Joint Defense Agreement: Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and Pakistan, news & updates

[SaadH]

One of the most important—and perhaps least discussed—aspects of Pakistan’s emerging defence partnerships is their potential to gradually reverse the country’s long-standing international image as the “troublemaker” of South Asia.

For much of the post-Cold War period, Pakistan was increasingly portrayed in international diplomatic circles as the “nasty kid on the block”—a state viewed as politically volatile, security-driven, and capable of triggering crises that could destabilize the wider region. This perception intensified after the Kargil conflict in 1999 and reached its peak following the 2008 Mumbai attacks. At that point, Pakistan found itself facing considerable diplomatic isolation. While a few strategic partners, most notably China and Turkey, remained relatively consistent, much of the broader international community adopted a more cautious and increasingly critical posture toward Islamabad. Pakistan was subjected to heightened diplomatic scrutiny, and its international room for manoeuvre narrowed considerably.

This isolation carried an important strategic cost that went beyond diplomatic discomfort. Countries are generally reluctant to enter into NATO-style mutual defence arrangements—or even deep security partnerships—with states perceived as unpredictable, unstable, or prone to confrontation. A country can possess significant military capabilities and strategic importance, but if its partners believe that closer alignment could unnecessarily expose them to regional conflict, the incentives for formal security commitments remain limited.

The strategic environment began to evolve after Narendra Modi came to power in India. New Delhi increasingly pursued a more assertive foreign and security policy, seeking to leverage Pakistan’s diplomatic isolation and frame Islamabad as the principal source of instability in South Asia. Yet the repeated use of this strategy produced an unintended consequence: over time, international actors began to distinguish between Pakistan’s historical reputation and the changing strategic realities of the region.

The gradual shift is important. Pakistan’s diplomatic narrative is no longer solely defined by its relationship with India, terrorism-related concerns, or its history of military crises. Its geopolitical importance—as a nuclear-armed state, a major Muslim country, a strategically located state linking South Asia, Central Asia and the Middle East, and a country with longstanding defence relationships with China and Turkey—is increasingly being reassessed through the lens of strategic utility and reliability.

This is where the emerging Saudi-Pakistan and Saudi-Pakistan-Turkey defence arrangements become particularly significant. Their importance goes beyond the military provisions contained in the agreements themselves. At a deeper level, such partnerships represent a form of international validation: major regional powers are demonstrating that they are willing to place significant elements of their own security architecture in partnership with Pakistan.

That is a profound change from the Pakistan of the post-Mumbai period.

A country perceived internationally as a perpetual source of instability is unlikely to become the preferred partner for formalized collective-security arrangements. Conversely, when countries such as Saudi Arabia and Turkey are willing to deepen defence commitments with Pakistan, it signals that Islamabad is increasingly being viewed not merely as a potential source of regional instability, but as a provider of strategic security and a reliable partner in managing it.

A potential defence pact with China would take this transformation to an entirely different level. Pakistan and China already share an exceptionally deep strategic relationship spanning defence, infrastructure, technology and economic cooperation. A formalized mutual-defence or strategic-security arrangement would institutionalize a relationship that has, for decades, been one of Pakistan’s most important strategic anchors. For Pakistan, the benefits could be substantial: stronger extended deterrence, deeper intelligence and military cooperation, greater access to advanced defence technologies, enhanced defence-industrial collaboration, and potentially more secure supply chains for critical military platforms and systems. It could also provide Islamabad with greater strategic confidence by reducing uncertainty over the extent of Chinese support during a major regional crisis. Most importantly, a formal Chinese commitment would send a powerful signal to the international community that Pakistan is not simply a country receiving security assistance, but a state whose security has become sufficiently important to a major global power that Beijing is prepared to institutionalize its strategic commitment.

