AZ_HighCountry
INT'L MOD
So explain then how the Yak-30 was downed near Tehran. Or where the F-35 was hit. Or perhaps some of the videos we've seen from within Iran showing US and Israeli aircraft in the skies of Iran.
Iran - Israel/US War: Israel-US declare war on Iran, Iran responds
- Thread starter Khorasan Black Flags
- Start date
PAKISTANFOREVER
Trusted Member
My sentiments echoed exactly.
You dont know our psycho general defacto ruler. He met with Shia clerics in Pakistan and, as per some reports, told them in clear terms to keep this one quiet, and apparently no one spoke otherwise.
Immortals
Elite Member
You are not taking Kharg without taking the coast line well before that.
That_Guy
THINK TANK: CONSULTANT
@RescueRanger
Hope you don't mind, but to prove just how stupid a ground invasion is, I asked Ai....
QUESTION:
How likely is the US to succeed in a regime changd invasion of Iran, considering current political climate and capabilities.
ANSWER:
**Extremely low—near zero for a successful, stable regime-change outcome via full-scale ground invasion.** As of March 2026, the US (under President Trump) is already engaged in a major air-and-naval campaign against Iran alongside Israel (launched February 28, 2026, dubbed Operation Epic Fury), which has killed Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and severely degraded Iran’s nuclear sites, missile arsenal, navy, air defenses, and command structures. Yet even this limited operation—far short of invasion—has not produced regime collapse, and US intelligence explicitly assessed beforehand that neither limited strikes nor a prolonged campaign would likely topple the Islamic Republic.
A hypothetical **full ground invasion** aimed at regime change and occupation would be orders of magnitude harder, politically untenable, and strategically disastrous. Here’s why success is assessed as highly improbable by US intelligence, military analysts, and think tanks across the spectrum.
### Military Capabilities and Realities
- **US strengths are air/naval-dominant**: The ongoing campaign shows overwhelming US/Israeli superiority in precision strikes, with minimal US casualties so far and effective degradation of Iran’s power-projection tools (missiles, navy, proxies strained). However, this is **not** translating to regime change. Iran’s IRGC retains domestic control, small arms, underground facilities, and resilience. No ground forces have been committed, and US posture remains carrier- and long-range-strike focused—explicitly avoiding the “boots on the ground” that would be required for occupation.
- **Invasion requirements vs. reality**: As previously analyzed, Iran’s size (4× Iraq), terrain (mountainous/desert), population (~90 million), and hybrid defenses make it a far tougher target than 2003 Iraq. Scaling for occupation would demand **hundreds of thousands to over a million troops**, trillions in costs, years of fighting, and massive logistics amid proxy attacks and potential Hormuz closure. The US military lacks the political will and force structure for this (post-Iraq/Afghanistan lessons; competing priorities with China). Experts and officials repeatedly state: “There is no sign that the US or anybody else is going to put boots on the ground.” Even limited special ops raids are risky and insufficient for regime change.
- **Iran’s advantages**: The regime prepared for decades (succession plans in place; new Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei reportedly selected). IRGC controls security/economy. No unified opposition ready to seize power. US intel (National Intelligence Council, February 2026) concluded explicitly: regime change “unlikely… even if the current leadership was killed.” Ongoing strikes have not triggered mass defections or collapse; Iran projects continuity and defiance.
Airpower alone has never toppled a regime like Iran’s (see Libya 2011 caveats or historical precedents). Adding ground invasion would turn it into a quagmire worse than Iraq, with higher attrition from urban/mountain fighting, drones, and insurgency.
### Current Political Climate (US and International)
- **Domestic opposition**: The **existing air war** is already deeply unpopular—the lowest initial support for any major US conflict in decades. Polls (CNN, Marist/PBS, Reuters/Ipsos, Economist/YouGov, March 2026) show **55–59% opposition**, with only 27–44% approval. Majorities disapprove of Trump’s handling (54%), see no clear US benefit (many believe it primarily helps Israel), and expect a long, costly conflict. There is no “grand narrative” rallying public support, unlike past wars. Republicans are more hawkish but split; Democrats and independents overwhelmingly oppose. Midterm implications loom large—Trump’s base dislikes “forever wars.” A ground invasion would amplify this into political suicide.
- **No coalition or international backing**: Unlike 2003 Iraq, Gulf states and traditional allies are wary or absent. China/Russia back Iran diplomatically/economically. Regional escalation (proxies, oil shocks) would isolate the US further. Trump has emphasized quick wins and avoidance of nation-building—no appetite for occupation.
