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THE FIGHT FOR AIRFIELD H-3
- Aviation Features
- The FIGHT for AIRFIELD H-3
By TOM COOPER 13th July 2017
FEATURE
How Arab and Israeli fighters clashed in the skies over a key Iraqi airfield during 1967’s Six-Day War
Hunter F73 708/J Royal Jordanian Air Force
TOM COOPER
SIX-DAY WAR
Every nation and every war has its heroes. Some attain the status of national legends, while many more remain unknown forever, except within narrow circles. Despite their catastrophic defeat in the June 1967 Arab-Israeli War — better known as the ‘Six-Day War’ — the Arab militaries had their own heroes from that conflict. Over time, one became better-known to the Western public. Part of the reason was that the person in question was not an Arab. Another was that following the 1967 defeat, many Arab heroes were treated with the utmost injustice by their superiors and discharged from service.
There is an old saying that no plan survives an encounter with the enemy. In June 1967, the Egyptian military’s planning fell apart before the war even began. With Egypt being the military powerhouse of the Arab world, this meant the contingency planning of all its allies began disintegrating too.
Following a misinformed Soviet warning about Israel preparing an invasion of Syria, and three weeks of growing tensions, Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser was determined not to act as an aggressor. Against the advice of his military and intelligence services, he decided not to start a war, but ordered his military to receive the opening Israeli strike — and only then hit back. Corresponding orders were issued not only to the United Arab Republic Air Force (UARAF, the official designation of the Egyptian Air Force from 1958-72), but also to the Iraqi Air Force (IrAF), Royal Jordanian Air Force (RJAF), and Syrian Arab Air Force (SyAAF). All were under the nominal command of the United Arab Command (UAC), a military body formed to coordinate an Arab war against Israel.
Egyptian Brig Gen Shalabi el-Hinnawy, commander of the United Arab Command’s air forces (wearing cap and glasses) and UAC commander-inchief Lt Gen Abdul al-Moneim Riyadh (back to camera) shake hands with Lt Col Hashem Manhal al-Azawi, CO of No 11 Squadron, Iraqi Air Force, during a visit to Rashid AB, Iraq, on 1 June 1967. In the background is a row of MiG-21F-13s.
SHALBI EL-HINNAWY COLLECTION
In an attempt to diminish the effects of the Israeli Defence Force/ Air Force (IDF/AF) attack, from 2-4 June 1967 the UARAF withdrew the majority of its combat aircraft from the Sinai and the Suez Canal zone to air bases further west, where, according to intelligence provided by Moscow, they were expected to be outside Israeli reach. At the same time, the IrAF began deploying its aircraft to Jordan. Thinking they would have enough time to do so, the Iraqis moved slowly. As of the morning of 5 June, they only had about a dozen Hawker Hunters at H-3 airfield in the deserts of western Iraq. Expecting reinforcements from their eastern neighbours, the Jordanians recalled their pilots from conversion training on Lockheed F-104 Starfighters in the USA, but otherwise did very little, except for asking the government of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan to grant permission for two of its pilots seconded to No 1 Squadron, RJAF, to fly combat sorties against Israel.
Day1 5 June1967
The Israeli strike on the morning of 5 June hit home hard. As wave after wave of IDF/AF fighter-bombers continued pounding Egyptian air bases, prompting one panicky report after another, officers at the high command in Cairo were paralysed with indecision. While the UARAF commander-in-chief, Air Marshal Mahmoud Sidki Mahmoud, never regained control of his force, Nasser’s minister of war, Field Marshal Hakim Amer, began making telephone calls and spreading a mixture of chaotic orders and lies.
Jordanian sources said it was one of Amer’s orders that put King Hussein’s military on a war footing with Israel. Supposedly, it stated that the Israeli strike on Egyptian air bases had been unsuccessful, that it had resulted in the destruction of 75 per cent of the IDF/AF aircraft involved, that a counter-attack by the Egyptian Air Force was under way, and that it ordered Jordan’s military to open a new front by launching an offensive into Israel.
