Asfandyar Bhittani
THINK TANK: CONSULTANT
Auto translated
Taliban do not want to lose the "TTP card" against Pakistan
Afghanistan International - Pashto Research
7 hours ago
Updated 2:20 p.m.
Ikramullah Mehsud enters the Taliban security offices in Khost without permission or a search. When he enters the office, the police headquarters and intelligence officers smile and say to each other: “The killer of Bhutto has arrived.” His car never stops at the gas station, because the tank is always full, on the orders of the Taliban.
On December 27, 2007, former TTP leader Baitullah Mehsud sent two suicide bombers, one of whom was Ikramullah Mehsud, to Liaquat Bagh in Rawalpindi, Pakistan.
Former Pakistan Peoples Party leader Benazir Bhutto was addressing a large gathering here. Bilal, wearing dark glasses, approached the left side of Bhutto's armored vehicle, pulled out a pistol and fired three rapid-fire rounds before blowing himself up. Within seconds, Bhutto's white car was covered in blood and he collapsed in the vehicle below. Ikramullah threw his suicide vest and pistol into a nearby mosque and fled the scene.
After the Zarb-e-Azb operation in North Waziristan in 2014, he went to Afghanistan with the slain commander of Hakimullah Mehsud's group, Shahryar Mehsud. At the time, he denied any involvement in Bhutto's assassination.
Ikramullah mullah Mehsud said in a video in June 2018 that he was not involved in the killing of Bhutto.
Since 2014, Ikramullah has been hiding in fear with TTP commanders in Nangarhar, Kunar, Khost, and Paktika. But after the Taliban took control of Kabul and Afghanistan in 2021, he is no longer hiding; he does not deny his involvement in the assassination of Benazir Bhutto and openly says that he went to Liaquat Bagh to kill Bhutto.
According to Afghanistan International's research, many of the senior commanders of the Pakistani Taliban, Mufti Noor Wali Mehsud, Hafiz Gul Bahadur, Azmatullah Mehsud, Akhtar Mohammad Khalil, and Mufti Sadiq Noor Dawar, are moving between Kabul, Kunar, Khost, Paktia, Paktika provinces, and Waziristan, Khyber, and Bajaur.
Gul Bahadur doesn't look much like Haibatullah.
Ghobargi is a village in the Zadran district of Khost's Spira district, but beyond this area is the Madakhel Wazir region of Paktika, which is separated from Waziristan by barbed wire and the Durand Line.
The Madakhel are a clan belonging to the famous commander Hafiz Gul Bahadur of the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) or Ittihad-e-Mujahideen Shura, who lives on both sides of the Durand Line. Therefore, he is considered the most powerful and influential person in this area.
In Afghanistan, cars are driven on the right, but from the Tanai district of Khost, which enters the Zadran Gharbiga area, they drive on the left, because the Pakistani Taliban all drive on the left here.
After Pakistani airstrikes on Afghan forces in the Khost province's Spira district and surrounding villages in April 1401 (2022), Gul Bahadur left the area for the Barmal district of Paktika, and some of his commanders scattered to the Shamal district of Khost and other areas, but his madrassas and fighters are still active in the Spira district.
The Taliban's Interior Minister Sirajuddin Haqqani and the Deputy Chief of Staff of the Ministry of Defense Mali Khan Siddique visited the area after the severe earthquake in July 1401 and after the Pakistani attack in April. Later, photos of them with two Pakistani Taliban commanders, Akhtar Mohammad Khalil and Commander Aftab Dawar, were published.
A Madakhel tribal leader, speaking on condition of anonymity, told Afghanistan International that “Sirajuddin Haqqani had promised the Madakhel tribe during this visit that he would approve a separate district for them called Kani.” However, due to Pakistan’s sensitivities and fears that the area could become another Waziristan, the approval of this district has been delayed.
The Taliban then established a checkpoint in the Kani area to closely monitor the situation in the area.
Former Khost Governor Abdul Qayyum Rohani opened a security checkpoint in Afghan Dubai at a time when the 10th and 5th battalions of the Khost KPF forces were in the hands of Hafiz Gul Bahadur's fighters.
A senior security source in Khost told Afghanistan International that "until recently, fighters affiliated with a commander of Hafiz Gul Bahadur, known as Commander Talwar, were stationed in the 10th Battalion of Spira and the 5th Battalion of Tanai."
According to the source, "The weapons of these two battalions fell into the hands of Aftab Yasir Dawar, a commander of the Sadiq Noor faction of the Pakistani Taliban, during the fall of the republic. Aftab Dawar, who was traveling to Kabul and Kandahar by air, was killed in an armed attack in Kandahar, in which the Gul Bahadur faction attributed the involvement of Pakistani intelligence agencies."
Aftabullah was suspicious that advanced American weapons were being sold to Baloch militants.
The Taliban sent a number of their military officials to this area in 1400 and advised people to refrain from collecting donations and firing rifles and other heavy weapons at weddings, but these recommendations have had no effect on the Pakistani fighters living here because most of the foreign fighters are former members of the Taliban's "strongholds."
Two sources in the region told Afghanistan International that security in the area is handled by the tribal militia, and the area is effectively under the authority and control of Gul Bahadur.
In late June 2025, Hafiz Gul Bahadur and Maulvi Sadiq Noor Dawar fled from Barmal in Paktika and Shamal in Khost districts to an unknown destination, fearing Pakistani airstrikes.
Two sources told Afghanistan International on July 8 that Hafiz Gul Bahadur and two of his other commanders, Qari Ismail and Akhtar Mohammad Khalil, lived in Barmal district, but left the area five days ago.
Maulvi Sadiq Noor Dawar and his two local commanders, Maulvi Sediqullah and Syed Anar, were active in the Shamal district of Khost and along the Durand Line, but after the June 28 suicide attack on the Pakistani army in the Mir alu area of North Waziristan, both of them left the area.
At least 13 Pakistani soldiers were killed and several others were injured in the attack.
The Pakistani military announced after the attack that it had killed 14 militants in the area during a clearance operation. Pakistan's army chief Asim Munir announced after the attack that he would "take revenge on the perpetrators." Munir stressed that he would "take the bridge of terrorists and expose the real source of terrorism in the area."
The Pakistani military described the attack as the work of an Indian proxy group, but New Delhi denies such allegations.
The Ittihad-e-Mujahideen group, led by Hafiz Gul Bahadur, whose activities are mainly focused on North Waziristan, claimed responsibility for the attack.
"Hafiz Gul Bahadur used to attend parties, but recently he has withdrawn from them. Last week, he received information that he may be under attack from Pakistan, which is why he has now left the area," sources told Afghanistan International.
According to the source, Hafiz Gul Bahadur has told members of the Waziristan tribal council that they should no longer come to him for talks.
Gul Bahadur suspected that the army was trying to locate him after holding meetings with tribal elders and then carrying out operations.
A tribal elder from North Waziristan, who has long been involved in negotiations between the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa provincial government and the Pakistani Taliban, told Afghanistan International that “the Pakistani military had given a deadline in late June to the Atmanzi Wazir tribe of North Waziristan, a tribe affiliated with Gul Bahadur, to either negotiate with the Taliban and stop attacks in their areas or prepare for military operations in the area.”
Under the umbrella of Gul Bahadur's group, units such as Jaish-e-Omari, Farsan Mohammad, Ghaziyan Karwan, Shimla War Karwan, Sufyan Karwan, and Jaish Ansar-ul-Mahdi operate, carrying out mass suicide attacks, explosions, and targeted killings.
Pakistan's National Counter-Terrorism Department listed Hafiz Gul Bahadur and his group as terrorist organizations on July 31, 2024.
The group had signed an agreement with the Pakistani government in 2006 and was considered by the people to be the "good Taliban" and a support group for the Pakistani army and intelligence services. However, after the Zarb-e-Azb military operation in North Waziristan, the Gul Bahadur group found safe havens around the Durand Line and began suppressive operations against the Pakistani army and security forces.
Gul Bahadur, like Afghan Taliban leader Haibatullah Akhundzada, rarely appears in public, and no clear images or videos of him have been released yet.
Mir Ali agreement
The Afghan Taliban signed an agreement with the Pakistani Taliban and other foreign militant groups in Mir Ali, North Waziristan, before the fall of Kabul, under which Kabul would assist them in waging "jihad" and establishing a Sharia system in Pakistan after the "Islamic Emirate" regained power.
A source close to Gul Bahadur's group, without naming him, told Afghanistan International-Pashto that the agreement was signed by Haqqani Network leader Sirajuddin Haqqani, who was the deputy leader of the Taliban at the time, former TTP leaders, al-Qaeda leaders, Hafiz Gul Bahadur, head of the North Waziristan Ittihad-e-Mujahideen Council, Maulvi Sadiq Noor Dawar, a member of this council, and a number of other Taliban leaders.
