sensitive task now undergoes a security clearance by Interservices Intelligence, Intelligence Bureau, Military Intelligence, and the SPD. This is similar to the U.S. system, and lessons have been learned and adapted from the U.S. PRP. After an initial screening, there are periodic clearance rechecks every two years or when a person is transferred from one area of the program to another. Additionally, random checks can be carried out when required. This process includes complete background checks on family, educational career, political affiliations, and inclinations.

Challenges remain, however, in controlling nuclear expertise. Pakistan has re-employed scientists with potentially sensitive expertise in other areas of the nuclear program to continue to use their knowledge. Once the system becomes more saturated and more scientists leave the program, dealing with these alumni will become more of a problem. Pakistan has spoken with the United States on this issue and is exploring ideas for scientists who leave the program, including retraining them in other areas of expertise. In the United States, scientists have a permanent obligation regarding the protection of sensitive information regardless of whether they have left government employment. This issue needs to be addressed in greater detail in order to devise an effective and sustainable system for Pakistan.

Nuclear Energy and Radiation Security and Authority

The civilian elements of Pakistan’s nuclear program are overseen largely by the Pakistan Nuclear Regulatory Authority (PNRA) and the PAEC.

The Pakistan Nuclear Regulatory Authority (PNRA)

The PNRA was established in January 2001. It is the national statutory nuclear authority responsible for regulating all aspects of radiation and nuclear energy. The PNRA issues licenses for imports and exports of radiological substances and controls, regulates, and supervises all matters relating to nuclear safety and radiation protection. Previously, the PAEC was responsible for overseeing nuclear safety and security. Following the September 11 terrorist attacks, the PNRA tightened its security and physical protection regime. The PNRA Ordinance of 2001 empowers the PNRA to “ensure that appropriate measures for physical protection of nuclear installations and nuclear materials are taken by the licensee.” The federal government retains the authority to create legislation and regulations for imports and exports, and the PNRA is responsible for issuing licenses and conducting inspections of the licensees. Applications are received at the PNRA and reviewed at the Regional Nuclear Safety Directorates. The capacity and expertise of companies are evaluated, and licenses and no-objection certificates are only issued to qualifying companies. The Ministry of Commerce is responsible for issuing the import and export procedures through the chief controller of imports and exports. Customs authorities are then responsible for controlling the entry and exit of nuclear and radioactive materials.

In 2002 the PNRA streamlined nuclear disaster management by announcing a host of new measures for protecting “the plant and society from hazards that could be man-made or natural.” These measures included stricter quality control and monitoring for infrastructure and equipment, multiple physical barriers to uncontrolled release of radioactive materials, radiation protection and acceptance criteria, and disaster mitigation equipment and arrangements. The PNRA also addressed resource issues in nuclear facilities, including the division of responsibilities and quality of technical staff.

The PNRA has developed a five-year Nuclear Security Action Plan (NSAP) intended to enhance safety and security for all nuclear and radiation facilities and sources. The plan should ultimately boost the confidence of the nuclear energy sector and industry and the international community regarding compliance with international obligations. The key focus areas of the NSAP are:

• Manage all sources under regulatory control, evaluate vulnerable facilities, and support their efforts. Inspections are held during use, storage, and transportation of any sources. The PNRA now conducts biannual assessments, and a follow-on process ensures that the findings are adequately implemented. The PNRA is also reassessing existing physical protection measures around facilities and providing guidance and training to strengthen these systems.

• Establish a PNRA Nuclear Safety and Security Training Center. The center will focus on training programs related to nuclear security and physical protection of radioactive materials, emergency preparedness, detection equipment, recovery operations, and border monitoring. It will train PNRA staff and first responders, including officials from customs, border, local governments, and other law enforcement agencies. Thus far, the PNRA has been involved in training up to 200 staff.

• Establish a National Nuclear Security Emergency Coordination Center (NuSECC). NuSECC has been established in Islamabad to coordinate government agencies, including customs, border, local governments, and PNRA regional directorates, which are based in Karachi, Chashma, and Islamabad. Three additional directorates are being created, and inspectorates are yet to be established. There is currently one mobile lab, and officials wish to acquire an additional five to be stationed at the directorates and inspectorates. NuSECC will also work on a communications system and evaluate the possibility of continual tracking of high-activity sources during movement.

• Locate and secure orphan radioactive sources. Orphan sources are defined as “sources not under regulatory control, either because they have never been under regulatory control or because they have been abandoned, lost, misplaced, stolen or transferred without proper authorization.”[11] The PNRA has launched a campaign to locate all sources through physical and nonphysical searches and public outreach. Officials must locate, secure, and dispose of such sources to reduce the risk that they will be used to perpetrate malicious acts.

• Provision of detection equipment at strategic points. Detection equipment is intended to help prevent illicit trafficking of radioactive materials and sources and to assist rapid response in the instance of a nuclear or radiological emergency. Equipment will be provided to local governments, emergency response personnel, customs, and rangers at selected border points. Training will also be provided on how to operate the equipment and verify information obtained.

The PNRA evaluates its credibility against a set of performance indicators. These include peer reviews conducted by the IAEA International Regulatory Review Team and the IAEA Radiation Safety Infrastructure Appraisal mission. The PNRA also draws on local universities and other external associates to assist with self-assessments and promote transparency. Results from appraisals are posted on the PNRA website. Reports submitted by Pakistan in compliance with UN Security Council Resolution 1540, which calls for national measures to prevent nonstate actors from obtaining highly dangerous weapons, and Pakistan’s accession to international agreements, including the CPPNM, also demonstrate Pakistan’s commitment toward addressing the challenges posed by nuclear security.

Export Controls

In 2000 the SPD issued internal export control guidelines for all nuclear organizations. Before the issuance of these guidelines, organizations acted independently; and their transactions invariably caused suspicions and concerns, especially given the strategic nature of these entities. Institutions now have to follow established procedures for all exports, including seeking clearance from the SPD and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Still, until 2004, Pakistan’s nuclear export control framework was largely governed by statutory regulatory orders, ordinances, and acts that supported regulations issued by the Ministry of Commerce. In the wake of the Khan scandal, many of these procedures and regulations were consolidated in 2004 in the Export Control Act, enacted to control the exports of goods, technologies, materials, and equipment related to nuclear and biological weapons and delivery systems.

The 2004 act also established controls over re-exports, transshipments, and transfers of goods and technologies that could contribute to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the means of their delivery or contribute to the threat of international terrorism.

The transfer of nuclear-related equipment and technology is not permitted except for disused radioactive sources, empty containers of these sources, equipment for repair or maintenance from these facilities, and samples for analysis or study from national nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards.

The jurisdiction of the act extends to the entire territory of Pakistan and to any offenses committed by a citizen of Pakistan or person in the service of Pakistan, a Pakistani national visiting or working abroad, a foreign national while on the territory of Pakistan, or any ground transport, ship, or aircraft registered in Pakistan. The control list for the act encompasses the lists and scope of export controls maintained by the Nuclear Suppliers Group, the Missile Technology Control Regime, and the Australia Group (for biological agents). The act also has a catchall clause. (A Chemical Weapons Convention ordinance had already been issued in 2000, which covered import/export requirements for the chemical industry.) The control list will be subject to periodic review, revision, and updating as and when required.

Exporters are required to maintain detailed inventories and records and to notify the relevant authority if they are aware or suspect that goods or technology are intended to be used in connection with weapons. Offenders face tough penalties, which include imprisonment of up to 14 years, a fine of up to five million rupees, and the seizure of all assets and property.

