Aftermath of the Iran-US war and its effects on proximities

Look who's issuing threats.......after Trump declared the war a success. The comments section is hilarious 😂

😅😅😅😅
There is difference of opinion in every country. However, many in the US continue to support Trump as he is having a string of successes. He virtually stopped illegal crossings from Mexico, encouraging private and foreign investment, teaching a lesson to cartels, controlling budget deficit, controlling housing prices, and he is now pushing the SAVE America Act. In foreign policy, he seized Venezuela and turned it around without destabilizing the region and he is now putting Cuba on notice. In the Middle East, the US forces have significantly degraded Iranian military capability in a few days and there might be a profound shift in ground realities of the region in the days ahead. Those hilarious comments might be fun to read but hold no value in this debate, bro. Naysayers are now silent on Venezuela, it will be rather hilarious to see them panting when Iran is settled.
 
Hello and welcome to the forum. I can see you have not posted much but judging by your most recent post, please take the time to post more. Before I start what, I am about to type will leave a bad taste in people's mouth, but I believe in data and objectivity when answering serious questions put in good faith.

Firstly, it is important to note that the relationship between the IRGC and Pakistan can only be described as a "Suspicious Peace". While we share a 560-mile border and common interests in stabilizing Afghanistan, our military and missile programs have remained largely separate and competitive- due to a mix of geopolitical, historical friction.

Until perhaps most recently, the IRGC traditionally views Pakistan through a lens of deep-seated mistrust for several reasons:

1. Proxy "Border" Wars: IRGC frequently accuses Pakistan of "willful negligence" or outright harboring of Sunni militant groups like Jaish al-Adl. These groups launch attacks on IRGC personnel in Iran's Sistan-Balochistan province. In January 2024, this tension boiled over into unprecedented tit-for-tat missile strikes between the two countries.

2. Conflicting Existential Alliances: The IRGC sees Pakistan as too close to its primary rivals. Pakistan maintains a "Special Defense Relationship" with Saudi Arabia and has historically relied on the U.S. for military aid. Conversely, Iran has developed a strategic partnership with India (specifically regarding the Chabahar Port), which Islamabad views as an encirclement tactic.
3. The Sectarian Factor: The IRGC is the vanguard of Iran's Shia clerical establishment. While Pakistan is a diverse state, the IRGC remains wary of Pakistan’s historical role in supporting Sunni movements (like the Taliban) and fears the influence of hardline Salafist elements within the Pakistani military and intelligence apparatus.

Similarly, whilst Pakistan presents the facade of brotherly nations - there is a serious concern inside Islamabad that the IRGC has historically cultivated and supported several proxy groups and networks within Pakistan. This support is usually driven by two goals: protecting Pakistan’s Shia minority and countering the influence of Saudi-backed Sunni groups.

1. The Zainabiyoun Brigade (The Most Recent Proxy)
View attachment 184714
The most significant modern proxy is the Zainabiyoun Brigade.

Recruitment: Formed by the IRGC-Quds Force around 2012–2014, it consists primarily of Pakistani Shias (many from the Kurram District and Gilgit-Baltistan).

Mission: Originally recruited to fight in Syria to defend the Bashar al-Assad regime and Shia shrines.

Domestic Impact: In early 2024, Pakistan officially designated the Zainabiyoun Brigade as a terrorist organization, citing its involvement in "activities against the interest of the state." The IRGC continues to provide pensions and support to the families of "martyrs" from this group living in Pakistan, which Islamabad views as a mechanism for maintaining a "sleeper cell" network.

In March 2024, the Pakistani Ministry of Interior officially designated the Zainabiyoun Brigade (Liwa Zainebiyoun) as a terrorist organization. This was a massive diplomatic blow to the IRGC, as the group is essentially their "foreign legion" for Pakistani Shias.

Why the Ban Happened: After the Syrian Civil War de-escalated, thousands of battle-hardened Pakistani fighters began returning home. Islamabad feared these men—trained in urban warfare and missile operation by the IRGC—would form "sleeper cells" or be used by Tehran to influence Pakistani internal politics.