The source says that after the airstrikes by Pakistani aircraft in the Spira district of Khost province in April 2022, when Islamabad increased pressure on the Afghan Taliban to stop the TTP from carrying out attacks in Pakistan, the Taliban’s Defense Minister Mullah Mohammad Yaqoob Mujahid summoned the leaders of the Pakistani Taliban and Hafiz Gul Bahadur, the head of the North Waziristan Ittihad-ul-Mujahideen Shura, who was then living in the Shakardara district of Kabul, and asked them to stop their attacks in Pakistan.
The source says, "Hafiz Gul Bahadur, who had established a support umbrella for the Haqqani Network and Al-Qaeda in North Waziristan, showed Mullah Yaqoob the document of Mir Ali agreement during this meeting, which emphasizes the support of the Islamic Emirate for foreign fighters."
According to the source, in this document, Afghan and foreign fighters have agreed that they will fight alongside the Afghan Taliban against the Afghan government, NATO, and American forces to restore the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, but that after the Islamic Emirate regains power, the Afghan Taliban will cooperate with them in kind.
Another source, who did not want to be named, told Afghanistan International that after the killing of former al-Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri in a US drone strike, Sirajuddin Haqqani and Maulvi Yaqoob did not consider Kabul safe for al-Qaeda and Pakistani Taliban leaders and asked them to choose to settle in Afghanistan's border provinces and areas that were isolated and far from domestic and international surveillance.
The source added, "Hafiz Gul Bahadur moved from Shakar Dara district of Kabul to the border area of Barmal district of Paktika, and Mufti Noor Wali, who until recently lived in a non-Pashtun-populated area of Khair Khana in Kabul, went to Kunar province, but his travel to and from Kabul was regular."
Three days before the Pakistani attacks on Kabul in October 2025, Noor Wali Mehsud went to Hewad Shifa Hospital in the Qalacha area on the Kabul-Logar highway to closely monitor the condition of injured TTP fighters. However, after the attack, Hewad Shifa Hospital terminated its contract with the TTP to treat fighters. Afghanistan International spoke to the hospital’s officials about this, but they said that they do not treat fighters, nor do they have a contract with anyone, but that the hospital treats traffic accident victims.
On June 1, 2023, the United Nations Security Council said in a report that the killing of Ayman al-Zawahiri in Kabul had disheartened some Taliban members, who believed they had been deceived about the al-Qaeda leader's presence. Others suggested that al-Zawahiri's whereabouts had been deliberately leaked to the United States.
The issue has alarmed Taliban leaders, including Mullah Baradar, who had pledged good relations with the international community and not to provide sanctuary to foreign fighters. According to the report, Mullah Baradar told the interior minister in a meeting after Ayman al-Zawahiri’s death that “by providing shelter to Ayman al-Zawahiri, you have made me a liar to the international community,” but Sirajuddin Haqqani responded by saying that the guest house in Kabul for al-Zawahiri had been granted with the consent of the emir, Mullah Haibatullah Akhundzada
Sources close to the Pakistani Taliban told Afghanistan International that the Taliban government also asked TTP leader Mufti Noor Wali to refrain from walking around in public, but he responded by saying, "The sun cannot be hidden by two fingers."
Sources say that the Taliban government later banned the leaders and commanders of the TTP and other militant groups from giving interviews to the media and from openly residing and moving around cities, and that is why they now avoid interviews and do not appear in meetings.
TTP transfer process
In May 2022, the Taliban government, after pressure from Pakistan, offered the TTP the opportunity to move from the border areas to northern Afghanistan, Logar and Ghazni, but the TTP did not consider northern Afghanistan and the provinces far from the Durand Line as suitable areas for its activities and sustainability.
The Taliban's interior minister promised foreign fighters that they would build roads to residential areas, build houses for them, and connect them to centers to facilitate their movement. However, the leaders of the militant groups argued that they wanted to be close to Waziristan and the tribal areas, to be able to travel and interact with their people, and that moving them to other areas would not affect their jihadi activities.
The transfer of the families of the fighters to Ghazni, Logar, Baghlan and Kunduz is not desirable for them because it affects their fighting activities. Many other fighting families from Waziristan and the tribal areas were also transferred to northern Afghanistan, Ghazni, Logar, Maidan Wardak and north of Kabul in the 1920s and 1928 due to complaints from British India, which affected their fighting activities and later they were engaged in development and cultivation of the lands given to them instead of fighting.
However, in early 2025, after pressure and attacks from Pakistan, TTP leaders conditionally agreed to the transfer of some of their families.
According to this agreement, in the last week of January 2025, the Taliban administration secretly transferred dozens of families belonging to the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan from the Gulan camp in Khost, surrounding villages, Ismail Khel district, and border areas of Paktika to refugee camps in Ghazni.
In the agreement, the Taliban administration agreed with the TTP that the affected families and their members would not be biometrically registered, their photographs would not be taken, and each family would be given a monthly stipend and transportation and household expenses.
A source involved in the relocation of displaced Waziristan families told Afghanistan International that "the families agreed to the relocation on the condition that their privacy be maintained and financial assistance be provided."
According to the source, the Taliban government's ministries of refugee affairs, interior affairs, tribes, and intelligence were involved in the relocation process, and it was agreed that the Taliban government would pay each family member of these refugees a monthly salary of $400, $500 for relocation, rental expenses, and the cost of purchasing household items in Ghazni.
A source close to the TTP told Afghanistan International that the heads of Waziristan families were registered under pseudonyms and that only the cards issued by the TTP were valid for their salaries and other benefits.
The Taliban government has built three town-like camps for families of Waziristan and other foreign fighters, with a capacity of 500 to 1,000 families, in the Malik Din area of Ghazni’s Nawa district, Attar Bagh Dasht in Gulkoh district of Qarabagh district, and Dasht Kabuli area of Waghaz district. These single-story townships are all equipped with madrasas, schools, health centers, and water systems, but they have long been fenced off because the displaced Waziristanis have refused to move to these camps.
It was planned that the families of Hafiz Gul Bahadur and TTP fighters from Afghan Dubai, Pache Mela, Khara Bara, Sur Kando, Kani in Khost and from the Leman, Murgh, Mela, Manghari and Zabargi areas of Barmal district in Paktika would be transferred to these camps, but so far only a number of families belonging to the TTP's Mesed and Dawar tribes have gone to the Qarabagh camp. Afghanistan International's latest findings from Ghazni show that a number of families have returned to Khost and Paktika.
According to the TTP family relocation agreement, the TTP will organize security in the camps itself and will have its own security force and administrative department.
A source in Kabul told Afghanistan International that the transfer had no impact on security in the tribal areas, because, "these families were transferred due to pressure from the Taliban's Minister of Interior, Sirajuddin Haqqani. It was a calculated attempt and a pretext to put one's nose in the mud."
In addition to access to many districts of Kandahar, this district also has roads connecting to Zabul, Uruzgan, Helmand, Daikundi, Ghazni, and other provinces.
To the east of Kandahar's Shawali Kot district is Jaldak district of Zabul province, to the west is Khakrez and Arghandab districts of Kandahar, to the north is Uruzgan province and Mianshin district of Kandahar, and to the south is Daman and Arghandab districts of Kandahar.
These sanctuaries were not a source of concern for Pakistan until recently, but when the TT activities began in Balochistan and the Baloch fighters discovered new advanced weapons, Islamabad has now become aware of the sensitivity of this region.
In late December 2024, Pakistan's former special representative for Afghanistan implied in an interview that there are safe havens for the Pakistani Taliban movement in Kandahar.
Deep religious beliefs, friendships, bonds, and historical ties that developed during the Afghan war have created a new bond between these fighters.
Khalid Pashtun, a resident of Kandahar province, says that in recent months, the bodies of Afghan Taliban fighters have been brought from Balochistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa to the southern provinces, and even Farah and Badghis, and handed over to their families.
"Even in the previous republic, these areas of Shawali Kot were insecure, as they were very strong Taliban strongholds and were fighting," Pashtun told Afghanistan International.
General Sami Sadat, the youngest commander of the former Afghan army and the head of the 215th Maiwand Corps and the Ministry of Defense’s Special Operations Command in Helmand during the republican government, has long been involved in fighting the Taliban, al-Qaeda and other foreign fighters in Helmand and surrounding provinces. General Sadat, whose recently published book “The Last Commander” is a memoir, told Afghanistan International that the Afghan Taliban are providing the TTP with military equipment and financial support.