To ensure the successful implementation and enforcement of the act, a Strategic Export Control Division (SECDIV) has been created. This division is housed in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, but it is multidisciplinary and includes personnel from customs; the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Commerce, and Defense; the Central Board of Revenue; the PAEC; the PNRA; and the SPD. The division will operate independently so that personnel will not face any conflicts of interest.

The SECDIV will formulate the necessary rules and regulations for its internal functioning and for the implementation of the act. It will develop structures for issuing licenses for all items as per the National Control List and develop an outreach program for industry and the media. There will also be an oversight board, headed by the foreign secretary and consisting of high-level officials who will meet periodically (possibly twice a year) to oversee implementation of the act. The procedures for the oversight board have not yet been established.

Radiological Source Security

The PNRA is tasked with protecting radiation workers, the public, and the environment against accidental or malicious acts involving nuclear materials and facilities that may result in exposure to the harmful effects of radiation. The security of radioactive sources is ensured through periodic physical verification and regulatory inspections. In recent years, the PNRA has conducted numerous, nationwide inspections of nuclear and radiation facilities, identifying weaknesses and recommending countermeasures. The PNRA has also launched an orphan-sources initiative through a public awareness and education campaign.

The PNRA continuously reviews and updates safety and security measures according to recommendations and guidance received from the IAEA. They are also committed to protecting investment in the nuclear industry by specifying stringent design and operational safety targets to help eliminate the probability of major economic loss due to an accident, incident, or malicious act.

The total number of radiological sources in Pakistan is not clear, but 65 percent of the sources are claimed to be stored and 34 percent of sources are in use. Of the amount in use, 49 percent is under the PAEC, of which 26 percent is for medical use and 74 percent for nonmedical use, and 51 percent is non-PAEC, of which 12 percent is for medical use and 88 percent is for nonmedical use. The amount of category one, two, and three radioactive materials is claimed to be limited, and once its useful life is over, it must be returned to the government. For example, in hospitals, once a source has ended its effective life, the licensee must release the source to the PNRA, which in turn hands it over to the PAEC, the only government agency equipped to dispose of such materials. The PNRA would be required at some stage to develop its own waste disposal site because the disposal of such sources is its primary responsibility.

Pakistan has been working to ensure accurate tracking of all radioactive sources imported into the country. It is very difficult to secure all of Pakistan’s borders against illicit trafficking, especially because there are more than 2,000 miles of open borders with few legal crossing points. Yet, Pakistan has taken action to control the threat of radiological terrorism better. For example, the 2004 Export Control Act includes restrictions and penalties for transshipments. Pakistan has signed the Container Security Initiative, which provided for detectors in Karachi. Officials are engaged in discussions regarding possibly joining the Megaports Initiative. Pakistan also participates in the IAEA Illicit Trafficking Database, which allows countries to share information on incidents involving theft, loss, or pilferage of radiological materials.

Officials claim that Pakistan is working at “optimum speed” to cooperate with the U.S. Department of Energy on export and border control programs. Useful assistance for Pakistan to help meet this challenge would include providing metal detectors for border crossing points and mobile labs to identify any suspicious substances that are intercepted. Pakistani officials note that anyone bringing sources into Pakistan would find it difficult to sell such materials because there are only a small number of end users and they are known to officials, thus making it easier to identify any new sources that appear on the market.

Cooperation With the International Community

The United States and Pakistan initiated a bilateral dialogue on improving nuclear security in the wake of a visit by Secretary of State Colin Powell in October 2001. The results of the discussions have been very closely held, though not strictly secret, as references to the cooperation have been made in Western and Pakistani news media, in other expert publications, and in briefings to Pakistani parliamentarians.[12] The discussions have been conducted at the expert level and on a nonsensitive and nonintrusive basis, with Pakistan insisting on clear redlines. The scope reportedly includes export and commodity controls, PRPs, nuclear material protection, control and accounting, transportation security, sharing of best practices, training of security personnel, and the provision of equipment. According to the Pakistani Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the cooperation has been “in the nature of rudimentary training and ideas,” and the equipment provided for tracing nuclear materials is of a “basic nature.”[13]

This cooperation does not extend to the “safety” of nuclear weapons because of U.S. legal limitations as well as Pakistan’s insistence on nonintrusiveness and maintaining secrecy related to its nuclear weapons and their locations. Another very sensitive issue is the suggestion that the United States is engaging in contingency planning to “secure” or relocate Pakistani nuclear assets in case of a breakdown of order.[14] This is not part of the U.S.-Pakistani nuclear security dialogue. Pakistan would be very wary of continuing cooperation with the United States on nuclear security improvements should this issue become an official priority. It could raise the question of whether the United States has given up on the objective it had after the 1998 nuclear test of rolling back Pakistan’s nuclear capability. It also would raise questions about the sincerity of statements by knowledgeable current and former officials about the improved security and safety of Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal.

The IAEA is an important avenue for short- and long-term nuclear-security support for the safeguarded nuclear facilities in Pakistan. Pakistan is a member of the IAEA, and the IAEA has already made substantive contributions to their nuclear security efforts. Yet, although the IAEA plays an important role in verifying the implementation of the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), the IAEA is more than just an extension of the NPT. The IAEA was created by a statute more than a decade before the existence of the NPT. That statute states that any country can request the agency to apply safeguards to their nuclear activities, and the IAEA has already done so for four existing Pakistani nuclear reactors as well as to the Chashma-2 power plant, which is under construction.

Additionally, the PNRA, with assistance from the IAEA, has arranged a number of workshops in Pakistan to train personnel and first responders since 2005. Training is provided for many personnel, including customs officials, and is also now aimed at senior administration officials. The PNRA is currently planning additional workshops for 2008. The IAEA statute therefore provides a potentially useful tool for further cooperation in Pakistan.

Conclusion

The political crisis in Pakistan during the fall of 2007 has riveted attention on the security of the nuclear arsenal and infrastructure in that country. The main concerns are nuclear leakage and seizure of nuclear assets by radical groups or individuals.

Yet, Pakistan has significantly evolved its technical and procedural nuclear security operations since its 1998 nuclear tests. It also has willingly engaged with international partners in an attempt to further strengthen its security and control processes. The major changes over the past nine years include the creation of the NCA, the establishment of the SPD, the development of a nuclear doctrine, the improvement of export controls, the integration of the command and control system, and the employment of permissive action links on nuclear weapons.

Although the concerns about Pakistan’s nuclear security during the current political crisis raised questions about the adequacy of the system, there have not been any examples to date of systemic failure. In fact, the weapons and facilities have been secure throughout the crisis, providing a measure of assurance that the last decade’s improvements are working.
These actions should build confidence in the international community that the Pakistani government is very serious about nuclear security and reducing the possibilities for proliferation. The evolution of this security system will need to continue well into the future, but a substantial foundation now exists on which these future improvements can be built.



Kenneth N. Luongo is executive director of the Partnership for Global Security and a former senior adviser on nonproliferation policy to the secretary of energy. Brigadier General (Ret.) Naeem Salik is currently the South Asia Studies Visiting Scholar at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies. He previously served as director of Arms Control and Disarmament Affairs at the Strategic Plans Division of Pakistan’s National Command Authority. This article is based in part on the first of a series of workshops on the evolution, status, and future of nuclear security in Pakistan that the authors organized in the spring of 2007. The authors wish to acknowledge the contribution of Isabelle Williams in drafting the results of the workshop.

ENDNOTES

1. “Pakistan Nukes Under Control: Musharraf,” Agence France-Presse, November 13, 2007.

2. Thomas R. Pickering, Carla Hills, and Morton Abramowitz, “The Answer in Pakistan,” The Washington Post, November 14, 2007.

