Pakistan-India Conflict 2025: News Updates and Discussion

I think Pakistan is already falling into the trap being laid for it in Afghanistan and the sponsors of the Afghans this time are those who want to punish Pakistan for hiding OBL and playing a double game after 9/11.

But regarding the nuclear option, do you really believe the Pakistani high command will eventually pull the trigger ?
So far Pakistan has shown no signs of invading Afghanistan. There is no military buildup or mobilization on the western border. A military buildup would have been detected by foreign surveillance and most importantly by our eastern border enemy surveillance. This military buildup would have been revealed to foreign news outlets. This is exactly what happened in February 2022 when Russia invaded Ukraine. There is no such news. internationally.
Pakistan is fighting defensively to sporadic attacks on its eastern border and carrying out tactical air strikes to neutralize terror networks. Pakistan has sealed the border checkpoints imposing a crippling economic blockade on Afghanistan in an attempt to deter the regime there from supporting terror attacks and violating Pakistan's border.

OBL and 9/11 are history. A few notable developments:

  • For 2025, Pakistan serves as a Vice-Chair of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Counter-Terrorism Committee (CTC). Along with France and Russia, Pakistan holds one of the Vice-Chair positions for the 2025 term. The CTC monitors the implementation of Resolution 1373 (2001), which forms a core part of the UN's global counter-terrorism framework. The role is primarily procedural, assisting the chair. The current Chair for the CTC is Algeria.
  • Chair of the Taliban Sanctions Committee: Pakistan was also appointed as the Chair of the UN Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1988 (2011), which oversees sanctions on the Taliban.
  • Co-Chair of Working Groups: Additionally, Pakistan co-chairs the Informal Working Group on documentation (working methods) and the Informal Working Group on Sanctions.

There is no evidence of a "trap" Pakistan is walking into. Pakistan's existential threat is in the east. In the west Pakistan is facing an enemy that has very little military capability to inflict any harm beyond terror strikes. The enemy in the west has no armor, long range missile, artillery, satellite surveillance, encrypted communications, aero-space assets, navy, army aviation, heavy transport cargo aircraft logistics. The military capability is based off captured or abandoned small arms, and soft skinned converted MRAPs and transport. That military capability is being rapidly depleted through precision strikes and not being replaced by our enemy's ally India.
Pakistan has complete air superiority over Afghanistan and it will continue to degrade Afghanistan's military capabilities while maintaining a choke hold on Afghanistan's economy and transit of essential food, fuel and medical supplies.

"But regarding the nuclear option, do you really believe the Pakistani high command will eventually pull the trigger ?"

What is more important here is does our prime enemy India believe the Pakistani high command "will eventually pull the trigger " ?

Answer: No, India doesn't believe the Pakistani high command will eventually "pull the nuclear trigger" . Our enemy also believes that it will win a nuclear showdown if the Pakistani high command "does pull the trigger"

Which is why an attack is imminent. Will the high command eventually pull the trigger? Let's find out. We do not have long to wait.
I discussed this in my earlier post below.

Post in thread 'Pakistan-India Conflict 2025: News Updates and Discussion'
https://defencepk.com/forums/thread...ews-updates-and-discussion.21640/post-1049608
 
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Being proud in one’s armed forces is an honourable thing and it is good to see that you are.
As far as bold part goes, bold doesn’t make it truth.
What is the truth? A defeat for Pakistan? What is the current situation?
Is there peace because India has "defeated " Pakistan which has surrendered. or is there currently a state of war with just a brief pause, in hostilities?
There was a somewhat similar situation between Egypt and Israel in between 1967–1970 called the War of Attrition. Air and naval conflicts continued till a ceasefire was agreed upon in 1970., Is there a war of attrition between India and Pakistan?
 
The bold part was from your post not mine. The part where you agreed about PAF's performance.
There has been no doubt about that part. PAF did well on 7th May and I have accepted it many times.

10th May was the Indian day. They salvaged a lot.

The question is what did Munir achieve by not accepting ceasefire offer after 7th May?
The answer is - nothing.