He added: "The Afghan Taliban provide financial support to the Pakistani Taliban, provide military equipment and training. Some Afghan Taliban even go in formation with the Pakistani Taliban, some of whom have been killed in the fighting."
In the North Waziristan, South Waziristan, Bannu, Tank, Lakki Marwat, Mohmand, and Bajaur districts of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province, many Afghan Taliban have been killed recently, fighting alongside Pakistani fighters against the Pakistani army.
TTP gains access to advanced weapons
The Taliban leader issued a decree in August 2024 restricting the distribution of all weapons and military equipment to himself. According to the decree, the group’s ministers of defense and interior, as well as the head of the intelligence agency, can no longer remove weapons from arsenals or distribute them on their own. Following the decree, registration of weapons and military equipment began in all provinces, and many weapons, especially M4 weapons, were transferred to Kandahar and placed under the control of Haibatullah Akhundzada’s special forces
However, these measures have not completely stopped the sale and smuggling of weapons.
With the transfer of the TTP to Afghanistan, numerous arms dealers and smugglers have spread across Khost, Paktia, Paktika, Kunar, Nangarhar, Helmand, and Nimroz provinces.
With the intensification of the fighting in Pakistan, the arms market has boomed again.
In the first months of the fall of Kabul in August 2021, the prices of American M16s and M4s were around $1,000 and $2,000, as both soldiers and fighters bought and sold weapons, but as these weapons became scarcer on the market, their prices rose.
Haji Matiullah, who used to trade in arms in Azam Warsak, South Waziristan, and Miranshah, the capital of North Waziristan, has now expanded his business to Khost and Paktika. He told Afghanistan International that in Afghan markets, especially in Khost and Paktika, a new American M4 is sold for $4,285 and an M16 for $1,428. The prices of Chinese M4 rifles are three times lower than American ones and are sold for the same price as an American M16.
These weapons are mostly purchased by the Pakistani Taliban and used in their battles against the Pakistani army. The fighters use the American M4, American M16, and Chinese M4 laser night vision goggles.
The BM1 rocket, currently priced at $424, is the TTIP’s preferred weapon for long-range attacks on airfields and military installations. The Russian RPG-7 rocket launcher is now a common weapon among fighters, priced at $535. This weapon is often used to attack motorcades, but it has been replaced by an 82-millimeter cannon, which is capable of piercing concrete walls of courts.
TTP minelayers have recently been able to prepare 82mm shells for RPG-7 rockets. Fighters use a lathe to machine the 82mm shells and then attach RPG-7 shell casings to the bottom.
A former arms dealer from Mir Ala, North Waziristan, whom we will refer to as Dawar for security reasons, told Afghanistan International, “The demand for 82mm guns, which are shoulder-fired, has increased significantly. These guns have proven very effective in attacking Pakistani army posts because they can break through concrete walls and solid stone-cement walls. RPG-7 rockets are not capable of breaking through or piercing walls.”
According to his information, the price of an 82 mm cannon has increased to $1,784, and one bullet is being sold for $71.
Similarly, the price of the Russian-made PK machine gun, which is still a popular weapon among Pakistani fighters, is around $1,710, and a box of PK shells (10 rounds) sells for around $3.40.
Other weapons that have seen their prices rise and in some cases fall include both Soviet-made and American-made weapons. Hand grenades are sold on the black market between Paktika and Waziristan for around $12 to $14. A domestic Russian Kalashnikov (AK-47) costs between $1,370 and $1,540.
Before 2002, the Kalashnikov was the weapon of every soldier and the Klyukov of every commander, but now, with the changing generation of soldiers, the Russian culture of weapons has also changed and has been replaced by the American M16 and M4. The value of American weapons is often considered to be linked to their durability and the devices that can be mounted on them.
Ten cartridges of this weapon are sold for $5.43 per hour, which is about a dollar less than the price of Kalashnikov ammunition ($4.36 per hour).
Fighters usually use Russian and Chinese telescopes on their weapons, as American access to them is limited.
Afghanistan International has studied the nature and tactics of Pakistani Taliban attacks in the South Waziristan, North Waziristan, Bajaur, Mohmand, Tank, Lakki Marwat and Bannu districts of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa over the past year, which shows that in most of the attacks, mass and targeted attacks, the group has first targeted Pakistani security cameras with laser weapons (usually mounted on M4 and M16) and then attacked them. In laser attacks, they often use experienced Afghan Taliban fighters.
Abidullah Mehsud (pseudonym), who leads a small group of Pakistani Taliban, sees the new equipment as more economical than the old ones. “These telescopes and lasers have reduced the cost of the fighters by three times,” he says, who operates in the Ladakh and Makin areas of South Waziristan. “Previously, the cost of weapons was high, but now the bullets are on target and there is no need for additional costs,” he says.
According to him, "Previously, fighters used Russian grenade launchers during attacks, which could be used to launch missiles at checkpoints from a distance of one kilometer, but now American grenade launchers are used, which can hit targets from 1,500 meters and are well-mounted on American M4 and M16 rifles."
The price of a grenade launcher is $727, and a round shell, similar to a bomb-laden cannon, costs $3.64.
Haji Matiullah cites al-Qaeda, the Pakistani Taliban, Baloch separatists, the anti-Iranian Jaish al-Adl group, and Pakistani arms dealers as key buyers of American weapons. “In the early years, Pakistani dealers, mostly from the tribal areas, bought a lot of weapons at cheap prices because after the collapse of al-Qaeda, they were paid back for the previous years’ debts and they had enough money to buy weapons,” he told Afghanistan International.
The TTP uses ammonium phosphate, ammonium nitrate and potassium to make explosives, which are smuggled into the tribal districts of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and areas along the Durand Line. Pakistan has recently tightened restrictions on the export and import of these materials, making them subject to insurance through Gwadar port, but militants have turned to Iran and other countries.
According to Matiullah, the Pakistani Taliban movement previously used Chinese firecrackers and explosive rope, but now has access to more advanced firecrackers and explosive rope smuggled from Iran.
Primacord is a soft, flexible detonating cord that transmits a high-velocity blast wave. It is used for simultaneous detonations in minelaying, military, and sabotage operations.
Another source from the arms smuggling network told Afghanistan International, "The Pakistani Taliban movement and Hafiz Gul Bahadur's group use this rope in landmine explosions and car bombs. The speed of the Iranian rope's blast wave is around seven to eight thousand meters per second."
Like the Afghan Taliban, the Pakistani Taliban use explosives in mass, simultaneous, and coordinated attacks. These include roadside bombs (IEDs), which are strategically placed on roads, near military posts, or in areas where security forces travel. The Taliban use explosives to target military targets such as checkpoints, patrols, and checkpoints. They are also used to breach security barriers and steel barriers.
“In the fall of 2022, the TTP succeeded in gaining access to ammonium nitrate, originally made in the United Arab Emirates,” said an arms smuggler in Khost, speaking on condition of anonymity. “This gray ammonium nitrate is produced for agricultural fields and gardens, which traders transport to Afghanistan via Iran. This ammonium nitrate is purchased by the fighters through gardeners and transported to the tribal areas via Nangarhar and Paktika.”
He says, "Previously, this ammonium nitrate was converted into gunpowder in Paktika and Nangarhar and then sent to the tribal areas, but later a problem arose, in which after two months, the gunpowder obtained from ammonium nitrate would lose its effectiveness and would not explode. That is why they stopped making gunpowder here."
TTP fighters are now transporting ammonium nitrate and other raw materials via the long, mountainous routes to Khyber and the Datta Khel Tehsil of North Waziristan, and from there they are transported by others to various tribal areas.
According to a TTP bomb-making expert, the fighters heat ammonium nitrate to turn it from a solid to a liquid state, then add five liters of diesel to 15 kilograms to solidify it back into gunpowder.
Helmand smugglers cooperate with the TTP in the supply of potassium nitrate (KNO₃), which is usually imported from Iran. This potassium is brought from Iran in paper packets disguised as powdered milk and sold to TTP arms smugglers in Waziristan. Potassium has the property that it does not deteriorate even after a year when mixed with diesel, and the militants use it for explosives.
A
source who closely observed the militants' explosives process says, "Twenty kilograms of ammonium nitrate can destroy a tank, and 7 kilograms of potassium can shatter heavy tanks. After heating, when diesel is mixed with potassium or ammonium nitrate, it is immediately poured into barrels, buckets, and thermoses where it solidifies again. When it is in a liquid state, firecrackers are placed in it so that the firecrackers remain solid and locked inside."