- **Trump administration signaling**: Rhetoric includes regime-change hopes (“take over your government”), but actions and leaks show realism: focus on degrading capabilities, possible off-ramps/deals, and no invasion plans. Officials seek “Venezuela scenario” (deal with successor) over full occupation. Even hawks acknowledge limits of American power here.
### Overall Likelihood Assessment
- **Short-term regime weakening**: High (already happening via air strikes—nuclear/missile rollback achieved or imminent).
- **Full regime change via invasion**: **Very low (<10–20% at best, per consensus)**. Even optimistic analysts call it a “high-stakes gamble” reliant on unpredictable popular revolt (which intel deems unlikely). Most probable outcomes: battered but surviving regime (possibly more hardline/IRGC-dominated “IRGCistan”), chaotic fragmentation, or negotiated off-ramp—not stable pro-US democracy. History (Iraq, Afghanistan, Libya) shows US regime-change invasions rarely produce lasting success; Iran would be worse.
- **Risks outweigh rewards**: Prolonged war diverts from China competition, spikes global energy prices/recession, inflates US costs/casualties, and could radicalize Iran further. Public and military realities make sustained invasion politically impossible.
In summary, US capabilities excel at precision degradation but not at the occupation-scale regime change the question envisions. The current political climate—war-weary public, divided Congress, Trump’s anti-forever-war stance—makes commitment to invasion untenable. US intelligence and expert consensus is clear: success in toppling and stabilizing Iran through ground invasion is highly improbable. Continued air/naval pressure or diplomacy remains the far more realistic (if still uncertain) path being pursued. Any escalation to boots-on-ground would carry catastrophic risks with minimal upside.
Hope you don't mind, but to prove just how stupid a ground invasion is, I asked Ai....
QUESTION:
How likely is the US to succeed in a regime changd invasion of Iran, considering current political climate and capabilities.
ANSWER:
**Extremely low—near zero for a successful, stable regime-change outcome via full-scale ground invasion.** As of March 2026, the US (under President Trump) is already engaged in a major air-and-naval campaign against Iran alongside Israel (launched February 28, 2026, dubbed Operation Epic Fury), which has killed Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and severely degraded Iran’s nuclear sites, missile arsenal, navy, air defenses, and command structures. Yet even this limited operation—far short of invasion—has not produced regime collapse, and US intelligence explicitly assessed beforehand that neither limited strikes nor a prolonged campaign would likely topple the Islamic Republic.
A hypothetical **full ground invasion** aimed at regime change and occupation would be orders of magnitude harder, politically untenable, and strategically disastrous. Here’s why success is assessed as highly improbable by US intelligence, military analysts, and think tanks across the spectrum.
### Military Capabilities and Realities
- **US strengths are air/naval-dominant**: The ongoing campaign shows overwhelming US/Israeli superiority in precision strikes, with minimal US casualties so far and effective degradation of Iran’s power-projection tools (missiles, navy, proxies strained). However, this is **not** translating to regime change. Iran’s IRGC retains domestic control, small arms, underground facilities, and resilience. No ground forces have been committed, and US posture remains carrier- and long-range-strike focused—explicitly avoiding the “boots on the ground” that would be required for occupation.
- **Invasion requirements vs. reality**: As previously analyzed, Iran’s size (4× Iraq), terrain (mountainous/desert), population (~90 million), and hybrid defenses make it a far tougher target than 2003 Iraq. Scaling for occupation would demand **hundreds of thousands to over a million troops**, trillions in costs, years of fighting, and massive logistics amid proxy attacks and potential Hormuz closure. The US military lacks the political will and force structure for this (post-Iraq/Afghanistan lessons; competing priorities with China). Experts and officials repeatedly state: “There is no sign that the US or anybody else is going to put boots on the ground.” Even limited special ops raids are risky and insufficient for regime change.
- **Iran’s advantages**: The regime prepared for decades (succession plans in place; new Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei reportedly selected). IRGC controls security/economy. No unified opposition ready to seize power. US intel (National Intelligence Council, February 2026) concluded explicitly: regime change “unlikely… even if the current leadership was killed.” Ongoing strikes have not triggered mass defections or collapse; Iran projects continuity and defiance.