Amer could not have issued such an order at the time the Jordanians say he did, but the Jordanians did nothing for several hours. Their top officers quarrelled with the Egyptians at UAC headquarters about what to do next — and how — and waited for other allies to go into action instead.
For the RJAF, the war thus began with a missed opportunity. Its major radar station near Ajloun had a good view of what was going on over Israel, and its fighter pilots were demanding permission to strike Israeli air bases. However, their commanders failed to react while there was still time to do so. When they did, it turned out that the main ammunition depot at Mafraq — then the RJAF’s major air base — was locked, with the keys still in Amman.
This is how the Iraqis came to go into action first. Around 12.15hrs Baghdad time, eight Hunters of No 6 Squadron, IrAF, launched from H-3. Based on faulty intelligence, the target for five of them was Kfar Sirkin, an old airfield in central Israel that by now was used as a paratroop school and a dispersal site for some Israeli transport aircraft. The other three were earmarked to attack Lod International Airport.
To make their navigation easier, the Iraqis followed the old ‘H’ pipeline constructed by the British in the 1930s. After all, this connected H-3 with Mafraq AB, and then with Ramat David AB in Israel.
By June 1967, several Jordanian Hunters had received kill markings commemorating claims from clashes with Israeli Mirages in 1964 and 1966. This is Flt Lt Farouq Abdeen in the cockpit of the Hunter F6 with which he claimed a Mirage shot down on 13 November 1966.
FAROUQ ABDEEN COLLECTION
Descending to low altitude well before entering enemy-controlled territory, the Iraqis caught the Israelis by surprise. Not a single interceptor, not one surface-to-air missile (SAM), nor one shot from the air defences molested the first three Hunters. Using 72 unguided rockets, their pilots claimed the destruction of seven Douglas C-47 Skytrain and Nord 2501 Noratlas transports. According to Israeli sources, this ‘Jordanian’ attack resulted in the destruction of the Noratlas registered 4X-FAX, and a civilian Piper Super Cub.
The attack by the last two Hunters in this formation was spoiled by two MIM-23 HAWK SAMs fired by the Israeli SAM site that was protecting Tel Aviv. These forced the Iraqis into evasive manoeuvring. Although the other Iraqi formation failed to find Lod and make its attack, all eight Hunters returned safely to H-3.
The RJAF finally launched four Hunters a few minutes after their Iraqi counterparts had passed overhead. Also based on incorrect intelligence, their target was nonexistent; there never was a ‘Netanya AB’ in Israel. Unsurprisingly, despite reaching the area without attention from hostile air defences, the Jordanians wasted their effort by unleashing their unguided rockets at the compound of the ABC Pharmaceutics Factory, killing one civilian worker and injuring several more.
As the four Jordanian jets returned from Netanya to Mafraq, the RJAF launched two additional formations. One went to make a further strike on Israel, while the other flew top cover over the West Bank. The first four-ship flew straight into a hornet’s nest and was caught by at least four Dassault Mirage IIICJs that had been scrambled from Ramat David in reaction to earlier Iraqi and Jordanian attacks. The Hunter flown by Capt WasfiAmmari was shot down: the pilot ejected over Jerash but made a hard landing, suffering back injuries that ended his RJAF career.
The Israelis returned the favour with the first of a series of air strikes on Jordan. Eight Dassault Mystère IVAs attacked Mafraq and destroyed 13 Hunters on the ground, including the aircraft flown by the commander of No 1 Squadron, RJAF, Maj Firas al-Ajouni, who was killed. In turn, they were engaged by Hunters flown by Jordanian pilot Ihsan Shurdom and the Pakistani Saif-ul-Azam. They shot down at least one and perhaps two Mystères, and damaged another before running out of fuel and deciding to land at Amman International.
Three Egyptian Air Force Tupolev Tu-16s — serials (40)27, (40)87 and (40)92 — overflying Cairo in early 1967.