According to the source, "In the past, when the Afghan Taliban were in Waziristan, they used Chinese and Pakistani firecrackers, which did not explode in large numbers and could not detonate the gunpowder, but the current Iranian firecrackers explode quickly."
The source says that bundles of pre-mades arrive at a distance of 200 and 300 meters and are delivered to TTP fighters by smugglers from Helmand and Nimroz. “In the fall of 2022, all the Iranian ammunition, pre-mades and plates stored in Helmand were seized by the Noorwali Mesed group,” the source told Afghanistan International.
Modern weapons have changed the traditional form of warfare.
In January 2025, Pakistan's Chief of Army Staff Asim Munir said at a military exercise in Balochistan that Pakistan's armed forces were modernizing their weapons and systems "according to the needs of the country."
General Munir emphasized that the goal of modernizing the military is to effectively respond to and deter any emerging threat to Pakistan.
The fall of advanced weapons into the hands of Pakistani militant groups poses a major challenge to Pakistan's security forces. The most vulnerable to attacks by the TTP and Baloch separatists are the border forces and law enforcement agencies, especially the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Police. They are often armed with outdated weapons that are ineffective in combat and have been trained in a less combat-friendly environment than the militants.
Laser weapons in the hands of the Taliban, or rather American and NATO-made weapons in general, are a major headache for the Pakistani military, especially the border forces. Soldiers cannot leave their posts freely and often fall prey to these weapons.
Therefore, Pakistan is expressing its concerns internationally about the remaining American weapons in Afghanistan, urging the United States and the international community to reclaim these weapons, or at least to pressure the Afghan Taliban to control them.
The army has equipped the Frontier Corps with a number of new weapons, including drones and snipers, to counter the militants' military technology and superiority.
The Pakistani Taliban claim that Chinese quadcopters have recently been provided to the Pakistani army and border forces along the Durand Line, which carry 85mm mortar shells and use them against fighters.
Abidullah Maseed said, "The army is trying to find ways to counter the Taliban's combat tactics, one example of which is small Chinese drones, but they are effective during the day, but they do not give results at night. Now, when the Taliban come close to the checkpoints to fight, the soldiers immediately take out these drones."
But TTP fighters and Hafiz Gul Bahadur's group are also not oblivious to the value of drones and quadcopters. These groups are looking for cheap and small commercial drones that can provide them with a support umbrella on the battlefield.
Three sources told Afghanistan International that some local affiliates of the TTP were in Kabul six months ago looking for companies that import Chinese commercial drones, or quadcopters. But it’s not just about buying. The group is also trying to find technicians and university students to modify these simple drones to be able to drop bombs or missiles.
A source who met with these people says, "They want to customize drones that can be used for surveillance in the first step and can be used to deliver bombs to targets at least 10 kilometers or more away in the second step. For this, the technical components of the drone, such as batteries and cameras, must be replaced, and this is not possible without specialized personnel."
Sources told Afghanistan International that the first drone attack was carried out by Hafiz Gul Bahadur’s group in Mir Ali, North Waziristan, and the last drone attack attempt was on July 19 in the Miryan security zone of Bannu district, which Pakistani forces thwarted before the attack could take place. Officials from the Miryan security zone of Bannu also showed the media the mortar shells that the TTP intended to use on the security zone.
Sources told Afghanistan International that the militants had tested the drones in the Laman area of Paktika province, near the Durand Line, before the attack. According to the source, “the drones they have so far only operate during the day and can only target stationary targets.”
Sources added to Afghanistan International that "the fighters wanted to use these drones along the Durand Line, but the Afghan Taliban government prevented them."
Sources said that both the TTP and Gul Bahadur's group have acquired quadcopters, but they are not using them because their systems are not sophisticated and can be detected and destroyed quickly. Pakistani fighters want to acquire advanced drones that can fly long distances, have thermal imaging cameras, and can track targets and enemy movements at night.
TTP fighters have also purchased large quantities of Honda motorcycle batteries, which are considered effective for roadside bombs and for keeping drones in the air for long periods of time.
Previously, these fighters usually connected six different small batteries together in a circuit to provide the voltage needed to remotely activate a mine, but these batteries would quickly run out of charge and the minelayer would have to return to load new batteries. This was a life-threatening task, and many of their mines exploded. But now, the fighters are using Honda motorcycle batteries in their mine blasts, which can hold a charge for up to a week and are activated via electronic communications
Why are the Pakistani Taliban looking for drones?
Advanced American weapons have proven deadly to the Pakistani military in the hands of the TTP and Baloch militants over the past four years, but Islamabad has now changed its combat and operational strategy and has increased the use of drones and quadcopters in its operations.
In late April 2025, Pakistani security forces announced that they had killed 54 militants in the Datakhel tehsil of North Waziristan as they crossed the Durand Line. Video footage of the attack showed the militants being killed en masse and tall trees being uprooted. Social media accounts close to the Pakistani military described the attack as a drone strike. There have been several other similar attacks, all of which have been fatal for the militants.
Most of the drones used against the militants are medium-altitude drones, which are manufactured in Pakistan itself, and the Taliban do not have the necessary weapons and equipment to shoot them down or neutralize them.
The Pakistani military has been developing its own drones since 2015, when it successfully tested its first armed drone, the Buraq. All three branches of the military—the land, air, and naval forces—use drones for surveillance, reconnaissance, and targeted attacks. The effectiveness of drones in the recent Indo-Pak war has further convinced Islamabad of the tool’s effectiveness. The drones are now also being used to strike TTP targets in Afghanistan.
The Taliban are walking a delicate path.
The Afghan Taliban are walking a delicate political tightrope between their former ally, the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan, and the demands of the international community and Pakistan. This is a result of the relationships the Taliban have cultivated since taking power.
The Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan, often considered an ideological and combative ally of the Afghan Taliban, renewed its allegiance by congratulating Taliban leader Haibatullah Akhundzada after the Taliban took power in Kabul in August 2021.
Now, it appears that the TTP is not only seeking moral support from the Afghan Taliban, but is also asking them to support its efforts to establish a similar Islamic Emirate in Pakistan.
On the other hand, Pakistan has remained the strongest supporter and combat front of the Afghan Taliban. Many of the Taliban leaders; Mullah Mohammad Omar, Mullah Akhtar Mohammad Mansoor, Mullah Dadullah and the current leader Haibatullah Akhundzada have benefited from Pakistan’s safe havens for many years. Many of the Taliban’s high and low-ranking officials and fighters lived in various parts of Pakistan, received religious education and combat training there, and fought in Afghanistan.
For Taliban leaders, this relationship has become a two-way problem. On the one hand, they do not want to turn the Pakistani army against them. On the other hand, Islamabad is demanding that Kabul crack down on the TTP on a large scale, as the group has recently inflicted heavy casualties on Pakistani security forces.
In addition, the United States and the international community are pressuring the Taliban to remain committed to the Doha agreement, in which the Taliban pledged not to use Afghan soil against neighboring countries or other international organizations and to prevent the activities of terrorist groups.
The TT-P has created a parallel ecosystem for itself along the Durand Line through local Taliban, religious leaders, and arms markets. This situation has created a contradiction between the Taliban’s official position and the practical reality.
Although the Taliban have officially pledged not to host any militant group in Doha, in practice their soft stance on the activities of the TTP suggests that the group is trying to use the support of the TTP and other extremist groups as a leverage against Islamabad and other neighbors of Afghanistan to maintain its power. However, analysts believe that this strategy could lead to long-term risks, given Pakistan’s similar experiences.
The continued security of the TTP is also a concern for regional players. China is concerned about the security of its economic projects, especially the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), as TTP activities undermine Islamabad's focus on Baloch militants and pose a threat to Chinese companies.
Iran and Russia are trying to keep the Taliban government stable and prevent a resurgence of American influence in the region, but the activities of terrorist groups in Afghanistan are undermining Moscow and Tehran's position. For the Taliban, the current situation renews the threat of a repeat of the disaster of 2001, when they faced a US response for not handing over al-Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden.
The Taliban may promise to expel and ban some TTP members, but they will not turn their backs on it unilaterally. If the Taliban takes repressive measures against the TTP, it is possible that violence will arise between the two groups and the Taliban will face internal conflicts.
General Sadat believes that the Afghan Taliban's support for the Pakistani Taliban, al-Qaeda, and ISIS will once again lead to the United States or another country intervening militarily in Afghanistan. "There is a fear that many Afghans will be sacrificed because of the Taliban's wrong policy," he says.
Note : This report is based on field research, interviews with TTP members, Afghan Taliban members, tribal elders, security analysts, arms dealers and smugglers, and local colleagues, field visits, and verified information. Some names used in the report have been anonymized for security reasons.