The Turning Point: The ban followed the January 2024 tit-for-tat missile strikes between Iran and Pakistan. Pakistan used the designation to send a clear message: "We will no longer tolerate the IRGC recruiting our citizens to fight your regional wars."
View attachment 184716
Current Status (March 2026): Following the collapse of the Assad regime in late 2024/2025, many Zainabiyoun fighters fled to Iraq. Pakistan has strictly refused to repatriate them, viewing them as a permanent security threat. Recent reports suggest the IRGC is attempting to re-infiltrate these members back into Pakistan as "pilgrims" to maintain influence during the current regional instability.
2. Sectarian Proxy War (1980s–1990s)
Following the 1979 Iranian Revolution, the IRGC sought to "export the revolution." This led to a brutal proxy war on Pakistani soil against Saudi-funded groups.

Tehreek-e-Nifaz-e-Fiqh-e-Jafaria (TNFJ): Iran provided significant ideological and financial backing to this group in the 1980s to advocate for Shia rights under the Sunni-centric Islamization of General Zia-ul-Haq.

Sipah-e-Muhammad Pakistan (SMP): Formed in the early 1990s as a militant offshoot to counter the Sunni militant group Sipah-e-Sahaba. SMP was involved in numerous assassinations and bombings targeting Sunni hardliners. The IRGC was frequently accused by Pakistani intelligence (ISI) of providing training and sanctuary to SMP militants in Iran.

3. Cultural and Intelligence "Soft Power"
The IRGC operates through less "militant" channels that Pakistan still categorizes as proxy influence:

Imamia Students Organization (ISO): While primarily a student group, the ISO is openly pro-Iranian and follows the ideology of Velayat-e Faqih (Guardianship of the Jurist). The IRGC uses these networks for "ideological recruitment."

Intelligence Recruitment: In the late 2010s and early 2020s, several "spy rings" were uncovered in Karachi and Islamabad. Pakistani officials alleged these individuals were recruited by the IRGC to monitor U.S. and Saudi interests within Pakistan.

4. The "Baloch" Complication
While the IRGC fights Baloch separatists (like Jaish al-Adl) who hide in Pakistan, it has also been accused of selective blindness.

Pakistan has historically claimed that Iran allows certain Baloch insurgent groups (fighting against Pakistan) to maintain low-level presence on Iranian soil as leverage.

This "tit-for-tat" proxy game is why the border remains one of the most militarized and distrustful zones in Asia today.


Chabahar vs. Gwadar: The Port Rivalry
Senior officials in Pakistan are of the opinion that The IRGC uses the Chabahar Port as a strategic "chokepoint" to bypass and undermine Pakistan’s economic and military leverage.


FeatureChabahar Port (Iran)Gwadar Port (Pakistan)
Primary PartnerIndiaChina
Strategic GoalBypass Pakistan to reach Central Asia.Gateway for the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC).
IRGC InfluenceHigh; the IRGC controls the security and logistics around the port.None; seen as a rival "Sunni/Chinese" hub.



Features of Chabahar Port which are a cause for concern in Islamabad:
The Indian Connection:
By partnering with India to develop Chabahar, the IRGC provides New Delhi with a trade route to Afghanistan and Central Asia that completely skips Pakistan. This robs Islamabad of transit fees and "geography-based" diplomatic leverage.

A "Listening Post": Chabahar is located less than 200 kilometers from Gwadar. The IRGC uses its presence there to monitor Pakistani naval movements and the Chinese-funded activities in Gwadar.

The "Sanctions Shield": In early 2026, even as the U.S. ramped up tariffs and sanctions on Iran, India completed its $120 million investment in Chabahar. The IRGC views this port as an "unsinkable asset" that keeps India—a nuclear power and Pakistan's rival—tethered to Iranian interests despite Western pressure.


So why no Missile cooperation?
Pakistan and Iran do not co-develop weapons for very specific strategic reasons:

Nuclear Sensitivity:
Pakistan is a declared nuclear state that developed its program with significant Western and Chinese components. Openly cooperating with the IRGC—a sanctioned entity—on missile technology would trigger massive international sanctions against Pakistan and jeopardize its remaining ties with the West and the Gulf.

Strategic Silence (The "Ballistic" Standoff):
The two countries maintain what analysts call "ballistic silence." Because both have sophisticated missile arsenals, they prefer a "live and let live" arrangement. Joint development would require a level of trust (and sharing of sensitive telemetry/data) that does not exist.

Different Technological Parents: Pakistan’s missile and air technology is a blend of Chinese, American, and indigenous designs. Iran’s IRGC-led missile program is heavily rooted in Soviet/North Korean lineage and increasingly independent indigenous innovation. These systems are not naturally compatible.

