Pakistan-India Conflict 2025: News Updates and Discussion

[Baibers_1260]

@Maarkhoor

I believe the Indian government under Prime Minister Modi may orchestrate a major false-flag operation involving civilian casualties, which could then be used to justify aggressive foreign policy actions.

Why would Modi do that? Since the outcome would be another defeat (as per PDF consensus).

Regards

Modi would certainly do an Operation Sindoor 2 ( rather continue Operation Sindoor 1) since as per Ajit Doval, not a "single pane of glass " was broken the last time

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[Master Chief]

Modi would certainly do an Operation Sindoor 2 ( rather continue Operation Sindoor 1) since as per Ajit Doval, not a "single pane of glass " was broken the last time

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Instead of questioning Doval and Modi for their failures, the noblest and most literate creme de la creme of Indian citizenry come here to ask us to explain how Modi works to them.

 

[maverick]

its the same indian pattern, got whooping in 1965 and 1971 air war, in 1999 kargil, in 2019 air war and then in 2025 air war. They have excuse for every evidence when the evidence is on their face. they always try to bend the truth, even when presented, its like abu jahil, lahab and others when truth is shown to them, they come up with excuses,

its ingrained in pagan worshippers, we have seen it all throughout history, nothing changed.

 

[kimjongun]

For a Fact I can say our response to indian strikes was piss poor.
Abosulte garbage response after the initial air battle.
The more you dive deeper into what happened after the initial faceoff the more you get depressed. Kindly take at least some of the copium and hopium aside guys.

 

[Ibbi32]

For a Fact I can say our response to indian strikes was piss poor.
Abosulte garbage response after the initial air battle.
The more you dive deeper into what happened after the initial faceoff the more you get depressed. Kindly take at least some of the copium and hopium aside guys.

Why are people still so hung up on our initial response as if we did nothing between 7-10th. Have they forgotten how many border posts were blown up and how heavily we shelled kashmir. On the 7th and 8th we saw Pakistani counter air ops in IOK as well.

 

[Cipher212]

For a Fact I can say our response to indian strikes was piss poor.
Abosulte garbage response after the initial air battle.
The more you dive deeper into what happened after the initial faceoff the more you get depressed. Kindly take at least some of the copium and hopium aside guys.

I think if we responded in kind to everything the Indians did after 7th then we'd have an actual war. We did what we could while defending and only reacting to what Indians did.

The drawback of it was letting them control the escalation ladder.

Also, the way the IAF just grounded itself for a couple of days to rework their tactics and doing SEAD for days to carry out strikes on 10th is not a luxury they'd have in a real war.

 

[hasssanali8998]

I think if we responded in kind to everything the Indians did after 7th then we'd have an actual war

we could have at least used something bigger than a GMRLS or made sure we got s400 kills with evidence

 

[Oscar]

For a Fact I can say our response to indian strikes was piss poor.
Abosulte garbage response after the initial air battle.

By what metrics?
Damage on ground? Potentially but it mirrors previous conflicts in which initial attacks were largely ineffective due to overriding “prevention of loss” and “restraint” directives.

Preventing damage to own assets ? Absolutely because no proactive action was taken (or probably had no capability or even if capability existed no plan on how to use it in that context) against ground Brahmos launches other than leaving it to AD.

Emphasis on EW emissions control( to prevent further harop and even KH series strikes) meant disciplined use of kinetic assets but that opened up windows for situations like Jacobabad and Bholari. You have barely 1/20th the kinetic AD assets or layers India has available (regardless of obsolescence)

Dithering and paralysis by analysis? Very much
But go back to overarching goals and these are agnostic to current government regardless of typical fanatical supporters for any side:

Strategic objective​

• Preserve deterrence credibility against India while preventing a slide into full‑scale conventional or nuclear war.
• Maintain internal and external political legitimacy by appearing responsible, law‑abiding, and escalation‑averse in front of major powers.