Taliban do not want to lose the "TTP card" against Pakistan
Afghanistan International - Pashto Research
7 hours ago
Updated 2:20 p.m.
Ikramullah Mehsud enters the Taliban security offices in Khost without permission or a search. When he enters the office, the police headquarters and intelligence officers smile and say to each other: “The killer of Bhutto has arrived.” His car never stops at the gas station, because the tank is always full, on the orders of the Taliban.
On December 27, 2007, former TTP leader Baitullah Mehsud sent two suicide bombers, one of whom was Ikramullah Mehsud, to Liaquat Bagh in Rawalpindi, Pakistan.
Former Pakistan Peoples Party leader Benazir Bhutto was addressing a large gathering here. Bilal, wearing dark glasses, approached the left side of Bhutto's armored vehicle, pulled out a pistol and fired three rapid-fire rounds before blowing himself up. Within seconds, Bhutto's white car was covered in blood and he collapsed in the vehicle below. Ikramullah threw his suicide vest and pistol into a nearby mosque and fled the scene.
After the Zarb-e-Azb operation in North Waziristan in 2014, he went to Afghanistan with the slain commander of Hakimullah Mehsud's group, Shahryar Mehsud. At the time, he denied any involvement in Bhutto's assassination.
Ikramullah mullah Mehsud said in a video in June 2018 that he was not involved in the killing of Bhutto.
Since 2014, Ikramullah has been hiding in fear with TTP commanders in Nangarhar, Kunar, Khost, and Paktika. But after the Taliban took control of Kabul and Afghanistan in 2021, he is no longer hiding; he does not deny his involvement in the assassination of Benazir Bhutto and openly says that he went to Liaquat Bagh to kill Bhutto.
According to Afghanistan International's research, many of the senior commanders of the Pakistani Taliban, Mufti Noor Wali Mehsud, Hafiz Gul Bahadur, Azmatullah Mehsud, Akhtar Mohammad Khalil, and Mufti Sadiq Noor Dawar, are moving between Kabul, Kunar, Khost, Paktia, Paktika provinces, and Waziristan, Khyber, and Bajaur.
Gul Bahadur doesn't look much like Haibatullah.
Ghobargi is a village in the Zadran district of Khost's Spira district, but beyond this area is the Madakhel Wazir region of Paktika, which is separated from Waziristan by barbed wire and the Durand Line.
The Madakhel are a clan belonging to the famous commander Hafiz Gul Bahadur of the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) or Ittihad-e-Mujahideen Shura, who lives on both sides of the Durand Line. Therefore, he is considered the most powerful and influential person in this area.
In Afghanistan, cars are driven on the right, but from the Tanai district of Khost, which enters the Zadran Gharbiga area, they drive on the left, because the Pakistani Taliban all drive on the left here.
After Pakistani airstrikes on Afghan forces in the Khost province's Spira district and surrounding villages in April 1401 (2022), Gul Bahadur left the area for the Barmal district of Paktika, and some of his commanders scattered to the Shamal district of Khost and other areas, but his madrassas and fighters are still active in the Spira district.
The Taliban's Interior Minister Sirajuddin Haqqani and the Deputy Chief of Staff of the Ministry of Defense Mali Khan Siddique visited the area after the severe earthquake in July 1401 and after the Pakistani attack in April. Later, photos of them with two Pakistani Taliban commanders, Akhtar Mohammad Khalil and Commander Aftab Dawar, were published.
A Madakhel tribal leader, speaking on condition of anonymity, told Afghanistan International that “Sirajuddin Haqqani had promised the Madakhel tribe during this visit that he would approve a separate district for them called Kani.” However, due to Pakistan’s sensitivities and fears that the area could become another Waziristan, the approval of this district has been delayed.
The Taliban then established a checkpoint in the Kani area to closely monitor the situation in the area.
Former Khost Governor Abdul Qayyum Rohani opened a security checkpoint in Afghan Dubai at a time when the 10th and 5th battalions of the Khost KPF forces were in the hands of Hafiz Gul Bahadur's fighters.
A senior security source in Khost told Afghanistan International that "until recently, fighters affiliated with a commander of Hafiz Gul Bahadur, known as Commander Talwar, were stationed in the 10th Battalion of Spira and the 5th Battalion of Tanai."
According to the source, "The weapons of these two battalions fell into the hands of Aftab Yasir Dawar, a commander of the Sadiq Noor faction of the Pakistani Taliban, during the fall of the republic. Aftab Dawar, who was traveling to Kabul and Kandahar by air, was killed in an armed attack in Kandahar, in which the Gul Bahadur faction attributed the involvement of Pakistani intelligence agencies."
Aftabullah was suspicious that advanced American weapons were being sold to Baloch militants.
The Taliban sent a number of their military officials to this area in 1400 and advised people to refrain from collecting donations and firing rifles and other heavy weapons at weddings, but these recommendations have had no effect on the Pakistani fighters living here because most of the foreign fighters are former members of the Taliban's "strongholds."
Two sources in the region told Afghanistan International that security in the area is handled by the tribal militia, and the area is effectively under the authority and control of Gul Bahadur.
In late June 2025, Hafiz Gul Bahadur and Maulvi Sadiq Noor Dawar fled from Barmal in Paktika and Shamal in Khost districts to an unknown destination, fearing Pakistani airstrikes.
Two sources told Afghanistan International on July 8 that Hafiz Gul Bahadur and two of his other commanders, Qari Ismail and Akhtar Mohammad Khalil, lived in Barmal district, but left the area five days ago.
Maulvi Sadiq Noor Dawar and his two local commanders, Maulvi Sediqullah and Syed Anar, were active in the Shamal district of Khost and along the Durand Line, but after the June 28 suicide attack on the Pakistani army in the Mir alu area of North Waziristan, both of them left the area.
At least 13 Pakistani soldiers were killed and several others were injured in the attack.
The Pakistani military announced after the attack that it had killed 14 militants in the area during a clearance operation. Pakistan's army chief Asim Munir announced after the attack that he would "take revenge on the perpetrators." Munir stressed that he would "take the bridge of terrorists and expose the real source of terrorism in the area."
The Pakistani military described the attack as the work of an Indian proxy group, but New Delhi denies such allegations.
The Ittihad-e-Mujahideen group, led by Hafiz Gul Bahadur, whose activities are mainly focused on North Waziristan, claimed responsibility for the attack.
"Hafiz Gul Bahadur used to attend parties, but recently he has withdrawn from them. Last week, he received information that he may be under attack from Pakistan, which is why he has now left the area," sources told Afghanistan International.
According to the source, Hafiz Gul Bahadur has told members of the Waziristan tribal council that they should no longer come to him for talks.
Gul Bahadur suspected that the army was trying to locate him after holding meetings with tribal elders and then carrying out operations.
A tribal elder from North Waziristan, who has long been involved in negotiations between the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa provincial government and the Pakistani Taliban, told Afghanistan International that “the Pakistani military had given a deadline in late June to the Atmanzi Wazir tribe of North Waziristan, a tribe affiliated with Gul Bahadur, to either negotiate with the Taliban and stop attacks in their areas or prepare for military operations in the area.”
Under the umbrella of Gul Bahadur's group, units such as Jaish-e-Omari, Farsan Mohammad, Ghaziyan Karwan, Shimla War Karwan, Sufyan Karwan, and Jaish Ansar-ul-Mahdi operate, carrying out mass suicide attacks, explosions, and targeted killings.
Pakistan's National Counter-Terrorism Department listed Hafiz Gul Bahadur and his group as terrorist organizations on July 31, 2024.
The group had signed an agreement with the Pakistani government in 2006 and was considered by the people to be the "good Taliban" and a support group for the Pakistani army and intelligence services. However, after the Zarb-e-Azb military operation in North Waziristan, the Gul Bahadur group found safe havens around the Durand Line and began suppressive operations against the Pakistani army and security forces.
Gul Bahadur, like Afghan Taliban leader Haibatullah Akhundzada, rarely appears in public, and no clear images or videos of him have been released yet.
Mir Ali agreement
The Afghan Taliban signed an agreement with the Pakistani Taliban and other foreign militant groups in Mir Ali, North Waziristan, before the fall of Kabul, under which Kabul would assist them in waging "jihad" and establishing a Sharia system in Pakistan after the "Islamic Emirate" regained power.
A source close to Gul Bahadur's group, without naming him, told Afghanistan International-Pashto that the agreement was signed by Haqqani Network leader Sirajuddin Haqqani, who was the deputy leader of the Taliban at the time, former TTP leaders, al-Qaeda leaders, Hafiz Gul Bahadur, head of the North Waziristan Ittihad-e-Mujahideen Council, Maulvi Sadiq Noor Dawar, a member of this council, and a number of other Taliban leaders.