The A.Q. Khan Legacy:
In the early 2000s, it was revealed that Pakistani scientist A.Q. Khan had leaked nuclear secrets to Iran. The fallout was a massive diplomatic disaster for Pakistan. Since then, the Pakistani military has been extremely careful to avoid any perception of "secondary proliferation" to Tehran to maintain its standing as a "responsible" nuclear power.
---
Sources:
  1. https://issi.org.pk/pakistan-iran-relations-in-the-evolving-international-environment/
  2. https://issi.org.pk/prospects-for-p...ral-cooperation-opportunities-and-challenges/
  3. https://cscr.pk/explore/themes/politics-governance/islamabad-navigating-the-convergent-crisis/
  4. https://cscr.pk/explore/themes/trad...out-a-win-for-pakistans-inevitable-geography/
  5. https://moderndiplomacy.eu/2026/03/01/how-china-is-securing-its-alliance-with-irans-new-power-structure/#:~:text=the existing approach.-,China is closely monitoring the situation to ensure that energy,approximately 80% of Iran's oil.
  6. https://peace-ipsc.org/2025/01/23/outlook-of-relations-between-iran-and-pakistan-2025/#:~:text=In Pakistan, Baloch separatists, with,over both Pakistan and Iran.
  7. https://mecouncil.org/blog_posts/pakistans-iran-trap/
  8. https://mei.edu/ar/events/iran-and-pakistan-security-diplomacy-and-american-influence/
  9. https://www.dawn.com/news/1806806
  10. https://www.chathamhouse.org/2024/01/iran-pakistan-tensions-why-further-escalation-unlikely
  11. https://www.asiasentinel.com/p/pakistan-two-front-nightmare
  12. https://issi.org.pk/press-release-special-event-76-years-of-pakistan-iran-diplomatic-relations/

Hello and welcome to the forum. I can see you have not posted much but judging by your most recent post, please take the time to post more. Before I start what, I am about to type will leave a bad taste in people's mouth, but I believe in data and objectivity when answering serious questions put in good faith.

Firstly, it is important to note that the relationship between the IRGC and Pakistan can only be described as a "Suspicious Peace". While we share a 560-mile border and common interests in stabilizing Afghanistan, our military and missile programs have remained largely separate and competitive- due to a mix of geopolitical, historical friction.

Until perhaps most recently, the IRGC traditionally views Pakistan through a lens of deep-seated mistrust for several reasons:

1. Proxy "Border" Wars: IRGC frequently accuses Pakistan of "willful negligence" or outright harboring of Sunni militant groups like Jaish al-Adl. These groups launch attacks on IRGC personnel in Iran's Sistan-Balochistan province. In January 2024, this tension boiled over into unprecedented tit-for-tat missile strikes between the two countries.

2. Conflicting Existential Alliances: The IRGC sees Pakistan as too close to its primary rivals. Pakistan maintains a "Special Defense Relationship" with Saudi Arabia and has historically relied on the U.S. for military aid. Conversely, Iran has developed a strategic partnership with India (specifically regarding the Chabahar Port), which Islamabad views as an encirclement tactic.
3. The Sectarian Factor: The IRGC is the vanguard of Iran's Shia clerical establishment. While Pakistan is a diverse state, the IRGC remains wary of Pakistan’s historical role in supporting Sunni movements (like the Taliban) and fears the influence of hardline Salafist elements within the Pakistani military and intelligence apparatus.

Similarly, whilst Pakistan presents the facade of brotherly nations - there is a serious concern inside Islamabad that the IRGC has historically cultivated and supported several proxy groups and networks within Pakistan. This support is usually driven by two goals: protecting Pakistan’s Shia minority and countering the influence of Saudi-backed Sunni groups.

1. The Zainabiyoun Brigade (The Most Recent Proxy)
View attachment 184714
The most significant modern proxy is the Zainabiyoun Brigade.

Recruitment: Formed by the IRGC-Quds Force around 2012–2014, it consists primarily of Pakistani Shias (many from the Kurram District and Gilgit-Baltistan).

Mission: Originally recruited to fight in Syria to defend the Bashar al-Assad regime and Shia shrines.

Domestic Impact: In early 2024, Pakistan officially designated the Zainabiyoun Brigade as a terrorist organization, citing its involvement in "activities against the interest of the state." The IRGC continues to provide pensions and support to the families of "martyrs" from this group living in Pakistan, which Islamabad views as a mechanism for maintaining a "sleeper cell" network.