Had Pakistan accepted the ceasefire, imagine where India would have been?
Lost four fighters at the cost of attacking few camps? Didn’t look good at all.

The satellite pictures after 10th retrieved a lot for them.
 
There has been no doubt about that part. PAF did well on 7th May and I have accepted it many times.

10th May was the Indian day. They salvaged a lot.

The question is what did Munir achieve by not accepting ceasefire offer after 7th May?
The answer is - nothing.

Had Pakistan accepted the ceasefire, imagine where India would have been?
Lost four fighters at the cost of attacking few camps? Didn’t look good at all.

The satellite pictures after 10th retrieved a lot for them.

Ok so India was ready for a ceasefire after the losses incurred by 7 May?
 
A few disagreements based on my understanding

I actually kept downloading both the forum posts from those days, rss feeds and X posts to create a timeline then cross referenced it with accounts to feed it into a notebook llm project.

So based on that.
7 May 2025 – Opening strikes and largest air battle

00:00–04:00 PKT


In the very early hours, India launches Operation Sindoor, a coordinated set of missile, artillery, and air strikes against nine targets in Pakistani-administered Kashmir and Punjab. The targets are described by India as infrastructure linked to Lashkar-e-Taiba, Jaish-e-Mohammed, and Hizbul Mujahideen, with care taken—according to Indian statements—to avoid Pakistani military bases and dense civilian areas.

  • Ground element: Indian Army artillery employs M982 Excalibur precision rounds and loitering munitions against sites close to the Line of Control (LoC).
  • Air element: Indian Air Force (IAF) Rafale aircraft fire SCALP cruise missiles and AASM Hammer precision bombs against deeper targets in Pakistani Punjab and Azad Kashmir, while Indian air defence provides cover. The Indian side later claims it “bypassed and jammed” Chinese-supplied Pakistani air-defence radars during the operation.
Within hours, a massive beyond-visual-range (BVR) air engagement develops over and near the LoC. Around 114 aircraft are involved—roughly 72 IAF and 42 PAF—in what becomes the largest recorded BVR engagement between the two air forces. Neither side crosses the international boundary or LoC; all shots are taken from standoff ranges.

Pakistan claims up to six Indian fighters downed. Independent investigations later confirm at least three crash sites inside India and strong evidence for up to four aircraft lost, including at least one Rafale and one other type not operated by Pakistan. Debris of PL-15 long-range air-to-air missiles is recovered in India, confirming their combat use by Pakistan’s Chinese-origin fighters.

04:00–08:00 PKT

As the air battle winds down, both sides shift to damage assessment and search-and-rescue. Indian teams move to crash locations in Jammu & Kashmir and Punjab; Pakistani units check targeted areas in Azad Kashmir and Punjab, logging initial military and civilian damage.

Along the LoC, the 2021 ceasefire effectively collapses. What begins as sporadic exchanges quickly grows into sustained small-arms, mortar, and artillery fire along multiple sectors. This pattern will continue throughout the crisis, causing a significant share of overall casualties, especially among civilians in frontline villages.

08:00–12:00 PKT

Daylight over the subcontinent brings a relative lull in long-range strikes. Both capitals weigh next steps. The Stimson reconstruction notes that by comparison with the dramatic early-morning events, “the daylight hours of May 7 were marked by comparative quiet.”

  • The IAF and PAF maintain combat air patrols (CAPs) on both sides of the border.
  • Ground forces dig in along the LoC and Working Boundary, improving bunkers and ammunition stocks; civilians begin moving away from exposed villages where they can.
12:00–16:00 PKT

International reactions gather pace. Statements from major powers call for restraint and warn against escalation, especially toward a nuclear confrontation. Quiet diplomatic outreach begins, but both governments signal that they will pursue their military objectives for now.