The source says that after the airstrikes by Pakistani aircraft in the Spira district of Khost province in April 2022, when Islamabad increased pressure on the Afghan Taliban to stop the TTP from carrying out attacks in Pakistan, the Taliban’s Defense Minister Mullah Mohammad Yaqoob Mujahid summoned the leaders of the Pakistani Taliban and Hafiz Gul Bahadur, the head of the North Waziristan Ittihad-ul-Mujahideen Shura, who was then living in the Shakardara district of Kabul, and asked them to stop their attacks in Pakistan.
The source says, "Hafiz Gul Bahadur, who had established a support umbrella for the Haqqani Network and Al-Qaeda in North Waziristan, showed Mullah Yaqoob the document of Mir Ali agreement during this meeting, which emphasizes the support of the Islamic Emirate for foreign fighters."
According to the source, in this document, Afghan and foreign fighters have agreed that they will fight alongside the Afghan Taliban against the Afghan government, NATO, and American forces to restore the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, but that after the Islamic Emirate regains power, the Afghan Taliban will cooperate with them in kind.
Another source, who did not want to be named, told Afghanistan International that after the killing of former al-Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri in a US drone strike, Sirajuddin Haqqani and Maulvi Yaqoob did not consider Kabul safe for al-Qaeda and Pakistani Taliban leaders and asked them to choose to settle in Afghanistan's border provinces and areas that were isolated and far from domestic and international surveillance.
The source added, "Hafiz Gul Bahadur moved from Shakar Dara district of Kabul to the border area of Barmal district of Paktika, and Mufti Noor Wali, who until recently lived in a non-Pashtun-populated area of Khair Khana in Kabul, went to Kunar province, but his travel to and from Kabul was regular."
Three days before the Pakistani attacks on Kabul in October 2025, Noor Wali Mehsud went to Hewad Shifa Hospital in the Qalacha area on the Kabul-Logar highway to closely monitor the condition of injured TTP fighters. However, after the attack, Hewad Shifa Hospital terminated its contract with the TTP to treat fighters. Afghanistan International spoke to the hospital’s officials about this, but they said that they do not treat fighters, nor do they have a contract with anyone, but that the hospital treats traffic accident victims.
On June 1, 2023, the United Nations Security Council said in a report that the killing of Ayman al-Zawahiri in Kabul had disheartened some Taliban members, who believed they had been deceived about the al-Qaeda leader's presence. Others suggested that al-Zawahiri's whereabouts had been deliberately leaked to the United States.
The issue has alarmed Taliban leaders, including Mullah Baradar, who had pledged good relations with the international community and not to provide sanctuary to foreign fighters. According to the report, Mullah Baradar told the interior minister in a meeting after Ayman al-Zawahiri’s death that “by providing shelter to Ayman al-Zawahiri, you have made me a liar to the international community,” but Sirajuddin Haqqani responded by saying that the guest house in Kabul for al-Zawahiri had been granted with the consent of the emir, Mullah Haibatullah Akhundzada
Sources close to the Pakistani Taliban told Afghanistan International that the Taliban government also asked TTP leader Mufti Noor Wali to refrain from walking around in public, but he responded by saying, "The sun cannot be hidden by two fingers."
Sources say that the Taliban government later banned the leaders and commanders of the TTP and other militant groups from giving interviews to the media and from openly residing and moving around cities, and that is why they now avoid interviews and do not appear in meetings.
TTP transfer process
In May 2022, the Taliban government, after pressure from Pakistan, offered the TTP the opportunity to move from the border areas to northern Afghanistan, Logar and Ghazni, but the TTP did not consider northern Afghanistan and the provinces far from the Durand Line as suitable areas for its activities and sustainability.
The Taliban's interior minister promised foreign fighters that they would build roads to residential areas, build houses for them, and connect them to centers to facilitate their movement. However, the leaders of the militant groups argued that they wanted to be close to Waziristan and the tribal areas, to be able to travel and interact with their people, and that moving them to other areas would not affect their jihadi activities.
The transfer of the families of the fighters to Ghazni, Logar, Baghlan and Kunduz is not desirable for them because it affects their fighting activities. Many other fighting families from Waziristan and the tribal areas were also transferred to northern Afghanistan, Ghazni, Logar, Maidan Wardak and north of Kabul in the 1920s and 1928 due to complaints from British India, which affected their fighting activities and later they were engaged in development and cultivation of the lands given to them instead of fighting.
However, in early 2025, after pressure and attacks from Pakistan, TTP leaders conditionally agreed to the transfer of some of their families.
According to this agreement, in the last week of January 2025, the Taliban administration secretly transferred dozens of families belonging to the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan from the Gulan camp in Khost, surrounding villages, Ismail Khel district, and border areas of Paktika to refugee camps in Ghazni.
In the agreement, the Taliban administration agreed with the TTP that the affected families and their members would not be biometrically registered, their photographs would not be taken, and each family would be given a monthly stipend and transportation and household expenses.
A source involved in the relocation of displaced Waziristan families told Afghanistan International that "the families agreed to the relocation on the condition that their privacy be maintained and financial assistance be provided."
According to the source, the Taliban government's ministries of refugee affairs, interior affairs, tribes, and intelligence were involved in the relocation process, and it was agreed that the Taliban government would pay each family member of these refugees a monthly salary of $400, $500 for relocation, rental expenses, and the cost of purchasing household items in Ghazni.
A source close to the TTP told Afghanistan International that the heads of Waziristan families were registered under pseudonyms and that only the cards issued by the TTP were valid for their salaries and other benefits.
The Taliban government has built three town-like camps for families of Waziristan and other foreign fighters, with a capacity of 500 to 1,000 families, in the Malik Din area of Ghazni’s Nawa district, Attar Bagh Dasht in Gulkoh district of Qarabagh district, and Dasht Kabuli area of Waghaz district. These single-story townships are all equipped with madrasas, schools, health centers, and water systems, but they have long been fenced off because the displaced Waziristanis have refused to move to these camps.
It was planned that the families of Hafiz Gul Bahadur and TTP fighters from Afghan Dubai, Pache Mela, Khara Bara, Sur Kando, Kani in Khost and from the Leman, Murgh, Mela, Manghari and Zabargi areas of Barmal district in Paktika would be transferred to these camps, but so far only a number of families belonging to the TTP's Mesed and Dawar tribes have gone to the Qarabagh camp. Afghanistan International's latest findings from Ghazni show that a number of families have returned to Khost and Paktika.
According to the TTP family relocation agreement, the TTP will organize security in the camps itself and will have its own security force and administrative department.
A source in Kabul told Afghanistan International that the transfer had no impact on security in the tribal areas, because, "these families were transferred due to pressure from the Taliban's Minister of Interior, Sirajuddin Haqqani. It was a calculated attempt and a pretext to put one's nose in the mud."
In addition to access to many districts of Kandahar, this district also has roads connecting to Zabul, Uruzgan, Helmand, Daikundi, Ghazni, and other provinces.
To the east of Kandahar's Shawali Kot district is Jaldak district of Zabul province, to the west is Khakrez and Arghandab districts of Kandahar, to the north is Uruzgan province and Mianshin district of Kandahar, and to the south is Daman and Arghandab districts of Kandahar.
These sanctuaries were not a source of concern for Pakistan until recently, but when the TT activities began in Balochistan and the Baloch fighters discovered new advanced weapons, Islamabad has now become aware of the sensitivity of this region.
In late December 2024, Pakistan's former special representative for Afghanistan implied in an interview that there are safe havens for the Pakistani Taliban movement in Kandahar.
Deep religious beliefs, friendships, bonds, and historical ties that developed during the Afghan war have created a new bond between these fighters.
Khalid Pashtun, a resident of Kandahar province, says that in recent months, the bodies of Afghan Taliban fighters have been brought from Balochistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa to the southern provinces, and even Farah and Badghis, and handed over to their families.
"Even in the previous republic, these areas of Shawali Kot were insecure, as they were very strong Taliban strongholds and were fighting," Pashtun told Afghanistan International.
General Sami Sadat, the youngest commander of the former Afghan army and the head of the 215th Maiwand Corps and the Ministry of Defense’s Special Operations Command in Helmand during the republican government, has long been involved in fighting the Taliban, al-Qaeda and other foreign fighters in Helmand and surrounding provinces. General Sadat, whose recently published book “The Last Commander” is a memoir, told Afghanistan International that the Afghan Taliban are providing the TTP with military equipment and financial support.