3. Trudy Rubin, “Worldview: Musharraf’s Dangerous Aim,” The Philadelphia Inquirer, November 7, 2007.

4. International Panel on Fissile Materials, “Global Fissile Material Report 2007,” October 10, 2007, pp. 8, 10, 14.

5. David Sanger, “So, What About Those Nukes?” The New York Times, November 11, 2007.

6. David Albright, “Securing Pakistan’s Nuclear Complex,” October 2001 (report commissioned and sponsored by the Stanley Foundation for the 42nd Strategy for Peace, Warrenton, VA).

7. Landau Network, “Nuclear Safety, Nuclear Stability, and Nuclear Strategy in Pakistan,” found at http://lxmi.mi.infn.it/~landnet/Doc/pakistan.pdf (mission carried out December 3-7, 2001).

8. Samar Mubarakmand recently retired as chairman of the National Engineering and Scientific Commission (NESCOM), which was created in 2001 as an umbrella organization to coordinate and oversee the activities of several independent entities, such as the National Development Complex, the main missile production facility. The interview was aired by Geo TV in April 2004 in the wake of Khan affair. He was a member technical in the PAEC before taking over as NESCOM chairman and was leader of the team that conducted Pakistan’s nuclear tests in May 1998.

9. Lt. General Khalid Kidwai, “Pakistan’s Evolution as a Nuclear Weapons State,” Address to the Center for Contemporary Conflict, November 1, 2006.

10. Joseph Cirincione with Jon B. Wolfsthal and Miriam Rajkumar, Deadly Arsenals: Tracking Weapons of Mass Destruction (Washington DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2002).

11. Jamshed Azim Hashmi and Muhammad Khaliq, “Pakistan’s Nuclear Safety and Security Action Plan” Presentation to the Workshop on Building Confidence in Pakistan’s Nuclear Security, April 30, 2007, found at Partnership For Global Security :: Home.

12. Pakistani Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “New York Times Story on Nuclear Cooperation,” No. 281/2007, Islamabad, November 19, 2007, found at http://www.mofa.gov.pk/Press_Release...PR_281_07.htm; Kenneth N. Luongo and Isabelle Williams, “Seizing the Moment: Using the U.S.-India Nuclear Deal to Improve Fissile Material,” Arms Control Today, May 2006; Paul Kerr and Mary Beth Nikitin, “Pakistan’s Nuclear Weapons: Proliferation and Security Issues,” CRS Report for Congress, RL34248, November 14, 2007; “Interview With Ambassador Robert Oakley,” Nightly News with Tom Brokaw, MSNBC, February 9, 2004; “U.S. Secretly Aids Pakistan in Guarding Nuclear Arms,” The New York Times, November 18, 2007.

13. Pakistani Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “New York Times Story on Nuclear Cooperation.”
14. Frederick W. Kagan and Michael O’Hanlon, “Pakistan’s Collapse, Our Problem,” The New York Times, November 18, 2007.

 

[RescueRanger]

Jane's Defence Weekly - December 26, 2007

Pakistan allays nuclear fears as Babur is tested
Farhan Bokhari JDW Correspondent - Islamabad

Pakistan tested its 700 km-range Hatf 7 (Babur) cruise missile on 11 December with a renewed pledge to safeguard the country's nuclear programme.

Pakistan's nuclear programme has recently been at the centre of Western concerns over safety issues in the event of a political takeover of the country by hardline Islamists.

In a statement following the test, the Pakistani military said the Babur missile will "consolidate Pakistan's strategic capability and strengthen national security.

"The Babur, which has near-stealth capabilities, is a low-flying, terrain-hugging missile with high manoeuvrability, pinpoint accuracy and radar-avoidance features," the statement added, which gave no specific technical details of the missile except for its range. Previous tests of the Babur were conducted in March and July this year; the system was first test fired in 2005, when its range was 500 km.

However, the chairman of Pakistan's joint chiefs of staff, General Tariq Majid, criticised reports by "vested and hostile elements in the international media" about the security of Pakistan's nuclear arsenal.

"Suggestions have been made that our assets could either be neutralised or taken away to a safer place to prevent them from falling into the wrong hands," Gen Majid was quoted as saying. "We remain alert to such threats and are fully capable of handling these."

Responding to Gen Majid's remarks, Western analysts in Islamabad said the Pakistani military appeared to be responding to suggestions that the United States will be pressed to destroy Pakistan's nuclear programme in the event that Islamists - who have been recently gaining political influence - ultimately seize power. "Will the Western world remain an idle spectator if the world's first Taliban-type government seizes control of a nuclear bomb? That is the question confronting many policymakers today," said one Western analyst in Islamabad, who declined to be named.

A Pakistani government official said the safety of the country's nuclear arsenal should not be in doubt as the country's military, with strong ties to the US, has taken close control of the nuclear programme since 2003. It was in that year that revelations surfaced over the role of Abdul Qadeer Khan, the founder of Pakistan's nuclear programme, in trading nuclear expertise and technology with Iran, Libya and North Korea.

Pakistan is estimated to have at least 50 uranium-based nuclear warheads and up to 10 plutonium-based nuclear weapons. "The safeguards are tightly in place; there are no safety issues as far as further proliferation is concerned," said a senior Pakistani official.

© 2008 Jane's Information Group

 

[RescueRanger]

Capturing Pak Nukes Impossible, Officals claim

Tuesday, May 19, 2009
By Ansar Abbasi

ISLAMABAD: Pakistan’s military establishment and the Foreign Ministry confidently rule out the possibility of a capture of the country’s nuclear arsenal by US forces.

Contrary to the prevailing concerns about the serious threats looming over Islamabad’s nuclear programme, the military as well as the Foreign Ministry are pretty sure that the US administration and its military high command are well aware of Islamabad’s capabilities to defend its strategic assets and also know that that the nukes are in safe hands.

Though certain members of these establishments admit that the US is keenly pursuing the objective of denuclearising Pakistan, yet they acknowledge that this is not possible without Islamabadís cooperation.

Director-General ISPR Maj General Athar Abbas does see the Jewish and the Indian lobby behind the international propaganda unleashed against Pakistan’s nuclear programme. He, however, insisted that Washington knows that these are non-issues and that the Pakistan’s nuclear programme is secure. “They know this. They have acknowledged this,” Abbas said. He also strongly ruled out the capability of the US forces to capture Pakistan’s nuclear assets.

Foreign Office spokesman Abdul Basit, when contacted, said that those planning to get hold of “our nuclear arsenal” were not aware of Pakistan’s capabilities. ”This is simply impossible,” he said, adding that “our command and control system is second to none”.

The US media recently claimed that a US special squad, specifically trained to secure Pakistan’s nuclear assets, is in Afghanistan and waiting a green signal from President Obama to launch its operation inside Pakistan to complete the mission. Such reports are laughable for both the FO and the Pakistan Army.

A diplomatic source, however, is of the view that there is a turf war presently going on between the State Department under Obama administration and the Pentagon that is resulting into the pouring out of conflicting statements about the nuclear programme of Pakistan.

The source said that of late media hype was deliberately created on this issue by certain players in Washington to expedite the passage of the Kerry-Lugar Bill from the US Congress. It is said that after Pakistan went for nuclear tests in 1998, it entered into a strategic dialogue with the US, the EU and Japan and evolved a multi-layered command and control system to the satisfaction of the international community.

While the sources in the Foreign Office and the military establishment admit that pressure is being exerted on Islamabad on the issue of the nuclear programme to compel Pakistan to dance to the tunes of the US, a retired general said that America seeks joint control on Pakistan’s nuclear programme. However, the FO spokesman said it was out of question. Basit said that no such offer was made to Pakistan but if made at any stage, he assured, “It would be rejected completely.”

