Why an army chief as CDF fits Pakistan's strategic realities

The lack of trust in the military leadership will undermine any discussion about the merits of such changes. When the man is busy grabbing power everywhere he can, why should this act be looked at differently?

I've always been of the opinion the CJCSC should be the head of the armed forces and the position should rotate across the three forces. I also think the heads of the three forces should be reporting to him and he should be reporting to the defence minister.

The positive aims of the CDF can be achieved without over-reach from 1 branch of the forces.
 
Thank you for your reply. This is what I was thinking. So, essentially, CJCSC's role is been given to COAS, which is not unprecedented since Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif had already done that with Musharraf back in 1998.

As long as there's no interference with the operational aspects of the services, which I believe no Air Chief would agree to, even Mushaf Ali Mir, been handpicked by Musharraf after superseding top leadership of PAF never compromised on PAF's operational requirements.

I do think a CDF position where all services could get a chance to lead would have been better but seeing ground realities, I guess this isn't bad afterall. As long as it's implemented properly, and not left for ceremony like JCSC office was.
Yes, BUT with a major change.

CJCSC was a quasi-ceremonial, strategic planning post. It has no operational command over anything material. The respective chiefs held all the control over how the strategy was to be implemented by their forces.

The CDF fundamentally changes it. It reminds me of a few lines from the movie "Remember the Titans" in the following dialogue:

"Coach Boone: Let's talk football.

Assistant Coach Yoast: I run the defense--

Coach Boone: As a part of my team strategy. Now, I have never seen an assistant coach's name in the newspaper for losing a game."
;)

Meaning the overall conduct and responsibility for military operations will rest with the CDF. This was not the case with CJCSC. It will be the former's strategy and operational planning that will be questioned if something were to happen.

Thus the relationship with the CDF role and the services chiefs. The CDF is the leader of the higher defense organization (HDO). He holds not only the final call on the overall defense strategy, but also has the ground component under his command to implement it on the land. The other services chiefs are part of his team and have their distinct commands to run but in full coordination and alignment with the CDF. I also think, under the new structure, the VCoAS will become a more prominent role within the Army.

This by the way is no different than the US Joint Chiefs and the UK CDS. There is noise about doing this because of the current political overlay with FM Munir. Minus him and the politics around him and this call is a sound one. I also do not see the CDF telling the CNS or CAS to appoint someone to a post within their respective services because it is strictly their purview. However, the higher promotions within the services may become a more centralized process as the senior officers would be expected to operate in the "joint" capacity far more.

The other benefit will come by way of a more optimized spend on the military procurement. All procurements will have to align to joint plans. They will be vetted and approved with greater transparency across the HDO so the acquisitions are more effective for combined operations.

Over time, it is possible that other services chiefs will be able to land the post of CDF, however it remains to be seen. I think it is alright to get the CDF centric HDO off the ground with an army officer leading it for now.

Last point, on your question about whether this will help avoid future Kargils, yes, because at least conceptually, the inner staff of the CDF, who is also the CoAS, will include the 2 other Service Chiefs. Second, post 2019, 2025 conflicts, a Kargil like operation cannot happen without it becoming a full-scale war. This is understood on both sides now.
 
Last edited:
We will know whether he has the ability to meet the title and the obligations in a few days.
 
We will know whether he has the ability to meet the title and the obligations in a few days.
The work that needs to be done in the capacity of CDF will not show in a few weeks/months. It will require significant work to manifest the benefits of this office.
 
(like the foolish decision by ghq to send ghazi submarine to eastern indian coast).

Can you elaborate please? The international consensus (including former Indian Naval Chiefs) is that it sank due to an accident. Even if one is to believe that it was sank by INS Rajput, could you explain what went wrong? And how GHQ was involved when Ghazi's operational coordination was being done with NHQ under Commander Zafar Muhammad Khan?
 
yeah, he is not saying that navy or air chief should be in command instead.

he is saying that there should be no command, like this one, at all.

this CDF stuff will just concentrate power into a single person and will negatively affect the operations of other forces (like the foolish decision by ghq to send ghazi submarine to eastern indian coast).
How was the decision to send any sub-surface assets anywhere a GHQ call? Please elaborate.
 
How was the decision to send any sub-surface assets anywhere a GHQ call? Please elaborate.

NGL, Ghazi's mission was forced by GHQ 😝 but there're more nuances to where the blame shall finally rest and if that event can be used as good example against a unified command structure. I'll wait for others to present their side first.
 
.

The question here is if we are resistant to an idea because it is inherently flawed or because we dislike the person bringing about the change.
Both the person and current scenario mean this change cannot be seen without the taint of political, power grabbing and overall negativity.
Regardless of the overall merits of such a reorganization.
 
I also do not see the CDF telling the CNS or CAS to appoint someone to a post within their respective services because it is strictly their purview. However, the higher promotions within the services may become a more centralized process as the senior officers would be expected to operate in the "joint" capacity far more.

Trivia: For those who are worried about favoritism I hope they are aware of Parochialism and Sargodhian 🥲 and if the argument is that things have now changed within PAF then the argument applies to CDF too. Also, if the argument is why only Army General for CDF, then the same argument applies to why only GD(P) and mostly Sargodhian for CAS.

The above is not an argument in favor of CDF but an argument to highlight the logical inconsistencies, fallacies, and incoherence of the raised arguments against CDF.
 