Operationally, both sides focus on:

  • Force protection: dispersing aircraft, moving high-value assets (aircraft, SAM batteries, radars) away from obvious target points.
  • Air-defence readiness: Pakistani HQ-9 and other systems, Indian S-400 and Akash batteries remain on high alert.
16:00–20:00 PKT

Fighting along the LoC intensifies through the late afternoon and evening:

  • Both armies employ mortars, artillery, and occasionally tanks / ATGMs against each other’s posts.
  • Neither side attempts to seize and hold new ground; the violence remains in the mold of high-tempo but positional warfare.
India keeps long-range aviation on alert, while Pakistan continues to integrate ground and air sensors, with an emphasis on understanding the electromagnetic environment after the morning’s jamming experience.

20:00–24:00 PKT – First drone wave into India

During the night of 7–8 May, Pakistan begins a drone and missile campaign against targets in western and northern India—about 15 locations, according to later Indian briefings.

  • The strike package mixes basic, inexpensive drones (serving as decoys and “flying chaff”) with more capable armed UAVs and loitering munitions, probing Indian radar coverage and response patterns.
  • Targets include infrastructure and military facilities around cities such as Amritsar and other Punjab / Rajasthan locations; the aim is to test and saturate Indian air defences rather than cause decisive physical damage.
Indian air defences respond vigorously, firing S-400 interceptors, other SAMs, and anti-aircraft artillery, creating a visible “umbrella” of tracers and launches captured in numerous videos. India later describes Pakistan’s effort as a “raid” conducted in waves to saturate its defences. Damage on the ground appears limited.


8 May 2025 – SEAD duels and narrative split

00:00–04:00 PKT


The first night’s drone raids and Indian defensive fire continue into the early hours. India afterwards reports hundreds of drone incursions over this and the following night, largely aimed at probing and mapping its air-defence network.

India also states that its S-400 system based at Adampur plays a role in negating Pakistani strikes, marking the first combat use of the system. Pakistan officially denies having attacked India at all in this phase, setting up a major narrative gap.

04:00–08:00 PKT – Indian SEAD strike on Lahore radar

In the morning, India launches a “proportionate response” SEAD/DEAD operation against Pakistani air-defence sites.

  • India uses Harpy and Harop anti-radiation drones plus Banshee target drones as decoys.
  • Pakistani officials later acknowledge attacks on 11 sites and confirm that four soldiers were injured and equipment partially damaged, including at least one air-defence radar in Lahore effectively neutralised.
Pakistani air defences claim to have shot down two dozen-plus drones, with debris scattered around several locations. One civilian is reported killed.

08:00–12:00 PKT

Public messaging diverges sharply:

  • India presents the morning operation as a calibrated counter-strike in the same domain (drones/air-defence) and of similar intensity to what it says were Pakistani drone raids the night before.
  • Pakistan continues to deny any preceding drone strikes on India and portrays the Indian SEAD mission as unprovoked aggression against Pakistani cities, especially Lahore and Karachi, thereby hardening domestic opinion.
On the LoC, heavy small-arms and artillery exchanges continue. Civilians on both sides increasingly shelter in basements, schools, or improvised bunkers.

12:00–16:00 PKT

The ground picture remains static but violent:

  • Static, hardened positions dominate; both sides avoid large maneuver operations while continuing to trade fire.
  • Many of the eventual 50+ fatalities in Kashmir during the crisis are later attributed to this continued cross-border shelling, including deliberate or collateral fire striking villages.
At sea, the two navies maneuver in the Arabian Sea, staying outside firing range but clearly signalling coercive options.

16:00–20:00 PKT – Nuclear concerns surface abroad

As the second day wears on, international attention shifts explicitly to nuclear risk.

Other states, including China and European countries, issue statements urging immediate de-escalation and increased dialogue.

20:00–24:00 PKT – Second drone wave

The night of 8–9 May sees a second, somewhat larger drone campaign against India, attributed by India to Pakistan.

  • Swarms of “poor-quality, basic drones” are mixed with a smaller number of surveilling and armed platforms, an apparent attempt to saturate radars and SAMs.
  • India claims again that damage is minor; images support the view that most drones are either intercepted or fall without major effect.
India retaliates with another limited drone-based SEAD strike; Pakistan, for its part, claims to have shot down dozens of Indian drones over this period, announcing a cumulative tally of over 70 drones downed.