Source: Capturing Pak Nukes impossible, official claims

 

[RescueRanger]

This article talks about how the U.S and U.K are confident that Pakistani nkes are safe

WASHINGTON: The United States took the lead on Sunday in assuring the world that the militant attack on the GHQ in Rawalpindi posed no threat to the Pakistani state which was not only capable of defending its nuclear weapons but also of defeating the terrorists.

The assurance, given first by US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton at a joint news briefing with her British counterpart in London, was echoed by other prominent US politicians, lawmakers and military commanders.

Secretary Clinton said the extremists were ‘increasingly threatening the authority of the state, but we see no evidence that they are going to take over the state.’

She added: ‘We have confidence in the Pakistani government and military’s control over nuclear weapons.’

British Foreign Secretary David Miliband endorsed her, saying that Pakistan faced a ‘mortal threat,’ but there was no danger of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons being seized by terrorists.

‘I think it’s very important that alarmist talk is not allowed to gather pace,’ he said.

Yet, as the news of the attack on the GHQ reached Washington, it did cause an alarm, with experts urging the US government to look closely at Pakistan’s capability to protect its nuclear weapons.

But soon a retired US general, Tom McInerney, appeared on Fox News to assure the Americans that ‘the Pakistani army … is a very capable army.’ He, however, urged the Obama administration to encourage Pakistan to launch an attack on North and South Waziristan where, he said, Al Qaeda was hiding and using those areas for attacking other places in Pakistan.

Another retired US general, Jack Keane, emphasised the need to work with Pakistan to defeat the extremists. ‘We have to convince them that we’re there, that Pakistan’s stability is in our national interest. And we have to prove that, as well, by stabilising Afghanistan,’ he told ABC News.

The general conceded that ‘given our track record in Afghanistan and also in Pakistan, there’s reason for that scepticism’ and that’s why the previous and current Pakistani governments had ‘a hedging strategy with the Taliban.’

In CBS ‘Face the Nation,’ Senate Minority Leader Mitch McConnell said Saturday’s attack underscored the danger of the Taliban, not only in Afghanistan but in Pakistan as well.

‘We also know that Pakistan has nuclear weapons. The Taliban taking over a country like Pakistan would be completely and totally unacceptable, destabilising not only in that area of the world but all around,’ he warned.

Senator Diane Feinstein, another prominent Democrat, said the US could not allow the Taliban to take over Afghanistan because their next step would be in Pakistan ‘and that’s very serious.’

The Pakistanis, she noted, were beginning to ‘show their mettle … they seemed to have much more get-up-and-go, to really be able to work with us in securing Fata and other areas.’

Senator Saxby Chambliss, a Republican, warned that ‘if Afghanistan falls … the neighbouring country has the opportunity to be really invaded or encroached upon by bad guys.’

The programme’s coordinator, George Stephanopoulos, questioned the wisdom of putting Afghanistan before Pakistan, noting that ‘for every dollar we’re spending in Pakistan, we’re spending $30 in Afghanistan.’

In CNN’s ‘State of the Union’ show, Senator John McCain, a former Republican presidential candidate, noted the progress that the Pakistani military was making against the militants.

‘We, the Pakistani military, go in, we clear and we hold and we secure, and you Americans are using the wrong strategy,’ Mr McCain quoted Foreign Minister Shah Mehmood Qureshi as telling a think-tank in Washington last week.

‘I’ll tell you, I didn’t think I’d hear that some time ago,’ said Senator McCain.

Senator Bob Casey, a Democrat, noted that Al Qaeda and related groups in Fata could threaten Islamabad and ‘we’ve got to make sure that that threat is dealt with.’

Senator Jack Reed, a senior Democratic lawmaker, warned that the situation in Pakistan was extremely complicated.

And because of the Bush administration’s preoccupation with Iraq, ‘Al Qaeda has significantly reconstituted itself in Pakistan over the last several years,’ he said.

The United States, he said, not only needed to continue drone attacks but should also deploy counter-terrorism forces on the ground in Afghanistan.

‘And we also have to begin to work together with the Pakistani forces. And that’s a very delicate issue because they’re very sensitive of their sovereignty. They’re very sensitive of our presence in Pakistan,’ he added.

‘But lately they’ve shown because they’re, I think, generally fearful of their own situation, a willingness to cooperate more, to conduct operations in South Waziristan, to attack or allow drone operations in their airspace,’ he said.

‘That has to be continued. And so when the president (Obama) is making a judgment on Afghanistan, he literally has to understand its complications and its effects in Pakistan.’

I found this on dawn.com

LINK:DAWN.COM | World | No threat to Pakistan?s N-arsenal: US

 

[RescueRanger]

General Khalid Shameem Wynne, Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee (CJCSC) visited the Headquarters of the Security Division of Strategic Plans Division (SPD) at Rawalpindi, for a review of security plans for Pakistans Strategic Assets.

A comprehensive briefing was given by Director General Security Major General Muhammad Tahir covering details of the operational preparedness of the Security Division.

Expressing complete satisfaction in the security arrangements, the CJCSC commended all concerned for their professional approach in enhancing nuclear security.

CJCSC witnessed an operational display of state of the art Security equipment. Earlier, on arrival at Headquarters Security Division, CJCSC was received by Director General SPD Lieutenant General Khalid Ahmed Kidwai (Retired) and Director General Security Major General Muhammad Tahir.

General Khalid Shameem Wynne, Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee witnessing the operational display of state of the art security equipment during his visit at Headquarters of the Security Division of Strategic Plans Division Rawalpindi.

General Khalid Shameem Wynne, Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee being briefed on operational preparedness by Director General Secu rity Major General Muhammad Tahir during his visit at Headquarters of the Security Division of Strategic Plans Division Rawalpindi.

 

[RescueRanger]

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This article was posted by sir @Fatman17 on the old forum

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Pakistans nuclear command and control.



Introduction

Pakistan has significantly improved the institutional frameworks and operational procedures for its nuclear weapons and moved from a clandestine nuclear weapons program to greater openness.

However, three major developmentsthe 9/11 terrorist attacks, the 2003/2004 A. Q. Khan scandal, and the recent instability in Pakistantriggered concerns in the international community that Pakistans control over its nuclear weapons may be weak. This perception has wide-ranging strategic diplomatic, political, and economic implications for Pakistan.

Pakistans new Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP)-led coalition government needs to build internationalgovernmental and nongovernmentalconfidence in its nuclear command and control system and the security of its nuclear weapons if it is to have any hope of securing a more stable regional environment, a more stable economic and security environment, or any hope of gaining access to civilian nuclear technology.

Overview of Pakistan's nuclear capability

Pakistan developed its nuclear capability in three phases. During the first phase (19541974) Pakistan acquired basic knowledge about nuclear energy and built its first research reactor in 1965.

During this phase, development was slow because of the governments weak commitment and lack of skill, technology, and investment. Indias May 1974 peaceful nuclear test was a major turning point. It heightened the countrys sense of vulnerability and marked the beginning of the second, more robust and military focused phase (197498).

During this phase, Pakistan learnt to enrich uranium and to manufacture components for a nuclear weapon.
Although it is likely to have achieved the technological capability to carry out an explosive nuclear test by mid-1980s, it did not do so until late May 1998 (after India carried out an 18 May nuclear test).

During the third phase (1998present) Pakistan has focused on designing more sophisticated nuclear weapons and delivery systems.1 Pakistan probably wants to develop a plutonium based weapon, improve the range of its surface-to-surface missiles, and gain naval and cruise missile capability.