Airpower alone has never toppled a regime like Iran’s (see Libya 2011 caveats or historical precedents). Adding ground invasion would turn it into a quagmire worse than Iraq, with higher attrition from urban/mountain fighting, drones, and insurgency.
### Current Political Climate (US and International)
- **Domestic opposition**: The **existing air war** is already deeply unpopular—the lowest initial support for any major US conflict in decades. Polls (CNN, Marist/PBS, Reuters/Ipsos, Economist/YouGov, March 2026) show **55–59% opposition**, with only 27–44% approval. Majorities disapprove of Trump’s handling (54%), see no clear US benefit (many believe it primarily helps Israel), and expect a long, costly conflict. There is no “grand narrative” rallying public support, unlike past wars. Republicans are more hawkish but split; Democrats and independents overwhelmingly oppose. Midterm implications loom large—Trump’s base dislikes “forever wars.” A ground invasion would amplify this into political suicide.
- **No coalition or international backing**: Unlike 2003 Iraq, Gulf states and traditional allies are wary or absent. China/Russia back Iran diplomatically/economically. Regional escalation (proxies, oil shocks) would isolate the US further. Trump has emphasized quick wins and avoidance of nation-building—no appetite for occupation.
- **Trump administration signaling**: Rhetoric includes regime-change hopes (“take over your government”), but actions and leaks show realism: focus on degrading capabilities, possible off-ramps/deals, and no invasion plans. Officials seek “Venezuela scenario” (deal with successor) over full occupation. Even hawks acknowledge limits of American power here.
### Overall Likelihood Assessment
- **Short-term regime weakening**: High (already happening via air strikes—nuclear/missile rollback achieved or imminent).
- **Full regime change via invasion**: **Very low (<10–20% at best, per consensus)**. Even optimistic analysts call it a “high-stakes gamble” reliant on unpredictable popular revolt (which intel deems unlikely). Most probable outcomes: battered but surviving regime (possibly more hardline/IRGC-dominated “IRGCistan”), chaotic fragmentation, or negotiated off-ramp—not stable pro-US democracy. History (Iraq, Afghanistan, Libya) shows US regime-change invasions rarely produce lasting success; Iran would be worse.
- **Risks outweigh rewards**: Prolonged war diverts from China competition, spikes global energy prices/recession, inflates US costs/casualties, and could radicalize Iran further. Public and military realities make sustained invasion politically impossible.
In summary, US capabilities excel at precision degradation but not at the occupation-scale regime change the question envisions. The current political climate—war-weary public, divided Congress, Trump’s anti-forever-war stance—makes commitment to invasion untenable. US intelligence and expert consensus is clear: success in toppling and stabilizing Iran through ground invasion is highly improbable. Continued air/naval pressure or diplomacy remains the far more realistic (if still uncertain) path being pursued. Any escalation to boots-on-ground would carry catastrophic risks with minimal upside.
Mutakalim
Registered Member
But they were allies of US and Israel, installed by them against Iran!
There are no allies of Crusaders only pawns in their scheme of absolute domination. Those who think that their good will, their wealth, their oil, their relationships and especially their distance will protect them from the invaders, they are mistaken and will soon join the fallen.
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925boy
Elite Member
So at what point will u not ask me racist questions?
AZ_HighCountry
INT'L MOD
I am highly skeptical of any attempted amphibious assault on Kharg.
mangekyo
Trusted Member
Which footage? There are too many AI videos. No aircraft have been shot over Iran as far as I know. The tankers were shot over Iraq, Probably the F35 too.
Aad80
Registered Member
Iran will destroy the entire energy infrastructure in the region? They gave the last warning yesterday.
Haz
Registered Member
Amazing logic.
But again, that's the mental gymnastics people that keep on running with that narrative have to do in order to explain the obvious away and maintain their BS propaganda that our revolution is just a Zionist plot, and Iranians are the real angels for their intervention there.
Immortals
Elite Member
Even if there is some type of land based operation coming somewhere in Iran, The first wave is 1-2 weeks away and the 2nd wave is a month away. And you aren’t doing any land operation with just 8000-10000 troops, no way. Look at how many marines + others were sent in to take Fallujah back in the day.
So with the long lead time till actual ground invasion starts (ie. >4 weeks) who knows what the battlefield looks by then. A lot of things can change between now and then.
laser guided bombs have a range of 20 miles. Larger bombs is 8 miles. GBU-39 SDB is 40 miles.
Now is Tehran 40 miles from the Persian Gulf or Saudi or Kuwait?