9 May 2025 – Drone duels, cyber war, and escalation calculus

00:00–04:00 PKT


The second night of drone engagements continues into the early hours. Air-defence batteries on both sides remain active, with bursts of fire as drones or suspected drones appear on radar. Much of this activity serves intelligence purposes, mapping adversary sensors and doctrine under stress.

Along the LoC, fire remains heavy but still bounded by the line; neither side attempts a ground offensive beyond limited raids.

04:00–08:00 PKT – Further Indian SEAD strikes

In the morning, India conducts another SEAD-focused operation, sending armed drones against four Pakistani air-defence sites.

  • India claims at least one additional radar is destroyed.
  • Pakistan claims that between the previous evening and midday of 9 May it has shot down 48 Indian drones, reinforcing the narrative that it is blunting Indian unmanned operations.
From the Indian perspective, these attacks are part of a cross-service “escalation control mechanism” that prioritizes suppression of enemy air defences (SEAD) so that, if needed, manned aircraft can operate with reduced risk in later phases.S

08:00–12:00 PKT

Information operations peak:

  • India publicly identifies specific Pakistani drones, including Turkish-origin Songar systems, and characterises many others as crude platforms used to clutter radar.
  • Pakistan continues to stress its success in intercepting Israeli-origin loitering munitions and notes that it has limited casualties and damage from Indian attacks so far, aside from admitted radar losses.
Social media and news outlets circulate extensive footage of air-defence fire over Indian cities and drone debris in Pakistan, reinforcing the image of a two-night “drone war” layered on top of artillery duels in Kashmir.

12:00–16:00 PKT – U.S. posture hardens

By this window, U.S. internal assessments reportedly shift in response to “alarming intelligence”, leading to more active behind-the-scenes pressure on both New Delhi and Islamabad to move toward a ceasefire.

Meanwhile, firing along the LoC continues, and later reporting suggests over 50 deaths in Kashmir across the crisis, many from shells landing in or near villages.

16:00–20:00 PKT – Operation Bunyun Marsoos (cyber)

Pakistan opens a major offensive cyber campaign known as Operation Bunyan al Marsoos.

  • Targets reportedly include Indian military networks, government agencies, state-linked companies, and thousands of surveillance cameras.
  • Pakistani reporting claims that databases at organisations such as Hindustan Aeronautics Limited, the Border Security Force, and India’s Unique Identification Authority (UIDAI) are accessed or disrupted; multiple websites are defaced or taken offline.
  • Indian authorities record over 1.5 million intrusion attempts and scramble to contain and eject intruders, patch vulnerabilities, and restore services.
20:00–24:00 PKT – Preludes to broader Indian strikes

On the night of 9–10 May, Indian media report another barrage of drones and missiles incoming from Pakistan.

This is follow up from Pakistan which claims to have

In response, India’s political and military leadership authorise an expanded conventional strike against Pakistani military installations, building on the SEAD groundwork laid on the 8th and 9th. Planning for these strikes focuses on:

  • Air bases and air-defence nodes judged critical to Pakistan’s ability to threaten India in a prolonged air campaign.
  • Maintaining a narrative of “calibrated” and domain-matched responses, to deter further attacks without crossing red lines that could trigger nuclear risk.

10 May 2025 – Indian expanded strikes and move toward ceasefire

00:00–04:00 PKT – Indian strikes on Pakistani air bases


In the early hours, the Indian Armed Forces carry out multiple air-strike operations using Su-30MKI fighters armed with BrahMos missiles and other standoff munitions against selected Pakistani military installations, especially air-defence sites and air bases.

According to Indian accounts and later analysis:

  • These strikes disable or damage additional radars and air-defence systems at several locations.
  • Pakistan acknowledges that soldiers are wounded, equipment suffers “partial damage”, and at least some air-defence radars are neutralised, though it stresses that core combat capability remains intact.
Pakistani sources also claim successful air defence against part of this raid, but details remain less documented than the earlier SEAD duels.