In March 2024, the Pakistani Ministry of Interior officially designated the Zainabiyoun Brigade (Liwa Zainebiyoun) as a terrorist organization. This was a massive diplomatic blow to the IRGC, as the group is essentially their "foreign legion" for Pakistani Shias.

Why the Ban Happened: After the Syrian Civil War de-escalated, thousands of battle-hardened Pakistani fighters began returning home. Islamabad feared these men—trained in urban warfare and missile operation by the IRGC—would form "sleeper cells" or be used by Tehran to influence Pakistani internal politics.

The Turning Point: The ban followed the January 2024 tit-for-tat missile strikes between Iran and Pakistan. Pakistan used the designation to send a clear message: "We will no longer tolerate the IRGC recruiting our citizens to fight your regional wars."
View attachment 184716
Current Status (March 2026): Following the collapse of the Assad regime in late 2024/2025, many Zainabiyoun fighters fled to Iraq. Pakistan has strictly refused to repatriate them, viewing them as a permanent security threat. Recent reports suggest the IRGC is attempting to re-infiltrate these members back into Pakistan as "pilgrims" to maintain influence during the current regional instability.
2. Sectarian Proxy War (1980s–1990s)
Following the 1979 Iranian Revolution, the IRGC sought to "export the revolution." This led to a brutal proxy war on Pakistani soil against Saudi-funded groups.

Tehreek-e-Nifaz-e-Fiqh-e-Jafaria (TNFJ): Iran provided significant ideological and financial backing to this group in the 1980s to advocate for Shia rights under the Sunni-centric Islamization of General Zia-ul-Haq.

Sipah-e-Muhammad Pakistan (SMP): Formed in the early 1990s as a militant offshoot to counter the Sunni militant group Sipah-e-Sahaba. SMP was involved in numerous assassinations and bombings targeting Sunni hardliners. The IRGC was frequently accused by Pakistani intelligence (ISI) of providing training and sanctuary to SMP militants in Iran.

3. Cultural and Intelligence "Soft Power"
The IRGC operates through less "militant" channels that Pakistan still categorizes as proxy influence:

Imamia Students Organization (ISO): While primarily a student group, the ISO is openly pro-Iranian and follows the ideology of Velayat-e Faqih (Guardianship of the Jurist). The IRGC uses these networks for "ideological recruitment."

Intelligence Recruitment: In the late 2010s and early 2020s, several "spy rings" were uncovered in Karachi and Islamabad. Pakistani officials alleged these individuals were recruited by the IRGC to monitor U.S. and Saudi interests within Pakistan.

4. The "Baloch" Complication
While the IRGC fights Baloch separatists (like Jaish al-Adl) who hide in Pakistan, it has also been accused of selective blindness.

Pakistan has historically claimed that Iran allows certain Baloch insurgent groups (fighting against Pakistan) to maintain low-level presence on Iranian soil as leverage.

This "tit-for-tat" proxy game is why the border remains one of the most militarized and distrustful zones in Asia today.


Chabahar vs. Gwadar: The Port Rivalry
Senior officials in Pakistan are of the opinion that The IRGC uses the Chabahar Port as a strategic "chokepoint" to bypass and undermine Pakistan’s economic and military leverage.


FeatureChabahar Port (Iran)Gwadar Port (Pakistan)
Primary PartnerIndiaChina
Strategic GoalBypass Pakistan to reach Central Asia.Gateway for the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC).
IRGC InfluenceHigh; the IRGC controls the security and logistics around the port.None; seen as a rival "Sunni/Chinese" hub.



Features of Chabahar Port which are a cause for concern in Islamabad:
The Indian Connection:
By partnering with India to develop Chabahar, the IRGC provides New Delhi with a trade route to Afghanistan and Central Asia that completely skips Pakistan. This robs Islamabad of transit fees and "geography-based" diplomatic leverage.

A "Listening Post": Chabahar is located less than 200 kilometers from Gwadar. The IRGC uses its presence there to monitor Pakistani naval movements and the Chinese-funded activities in Gwadar.

The "Sanctions Shield": In early 2026, even as the U.S. ramped up tariffs and sanctions on Iran, India completed its $120 million investment in Chabahar. The IRGC views this port as an "unsinkable asset" that keeps India—a nuclear power and Pakistan's rival—tethered to Iranian interests despite Western pressure.