Both the person and current scenario mean this change cannot be seen without the taint of political, power grabbing and overall negativity.
Regardless of the overall merits of such a reorganization.

True, but then again shall the decisions be made on feelings or an informed assessment on risk to benefit ratio?
 
Trivia: For those who are worried about favoritism I hope they are aware of Parochialism and Sargodhian 🥲 and if the argumwnt is that things have now changed within PAF then the argument applies to CDF too. Also, if the argument is why only Army General for CDF, then the same argument applies to why only GD(P) and mostly Sargodhian for CAS.

The above is not an argument in favor of CDF but an argument to highlight the logical inconsistencies, fallacies, and incoherence of the raised arguments against CDF.
There is then overall aspect of the “establishment”(I apologize having to repeat that this in every thread to elucidate that this isn’t just the military OR the whole military but a specific background in both ethnic, regional and niche wealth groups) also plays into the factor of who gets the post.

Pakistan is incapable of truly being meritorious for both social and political factors which automatically makes concentration of power a gamble.

So the earlier point comes into play is if we assume Gen Bajwa was now CDS and India attacked - will his excessive restraint and lack of gumption leave every aggression not responded to?
 
There is then overall aspect of the “establishment”(I apologize having to repeat that this in every thread to elucidate that this isn’t just the military OR the whole military but a specific background in both ethnic, regional and niche wealth groups) also plays into the factor of who gets the post.

Pakistan is incapable of truly being meritorious for both social and political factors which automatically makes concentration of power a gamble.

So the earlier point comes into play is if we assume Gen Bajwa was now CDS and India attacked - will his excessive restraint and lack of gumption leave every aggression not responded to?

Exactly and I agree 100%. It is part of the reason I'm not so much opposed to idea of CDF but rather concerned if it is done properly. The key contention here is what you have already quoted "the person" and "the current scenario" - FM constitutional immunity is the key issue here - it should have not been granted under any circumstance - but now that it has been I'm only hopeful that FM will keep the Politics out of the Military (keeping military out of politics has never been the story in Pakistan 😝)

As to the example of Gen Bajwa being CDS now - you have rightly pointed out another linchpin here i.e. "the temprament/character/wisdom" of the commander itself but then again this applies equally to all services chiefs whether under a unified commander or not e.g. a CAS/CN could be passive too, and if the argument is that previously there were multiple points of failure i.e. if CoAS is passive then at least CAS wasn't, then a unified command resolves that much better. The manifested strength of the leader is highly dependent on who surrounds them. So even if you get a meek CDF, but his operational commanders have the spine, CDF's meekness will be mitigated to a larger extent. That's the power dynamic at play - if the power difference b/w a leader and his team is greatly skewed towards the former it's manifested as authoritarianism - if it's greatly skewed towards the latter it's manifested as anarchism. The organizational structure and it's integrity is of the utmost importance here. It's why I have already mentioned that the "operational command of CDF needs to be anchored in the operational input of his Field Commanders". A strong organizational structure is self-balancing, and that is going to be the key for this CDF to either succeed or fail. The idea itself isn't inherently flawed but in line with needs of modern warfare, the execution is what matters now.
 
There is nothing ever perfect about any organizational structure. You could have the most equitable structure but horrendous leaders destroying the culture and the working of the said structure. On top of that, in our culture, ethnic ties, clan affiliations, giraen-baazi are an ever-present issue at the expense of merit.

However, when the intent at the top is on point, then even if you had a somewhat biased structure, it would yield good outcomes because those involved are vested in its success no matter the obstacles.

A good example of above are the accomplishments of ACMs Asghar Khan and Nur Khan in an Army-centric structure that we inherited post independence.
 
  • Like
Reactions: hnn
There is then overall aspect of the “establishment”(I apologize having to repeat that this in every thread to elucidate that this isn’t just the military OR the whole military but a specific background in both ethnic, regional and niche wealth groups) also plays into the factor of who gets the post.

Pakistan is incapable of truly being meritorious for both social and political factors which automatically makes concentration of power a gamble.

So the earlier point comes into play is if we assume Gen Bajwa was now CDS and India attacked - will his excessive restraint and lack of gumption leave every aggression not responded to?
I completely agree with you on the "merit" part as I just posted about the same.

However, why is there a perception that Gen Bajwa demonstrated a lack of aggression? He advised a caliberated response without escalating to a full-scale war. The Indian action was limited, so Pakistan's response was also measured.

Second, why would a smaller power start a full-fledged war when it has other options? It would be self-destructive to go with all guns blazing under the nuclear overhang.

At the highest level of our national security, the survival of the state is a key consideration and any chief who is reckless would be a liability. That is our case and the case for India and any other country.

As always, there are two sides to each story. One says the CoAS advised restraint, the other says the CJCSC spoke for 30 mins and advocated for a much more robust response. IK's government decided to go with the CoAS' advice. I see no issues with what Bajwa advised.
 
However, when the intent at the top is on point, then even if you had a somewhat biased structure, it would yield good outcomes because those involved are vested in its success no matter the obstacles.

This is where most people are raising their reservations. They don't trust the intentions of FM especially after he executed that Constitutional Immunity cheatcode 😝

I've asked it before and I'll ask again, are we resistant to an idea (CDF) because it is inherently flawed or because it is being initiated by FM 🥲
 

Users who are viewing this thread

Pakistan Defence Latest

Back
Top