04:00–08:00 PKT – Pakistani Bunyan al Marsoos strikes and pause toward negotiations

In this same early‑morning window, Pakistan launches the principal kinetic wave of Operation Bunyan al Marsoos, combining air‑launched and ground‑launched stand‑off weapons against a set of Indian military targets. Pakistani and later regional analyses refer to the use of CM‑400AKG anti‑ship/anti‑surface missiles, land‑attack cruise missiles such as Babur and Ra’ad variants, and loitering munitions aimed at Indian airbases, BrahMos‑related sites (frequently including Bhuj in open‑source reconstructions), and supporting infrastructure.

Islamabad presents this as a comprehensive but still conventional‑limited strike package, announcing hits on multiple Indian airbases and claiming damage to runways, fuel and ammunition storage, air‑defence systems, and at least one BrahMos launcher location. The Pakistani line is that by the morning of 10 May, this wave has achieved its objectives: demonstrating that Pakistan can match long‑range precision strikes, impose costs on key Indian military assets, and yet keep the conflict inside a controlled envelope.

Pakistan however is unable to provide any visual proof to its claims as India starts providing visuals of Pakistani airbases hit.

As news of these exchanges spreads, both sides avoid immediately launching even larger follow‑on packages. Indian airspace restrictions and Pakistani airspace closures continue, with dozens of Indian airports in the north and west operating under severe constraints and Pakistan keeping its skies tightly controlled for roughly two days, affecting civil aviation and logistics. Around this time, according to multiple accounts, India signals willingness to enter ceasefire talks; Pakistan, having executed the main BM kinetic wave, is also open to negotiations, seeing its primary deterrence goals as met

Indian claims of damaging and destroying more than 1 radar sites were not found to be accurate, specially, claims about Chunian, Sukku and Jacobabad radar hits were found to be inconclusive at best.

no major Western publication has accepted indian claims of destroying many radar site as accurate!

and Lahore hit was a drone station, not a radar site

Further, we know Sh15 guns were used, this does not mention this at all, what those gun strikes eventually led to!
 
I believe that the old nuclear threshold limit rule is obsolete. I respect General kidwai, but I think his rule is outdated and has no significance in modern warfare. New rules are needed.

1) Attack on Pakistani airbases will be responded to by an attack through some WMDs on the indian civilian population. Here, WMDs can be represented in many ways. They can be either missiles carrying nuclear warheads or some other technology like (chemical, biological, or radioactive weapons), attacking an area of interest and completely wiping out all life forms in the targeted region.

2) Every attack on Pakistan's armed forces will be responded to directly on the indian civilian population.

These two new rules will give indians sleepless nights. Remember, you have to target the weakness of the enemy, and not their strength.

I'd say instead of any clear rules keep it strategically ambiguous same as how France does it. Their Nuclear Threshold simply states "in defense of vital interests" without specifying these interests and the assessment of "threat to vital interests" solely lies with their President.

Pakistan could do the same:
  1. Keep it ambiguous so India has no idea what is allowed and what is isn't.
  2. Keep the authorization under a single person/office e.g. CNSC.
This way Pakistan can have a first use policy without aggravating international community.
 
Had Pakistan accepted the ceasefire, imagine where India would have been?


It's India who kept the attack posture for a week or two, trying to maintain the element of surprise. This was meant to be India's retribution, at a time of their choosing.


That's why what happened in the first few hours is impressive for me, because that's seemingly made no difference to Pakistan's effectiveness


The fact that India reverted to missiles and upped the escalation is a failure for India.

Remember it was not meant to be an actual war, it was meant to be India asserting the right to target within Pakistan, then became a war, to losing the skies
 
The question is what did Munir achieve by not accepting ceasefire offer after 7th May?
The answer is - nothing.
What did Chauhan, Upendra Dwivedi, and A.P Singh, achieve after May 10th ?
There was yet another terrorist attack on November 10th
Had Pakistan accepted the ceasefire, imagine where India would have been?
Lost four fighters at the cost of attacking few camps? Didn’t look good at all.
Don't know if the dinner invitations and lecture tours invitations would have been received by our COAS and ACM,
The satellite pictures after 10th retrieved a lot for them.
"Satellite pictures" didn't prevent a screaming match in the Indian parliament and demands by the opposition as to why a ceasefire was accepted. Which raises the million dollar question "why a ceasefire " ?
 