So why no Missile cooperation?
Pakistan and Iran do not co-develop weapons for very specific strategic reasons:

Nuclear Sensitivity:
Pakistan is a declared nuclear state that developed its program with significant Western and Chinese components. Openly cooperating with the IRGC—a sanctioned entity—on missile technology would trigger massive international sanctions against Pakistan and jeopardize its remaining ties with the West and the Gulf.

Strategic Silence (The "Ballistic" Standoff):
The two countries maintain what analysts call "ballistic silence." Because both have sophisticated missile arsenals, they prefer a "live and let live" arrangement. Joint development would require a level of trust (and sharing of sensitive telemetry/data) that does not exist.

Different Technological Parents: Pakistan’s missile and air technology is a blend of Chinese, American, and indigenous designs. Iran’s IRGC-led missile program is heavily rooted in Soviet/North Korean lineage and increasingly independent indigenous innovation. These systems are not naturally compatible.

The A.Q. Khan Legacy:
In the early 2000s, it was revealed that Pakistani scientist A.Q. Khan had leaked nuclear secrets to Iran. The fallout was a massive diplomatic disaster for Pakistan. Since then, the Pakistani military has been extremely careful to avoid any perception of "secondary proliferation" to Tehran to maintain its standing as a "responsible" nuclear power.
---
Sources:
  1. https://issi.org.pk/pakistan-iran-relations-in-the-evolving-international-environment/
  2. https://issi.org.pk/prospects-for-p...ral-cooperation-opportunities-and-challenges/
  3. https://cscr.pk/explore/themes/politics-governance/islamabad-navigating-the-convergent-crisis/
  4. https://cscr.pk/explore/themes/trad...out-a-win-for-pakistans-inevitable-geography/
  5. https://moderndiplomacy.eu/2026/03/01/how-china-is-securing-its-alliance-with-irans-new-power-structure/#:~:text=the existing approach.-,China is closely monitoring the situation to ensure that energy,approximately 80% of Iran's oil.
  6. https://peace-ipsc.org/2025/01/23/outlook-of-relations-between-iran-and-pakistan-2025/#:~:text=In Pakistan, Baloch separatists, with,over both Pakistan and Iran.
  7. https://mecouncil.org/blog_posts/pakistans-iran-trap/
  8. https://mei.edu/ar/events/iran-and-pakistan-security-diplomacy-and-american-influence/
  9. https://www.dawn.com/news/1806806
  10. https://www.chathamhouse.org/2024/01/iran-pakistan-tensions-why-further-escalation-unlikely
  11. https://www.asiasentinel.com/p/pakistan-two-front-nightmare
  12. https://issi.org.pk/press-release-special-event-76-years-of-pakistan-iran-diplomatic-relations/
Thank you for the detailed and well-structured response. I genuinely appreciate the time and effort you put into explaining the complexities of the Iran–Pakistan relationship.





Just to clarify something first: I have actually been on this forum since around 2008–2009, but unfortunately my original account was misplaced over time, so I had to sign up again with a new ID. That is why it may appear that I have not posted much. In reality, I have mostly been an observer and reader, following discussions related to Pakistan’s geopolitical environment, defense matters, and developments within the Pakistani military.





Coming to your points, I agree that the relationship between Pakistan and Iran—especially involving the IRGC—has historically been best described as a managed rivalry with limited cooperation rather than a full strategic partnership. Many of the issues you mentioned—border tensions, mistrust, competing alliances, and sectarian dynamics—are indeed important realities shaping the relationship.





However, my original point was less about the political relationship and more about lessons that can be learned from modern conflicts, particularly in the conventional missile and drone domain.





Pakistan historically structured its missile program primarily around nuclear deterrence, which made strategic sense under the doctrine of minimum credible deterrence. Systems such as the Shaheen series, Ghauri series, and Ghaznavi were primarily designed as nuclear delivery platforms. Because they are intended to carry nuclear warheads, extreme pinpoint accuracy is not always the primary design priority. From what I have read, nuclear warheads have a destructive radius that can compensate for lower accuracy compared with precision conventional weapons. If I am mistaken, I would welcome correction from more knowledgeable members here.





Many of these earlier systems also rely on older navigation and guidance architectures, which means their conventional precision strike capability is not at the same level as modern precision-guided missile systems. That is why my argument is that Pakistan has historically done less work in high-precision conventional missile development compared to its nuclear delivery systems.