So from that you have constraints to work with - no fanciful ideas of “China, KSA , Mongolia or Mars will never let us go”

• Conventional asymmetry: India’s larger economy and military mean any prolonged high‑intensity conflict would impose disproportionate costs on Pakistan.
• Nuclear thresholds: Full‑spectrum deterrence doctrine is built on keeping clear firebreaks between conventional, sub‑conventional, and nuclear use; mis‑signalling could trigger catastrophic escalation even more when your opposing leadership(Bhaktoras) is no longer following responsible patterns.
• External pressure: Strong incentives from global powers and financial institutions to avoid war, due to Pakistan’s economic fragility and dependence on external support.
• Internal stability: Need to avoid domestic political breakdown, mass displacement, and economic collapse that a major war would worsen.

You cannot “Inshallah” these away nor come up with hypothetical scenarios on “Agar IK hota” or “KSA will provide money”. Whats real is real.


Which means the focus was a clear effort to keep actions under thresholds that would justify a massive Indian reply. Fortunately many of the strikes did not pan out but some did which were then negotiated on channels to “we wont say we did this” just as certain bargains were made that were negative to Pakistan which India wont(at least to their “word”) claim was them.

Regardless of public bravado - those in power do get nervous on support from public - and so the emphasis is on self‑defence, proportionality, and readiness for dialogue to reassure external actors and justify restraint to domestic audiences based on “victory”.

Think of it like a small company responding to a big rival’s aggression with narrow, legally defensible moves (targeted countersuits, specific marketing pushes) rather than a market‑wide price war.

But since then there has been some “smart” moves( that doesn’t automatically mean I endorse this government or every other bumble its doing for the anti government kneejerk category here).

Specifically its Information, diplomatic, and economic levers deployed to shape international opinion and constrain India, instead of matching every kinetic move.

Pakistan leaves diplomatic off‑ramps open, including signalling willingness to accept de‑escalation under international observation.

The problem with this strategy is while promising restraint, Pakistan looks to its lomg standing policy of sustaining ambiguity about exact red lines and response scales through full‑spectrum deterrence, keeping India uncertain about the cost of pushing higher - India has pushed more clarity for itself in terms of gaps in these red lines.

Which means now it knows it had a large leeway in these red lines to achieve mostly local political and then overtly state damaging objectives against Pakistan vis a vis its multi pronged approach to cultivate expanding ethnic and political chasms in Pakistan (which are largely self created).

 

[kimjongun]

By what metrics?
Damage on ground? Potentially but it mirrors previous conflicts in which initial attacks were largely ineffective due to overriding “prevention of loss” and “restraint” directives.

Preventing damage to own assets ? Absolutely because no proactive action was taken (or probably had no capability or even if capability existed no plan on how to use it in that context) against ground Brahmos launches other than leaving it to AD.

Emphasis on EW emissions control( to prevent further harop and even KH series strikes) meant disciplined use of kinetic assets but that opened up windows for situations like Jacobabad and Bholari. You have barely 1/20th the kinetic AD assets or layers India has available (regardless of obsolescence)

Dithering and paralysis by analysis? Very much
But go back to overarching goals and these are agnostic to current government regardless of typical fanatical supporters for any side:

Strategic objective​

• Preserve deterrence credibility against India while preventing a slide into full‑scale conventional or nuclear war.
• Maintain internal and external political legitimacy by appearing responsible, law‑abiding, and escalation‑averse in front of major powers.

So from that you have constraints to work with - no fanciful ideas of “China, KSA , Mongolia or Mars will never let us go”

• Conventional asymmetry: India’s larger economy and military mean any prolonged high‑intensity conflict would impose disproportionate costs on Pakistan.
• Nuclear thresholds: Full‑spectrum deterrence doctrine is built on keeping clear firebreaks between conventional, sub‑conventional, and nuclear use; mis‑signalling could trigger catastrophic escalation even more when your opposing leadership(Bhaktoras) is no longer following responsible patterns.
• External pressure: Strong incentives from global powers and financial institutions to avoid war, due to Pakistan’s economic fragility and dependence on external support.
• Internal stability: Need to avoid domestic political breakdown, mass displacement, and economic collapse that a major war would worsen.