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Keep in mind that Trump narrated an interesting exchange between him and Modi - on how he was pretty bellicose on a call and wanting to continue fighting.

At the end the military leadership in Pakistan is well aware that plain mathematics doesn’t favor an escalation and that it will lose more if India ups the ante. They want to keep it confined to a limited air war - if India commits to a full unleashed war machine regardless of fighting spirit or otherwise the 20% competent of Pakistani military are still not enough to hold off the 10% competent of theirs.

If they're looking for 'limited' options then they are lost. Wars are fluid and you need to seize opportunity.
Numbers lose their edge in the face of good strategy as the Russians found out against Ukraine. They to, and even now have trash leadership, it was the work of able field commanders which saved them.
 
I'd say instead of any clear rules keep it strategically ambiguous same as how France does it. Their Nuclear Threshold simply states "in defense of vital interests" without specifying these interests and the assessment of "threat to vital interests" solely lies with their President.
Pakistan's nuclear doctrine of "first use" remains unchanged, though unfortunately after the May 2025 war , our prime enemy no longer considers this a deterrent. The enemy propaganda has self-deluded it into an interpretation that the May 2025 war was proof that the nuclear red line threshold could be crossed with no consequences. So our enemy is currently preparing another attack that in reality will cross the nuclear red lines and will cause Pakistan to use nuclear weapons, most likely on Pakistani territory itself to blunt a loss of territory.

Pakistan could do the same:
  1. Keep it ambiguous so India has no idea what is allowed and what is isn't.
  2. Keep the authorization under a single person/office e.g. CNSC.
This way Pakistan can have a first use policy without aggravating international community.
Pakistan's nuclear first use doctrine has already been declared:
1. Pakistan faces a loss of territory which comes under enemy occupation.
2. Pakistan faces a naval blockade that chokes Pakistan economically.
3. Pakistan's existence is threatened through starvation because its access to the Indus water resources is cut off by enemy actions.
4. Pakistan faces a massive conventional air, missile, and naval assault completely destroying its critical infrastructure causing hundreds of thousands of civilian casualties across the nation and in all major cities.

Aggravating the international community will be a moot point in the above circumstances.
 
Indian claims of damaging and destroying more than 1 radar sites were not found to be accurate, specially, claims about Chunian, Sukku and Jacobabad radar hits were found to be inconclusive at best.

no major Western publication has accepted indian claims of destroying many radar site as accurate!

and Lahore hit was a drone station, not a radar site

Further, we know Sh15 guns were used, this does not mention this at all, what those gun strikes eventually led to!
Hello sir,

Problem is we as a Pakistani have problem that when some external source says negative points about Pakistan. We believe them instantly. When Pakistan says something we dont believe it. See how easily a member just mentions we lost radar but what evidence has India gave before being a pakistani we are even mentioning Indian claims ?

Truth is we have their land during may and sh15 pounding was done more than Pakistan should have done as per indian expectations that caught Indians in surprise.

Modi was Bellicose while talking to trump, but instead listened to trump is pure nonsense. Since when trump press talks and claims have been so much true to be trusted at first place. He just didnt want India to feel humiliated so said it. India has always been we dont care when they decide something they do it dont care what USA says. Right now they are after sir creek and Kashmir. So that makes them literal bad guy as its no more about terrorism.

Truth is India lost more than Pakistan did and significantly and its airforce grounded. That caused the war to ceasefire.

I have been member since 2008 at I mostly listen to posts of fellow member. But I have observed that here in forum some highly decorated members always give Masala like "We cant fight long war" which is narrative of like each Pakistani in each street. There is nothing new. What is new is that we gave beating of century as we are weak "beggars" and they were 4th largest. Making Indians stall at all is marvel itself.