Given the rapidly changing geopolitical environment, Pakistan may need to invest more heavily in conventional missile capabilities with higher accuracy, greater speed, and improved lethality, including supersonic and eventually hypersonic systems.





Another point raised earlier by a very insightful member here was that Iran’s Revolutionary Guard missile and drone forces are currently surprising many observers, even though Iran’s conventional army, navy, and air force have faced serious pressure from technologically superior adversaries. This actually reinforces the broader lesson: missile forces and drones can serve as a strategic backbone even when other conventional assets are degraded.





From Pakistan’s perspective, this is an important lesson. For example, if—God forbid—in a future conflict our air bases were heavily targeted or the Pakistan Air Force suffered significant disruption, our conventional deterrence options could become limited very quickly. In such a scenario, the remaining strategic option would largely be nuclear deterrence, which is of course a very powerful deterrent but also an extreme one.





Therefore, strengthening the conventional domain becomes very important. Pakistan’s decision to establish a rocket force is a positive initiative in this direction, but it may need to be expanded and developed rapidly so that it can provide a strong and reliable conventional deterrent alongside the nuclear doctrine of minimum credible deterrence.





Ultimately, the goal is not to abandon Pakistan’s existing deterrence strategy, which has worked well, but rather to evolve it by incorporating modern realities of missile warfare, drone warfare, and precision conventional strike capabilities.





Thank you again for the thoughtful discussion. I always appreciate reading analytical perspectives from knowledgeable members on this forum.
 
There is difference of opinion in every country. However, many in the US continue to support Trump as he is having a string of successes. He virtually stopped illegal crossings from Mexico, encouraging private and foreign investment, teaching a lesson to cartels, controlling budget deficit, controlling housing prices, and he is now pushing the SAVE America Act. In foreign policy, he seized Venezuela and turned it around without destabilizing the region and he is now putting Cuba on notice. In the Middle East, the US forces have significantly degraded Iranian military capability in a few days and there might be a profound shift in ground realities of the region in the days ahead. Those hilarious comments might be fun to read but hold no value in this debate, bro. Naysayers are now silent on Venezuela, it will be rather hilarious to see them panting when Iran is settled.
Yeah , the other side of the coin. The other side of the story.

Currently the mindset in the entire western world is that as long as there are Muslims at the receiving end, the People will even bear the costs of Higher Fuel prices, and other losses. Such a huge Bogeyman had been created out of us , with decades of brainwashing
 
I see PNSC tankers being escorted.

The Black vessel i can identify as Pakistan National Shipping Motor Tanker Shalamar, which can carry 100,000 tons of oil. The red one also seems PNSC tanker due to the Logo on the Chimney / Funnel .
Thats roughly 200,000 Tons of oil Coming to Pakistan Under PN protection. Although Pakistan needs 1.8 Million tons of oil Monthly. Which means only 10 % of the required oil is coming under protection.
Although having sailed on similar ships myself, both ships seem to be empty as o can see the bulbous bow, and both are too high.
So i am not sure what PN is escorting.


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Last edited:
This thread is intended for discussions related to what can be inducted/improved upon in Pakistan based on past, ongoing & future global conflicts.

Anything you see anywhere around thd world that you feel would be relevant & beneficial for Pakistan's context can be posted here.

I will start by contributing what I think is important for Pakistan based on what we've seen so far:

Ranked by importance (war survival, escalation control, and early-war effectiveness):

1. Hardened national command infrastructure and integrated warfighting command


2. Large-scale conventional long-range strike arsenal


3. Strategic drone warfare at scale


4. Airbase survivability and dispersed air operations


5. Persistent space-based ISR and military communications


6. Large-scale electronic warfare capability


7. Area-denial & offensive air power


8. Selective layered missile and air defense


9. AI-assisted command and decision systems


10. Industrial war production and stockpiles


---

1. Hardened National Command Infrastructure

Goal
: Ensure national leadership and military command remain operational after a first decapitation strike.

Modern conflicts prioritize decapitation strikes against command centers and leadership nodes. Without hardened infrastructure, precision missile strikes can disable decision-making early in the conflict.

Required capabilities

• Deep underground national war headquarters

• Multiple redundant command nodes

• Mobile command centers

• Hardened communications infrastructure

Key requirement: A survivable national war command structure capable of operating even under sustained missile strikes.