NOUR BARDAI VIA TOM COOPER
A formation of Israeli Defence Force/Air Force SO4050 Vautours. Two such aircraft were lost in aerial engagements over airfield H-3.
IDF
The airport offered no safety. Before long, it was hit by four IDF/ AF Mirages and then four Dassault Ouragans. These destroyed four Hunters and several other aircraft, effectively taking the RJAF out of the war.
Although an attack on H-3 was not part of their pre-war planning, the Israelis were determined to prevent further Iraqi operations by knocking out this airfield, too. Correspondingly, while further Mystères and Ouragans were still busy ravaging Mafraq and Amman, four SO4050 Vautour twin-engined fighter-bombers from Ramat David were ordered to attack the westernmost Iraqi base.
Following the ‘H’ pipeline, the Israeli formation approached H-3 about an hour after the return of some Hunters that had attacked Kfar Sirkin, and the arrival of several MiG-21FLs from No 17 Squadron, IrAF. Indeed, by the time the Vautours appeared in the skies, two of the MiGs were already airborne again. Although the MiG pilots did their best to hinder the Israelis, they were fighting against the odds. Their aircraft were not cannon-armed, while their poor R-3S (AA-2 ‘Atoll’) air-to-air missiles proved unable to distinguish hot engine exhausts from the background of the rocky desert soil. As a consequence, the Israelis were able to press home their attack and destroy three MiG-21s, one Hunter, a de Havilland Dove and a single Antonov An-12 transport parked on the ground, while suffering no losses in return.
With this, the first day of the June 1967 Arab-Israeli War for the UAC drew to a close. From the Arab standpoint, it ended with the destruction of most of the RJAF, and severe losses for the IrAF. However, the Iraqis were still full of fight and determined to continue battling the Israelis.
Day2 6 June1967
For the morning of 6 June 1967, the UAC headquarters in Amman and the Iraqi military high command in Baghdad agreed that the IrAF should launch a series of air strikes on Ramat David AB, which the intelligence identified as the primary source for attacks on Iraq and Jordan. At dawn, six Hunters from No 6 Squadron launched in a westerly direction: four with the task of attacking Israeli ground forces advancing into the West Bank, and two against Ramat David. These were to be followed by four Tupolev Tu-16 bombers of No 10 Squadron hitting the northernmost Israeli air base in a series of single-ship attacks, so as to keep it under constant pressure.
The initial four Hunters made an undisturbed rocket attack on an IDF mechanised formation near Jenin. The other two apparently missed Ramat David, and rocketed two villages nearby. The first Tu-16 climbed to 25,000ft (7,620m) while approaching Israel, and its crew reported releasing bombs against the Israeli air base. However, it seems that the excited Iraqi navigator lost his way, and thus the string of bombs ploughed through an Israeli military base near Taamach, 6.2 miles (10km) south-east of Afula. The next two Iraqi Tu-16s were less lucky — both were forced to abort due to technical difficulties and return to Habbaniyah AB.
The fourth Iraqi bomber approached Ramat David undisturbed, but missed by a few degrees. The crew decided to climb, extend over the Mediterranean Sea and return for another attempt. However, around 08.35hrs, for unexplained reasons and despite a clear order from UAC HQ not to attack non-military targets, its crew disgorged a stick of bombs over the centre of Netanya, hitting the main street and causing a number of civilian casualties. Shortly afterwards, the bomber was intercepted by two Mirage IIICJs. The Iraqi rear gunner, 1st Lt Sabih, opened fire with his two 23mm cannon, forcing the interceptors to break and reposition, while his pilot, Sqn Ldr Hussein Mohammed ‘Kaka’ Hussein, entered a right-hand turn and a descent that brought him directly over Ramat David — at the very moment the Israelis were preparing for their second attack on H-3.
Still pursued by two Mirages, the Tupolev thundered low over the Israeli air base, its gunners opening fire from their barbettes before the aircraft was hit by one of two missiles fired by the fighters. Hussein reported via radio that his Tu-16 was still controllable and that he was attempting to escape in an easterly direction. However, the bomber soon crashed into the IDF base near Megiddo airfield, killing its entire crew as well as 11 or 14 Israeli reservists on the ground.
