If a "deal" is truly signed, presumably for the rest of the decade the west will focus on building pipelines and other methods to bypass Hormuz to remove that card from the equation. We should also presume that the US does not follow through with any agreement and that maximum pressure either remains or returns with any subsequent US presidential regimes. We should expect to see another war in the 2030s.
What lessons were learned from this war and how can Iran prepare for a future conflict?
You're both right and wrong in your assessment. Everything canbe done better... however under sanctions and a potential blockade what is the most critical resource that you fan rely upon?
The pipelines are expensive and harder to protect. They're not a solution especially in a hostile environment.
And herein lies your answer. Iran had to make do with lowest common denominator!
In my opinion:
- IRIAF will remain a weak point. Based on historical precedent, zionist Russia will continue to delay delivering already obsolete aircraft to IRIAF. Despite IRIAF being the force most dependent on foreign equipment, I don't expect them to make any efforts towards obtaining Chinese fighters due to its internal bias. Despite Rouhani-esque dreams of getting fighters from Europe, no other sources exist due to CAATSA sanctions. Given continued airframe attrition and lack of viable replacements, IRIAF will play an even smaller, if any role at all, in the next conflict.
Conventional air force can only perform missions within uncontested airspace against the largest and most mobile airforce in the world. The technological edge is there, fleeting but there are workarounds against that and Iran again showed how they employed their systems. That kept Iranian airspace hostile and contested at all times.
- IRIN performed abysmally and does not seem worth rebuilding outside of small coastal missile boats for launching missiles at tankers. Larger ships were not survivable and had essentially no useful offensive capacity. Moudge class is a dead-end, useless platform. IRIN seems unlikely to be able to build a force to challenge the USN within the next few years.
Again if the competition is USN then best have unmanned or agile fast boats... many of them and spread around. Asymmetry needs to be embraced here again!
- AD force needs massive expansion and doctrinal reorganization. Independent mobile TELs/TELARs were the most effective during the conflict. However when utilizing ambush tactics you are ceding your airspace. Geography remains a challenge for a more fixed area denial force.
Now here improvements canbe made... both in use, redundancy because most likely the ADS are going to absorb first blows... again the Russian approach is better suited for Iran as well... long range SAMs work best for land powers. Iran would have enjoyed relative safety had Iraqi airspace been contested even better if it was Syrian as well...
- The missile force was the most effective force. The bases proved survivable and maintained the ability to fire throughout the entire conflict. Given Iran's willingness to accept ceasefires whenever the enemy runs low on interceptors, the question becomes whether there should be a move towards quality over quantity.
The missiles and drones do here for Iran what it's airforce cannot... they however do need a hi-lo mox in salvos... and see what works best... as they did multiple times... with one snuck in there for good measure. Here... quantity is a friend.
And, they would need one off multi launch systems... one and done... that are not mobile but provide an immediate and instantaneous return fire... something that canbe critical in time sensitive situations. That means pre locked and loaded 10s or even hundreds such systems dispersed across the territory.
- Lessons for the Army should be mostly taken from Lebanon theatre. Army seems to be appropriately focusing on mobile light infantry with drones/FPV capability over heavier armor. Ground forces will remain extremely vulnerable to enemy air power and will have difficulties holding ground as we have seen the IDF continue to advance in Lebanon despite relatively high losses.
Artesh wasn't really needed... but Iran needs a highly mobile unit as it likely wouldn't face a large land invasion due to its size and geography. It will most likely be small team incursions from land air or sea needing quick effective response. Land attack drones may also be of good use here...
- Iran did not have a good answer to the naval blockade and likely will not next time either. Land routes east to China were discussed as an alternative but are limited by lower capacity, need for cooperation by multiple countries, mountainous terrain, and exposure to US proxy forces like ISIS-K and ETIM.
Land routes and Caspian trade is an alternative but US is primarily a sea power and though Iran can expand it's A2/AD and increase the operating distance... they cannot totally undo it... unless China starts escorting approved shops out of the second perimeter.
Iranian military planners should presume the next war will be fought from a much weaker overall position compared to this conflict.
Iranian planners will know that they've exhausted a bear and it will be a bear after the hibernation is over as well. Iran will still be an underdog and will still deploy asymmetrically. As I said US bases are in effect redundant in the region. The distance is a key factor and something worthwhile to establish.