---

2. Integrated Warfighting Command Network

Modern warfare increasingly relies on network-centric operations linking all branches of the military.

This structure must integrate:

• Air force operations

• Army missile and rocket forces

• Naval strike assets

• Space-based intelligence

• Cyber and electronic warfare


This creates a continuous targeting cycle:

Detection → Identification → Target prioritization → Strike → Battle damage assessment.

Without integration, advanced weapons cannot be employed effectively at scale.

---

3. Large-Scale Conventional Long-Range Strike Arsenal

Recent conflicts demonstrate the decisive role of mass precision strike capability.

Examples of modern long-range strike platforms include:

• Khorramshahr 4

• DF-17

Capabilities required:

• maneuverable re-entry vehicles

• cluster or runway-denial warheads

• rapid launch capability

• large inventory for saturation strikes

• de-centralised launchers + hardened silos


---

4. Strategic Drone Warfare

The war in Ukraine has demonstrated the effectiveness of cheap attritable drones in modern combat.

A representative example is the:

Shahed-136, Geran 2


Key characteristics:

•low cost

• long range

• simple navigation systems

• mass deployability


A complete drone ecosystem should include:

• Strategic strike drones

Range: 1,000–2,000 km
Used against infrastructure and airbases.

• Tactical loitering munitions

Used against armor, artillery, and frontline units.

• Decoy drones

Designed to exhaust air defense interceptors and radar capacity.

The critical principle is numerical saturation of defenses.


---

5. Airbase Survivability and Dispersal

Air forces remain decisive but increasingly vulnerable to precision missile strikes and are typically targeted during the opening phase of conflict.

Required survivability measures:

• hardened aircraft shelters

• underground aircraft hangars

• dispersed aircraft basing

• highway runway operations

• rapid runway repair units

These measures ensure that air power remains operational even after sustained strikes on main bases.

---

6. Area-Denial & Offensive Air Power

Air superiority does not always require destroying an enemy air force outright.

It can be achieved by denying safe operational zones.

Key tools include:

• long-range air-to-air missiles

• networked radar systems

• electronic warfare support

• integrated air defence & command networks

Area denial prevents sustained bombing campaigns and limits enemy air operations.


---

7. Electronic Warfare Forces

Electronic warfare has become a critical component of modern military operations.

During the war in Ukraine, extensive electronic warfare capabilities were used to disrupt:

• drones

• satellite navigation signals

• communications networks

Required capabilities include:

• GPS denial systems

• drone communication jamming

• radar deception

• datalink interception

Dedicated electronic warfare units should operate as mobile brigades supporting frontline formations.

---

8. Space-Based ISR and Military Communications

Modern military operations increasingly depend on space infrastructure.

Required space capabilities include:

• reconnaissance satellites

• persistent battlefield imaging

• secure military satellite communications

• navigation support systems

Space-based ISR enables faster targeting cycles and real-time battle damage assessment.


---

9. Selective Layered Air and Missile Defense

Comprehensive national missile defense is not realistic for most states due to cost and geographic limitations.

Instead, defense should focus on protecting strategic assets, including:

• national command centers

• major airbases

• key population centers


A layered defense structure typically includes:

1. long-range surface-to-air missiles


2. medium-range systems


3. short-range air defense


4. anti-drone defenses

Even advanced systems such as Iron Dome cannot fully stop saturation attacks.


---

10. AI-Assisted Military Decision Systems

Modern battlefields generate large amounts of operational data.

Artificial intelligence systems can assist with:

• satellite image analysis

• target identification

• strike planning

• logistics management

Organizations experimenting with such systems include:

• Israel Defense Forces

• United States Department of Defense

These systems function primarily as decision support tools for commanders.


---

11. Industrial War Production and Strategic Stockpiles (industry & economy)

Modern wars frequently become industrial conflicts of attrition.

Key requirements include:

• missile production capacity

• drone manufacturing scale

• artillery ammunition reserves

• spare parts stockpiles

• redundant production facilities

Sustained production capacity determines the ability to maintain combat operations during prolonged conflicts.


---

The future of high-intensity warfare increasingly favors militaries that combine:

• survivable command systems

• large long-range strike arsenals

• mass attritable drone forces

• space-enabled targeting

• strong electronic warfare capabilities

• industrial production capacity



@Tariq Habib Afridi @kimjongun @hasssanali8998 @313Ghazi @Panzerkiel @Hussain @hussain0216
 
I hope the thread won't be deleted/misplaced as promised by @RescueRanger as I think this kind of thread would be very beneficial to the forum.

