PAF SAM based Air Defense System - News, Discussion & Updates

[rafale]

Been hearing rumors that HQ-19 is expected to be inducted by end of 2026 by Pakistan.........

 

[hasssanali8998]

Been hearing rumors that HQ-19 is expected to be inducted by end of 2026 by Pakistan.........

can someone pls explain chinese sams sytems and their best use case
@Michael @Ali_Baba

 

[RandomThoughts7]

Been hearing rumors that HQ-19 is expected to be inducted by end of 2026 by Pakistan.........

Hi, this is more for old school gentlemen on the forum... LOL! Let's wait and see, too many rumors, J35AE, HQ19, etc.

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[hasssanali8998]

Hi, this is more for old school gentlemen on the forum... LOL! Let's wait and see, too many rumors, J35AE, HQ19, etc.

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i mean
nawaz posted tweet about china offering hq19 ,kj500 and j35 ( before deleting it )
also sidewinder mentioned we got new SAMs that will be unveiled later this year



only problem is money

 

[RandomThoughts7]

i mean
nawaz posted tweet about china offering hq19 ,kj500 and j35 ( before deleting it )
also sidewinder mentioned we got new SAMs that will be unveiled later this year



only problem is money

Hi, yes there are a lot of rumor floating around. I would love to see Pakistan get these systems. They are force multipliers.

The key is also to massively increase drone interception capabilities. YouTube and Telegram channels are flooded with Ukraine destroying S400 systems. I am more concerned about drone swarms. Pakistan need to invest in laser systems for handling drone swarms and buy, operate, and then build similar cheap drone interception systems like Ukraine is selling to Gulf countries.

However, let's stick to the topic on hand PAF SAM systems.

 

[Michael]

Been hearing rumors that HQ-19 is expected to be inducted by end of 2026 by Pakistan.........

In a nutshell: within our lifetimes, the probability of this happening is zero.

can someone pls explain chinese sams sytems and their best use case
@Michael @Ali_Baba

The HQ-19 constitutes a component of China's national missile defense system. It cannot operate independently of this system.

 

[rafale]

In a nutshell: within our lifetimes, the probability of this happening is zero.

Why would you say that?

 

[kimjongun]

can someone pls explain chinese sams sytems and their best use case
@Michael @Ali_Baba

HQ 19 is an ABM system...and for now is not the imediate need.
These high value systems would be targeted by Brahmos volleys and we cant buy them new

 

[rafale]

HQ 19 is an ABM system...and for now is not the imediate need.
These high value systems would be targeted by Brahmos volleys and we cant buy them new

Brahmos is not the real threat, there were multiple successful interceptions in May'25 with existing systems.......you need to fill the gaps, procure the same systems more and more to negate that advantage.

The real threat is ALBMs which India is procuring.......because of the nature of Ballistic entry, they need anti ballistic missile interceptors....which pakistan doesn't have in large quantity. I don't think only HQ9BE would suffice. That is what HQ19 is for....an analogous to THAAD.

 

[kimjongun]

Brahmos is not the real threat, there were multiple successful interceptions in May'25 with existing systems.......you need to fill the gaps, procure the same systems more and more to negate that advantage.

The real threat is ALBMs which India is procuring.......because of the nature of Ballistic entry, they need anti ballistic missile interceptors....which pakistan doesn't have in large quantity. I don't think only HQ9BE would suffice. That is what HQ19 is for....an analogous to THAAD.

We had multiple interceptions but not most . Brahmos is a percistant threat , India used the lowlife ALBM rampage with conjuction to the Brahmos , ALBMs like Lora and other will take time to integrate into the IAFs infra so not so soon ig .
My saying is the same to first increase the AD cover with 2 more squadrons of an mrsam and maybe downtheline more HQ9s .
Also ,
HQ19 is not a single system , infact every ABM system requires loads of radar and infra and still is suseptible to CMs and others.
Same can be said for the J35 if PAF inducts it , We would need newer and modern HAS like the ones used by Israeilis on their bases to protect them from BM strikes .

 

[Michael]

Why would you say that?

Typically, the flight trajectory of a ballistic missile is divided into three phases: the boost phase (initial ascent), the mid-course phase, and the terminal phase.

During the boost phase of a ballistic missile, interception is virtually impossible—unless, of course, an adversary were to permit you to deploy an interception system directly around their launch base (which is, of course, a laughable notion).

Consequently, anti-ballistic missile systems are generally categorized into two types: mid-course interceptors and terminal interceptors. Many observers draw an analogy between the HQ-19 system and the U.S. THAAD system; however, this is actually an inaccurate comparison. The THAAD system is designed for terminal-phase interception, whereas the HQ-19 system focuses primarily on mid-course interception, with terminal interception serving as a secondary capability. In terms of operational methodology, the appropriate analogues for the HQ-19 are actually the U.S. SM-3 and GMD systems.

From a technical perspective, a complete anti-ballistic missile system can be broken down into four subsystems:
1. Sensing Layer: Detection + Tracking.
Examples: Space-based infrared early warning satellite constellations, ground-based ultra-long-range strategic early warning radars, and mobile radar systems (land, sea, and air).
2. Information Processing Layer: Trajectory calculation, target discrimination (identifying whether an object is a decoy or a warhead), and data fusion.
3. Command and Control Layer: Deciding whether to intercept, allocating resources, and coordinating operations across multiple layers.
4. Interception Execution Layer: Interceptor missiles.

Typically, our focus centers on the interception layer, making it easy to overlook the preceding three—hidden yet critically important—layers. Nations also keep the capabilities of these first three layers highly classified, rarely disclosing significant details to the public.