The details of Pakistans nuclear weapons capability and doctrine remain uncertain because of Pakistans need to maintain strategic ambiguity. But, Pakistan is estimated to have between 50 and 60 nuclear weapons and the capability to deliver them either by aircraft (modified F-16s and Mirages) or surface-to-surface missiles. Pakistan has not formally announced any nuclear doctrine. However, statements by senior Pakistani military and government officials suggest that the objective of its nuclear doctrine is to deter all forms of external aggression that could endanger Pakistans national security or strategic forces.2 It is not clear what would constitute a severe enough danger to Pakistans national security to trigger the use of nuclear weapons, but a variety of events have been suggested. This threshold could be a loss of a significant part of Pakistani territory, a destruction of a large part of Pakistans military, economic strangulation, or social destabilization.3

Pakistan believes that it can achieve deterrence against aggression through a combination of conventional and strategic forces.4
Pakistan has not agreed to a no-first-use but will not use nuclear weapon against non-nuclear weapon states.5

Evolution of Pakistan's nuclear command and control system

Little is known about Pakistans command and control system during the first two phases (19541998) but it is likely to have been relatively weak.6 The governments focus during the first two phases of Pakistans nuclear development was on building a weapon and little attention was therefore paid to developing a nuclear command and control system. For example A. Q. Khans laboratory was granted a largely free hand to pursue its research.7

Since 1975 Pakistans nuclear weapons program has been controlled by the National Nuclear Command Authority (NCA) and the National Nuclear Command Committee (NNCC).8

There are different views on the composition of the NNCC and the balance of power between its key members. Originally, this committee is likely to have had six members including the president, the prime minister, and the chief of army staff. The balance of power between these key members is likely to have shifted in line with the wider political environment.9 In the 1990s, the membership of this committee is likely to have increased and the role of this committee is likely to have been formalized.

In 1998, Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif ordered the military to prepare a new institutionalized command and control system.

Since 1998 Pakistans nuclear command and control system has been transformed in four stages with the end result being a mature system.

During the first stage (19981999) Pakistan started to consider a more institutionalized command and control system.

During the second stage (20002001) Pakistan introduced its first reforms. On 7 February 2000, Pakistan announced a formal chain of command over nuclear weapons. This system was put into operation during 2001.

During the third stage (20012003) Pakistan further strengthened oversight over its nuclear weapons. This was a response to the 9/11 terrorist attacks, which focused international attention on Pakistan and put pressure on Pakistan to secure its nuclear weapons.10

The final phase (2003present) has been marked by the investigation into the A. Q. Khan nuclear network and related improvements in the command and control system, and export controls.11 Finally, in December 2007 President Pervez Musharraf transformed the ordinance establishing the system into a law.12

The current command and control system is likely to remain unchanged under the new government. Both the PPP and Pakistan Muslim League Nawaz (PML-N) argued in their election manifestos that nuclear command and control system should be overseen by the cabinet defense committee chaired by the prime minister instead of the NCA.

However, in April 2008 the PPP-led government announced that the nuclear command and control system will remain unchanged.13 Prime Minister Yousaf Raza Gillani even expressed satisfaction with the current system.14

The government is likely to understand the need to consolidate and build on the existing, well-functioning system.

Moreover, the government probably wants to focus on more urgently needed reforms, such as strengthening democracy, tackling the economic and power crisis, and fighting terrorism and Islamic militancy. However, the balance of power within the system is likely to shift to the prime minister in line with the wider political environment.

While the military will retain operational control, the government will have more say on Pakistans nuclear weapons program.
Overview of Pakistan's nuclear command and control system

Pakistans nuclear command and control system is considered to be relatively sophisticated and balanced. It has civilian and military involvement, checks and balances between the participating institutions, and a clear division of responsibility between the institutions.

The system is based on a three-tier structure: the National Command Authority (NCA), the Strategic Plans Division (SPD), and the three services strategic forces command. The composition and role of each of these institutions is outlined in the following sections.

National Command Authority (NCA)

The government created the NCA in 2000 as the highest decision-making body in the nuclear command and control system. It has ten members including the president (chairman), the prime minister (vice-chairman) and the chief of army staff.15 It is responsible for formulating policies, deploying the strategic forces, coordinating the activities of all strategic organizations, negotiating arms control/disarmament, overseeing implementation of export controls, and safeguarding nuclear assets and sites.16 It has two committees: the Employment Control Committee (ECC) and the Development Control Committee (DCC). The ECC is responsible for directing policy-making during peace time and deployment of strategic forces during war time, making recommendations on the evolution of nuclear doctrine, establishing the hierarchy of command and the policy for authorizing the use of nuclear weapons, and establishing the guidelines for an effective command and control system to safeguard against accidental or unauthorized use.

The DCC is responsible for exercising technical, financial, and administrative control over the strategic organizations involved in the nuclear weapons program, and overseeing development of strategic weapons programs.17

Strategic Plans Division (SPD)

The SPD was created in 1998 as the permanent secretariat for the NCA. The SPD is headed by a director general who is appointed from the army and comprises some 5070 officers from the three services.18 It is responsible for formulating policy options (nuclear policy, strategy, and doctrine) for the NCA, implementing the NCAs decisions, drafting strategic and operational plans for the deployment of strategic forces.19 Moreover, the SPD carries out the day-to-day management of Pakistans strategic forces, coordinates the activities of the different strategic organizations involved in the nuclear weapons program, and oversees budgetary, administrative and security matters.20

The SPD has eight directoratesincluding the Operations and Planning Directorate, the Computerized, Control, Command, Communication, Information, Intelligence and Surveillance Directorate (CCCCIISD), Strategic Weapons Development Directorate, and the Arms Control and Disarmament Affairs Directorateand several divisions.

One of the main divisions is the security division, which has a 10,000-strong force charged with guarding and protecting Pakistans nuclear weapons.

The Services' Strategic Forces Command

The Services Strategic Forces Command is raised from all the three services, which all have their respective strategic force commands. It is responsible for daily and tactical operational control of nuclear weapon delivery systems (the NCA is still responsible for overall strategic operational control).

This operational control includes technical, training, and administrative control over missiles and aircraft that would be used to deliver nuclear weapons.

Decision-making procedures

The NCA has established strategic operational policy guidelines and plans for the deployment of nuclear weapons systems (these are national secrets). A decision to launch a nuclear strike is made by consensus within the NCA with the chairman casting the final vote. The NCA will communicate the decisions and delegate authority to implement the decision to the SDP and down the institutional hierarchy/structure.

The details of this delegation are unclear.

Nonetheless, Pakistan applies a two and/or three-man rule to the authorization of assembly and use of nuclear weapons. 22

While the number of people required in different parts of the hierarchy is likely to vary because of technical reasons no single individual in any part of the institutional hierarchy is in a position to launch a nuclear strike or operate a nuclear weapon on their own.

In addition, the NCA has the ability to cancel the decision to launch a nuclear strike up until the last minute before delivery systems are activated.23 There is likely to be also contingency guidelines and plans in case of a disruption to the established guidelines.

Risks to Pakistan's nuclear command and control system

There are two major scenarios, which could subvert Pakistan's nuclear command and control system: Islamist takeover of the government or the military, and the assassination or elimination of key individuals in the command and control system. These scenarios could lead to either Un-authorized access to nuclear materials (and proliferation of nuclear materials) or use of nuclear weapons.

Both of these scenarios seem unlikely given the political realities in Pakistan and sophistication of the nuclear command and control system and the fact that the military maintains significant influence over the nuclear command and control system and the operational control of nuclear weapons. The military sees nuclear weapons as a major source of its influence and status and is therefore motivated to maintain the security of the weapons and materials.