Since the last one was I had to use AI to fill in the gaps of what I forgot but it's more comprehensive.
 
Thank you for the detailed and well-structured response. I genuinely appreciate the time and effort you put into explaining the complexities of the Iran–Pakistan relationship.





Just to clarify something first: I have actually been on this forum since around 2008–2009, but unfortunately my original account was misplaced over time, so I had to sign up again with a new ID. That is why it may appear that I have not posted much. In reality, I have mostly been an observer and reader, following discussions related to Pakistan’s geopolitical environment, defense matters, and developments within the Pakistani military.





Coming to your points, I agree that the relationship between Pakistan and Iran—especially involving the IRGC—has historically been best described as a managed rivalry with limited cooperation rather than a full strategic partnership. Many of the issues you mentioned—border tensions, mistrust, competing alliances, and sectarian dynamics—are indeed important realities shaping the relationship.





However, my original point was less about the political relationship and more about lessons that can be learned from modern conflicts, particularly in the conventional missile and drone domain.





Pakistan historically structured its missile program primarily around nuclear deterrence, which made strategic sense under the doctrine of minimum credible deterrence. Systems such as the Shaheen series, Ghauri series, and Ghaznavi were primarily designed as nuclear delivery platforms. Because they are intended to carry nuclear warheads, extreme pinpoint accuracy is not always the primary design priority. From what I have read, nuclear warheads have a destructive radius that can compensate for lower accuracy compared with precision conventional weapons. If I am mistaken, I would welcome correction from more knowledgeable members here.





Many of these earlier systems also rely on older navigation and guidance architectures, which means their conventional precision strike capability is not at the same level as modern precision-guided missile systems. That is why my argument is that Pakistan has historically done less work in high-precision conventional missile development compared to its nuclear delivery systems.





Given the rapidly changing geopolitical environment, Pakistan may need to invest more heavily in conventional missile capabilities with higher accuracy, greater speed, and improved lethality, including supersonic and eventually hypersonic systems.





Another point raised earlier by a very insightful member here was that Iran’s Revolutionary Guard missile and drone forces are currently surprising many observers, even though Iran’s conventional army, navy, and air force have faced serious pressure from technologically superior adversaries. This actually reinforces the broader lesson: missile forces and drones can serve as a strategic backbone even when other conventional assets are degraded.





From Pakistan’s perspective, this is an important lesson. For example, if—God forbid—in a future conflict our air bases were heavily targeted or the Pakistan Air Force suffered significant disruption, our conventional deterrence options could become limited very quickly. In such a scenario, the remaining strategic option would largely be nuclear deterrence, which is of course a very powerful deterrent but also an extreme one.





Therefore, strengthening the conventional domain becomes very important. Pakistan’s decision to establish a rocket force is a positive initiative in this direction, but it may need to be expanded and developed rapidly so that it can provide a strong and reliable conventional deterrent alongside the nuclear doctrine of minimum credible deterrence.





Ultimately, the goal is not to abandon Pakistan’s existing deterrence strategy, which has worked well, but rather to evolve it by incorporating modern realities of missile warfare, drone warfare, and precision conventional strike capabilities.





Thank you again for the thoughtful discussion. I always appreciate reading analytical perspectives from knowledgeable members on this forum.
Thank you for your reply, but to answer your question bluntly, there is a large forgive the pun "gulf" when it comes to trust between Pakistan ans IRGC on security and strategic affairs.

You cannot rightly expect Pakistan to upend all her political processes and national security concerns just to appease the "feel good" missile factor of a fistful of people.

Feel free to refer back to my closing remarks in my previous reply to you on this.

Once again, nice debate.
 
I see PNSC tankers being escorted.

The Black vessel i can identify as Pakistan National Shipping Motor Tanker Shalamar, which can carry 100,000 tons of oil. The red one also seems PNSC tanker due to the Logo on the Chimney / Funnel .
Thats roughly 200,000 Tons of oil Coming to Pakistan Under PN protection. Although Pakistan needs 1.8 Million tons of oil Monthly. Which means only 10 % of the required oil is coming under protection.
Although having sailed on similar ships myself, both ships seem to be empty as o can see the bulbous bow, and both are too high.
So i am not sure what PN is escorting.


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Minions of the sea. 😂 cute
 

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