You cannot “Inshallah” these away nor come up with hypothetical scenarios on “Agar IK hota” or “KSA will provide money”. Whats real is real.


Which means the focus was a clear effort to keep actions under thresholds that would justify a massive Indian reply. Fortunately many of the strikes did not pan out but some did which were then negotiated on channels to “we wont say we did this” just as certain bargains were made that were negative to Pakistan which India wont(at least to their “word”) claim was them.

Regardless of public bravado - those in power do get nervous on support from public - and so the emphasis is on self‑defence, proportionality, and readiness for dialogue to reassure external actors and justify restraint to domestic audiences based on “victory”.

Think of it like a small company responding to a big rival’s aggression with narrow, legally defensible moves (targeted countersuits, specific marketing pushes) rather than a market‑wide price war.

But since then there has been some “smart” moves( that doesn’t automatically mean I endorse this government or every other bumble its doing for the anti government kneejerk category here).

Specifically its Information, diplomatic, and economic levers deployed to shape international opinion and constrain India, instead of matching every kinetic move.

Pakistan leaves diplomatic off‑ramps open, including signalling willingness to accept de‑escalation under international observation.

The problem with this strategy is while promising restraint, Pakistan looks to its lomg standing policy of sustaining ambiguity about exact red lines and response scales through full‑spectrum deterrence, keeping India uncertain about the cost of pushing higher - India has pushed more clarity for itself in terms of gaps in these red lines.

Which means now it knows it had a large leeway in these red lines to achieve mostly local political and then overtly state damaging objectives against Pakistan vis a vis its multi pronged approach to cultivate expanding ethnic and political chasms in Pakistan (which are largely self created).

So basically our response was the least bad option under serious constraints right because our strategy to avoid the war and not lengthen it as we cannot fight a long conventional war with a country like india...But it hurts to see the loss of life suffered in the conflict. at least we should have provided concrete proof for the s400 strikes for the international media to see..

 

[kimjongun]

Why are people still so hung up on our initial response as if we did nothing between 7-10th. Have they forgotten how many border posts were blown up and how heavily we shelled kashmir. On the 7th and 8th we saw Pakistani counter air ops in IOK as well.

keeping the jets aside we didn"t did well tbh after the night of 6/7 may ...it was a lot for our military leadership to handle id say...i just dont know it just makes me sad seeing memes and other disgracefully stuff being made about the casualties in bholari..

 

[Baibers_1260]

Pakistan leaves diplomatic off‑ramps open, including signalling willingness to accept de‑escalation under international observation.

Well written article Yes." Pakistan leaves diplomatic off-ramps open and willingness to accept de-escalation under international observation "
That still leaves a set of major questions open.