He added: "The Afghan Taliban provide financial support to the Pakistani Taliban, provide military equipment and training. Some Afghan Taliban even go in formation with the Pakistani Taliban, some of whom have been killed in the fighting."
In the North Waziristan, South Waziristan, Bannu, Tank, Lakki Marwat, Mohmand, and Bajaur districts of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province, many Afghan Taliban have been killed recently, fighting alongside Pakistani fighters against the Pakistani army.
TTP gains access to advanced weapons
The Taliban leader issued a decree in August 2024 restricting the distribution of all weapons and military equipment to himself. According to the decree, the group’s ministers of defense and interior, as well as the head of the intelligence agency, can no longer remove weapons from arsenals or distribute them on their own. Following the decree, registration of weapons and military equipment began in all provinces, and many weapons, especially M4 weapons, were transferred to Kandahar and placed under the control of Haibatullah Akhundzada’s special forces
However, these measures have not completely stopped the sale and smuggling of weapons.
With the transfer of the TTP to Afghanistan, numerous arms dealers and smugglers have spread across Khost, Paktia, Paktika, Kunar, Nangarhar, Helmand, and Nimroz provinces.
With the intensification of the fighting in Pakistan, the arms market has boomed again.
In the first months of the fall of Kabul in August 2021, the prices of American M16s and M4s were around $1,000 and $2,000, as both soldiers and fighters bought and sold weapons, but as these weapons became scarcer on the market, their prices rose.
Haji Matiullah, who used to trade in arms in Azam Warsak, South Waziristan, and Miranshah, the capital of North Waziristan, has now expanded his business to Khost and Paktika. He told Afghanistan International that in Afghan markets, especially in Khost and Paktika, a new American M4 is sold for $4,285 and an M16 for $1,428. The prices of Chinese M4 rifles are three times lower than American ones and are sold for the same price as an American M16.
These weapons are mostly purchased by the Pakistani Taliban and used in their battles against the Pakistani army. The fighters use the American M4, American M16, and Chinese M4 laser night vision goggles.
The BM1 rocket, currently priced at $424, is the TTIP’s preferred weapon for long-range attacks on airfields and military installations. The Russian RPG-7 rocket launcher is now a common weapon among fighters, priced at $535. This weapon is often used to attack motorcades, but it has been replaced by an 82-millimeter cannon, which is capable of piercing concrete walls of courts.
TTP minelayers have recently been able to prepare 82mm shells for RPG-7 rockets. Fighters use a lathe to machine the 82mm shells and then attach RPG-7 shell casings to the bottom.
A former arms dealer from Mir Ala, North Waziristan, whom we will refer to as Dawar for security reasons, told Afghanistan International, “The demand for 82mm guns, which are shoulder-fired, has increased significantly. These guns have proven very effective in attacking Pakistani army posts because they can break through concrete walls and solid stone-cement walls. RPG-7 rockets are not capable of breaking through or piercing walls.”
According to his information, the price of an 82 mm cannon has increased to $1,784, and one bullet is being sold for $71.
Similarly, the price of the Russian-made PK machine gun, which is still a popular weapon among Pakistani fighters, is around $1,710, and a box of PK shells (10 rounds) sells for around $3.40.
Other weapons that have seen their prices rise and in some cases fall include both Soviet-made and American-made weapons. Hand grenades are sold on the black market between Paktika and Waziristan for around $12 to $14. A domestic Russian Kalashnikov (AK-47) costs between $1,370 and $1,540.
Before 2002, the Kalashnikov was the weapon of every soldier and the Klyukov of every commander, but now, with the changing generation of soldiers, the Russian culture of weapons has also changed and has been replaced by the American M16 and M4. The value of American weapons is often considered to be linked to their durability and the devices that can be mounted on them.
Ten cartridges of this weapon are sold for $5.43 per hour, which is about a dollar less than the price of Kalashnikov ammunition ($4.36 per hour).
Fighters usually use Russian and Chinese telescopes on their weapons, as American access to them is limited.
Afghanistan International has studied the nature and tactics of Pakistani Taliban attacks in the South Waziristan, North Waziristan, Bajaur, Mohmand, Tank, Lakki Marwat and Bannu districts of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa over the past year, which shows that in most of the attacks, mass and targeted attacks, the group has first targeted Pakistani security cameras with laser weapons (usually mounted on M4 and M16) and then attacked them. In laser attacks, they often use experienced Afghan Taliban fighters.
Abidullah Mehsud (pseudonym), who leads a small group of Pakistani Taliban, sees the new equipment as more economical than the old ones. “These telescopes and lasers have reduced the cost of the fighters by three times,” he says, who operates in the Ladakh and Makin areas of South Waziristan. “Previously, the cost of weapons was high, but now the bullets are on target and there is no need for additional costs,” he says.
According to him, "Previously, fighters used Russian grenade launchers during attacks, which could be used to launch missiles at checkpoints from a distance of one kilometer, but now American grenade launchers are used, which can hit targets from 1,500 meters and are well-mounted on American M4 and M16 rifles."
The price of a grenade launcher is $727, and a round shell, similar to a bomb-laden cannon, costs $3.64.
Haji Matiullah cites al-Qaeda, the Pakistani Taliban, Baloch separatists, the anti-Iranian Jaish al-Adl group, and Pakistani arms dealers as key buyers of American weapons. “In the early years, Pakistani dealers, mostly from the tribal areas, bought a lot of weapons at cheap prices because after the collapse of al-Qaeda, they were paid back for the previous years’ debts and they had enough money to buy weapons,” he told Afghanistan International.
The TTP uses ammonium phosphate, ammonium nitrate and potassium to make explosives, which are smuggled into the tribal districts of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and areas along the Durand Line. Pakistan has recently tightened restrictions on the export and import of these materials, making them subject to insurance through Gwadar port, but militants have turned to Iran and other countries.
According to Matiullah, the Pakistani Taliban movement previously used Chinese firecrackers and explosive rope, but now has access to more advanced firecrackers and explosive rope smuggled from Iran.
Primacord is a soft, flexible detonating cord that transmits a high-velocity blast wave. It is used for simultaneous detonations in minelaying, military, and sabotage operations.
Another source from the arms smuggling network told Afghanistan International, "The Pakistani Taliban movement and Hafiz Gul Bahadur's group use this rope in landmine explosions and car bombs. The speed of the Iranian rope's blast wave is around seven to eight thousand meters per second."
Like the Afghan Taliban, the Pakistani Taliban use explosives in mass, simultaneous, and coordinated attacks. These include roadside bombs (IEDs), which are strategically placed on roads, near military posts, or in areas where security forces travel. The Taliban use explosives to target military targets such as checkpoints, patrols, and checkpoints. They are also used to breach security barriers and steel barriers.
“In the fall of 2022, the TTP succeeded in gaining access to ammonium nitrate, originally made in the United Arab Emirates,” said an arms smuggler in Khost, speaking on condition of anonymity. “This gray ammonium nitrate is produced for agricultural fields and gardens, which traders transport to Afghanistan via Iran. This ammonium nitrate is purchased by the fighters through gardeners and transported to the tribal areas via Nangarhar and Paktika.”
He says, "Previously, this ammonium nitrate was converted into gunpowder in Paktika and Nangarhar and then sent to the tribal areas, but later a problem arose, in which after two months, the gunpowder obtained from ammonium nitrate would lose its effectiveness and would not explode. That is why they stopped making gunpowder here."
TTP fighters are now transporting ammonium nitrate and other raw materials via the long, mountainous routes to Khyber and the Datta Khel Tehsil of North Waziristan, and from there they are transported by others to various tribal areas.
According to a TTP bomb-making expert, the fighters heat ammonium nitrate to turn it from a solid to a liquid state, then add five liters of diesel to 15 kilograms to solidify it back into gunpowder.
Helmand smugglers cooperate with the TTP in the supply of potassium nitrate (KNO₃), which is usually imported from Iran. This potassium is brought from Iran in paper packets disguised as powdered milk and sold to TTP arms smugglers in Waziristan. Potassium has the property that it does not deteriorate even after a year when mixed with diesel, and the militants use it for explosives.
A
source who closely observed the militants' explosives process says, "Twenty kilograms of ammonium nitrate can destroy a tank, and 7 kilograms of potassium can shatter heavy tanks. After heating, when diesel is mixed with potassium or ammonium nitrate, it is immediately poured into barrels, buckets, and thermoses where it solidifies again. When it is in a liquid state, firecrackers are placed in it so that the firecrackers remain solid and locked inside."