This makes it unlikely that even if conservative Islamic political forces were to control the government that they would be able to gain immediate access to nuclear weapons and materials.

There are also concerns that conservative Islamic forces could increase their influence over the military and gain access to nuclear weapons and materials.

This scenario is based on the fact that the Pakistani military is becoming socially, ethnically, and religiously more diverse, with an increasing number of soldiers from low-income and religiously conservative backgrounds. Additionally, some elements within the military are known to have had links to Islamic extremist militant groups (such as the Taliban).

This is also an unlikely scenario because Musharraf and his successor have carried out major reshuffles in the military, removing officers believed to have sympathies for conservative Islamic forces or values, or who are suspected of having links to extremist groups.

The new Chief of Army Staff Ashfaq Pervez Kiyani is considered a liberal and is will probably move to prevent this scenario from emerging. Even if some extremist individuals were to assume influential positions in the military, a decision to launch of nuclear weapons requires consensus among the military and civilian members of the NCA. Moreover, these individuals would need to secure the cooperation of several senior officers in order to gain access to nuclear weapons or materials.

Assassination or elimination of key leaders

The second major scenario involves fears that extremist Islamic elements could assassinate or eliminate key individuals in the command and control system and create a dangerous vacuum in the system that might make nuclear weapons and materials vulnerable to un=authorized access or use.

But despite the litany of such attacks this remains an unlikely scenario because it would require the simultaneous assassination and or elimination of several individuals within the command and control system. In addition, it ignores the fact that Pakistan has contingency plans in place to respond to such scenario.

Strategic implication of concerns about Pakistan's nuclear command and control system

Since 1998 Pakistans nuclear command and control system has been significantly improved. In the process, the risk of a failure in the system that would allow un=authorized access to nuclear materials or use of nuclear weapons has been considerably reduced.

The main improvements include the establishment of the NCA and SPD, the integration of the command and control system, and the use of a two/or three-man rule and indigenous Permissive Action Links (PALs) on nuclear weapons.

This belief is shared by senior members of the US military including Admiral Michael Mullen, the former chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff, who in 2007 said that he did not see any indication right now that [the] security of those weapons is in jeopardy.26

Nonetheless, the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the 2003/2004 A. Q. Khan scandal, and recent instability in Pakistan have created the perception of weakness in the nations command and control system.

This has caused concern among the international community. In January 2008, the head of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Mohammad ElBaradei expressed concerns that Pakistans nuclear weapons could fall into the hands of extremist groups in either Pakistan or Afghanistan.27

These concerns highlight the fact that institutional and technical improvements need to be accompanied by efforts to combat negative perceptions in order to build international confidence.

In order to do this, Pakistan needs to demonstrate openness (without sacrificing national security) and provide details about its command and control system.

Pakistani officials have started this process with steps to brief the government and parliament about the nuclear command and control and security measures. On 16 April 2008, the head of the SPD, Khalid Kidwai, briefed the new PPP-led government on the command and control system, and security measures.28

Kidwai has also started to engage diplomats, academics, and journalists. In January 2005, he visited the US and spoke in academic think thanks about Pakistans nuclear command and control system.29

In January 2008, Kidwai also organized two unprecedented briefings for Islamabad-based diplomats and journalists to further explain the system.30

Kidwai said that Pakistan has "instituted command and control structures and security measures in a manner so as to make these foolproof."

These briefings have increase international communitys understanding on the level of sophistication related to the command and control system.

The PPP-led government and militaryunder Kiyanis leadershipshould continue this approach. Failure to do this will have wide-ranging diplomatic, political, and economic consequences for Pakistan.

The fallout from a failure to build international confidence will also include slower foreign investment in Pakistan, something that could hurt the economy.

Pakistan is facing a looming economic crisis: it has large fiscal (9.5%) and current account (9.2%) deficits, and an inflation rate of 10%.

Moreover, it was reported in April 2008 that there has been a 46% year-on-year drop in foreign investment during the first nine months of the 20072008 fiscal year from $5.55 billion to $2.98 billion compared to the same period a year earlier.32

After the 18 February election, the country received about $300 million in foreign investment, which is much lower figure than expected. This suggests that the drop in foreign investment was not just related to the February elections and related political instability but because of much wider concerns related to the political, economic and security environment in the country, including perceived growing Islamic extremism and presence of nuclear weapons.

Therefore, there is a risk that the current trend in foreign investment will continue, slowing Pakistans economic growth. The PPP-led coalition government has already been forced to scale back its GDP growth target to around 6% from an earlier 7%.
Pakistans failure to tackle this issue could also hinder development of civilian nuclear capability and efforts to tackle the countrys power crisis.

Pakistan is currently facing a power shortage of about 3,000 MW, which is expected to increase to over 7,000 MW by 2010 with the growth of the population, and domestic and industrial power consumption.

Pakistan currently generates about 400 MW of its power from nuclear plants and hopes to gradually increase this to 8,800 MW by 2030.

Pakistan is not able to produce nuclear power using its own technology and needs access to foreign civilian nuclear technology and uranium.

Pakistan wants access to Western technology. Press reports indicate that high-level military officials want to move that way. Press reports from 25 October 2006, cited a senior Pakistani military official as saying that Pakistan wanted to leave behind the A. Q. Khan scandal, improve its image in the US/West and get access to nuclear technology for civilian use.33

Musharrafs government expressed its interest in a civilian nuclear agreement similar to the 2006 US/India deal and the new government is likely to have similar interests.

There has been no US or Western involvement in Pakistans civilian nuclear industry since late 1970s due to international nuclear proliferation concernsand this has forced Pakistan to rely on China for nuclear cooperation. Although China has offered to build six more nuclear plants, Pakistan is interested in larger and more effective Western-designed plants.

Conclusion

Since 1998, Pakistan has taken a more mature approach to the command and control of its nuclear weapons and started to promote openness. The command and control system has been significantly improved, considerably reducing the risk of unauthorized access to nuclear materials or unauthorized use of nuclear weapons.

While Pakistan feels that it has already met international standards, it needs to continue to strengthen the NCAs and SPDs control over nuclear weapons, to improve operational procedures and promote openness.

Failure to do this could cause problems for the new government. The PPP-led government has announced that it wants to continue the dialogue with India, to develop a more independent strategy to tackle terrorism and Islamic militancy, and to tackle its power shortages, and its economic problems.

In order for the government to achieve these key political and economic goals, it needs to improve international confidence in its nuclear command and control systems and the safety of its nuclear sites and assets.

SAISS - London

 

[RescueRanger]

Pakistan's Military Sanguine on Avoiding Wartime Nuclear Calamity


April 3, 2013


By Elaine M. Grossman

Global Security Newswire



RAWALPINDI, Pakistan -- Defense officials here say they are confident that if conflict once again breaks out with India, Pakistan’s longtime rival to the east, the two nuclear-armed powers could prevent a catastrophic acceleration in violence.

To effectively control a wartime escalation, a nation must believe that its adversary is willing to use nuclear weapons, a senior official with the Pakistani army Strategic Plans Division, which oversees the atomic arsenal, told U.S. reporters last month.

Pakistan's strategy for its estimated 100-warhead stockpile is based on "credible minimum deterrence," said the official, who requested anonymity in addressing sensitive military topics. Realists, the senior figure noted, see Pakistan’s weapons as intended for staving off aggression, not for actual warfighting.

India has a nuclear arsenal similarly believed to number roughly 100 warheads.

Pakistan and India have fought four wars since British partition in 1947, including one -- the 1999 Kargil conflict -- after the two nations acquired nuclear arsenals. Concerns linger that hostilities could flare anew as a result of unresolved issues between them, such as disputes over the Kashmir region or the use of proxies to advance each state’s interests abroad.