1. Does the enemy similarly leave diplomatic off-ramps open, and has a willingness to accept de-escalation under international observation ?
2. Why should the enemy, with its overwhelming numerical and economic superiority, consider an off-ramp and de-escalation in any future conflict, with (or without) international observation?
3. What is the long term objective of the enemy? A few scenarios : (a) Continuous series of punishing air strikes after every "terrorist " attack with open scope for escalation ? (b) Long term economic strangulation by curtailing, water ( IWT revocation), blockading of Karachi port and sabotage of road and rail links to Iran and China through terrorist proxy activity ( TTP, BLA) (c) Full blown massive air land and sea attacks coupled with targeted assassinations of military and civilian leadership through drone or special forces actions ( Syria ,playbook).
4. I agree that Pakistan is unable to fight a war of attrition and will likely collapse within two weeks. The enemy knows this as well and it only has to resist foreign intervention and mediation for a few weeks to see the destruction ( or surrender) of the Pakistan armed forces. That is one lesson the enemy learned from Operation Sindoor, that a war of attrition with sustainable losses is far preferable to short conflict with a foreign mediated ceasefire, that produces a bonus of narratives and diplomatic opportunities for the adversary. It is safe to predict India will not let this happen again in the next Operation Sindoor that is under active planning. A future war must be concluded decisively with the surrender and capitulation of Pakistan's Armed Forces and the occupation of Pakistan. Which brings us to the question every General asks the government after defeating an enemy and occupying enemy territory. What is the post-victory plan? Indefinite rule over Pakistan as a colony with "cultural " restrictions and actions, such as beef ban, demolition of mosques, "no prayers at home" , based on the successful experiment in Kashmir, Uttar Pradesh, and Lakshadweep? Arya Samaj based forced conversion via Ghar Wapasi ? Unlikely...A much simpler option is "population replacement" by destroying or driving out the native population and repopulating by bringing in the masses from the over-populated areas of Uttar Pradesh and Bihar, The precedent is already underway in Kashmir,
5. The biggest question is how does Pakistan deal with the situation of a 7 times larger enemy hell bent on destroying it. The simplest answer is it can't. All the scenarios of a nuclear response to a conventional defeat are far fetched . The elite civil-military sections of our population are quite pragmatic, and realize there is no fun fighting on and getting vaporized, when India will likely offer a window to them and their families to escape abroad. This would only ne feasible IF an early surrender or capitulation happens. Indian war-gamers and analysts expect this will be the maximum resistance India will face, once the Pakistan Armed Forces collapse. The scenario being war-gamed is that of Iraq 2003 . . In 1972 the Soviet Union had war-gamed the occupation of Pakistan by India, if the war was to be continued against West Pakistan ( after the collapse of the Pakistan Army in East Pakistan). The asymmetry between the West Pakistani armed forces and India's deployed forces on the western frontier ( before India could transfer troops from Bangladeshi to the West) was much smaller than the current situation. The ratio then was about 4:1 in India's favor; a border line advantage in a full blown invasion. The Soviet Union predicted 250,000 Indian casualties to achieve a breakthrough and a 20 year insurgency by the local population mostly in KPK resisting Indian occupation. India did not choose that option then opting for dialogue and the Simla Summit instead. This time the asymmetry has grown to 7:1 in India's favor militarily and 10:1 in India's favor economically.An insurgency resisting Indian aggression is out of the question since the youth in economically depressed Pakistan only want to leave Pakistan not stay back and defend it.

The above scenarios may seem improbable but, the important part here is that the enemy THINKS a nuclear response from Pakistan is impossible, THINKS that a war of attrition will result in an inevitable victory; THINKS that an insurgency against foreign occupation of Pakistan is impossible. It is the "thinking" that leads to disastrous conflicts

 

[PK784]

Who really won the war between India and Pakistan?

The dispute over that dispute bodes ill for the next fight

www.economist.com

Who really won the war between India and Pakistan?​

The dispute over that dispute bodes ill for the next fight​

THE FOG of war can make it difficult to understand what is happening during a conflict. Sometimes that murkiness can persist long after the guns have fallen silent. That is proving true of the four-day skirmish between India and Pakistan that took place last May. This writer recently spoke to a wide range of Indian military and security officials on the lessons that the country took from Operation Sindoor, as the Indians dubbed their part in the conflict. They differ dramatically from those drawn by Pakistan. That greatly raises the risk of miscalculations when the two countries next come to blows.

Last year’s crisis began when terrorists with links to Pakistan massacred 26 people in Indian-administered Kashmir. Two weeks later, on May 7th, India bombed nine sites in Pakistan associated with jihadist groups, including some in Punjab, the country’s most populous province. That was a step up from the strikes India launched during a previous confrontation in 2019, which hit only one location, in territory that the two countries dispute. The two sides exchanged drone and missile strikes before declaring a ceasefire on May 10th.