According to the source, "In the past, when the Afghan Taliban were in Waziristan, they used Chinese and Pakistani firecrackers, which did not explode in large numbers and could not detonate the gunpowder, but the current Iranian firecrackers explode quickly."
The source says that bundles of pre-mades arrive at a distance of 200 and 300 meters and are delivered to TTP fighters by smugglers from Helmand and Nimroz. “In the fall of 2022, all the Iranian ammunition, pre-mades and plates stored in Helmand were seized by the Noorwali Mesed group,” the source told Afghanistan International.
Modern weapons have changed the traditional form of warfare.
In January 2025, Pakistan's Chief of Army Staff Asim Munir said at a military exercise in Balochistan that Pakistan's armed forces were modernizing their weapons and systems "according to the needs of the country."
General Munir emphasized that the goal of modernizing the military is to effectively respond to and deter any emerging threat to Pakistan.
The fall of advanced weapons into the hands of Pakistani militant groups poses a major challenge to Pakistan's security forces. The most vulnerable to attacks by the TTP and Baloch separatists are the border forces and law enforcement agencies, especially the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Police. They are often armed with outdated weapons that are ineffective in combat and have been trained in a less combat-friendly environment than the militants.
Laser weapons in the hands of the Taliban, or rather American and NATO-made weapons in general, are a major headache for the Pakistani military, especially the border forces. Soldiers cannot leave their posts freely and often fall prey to these weapons.
Therefore, Pakistan is expressing its concerns internationally about the remaining American weapons in Afghanistan, urging the United States and the international community to reclaim these weapons, or at least to pressure the Afghan Taliban to control them.
The army has equipped the Frontier Corps with a number of new weapons, including drones and snipers, to counter the militants' military technology and superiority.
The Pakistani Taliban claim that Chinese quadcopters have recently been provided to the Pakistani army and border forces along the Durand Line, which carry 85mm mortar shells and use them against fighters.
Abidullah Maseed said, "The army is trying to find ways to counter the Taliban's combat tactics, one example of which is small Chinese drones, but they are effective during the day, but they do not give results at night. Now, when the Taliban come close to the checkpoints to fight, the soldiers immediately take out these drones."
But TTP fighters and Hafiz Gul Bahadur's group are also not oblivious to the value of drones and quadcopters. These groups are looking for cheap and small commercial drones that can provide them with a support umbrella on the battlefield.
Three sources told Afghanistan International that some local affiliates of the TTP were in Kabul six months ago looking for companies that import Chinese commercial drones, or quadcopters. But it’s not just about buying. The group is also trying to find technicians and university students to modify these simple drones to be able to drop bombs or missiles.
A source who met with these people says, "They want to customize drones that can be used for surveillance in the first step and can be used to deliver bombs to targets at least 10 kilometers or more away in the second step. For this, the technical components of the drone, such as batteries and cameras, must be replaced, and this is not possible without specialized personnel."
Sources told Afghanistan International that the first drone attack was carried out by Hafiz Gul Bahadur’s group in Mir Ali, North Waziristan, and the last drone attack attempt was on July 19 in the Miryan security zone of Bannu district, which Pakistani forces thwarted before the attack could take place. Officials from the Miryan security zone of Bannu also showed the media the mortar shells that the TTP intended to use on the security zone.
Sources told Afghanistan International that the militants had tested the drones in the Laman area of Paktika province, near the Durand Line, before the attack. According to the source, “the drones they have so far only operate during the day and can only target stationary targets.”
Sources added to Afghanistan International that "the fighters wanted to use these drones along the Durand Line, but the Afghan Taliban government prevented them."
Sources said that both the TTP and Gul Bahadur's group have acquired quadcopters, but they are not using them because their systems are not sophisticated and can be detected and destroyed quickly. Pakistani fighters want to acquire advanced drones that can fly long distances, have thermal imaging cameras, and can track targets and enemy movements at night.
TTP fighters have also purchased large quantities of Honda motorcycle batteries, which are considered effective for roadside bombs and for keeping drones in the air for long periods of time.
Previously, these fighters usually connected six different small batteries together in a circuit to provide the voltage needed to remotely activate a mine, but these batteries would quickly run out of charge and the minelayer would have to return to load new batteries. This was a life-threatening task, and many of their mines exploded. But now, the fighters are using Honda motorcycle batteries in their mine blasts, which can hold a charge for up to a week and are activated via electronic communications
Why are the Pakistani Taliban looking for drones?
Advanced American weapons have proven deadly to the Pakistani military in the hands of the TTP and Baloch militants over the past four years, but Islamabad has now changed its combat and operational strategy and has increased the use of drones and quadcopters in its operations.
In late April 2025, Pakistani security forces announced that they had killed 54 militants in the Datakhel tehsil of North Waziristan as they crossed the Durand Line. Video footage of the attack showed the militants being killed en masse and tall trees being uprooted. Social media accounts close to the Pakistani military described the attack as a drone strike. There have been several other similar attacks, all of which have been fatal for the militants.
Most of the drones used against the militants are medium-altitude drones, which are manufactured in Pakistan itself, and the Taliban do not have the necessary weapons and equipment to shoot them down or neutralize them.
The Pakistani military has been developing its own drones since 2015, when it successfully tested its first armed drone, the Buraq. All three branches of the military—the land, air, and naval forces—use drones for surveillance, reconnaissance, and targeted attacks. The effectiveness of drones in the recent Indo-Pak war has further convinced Islamabad of the tool’s effectiveness. The drones are now also being used to strike TTP targets in Afghanistan.
The Taliban are walking a delicate path.
The Afghan Taliban are walking a delicate political tightrope between their former ally, the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan, and the demands of the international community and Pakistan. This is a result of the relationships the Taliban have cultivated since taking power.
The Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan, often considered an ideological and combative ally of the Afghan Taliban, renewed its allegiance by congratulating Taliban leader Haibatullah Akhundzada after the Taliban took power in Kabul in August 2021.
Now, it appears that the TTP is not only seeking moral support from the Afghan Taliban, but is also asking them to support its efforts to establish a similar Islamic Emirate in Pakistan.
On the other hand, Pakistan has remained the strongest supporter and combat front of the Afghan Taliban. Many of the Taliban leaders; Mullah Mohammad Omar, Mullah Akhtar Mohammad Mansoor, Mullah Dadullah and the current leader Haibatullah Akhundzada have benefited from Pakistan’s safe havens for many years. Many of the Taliban’s high and low-ranking officials and fighters lived in various parts of Pakistan, received religious education and combat training there, and fought in Afghanistan.
For Taliban leaders, this relationship has become a two-way problem. On the one hand, they do not want to turn the Pakistani army against them. On the other hand, Islamabad is demanding that Kabul crack down on the TTP on a large scale, as the group has recently inflicted heavy casualties on Pakistani security forces.
In addition, the United States and the international community are pressuring the Taliban to remain committed to the Doha agreement, in which the Taliban pledged not to use Afghan soil against neighboring countries or other international organizations and to prevent the activities of terrorist groups.
The TT-P has created a parallel ecosystem for itself along the Durand Line through local Taliban, religious leaders, and arms markets. This situation has created a contradiction between the Taliban’s official position and the practical reality.
Although the Taliban have officially pledged not to host any militant group in Doha, in practice their soft stance on the activities of the TTP suggests that the group is trying to use the support of the TTP and other extremist groups as a leverage against Islamabad and other neighbors of Afghanistan to maintain its power. However, analysts believe that this strategy could lead to long-term risks, given Pakistan’s similar experiences.
The continued security of the TTP is also a concern for regional players. China is concerned about the security of its economic projects, especially the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), as TTP activities undermine Islamabad's focus on Baloch militants and pose a threat to Chinese companies.
Iran and Russia are trying to keep the Taliban government stable and prevent a resurgence of American influence in the region, but the activities of terrorist groups in Afghanistan are undermining Moscow and Tehran's position. For the Taliban, the current situation renews the threat of a repeat of the disaster of 2001, when they faced a US response for not handing over al-Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden.
The Taliban may promise to expel and ban some TTP members, but they will not turn their backs on it unilaterally. If the Taliban takes repressive measures against the TTP, it is possible that violence will arise between the two groups and the Taliban will face internal conflicts.
General Sadat believes that the Afghan Taliban's support for the Pakistani Taliban, al-Qaeda, and ISIS will once again lead to the United States or another country intervening militarily in Afghanistan. "There is a fear that many Afghans will be sacrificed because of the Taliban's wrong policy," he says.
Note : This report is based on field research, interviews with TTP members, Afghan Taliban members, tribal elders, security analysts, arms dealers and smugglers, and local colleagues, field visits, and verified information. Some names used in the report have been anonymized for security reasons.