Terminal interception systems—such as the HQ-9, S-300/400, THAAD, and PAC-2/3—can compress these four layers of capability into a compact, closed-loop system, thereby establishing an independent operational capability. Naturally, when integrated into a national ballistic missile defense system (a "large closed loop"), their capabilities are further enhanced.

Mid-course interception systems—such as the HQ-19/26, SM-3, and GMD—must, however, rely on the support of a national missile defense network (the "large closed loop") to fully realize their potential. Absent the support of this large-scale, closed-loop architecture, they would be effectively downgraded to the status of terminal-phase interception systems, resulting in a severe reduction in their actual combat effectiveness.

=========================================================

Pakistan does not currently possess a comprehensive national missile defense system. Were it to acquire the HQ-19 system, the following scenarios would likely arise:

1. Reliance on China's National Missile Defense System: This approach mirrors the manner in which the United States deploys related systems in other nations—nominally belonging to the host country, yet in reality remaining under complete U.S. control. Evidently, the current national policies of both China and Pakistan would preclude such an arrangement.

2. Degraded Operation: Theoretically, the HQ-19 system is fully capable of operating autonomously to execute terminal defense missions. However, this system is extraordinarily expensive. When utilized strictly as a terminal defense system, its cost-effectiveness is significantly lower than that of specialized terminal defense systems, such as the HQ-9.

Furthermore, the 610A long-range early warning radar—a component integral to the HQ-19 system—boasts an high-altitude detection range on the order of 4,000 kilometers. If such a capability were to appear within Pakistan, do you realize the implications?

 

[Cipher212]

We cannot be buying SAMs for billions with the current budget and I don't expect it to ever increase meaningfully.

Indigenous solutions are a must to make up numbers. We will never have enough equipment with just foreign procurement.

 

[PakShaheen_79]

Typically, the flight trajectory of a ballistic missile is divided into three phases: the boost phase (initial ascent), the mid-course phase, and the terminal phase.

During the boost phase of a ballistic missile, interception is virtually impossible—unless, of course, an adversary were to permit you to deploy an interception system directly around their launch base (which is, of course, a laughable notion).

Consequently, anti-ballistic missile systems are generally categorized into two types: mid-course interceptors and terminal interceptors. Many observers draw an analogy between the HQ-19 system and the U.S. THAAD system; however, this is actually an inaccurate comparison. The THAAD system is designed for terminal-phase interception, whereas the HQ-19 system focuses primarily on mid-course interception, with terminal interception serving as a secondary capability. In terms of operational methodology, the appropriate analogues for the HQ-19 are actually the U.S. SM-3 and GMD systems.

From a technical perspective, a complete anti-ballistic missile system can be broken down into four subsystems:
1. Sensing Layer: Detection + Tracking.
Examples: Space-based infrared early warning satellite constellations, ground-based ultra-long-range strategic early warning radars, and mobile radar systems (land, sea, and air).
2. Information Processing Layer: Trajectory calculation, target discrimination (identifying whether an object is a decoy or a warhead), and data fusion.
3. Command and Control Layer: Deciding whether to intercept, allocating resources, and coordinating operations across multiple layers.
4. Interception Execution Layer: Interceptor missiles.

Typically, our focus centers on the interception layer, making it easy to overlook the preceding three—hidden yet critically important—layers. Nations also keep the capabilities of these first three layers highly classified, rarely disclosing significant details to the public.

Terminal interception systems—such as the HQ-9, S-300/400, THAAD, and PAC-2/3—can compress these four layers of capability into a compact, closed-loop system, thereby establishing an independent operational capability. Naturally, when integrated into a national ballistic missile defense system (a "large closed loop"), their capabilities are further enhanced.

Mid-course interception systems—such as the HQ-19/26, SM-3, and GMD—must, however, rely on the support of a national missile defense network (the "large closed loop") to fully realize their potential. Absent the support of this large-scale, closed-loop architecture, they would be effectively downgraded to the status of terminal-phase interception systems, resulting in a severe reduction in their actual combat effectiveness.

=========================================================

Pakistan does not currently possess a comprehensive national missile defense system. Were it to acquire the HQ-19 system, the following scenarios would likely arise:

1. Reliance on China's National Missile Defense System: This approach mirrors the manner in which the United States deploys related systems in other nations—nominally belonging to the host country, yet in reality remaining under complete U.S. control. Evidently, the current national policies of both China and Pakistan would preclude such an arrangement.

2. Degraded Operation: Theoretically, the HQ-19 system is fully capable of operating autonomously to execute terminal defense missions. However, this system is extraordinarily expensive. When utilized strictly as a terminal defense system, its cost-effectiveness is significantly lower than that of specialized terminal defense systems, such as the HQ-9.

Furthermore, the 610A long-range early warning radar—a component integral to the HQ-19 system—boasts an high-altitude detection range on the order of 4,000 kilometers. If such a capability were to appear within Pakistan, do you realize the implications?

Finances are real issue. Rest are managable. Pakistan's long range/High altitude air defense edifice is built around Chinese sensors and vectors. (LOMAD/HIMAD). PAF is looking for SHORADS and that too will come from China most probably. So integration is not an issue. HQ-19 being super expensive is the real concerns here while we still require large number of HQ-9Bs and HQ-16 etc.

 

[Starlord]

i mean
nawaz posted tweet about china offering hq19 ,kj500 and j35 ( before deleting it )
also sidewinder mentioned we got new SAMs that will be unveiled later this year



only problem is money

If i remember correct, Side-winder talked about a SHORAD.

 

[farooqbhai]

If i remember correct, Side-winder talked about a SHORAD.

Shorad(s)