Both sides have claimed a victory of sorts. India appears to have hit all the targets it originally set out to destroy (in 2019 India is believed to have missed). A “complex, innovative attack” with missiles that it launched on May 10th “appears largely to have overcome Pakistani air defences”, writes Christopher Clary, an expert at the University of Albany, in a detailed paper for the Stimson Centre, a think-tank in Washington. By contrast, he says, many or perhaps all Pakistani ballistic missiles fired that day either missed or were intercepted, judging by the lack of satellite images proving that they caused much harm.

Yet Pakistan can reasonably claim to have exacted a high price for all this. On May 7th, the first day of the conflict, it downed several Indian jets—probably five. More important, it snatched a diplomatic victory from the jaws of a military defeat. Indians remain furious at Donald Trump’s repeated claims to have ended the crisis by threatening both sides with tariffs. They were angered, too, by Mr Trump’s public embrace of Asim Munir, Pakistan’s army chief, who in the wake of the conflict elevated himself to the rank of field-marshal, consolidated power at home and shrewdly nominated Mr Trump for a Nobel peace prize.

One might guess that India will tread a bit more cautiously next time. Its relationship with America has soured since the conflict because of disputes over tariffs, India’s purchase of Russian oil and Mr Trump’s gloating over the ceasefire. During the same period, Pakistan has deepened its own ties with America and signed an ambitious defence pact with Saudi Arabia. On the day of the ceasefire Western governments were “hours away” from advising their citizens against travel to India, says one official. That would have panicked Indian businesses.

Yet Banyan’s conversations in Delhi suggest that many Indians see things very differently. Indian officials believe that Pakistan was on the ropes by May 10th. The fact that Pakistan could not get its Fatah ballistic missiles through Indian defences that day is evidence, some argue, that its options were limited. “This time we agreed to a halt,” says one Indian military official. “Next time, our desired end state may be much more.”

Indian officials do not dismiss the risk that a future conflict turns nuclear. But they insist they have a good grasp of where the limits lie. India has an “escalation matrix”, explains one official, spelling out in detail which targets might prompt what sort of response, and which might cross a red line. “One thing we take as an important lesson” from those days of fighting, says another senior official, “is that there is space between conventional and nuclear. Plenty of margin to play with.”

Some of this might be bravado, of course. In any war, each side has an incentive to play up its successes and play down its losses, if only to bolster deterrence. But the chasm between Indian and Pakistani perceptions of their skirmish is gaping. Pakistan may have come away with the view that India is likely to blink first in another conflict, that America will quickly step in and that post-war diplomacy will once again settle in Pakistan’s favour. Some Indians believe that the country erred in agreeing to a ceasefire on May 10th, and that it should have pressed on. All this suggests the next showdown could be more unpredictable—and a lot more dangerous

 

[Baibers_1260]

Not a single pane of glass was broken:

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[Oscar]

So basically our response was the least bad option under serious constraints right because our strategy to avoid the war and not lengthen it as we cannot fight a long conventional war with a country like india...But it hurts to see the loss of life suffered in the conflict. at least we should have provided concrete proof for the s400 strikes for the international media to see..

That’s the crux of it. The loss of life is unavoidable - because the initiative remains with the aggressor because they are looking to push red lines while you could go ahead and level their officers colony for e.g. but that is the bait they want you to take.

They say history is written by the victorious - but forgot to include it’s also written by the more powerful and those who spread their message/story fast.

 

[Cipher212]

we could have at least used something bigger than a GMRLS or made sure we got s400 kills with evidence

You can call me conspiracy theorist for this but I think Army saw that PAF was going to take the whole limelight again after the 7th of May and wanted to do the retaliatory ops this time around.

PAF probably had a whole strike mission of 30-40 planes ready to go but was scrapped in favour of MLRS for BuM. Instead they did a limited strike with 2-4 JF-17s carrying CM400.