I have studied a lot and I have always have had very different opinion. Pakistan will never flourish economically but we will be strong in fighting and always able to defend against other powers. This is huge sacrifice. Tell me can any Arab nation or Malaysia with great economy have same level of defence against any strong military as Pakistan ? I guess not.

We have always fought country larger in military then us and yet we live without losing inch of land. We got AJK in 48. Bangladesh was never ours. Logically and technically it was not feasible. as far as I know later if 71 had not happened, bangladesh would have separated anyway. Now see we know mujeeb u rehman and his daughter ruined the bangladesh. The corruption in defense aquisition has made them so weak. I suspect India might even attack bangladesh.

Dont forget we have downed Israeli planes, soviets and Indians and technically all 3 are world powers and have huge influence in some region.

I am entitled to my opinion if someone disagrees, its ok.
 
Pakistan's nuclear doctrine of "first use" remains unchanged, though unfortunately after the May 2025 war , our prime enemy no longer considers this a deterrent. The enemy propaganda has self-deluded it into an interpretation that the May 2025 war was proof that the nuclear red line threshold could be crossed with no consequences. So our enemy is currently preparing another attack that in reality will cross the nuclear red lines and will cause Pakistan to use nuclear weapons, most likely on Pakistani territory itself to blunt a loss of territory.


Pakistan's nuclear first use doctrine has already been declared:
1. Pakistan faces a loss of territory which comes under enemy occupation.
2. Pakistan faces a naval blockade that chokes Pakistan economically.
3. Pakistan's existence is threatened through starvation because its access to the Indus water resources is cut off by enemy actions.
4. Pakistan faces a massive conventional air, missile, and naval assault completely destroying its critical infrastructure causing hundreds of thousands of civilian casualties across the nation and in all major cities.

Aggravating the international community will be a moot point in the above circumstances.

Yes, it's why I'm suggesting the simple and ambiguous doctrine from my earlier post.

The current doctrine is not only explicit but is also late-stage war scenario so India can easily exploit that and remain below the threshold hence the losing value of deterrence.

Keeping it ambiguous and under a single authority makes it a "F around and find out" gamble. So if India doesn't know what is the threshold to begin with, firstly they'll have to change all their war plans, and even with the new war plans they don't know what will trigger the threshold.

This way, IMO it's a workable psychological deterrent, esp if the CNSC (or any other authorized office) is publicly known to be like Dee Dee from Dexter "Ooh what does this button do?" 😂
 
Truth is India lost more than Pakistan did and significantly and its airforce grounded. That caused the war to ceasefire
Just one correction to an otherwise well articulated post.

It was never meant to be a war, it was meant to be India asserting it's dominance at its choosing, but it became a skirmish to sustaining losses to going up the escalation ladder. None of this was meant to happen for India.

Sometimes Pakistanis get dragged into silly debates with India, but reminding India they are further away from credible minimum deterrence towards China now than 20 years ago should be humbling enough.
 
@Oscar
"Along the LoC, the 2021 ceasefire effectively collapses. What begins as sporadic exchanges quickly grows into sustained small-arms, mortar, and artillery fire along multiple sectors. This pattern will continue throughout the crisis, causing a significant share of overall casualties, especially among civilians in frontline villages"

Excellent analysis.
Could we have more details on the situation on the LOC ?
The casualties seem to have been more on the Indian side especially in the Poonch sector including military casualties

Questions:
  • Is the 2021 LOC ceasefire automatically re-instated or is it part of the Indian announced "pause" of Operation Sindoor?
  • India has not officially termed the cessation of hostilities as a ceasefire but defines it as a "pause" . Since no written ceasefire agreement was signed with technical details spelled out, is there officially a state of war between India and Pakistan now?
  • Back to my earlier question: Why didn't the Indian Air Force or Army Aviation conduct strikes on the LOC and IB to silence Pakistani artillery? Alternatively why didn't the Indian Army up the ante and bring in Pinaka or BM-21 Grad MRLS to hit Pakistani brigade HQ and border posts in response to Pakistani artillery fire ?
What is the current state of mobilization on the ground on either side? What is the Order of Battle?
 
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