Now four Vautours — this time escorted by two Mirages — launched towards H-3. Once again, the Israelis followed the ‘H’ pipeline in order to make navigation easier. They reached their target just as the two Hunters that had attacked Ramat David earlier that morning were about to land, while a pair each of MiG-21s and Hunters were on take-off. The Israelis missed the two Hunters that were airborne, but one of them attacked the Hawker fighters that were rolling down the runway. Under pressure to get into the air as soon as possible, the Iraqi Capt Abdel Wahed Yuzbaki, a veteran of the Kfar Sirkin raid on 5 June, pulled too hard and too early on his aircraft’s stick. His Hunter stalled, yawed and struck H-3’s main water tank. The pilot was killed instantly.
“The Tu-16’s rear gunner opened fire, while its pilot entered a turn and a descent that brought him directly over Ramat David — at the moment the Israelis were preparing for their second attack on airfield H-3”
The other three Iraqi fighters engaged the Israelis, provoking a hectic dogfight. 1st Lt Wallid Abdul-Latif as-Samarrai attacked the Vautour of the Israeli formation leader, but was in turn attacked by one of the Mirages, which suffered an engine stall. Undeterred, Samarrai went after the Vautour once more and claimed it as damaged by cannon fire. The experienced Israeli said he had outmanoeuvred the Hunter and hit him in return: supposedly it crashed seconds later. He had actually attacked the Hunter of 1st Lt Namiq Sa’adallah, short on fuel after the long flight to Ramat David. Sa’adallah’s aircraft was damaged, and the pilot injured, but he managed to land safely back at H-3.
Meanwhile, the two MiG-21FLs made a wide turn before accelerating to attack the Israelis as they were withdrawing to the west. His armament limited to two R-3S missiles, Maj Khalid Sarah engaged the enemy flight lead, but the Israeli made a skilful avoidance, dragging the MiG in front of a Mirage. The latter’s pilot claimed the Iraqi as shot down by a short burst from his 30mm cannon. Sarah’s MiG-21fltook a hit that caused its braking parachute to deploy, but a hard break saved his life and his aircraft: the Iraqi managed to land safely. Maj Mumtazz Abdel Ali as-Saydoon attacked another Vautour, but both of his missiles missed the low-flying Israeli, prompting the Iraqi pilot to complain bitterly about the poor quality of Soviet-made missiles upon his return to H-3.
Day3 7 June1967
Following the second Israeli strike on H-3, the Iraqis decided to withdraw their aircraft from this exposed and poorly defended position. A column of Jordanian vehicles carrying the surviving pilots of No 1 Squadron, RJAF, to Iraq — including Shurdom and Saif-ul-Azam — found H-3 nearly abandoned on the late afternoon of 6 June. They had to continue their journey all the way to Habbaniyah in western central Iraq. The Jordanians and the sole Pakistani arrived there in small, scattered groups on 6-7 June.
Early the latter morning, the Iraqis woke them up and ordered them to join their own pilots. Habbaniyahbased Hunters of Nos 6 and 29 Squadrons were to continue flying combat air patrols over H-3 and along the highway to Amman, via which an Iraqi armoured division was deploying to Jordan. The first such CAP was launched at around 07.00hrs, but it returned to Habbaniyah without making contact with any Israelis. The next got airborne around 10.15hrs Baghdad time. It consisted of four Hunters flown by Flt Lt Saif-ul- Azam with 1st Lt Ihsan Shurdom in front, followed by Iraqi 1st Lt Samir Yousif Zainal leading young 1st Lt Galeb al-Hameed al-Qaysee. The plan was to fly a CAP over H-3, then land and refuel there before flying another patrol and returning to Habbaniyah.
The wreckage of Israeli Noratlas 4X-FAX, destroyed by Iraqi Hunters at Kfar Sirkin on 5 June 1967.
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