“It’s a crisis-prone relationship,” said Maleeha Lodhi, a former Pakistani ambassador to the United States and now a political commentator. “Sometimes crisis breaks out between the two countries even if the two countries don’t want the crisis to happen.”

Regional experts worry that a future war could go nuclear. Moreover, any exchange of “limited” atomic blasts might quickly escalate out of control, as each nation becomes confronted with a possible existential crisis, the thinking goes.

Drawing from nuclear strategies devised decades ago by Cold War superpowers the United States and Soviet Union, any conflict should offer opportunities for “deliberate pauses, permitting time for adversaries to de-escalate by going to the table,” the Pakistani official said in comments sent subsequently by e-mail to a reporter.

Others have taken different lessons from the Cold War.

Nuclear strategy scholar Robert Jervis has described the danger of “undesired escalation” as “always present” in a crisis between two nuclear-armed states.

“The room for misunderstanding, the pressure to act before the other side has seized the initiative, the role of unexpected defeats or unanticipated opportunities, all are sufficiently great -- and interacting -- so that it is rare that decision-makers can confidently predict the end point of the trajectory which an initial resort to violence starts,” the Columbia University professor said in a 1984 book, “The Illogic of American Nuclear Strategy.”

The Pakistani nuclear official noted that Islamabad’s arsenal is under a multifaceted set of controls that reduce the risk of hasty or unauthorized launch.

Safety and security measures include monitoring scientific personnel; periodic intelligence reports; material accounting and control; special vehicles and security for sensitive materials transport; a requirement for two or more persons for carrying out key functions; the use of “permissive action links” or codes to help prevent unauthorized detonations; physical security; and the creation of personnel reliability programs and nuclear emergency security teams, the official said in a prepared briefing.

Pakistani control initiatives are also believed to include storing warheads separately from delivery platforms during peacetime, according to issue experts.

The defense official did not address that particular aspect, but did say the nation does not keep its nuclear arms in a “launch-on-warning” readiness status. This suggests Pakistan would not necessarily respond precipitously to any indications that India had fired an atomic weapon.

“When tensions escalate, one expects a rational-actor behavior from all parties,” the senior Pakistani nuclear official said.

Outsiders, though, have said either or both nations could unwittingly get caught up in the dynamics of competing battlefield strategies and lose rational control.

After Pakistan first tested nuclear weapons in 1998, India is widely believed to have formulated a so-called “Cold Start” strategy in which it would be prepared to dash across the border and seize key assets -- perhaps even cities, such as Lahore -- within reach. Under the strategy, which Indian officials have at times denied preparing, New Delhi would hope to prevent any use of Pakistani nuclear weapons.

In counter-reaction, Pakistan has expanded its atomic arsenal and devised plans to disperse these arms at the outset of any major war so they could not be captured, according to issue experts.

This dispersal might also make the use of nuclear arms more likely, some observers say.

Specifically, the worry is that spreading nuclear arms throughout Pakistani army units on a chaotic battlefield could make warheads more vulnerable to terrorist theft, unauthorized detonation or approved use based on misunderstanding.

“With dispersal, the loss of control is quite easy and that is one great fear,” said Abdul Hameed Nayyar, a retired scholar at Quaid-i-Azam University in Islamabad.

The Pakistani military has developed “tactical” or shorter-range nuclear arms for possible battlefield use. It has also planned for a “shoot-and-scoot” tactic in its plans for war against India, which would involve moving atomic-tipped missiles on mobile launchers to help evade enemy targeting, Nayyar said.

In such an approach, “you are actually delegating responsibility” to commanders at “very, very low” echelons, he said. “And delegating authority [over] nuclear weapons at that low level is very dangerous and I think that is something we all are very afraid of.”

“Use of tactical weapons is not an element of stability in the whole Indo-Pakistan strategic equation,” agreed retired Pakistani army Lt. Gen. Talat Masood. “There are dangers in delegation of authority as far as use of nuclear weapons are concerned.”

The Pakistani military has said that launch authority would remain at high levels, though some reports suggest otherwise, he told reporters visiting Islamabad.

“But the only problem is if the conditions are unstable, and if you are that close to the border, then you can’t really exercise physical control,” Masood said.

Even if strict high-level control over nuclear use were retained, “we are not going to detonate [once] and remain limited to that,” Nayyar said, calling the use of theater nuclear weapons by Pakistan “an escalatory step” in response to India’s military doctrine.

“Deterrence is an abstract notion that sometimes fails real-world tests,” South Asia expert Michael Krepon observed in a 2011 blog post.

“Every crisis that results in the increased readiness to use nuclear weapons also increases the likelihood of accidents and loss of control over nuclear assets,” he wrote more recently in a December analysis of Pakistan’s nuclear posture. “The probability of first use as a result of accidents and unauthorized use … appears greater than a deliberate command decision to cross the nuclear threshold.”

After a conflict breaks out, “crisis management and escalation control then become paramount,” but “there is no reliable playbook for escalation control once a crisis transitions to hostilities between nuclear-armed states,” Krepon said.

“India and Pakistan still lack the means to manage a crisis, frankly,” said Lodhi, the former ambassador. She added that the United States in the past has acted as a “fire brigade,” returning to the region repeatedly to “put out the fires.”

The United States helped calm tensions between the two antagonists in the course of four crises between 1990 and 2008, according to Krepon, a co-founder of the Henry L. Stimson Center in Washington. Whether that role could be repeated into the future to successfully prevent a nuclear war is far from certain.

Nayyar attributed the introduction of tactical nuclear weapons into South Asia to “the Pakistani urge to match India in all possible ways.” India’s Cold Start doctrine and the Pakistani response of nuclear force expansion and dispersal during conflict has become “a recipe for an all-out nuclear war,” he said.

Though Pakistani leaders could seek to temper their own responses to India’s use of its superior conventional capabilities, New Delhi has threatened outsized retaliation to any atomic attack.

Even “a very limited first use on Pakistani soil” could not necessarily “provide insurance against uncontrolled escalation, since Indian doctrine asserts that the use of nuclear weapons against Indian forces, wherever they may be situated, would prompt massive retaliation,” Krepon said in his recent analysis.

“Pakistani decision-makers understand that escalation control, even in the event of a single use of a tactical nuclear weapon, would be immensely problematic and could well have profoundly tragic consequences,” he said. “Nonetheless, they appear to view this option as being less problematic than relying solely on large-scale, long-range nuclear strikes, especially as the conventional military balance with India grows more adverse.”

Tags Cold War Era,Minimum Deterrence,Nuclear Doctrine,Tactical/Non-Strategic Nuclear Weapons

 

[RescueRanger]

May 20, 2009

Out of Control!

The World Doesn’t Have a Pakistan Nukes Problem … It Has a David Albright Problem

by PETER LEE


As AFP tells us, the Institute for Science and International Security just published a report on Pakistan’s nuclear program that seems designed to pour gasoline on the “the Pakistani nuclear program is outta control” story.

And, when you look at the story, there isn’t a whole lot of there there.

The commercial [satellite] images reveal a major expansion of a chemical plant complex near Dera Ghazi Kahn that produces uranium hexalfuoride and uranium metal, materials used to produce nuclear weapons.

Big whoop, I must say. The Pakistanis love their nuclear weapons, and it’s not surprising—as a sovereign state outside the NPT—they might decide to make some more.

The only conceivable takeaway from this report is muddled alarmism, which ISIS obligingly provides.

Given turmoil in Pakistan with the army waging war against Taliban militants in the northwest, the ISIS said the "security of its nuclear assets remains in question."

"An expansion in nuclear weapons production capabilities needlessly complicates efforts to improve the security of Pakistan’s nuclear assets," it said.

I don’t get it. How are things suddenly more complicated by an expansion in capacity?

Washington, apparently believing that it doesn’t have enough on its plate with al Qaeda and the Afghan Taliban and the Pakistan Taliban, is suddenly awash with dramatic plans to add a self-created problem to the mix: a quixotic effort to wrest Pakistan’s nuclear weapons out of the hands of the Army if the situation deteriorates.

And selling that idea seems to require fomenting an irrational panic concerning Pakistan’s nuclear program, as a metastasizing cancerous problem that’s getting BIGGER and BIGGER if we don’t DO SOMETHING.

You know what it smells like to me?

It smells like an effort by some to put a radical U.S. nuclear counterproliferation doctrine on the table now, so when it’s the end of the year and it’s time to deal with that other Muslim country with the destabilizing nuclear capability—you know, the one on the other side of Afghanistan, the one that the Israelis are so upset about—public opinion has been primed to accept the idea that some combination of air strikes, special ops, and insertion of U.S. forces is needed to save the world from an Islamic nuclear program that’s…outta control!

A crisis in Pakistan—and high-profile U.S. handwringing over those dangerous Muslim nukes—might be the best thing that happens to Benjamin Netanyahu this year.

We’ll see.

Anyway, I don’t think we have a Pakistan nukes problem.

We have a reckless and cynical fearmongering problem that should ring alarm bells for anybody who remembers the Iraq war.

In a small way, I think we also have a David Albright problem.

ISIS is run by David Albright.

Scott Ritter delivered a devastating rip job on Albright in Truthdig last year, entitled The Nuclear Expert Who Never Was.

He characterized Albright as a dilettante wannabe nuclear weapons guy, who has self-promoted himself, his honorary doctorate, and his institute using the flimsiest of pretexts.

More importantly, Ritter identifies Albright’s key credential as a willingness to offer up uninformed and tendentious alarmism when the situation demands it.

Ritter’s conclusion sums up his feelings about Albright’s role in the nuclear non-proliferation debate:

Albright, operating under the guise of his creation, ISIS, has a track record of inserting hype and speculation about matters of great sensitivity in a manner which skews the debate toward the worst-case scenario. Over time Albright often moderates his position, but the original sensationalism still remains, serving the purpose of imprinting a negative image in the psyche of public opinion. This must stop. It is high time the mainstream media began dealing with David Albright for what he is (a third-rate reporter and analyst), and what he isn’t (a former U.N. weapons inspector, doctor, nuclear physicist or nuclear expert). It is time for David Albright, the accidental inspector, to exit stage right. Issues pertaining to nuclear weapons and their potential proliferation are simply too serious to be handled by amateurs and dilettantes.

Amen to that.

PETER LEE is a business man who has spent thirty years observing, analyzing, and writing on Asian affairs. Lee can be reached at peterrlee-2000@yahoo.

 

[RescueRanger]

Pakistan’s Rickover


By krepon

3 June 2013


Pakistan’s national security decisions are usually choreographed between senior active duty military officers in Rawalpindi and government officials in Islamabad. If military leaders feel strongly about a particular policy or initiative, they can usually count on the consent of politicians. Conversely, if political leaders do not have military support, their favored initiatives are likely to fail. There is usually little daylight between Rawalpindi and Islamabad with respect to Pakistan’s nuclear deterrent.

Pakistan’s nuclear program is a rare success story and a great source of national pride. Those who have been instrumental in this record of accomplishment have been given broad leeway to pursue requirements as they see fit. These requirements are set by very few individuals, almost all with military backgrounds.

Every nation’s nuclear weapon-related programs have elevated a few individuals into positions of extraordinary authority. Some have remained in the shadows, a few have become national embarrassments, and others have gained public renown. The “father” of the U.S. nuclear navy, Admiral Hyman Rickover, had such a high profile and was deemed to be so essential by his supporters on Capitol Hill that his retirement from active duty was postponed until the ripe old age of 81.

Pakistan’s closest approximation to Admiral Rickover is Lt. General (ret.) Khalid Kidwai, who presently is in his thirteenth year as the Director-General of the Strategic Plans Division at Joint Staff Headquarters. The SPD oversees strategy, doctrine, research, development, production and protection of Pakistan’s nuclear assets.


Admiral Rickover and General Kidwai could not be more dissimilar in personality or conduct. Rickover’s steel will did not brook dissent over questions of submarine design, personnel, training and related matters. Rickover would imperiously circumvent his military superiors when he suspected or opposed their judgment. General Kidwai is a man of low-key demeanor with a sense of humility who works through military channels. Like Rickover, his competence inspires the view that he is indispensable. Unlike Rickover, my sense is that General Kidwai would contest this conclusion.

General Kidwai faced retirement in 2005 because his time on active duty would extend beyond those who were about to out-rank him. At that juncture, the Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee, General Ehsan ul-Haq, and Chief of Army Staff (and President of Pakistan) Pervez Musharraf decided to keep General Kidwai in place at the SPD after his retirement. While many retired military officers have been given plum assignments overseeing civilian institutions in Pakistan, the appointment of a retired military officer to be in charge of the nuclear program was very unusual.

General Kidwai has a long gallery of pictures on his wall of the successful strategic modernization initiatives he has overseen. He has cleaned up the mess at the A.Q. Khan Labs. He has improved security at sensitive sites. He has set up institutional mechanisms that are sound and that can handle a baton pass.

There aren’t many more tests for General Kidwai to pass. There is one test, however, that founding fathers of nuclear programs usually flunk. It’s the test of avoiding excess.

This is not a Pakistan-specific problem. Most of the founding fathers of the US and Soviet nuclear programs also flunked this test. Regardless of nationality, nuclear enclaves share a common assumption that more capability equals more security – especially when an adversary is engaged in a nuclear build-up. In this view, the more foreboding the edifice of deterrence looks, the less inclined your adversary will be to cross red lines.

There is no hard evidence to support this article of faith. A small, survivable nuclear arsenal might also be sufficiently persuasive as a deterrent, and there might well be many other reasons that induce caution in national leaders. But it’s understandably risky to take this for granted; the closer one is to the Bomb, and less risky it appears to choose more firepower. The equation of more nuclear deterrence with greater security can easily become a bedrock belief — even though the more adversaries compete, the less secure they feel.

It’s natural for nuclear enclaves facing stiff competition to reject constructs of minimum or finite deterrence in favor of additional targeting and use options. Unlike nuclear-armed states that have no reason to expect a hot war or rapid escalation, Pakistan and India are moving toward widely diversified deterrents that place greater stress on command, control, safety and security in times of crisis. Under these circumstances, weak points become distributed within the edifice as it grows. Crisis and deterrence stability become shakier.

As discussed in an earlier post, the question, ‘How much is enough?’ becomes perversely more difficult to answer when one success follows the next, and when an adversary responds in kind. The answer to this question cannot come from outsiders. Security dilemmas and nuclear weapon requirements can only be moderated by domestic reassessments, economic imperatives, negotiations, more normal ties with a competitor, or the demise of one of the contestants.

Within Pakistan, politicians usually shy away from questioning nuclear orthodoxy, whiz kids are not welcome, and criticism, no matter how sound or well meaning, is dismissed as being pro-India. The significant expenses associated with nuclear weapons are good for just one important thing: to reinforce caution. Meanwhile, other expenses and aspects of national security are short-changed. Pakistan faces terrible economic and energy crises as its nuclear enclave gears up to go toe-to-toe against India.