The implications for India and South Asia, however, would be profound. A formal China-Pakistan defence arrangement could alter India’s strategic calculus by creating the possibility of a much more institutionalized two-front security challenge along its western and northern borders. New Delhi would have to account for deeper Chinese-Pakistani coordination in intelligence, logistics, air and missile defence, military technology, space, cyber capabilities and maritime security. This could accelerate India’s military modernization and further strengthen its strategic alignment with the United States and other Indo-Pacific partners, potentially linking the traditional India-Pakistan rivalry more directly to the broader US-China strategic competition. At the same time, a credible Chinese security commitment to Pakistan could strengthen deterrence by dramatically increasing the potential costs of military escalation for all sides. The outcome, therefore, could be paradoxical: greater deterrence at the strategic level but greater polarization and arms competition at the regional level. Much would depend on the nature of the pact. A NATO-style automatic mutual-defence guarantee would carry vastly greater implications than a framework focused on strategic consultation, intelligence sharing, defence technology and coordinated military planning.

The significance, therefore, is not simply that Pakistan is acquiring new defence partners. It is that the underlying international perception of Pakistan may itself be changing. The country is gradually moving from being treated as a problem to be managed to being treated as a partner whose military capabilities, geographic position and strategic relationships can contribute to a broader regional security architecture.

In that sense, the emerging defence partnerships may represent the beginning of a reversal of Pakistan’s “nasty kid of South Asia” image. The transformation is unlikely to happen overnight, and Pakistan still faces substantial diplomatic, economic and security challenges. But the direction of travel matters. If Islamabad can sustain strategic restraint, institutional reliability and constructive diplomacy, these partnerships could help establish a fundamentally different international perception of Pakistan: not the unpredictable state that others fear might trigger the next regional crisis, but a strategically important and increasingly reliable partner whose cooperation is actively sought by major regional powers.

The ultimate strategic victory for Pakistan, therefore, may not be the signing of any single defence pact. It would be the gradual normalization of Pakistan as a reliable security partner—a country whose military weight, geographic position and strategic relationships are seen as assets to be incorporated into the regional order rather than risks that the international community must contain.

Without economic progress and as long as Pakistan remains sub-saharan version of Asia, it will be considered a trouble maker.

 

[RocketLaw]

Earthquake in the Middle East: Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Pakistan form a military alliance that could change the balance of power!

Great details and an in-depth perspective from this person (Doctor Saudi)

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We need to hear more diverse perspectives from around the world, not just one-sided views from Indian garbages.

 

[Foinikas]

The Indians have been in panic ever since the Saudi Pakistan pact.

For as far as my little knowledge goes,the Indians have been in panic for some 15 years now. Always projecting insecurity and bad propaganda. Reminds me of a neighboring country. But yeah,it's basically the same thing when you read about super Mig-29s locking on Pakistani F-16s or Raptor of the East or Godzilla Rafale

 

[Starlord]

Syria still has Asadists amongst her ranks. They need to be cleansed first. The Turkish Intelligence is working hard on it in cooperation with the current Muslim leadership...

That, and I don't trust this Jolani guy, he is former AQ and he represents a ideology that has cause Pakistan immense harm, i don't think we should cozy up to Jolani just yet. Actually we don't even know if he will survive, Israel already once bomb Syrian president palace not long ago, so he is living on borrowed time or as long as he serves the purpose.

 

[sutton9999]

Once upon a time,I thought Saudi Arabia could take on Iran in a one-on-one war. Maybe have some help from Qatar,UAE and Kuwait at most. But after seeing Saudis doing almost nothing the last year and not being able to kick out the Houthis and establish their will in their own backyard,all that money and good equipment they got is just for parades.

Nah, time has changed.

The Houthis will be crushed by endless drone warfare (Ukraine-style) bankrolled by Saudi.
The Houthis isn't going to get enough supplies and training to counter this.

Iran has its strengths. However Iran completely lacks invading capability. Iran can only defend its own territory and throw rockets and long-distance drones.

 

[Foinikas]

Nah, time has changed.

The Houthis will be crushed by endless drone warfare (Ukraine-style) bankrolled by Saudi.
The Houthis isn't going to get enough supplies and training to counter this.

Iran has its strengths. However Iran completely lacks invading capability. Iran can only defend its own territory and throw rockets and long-distance drones.

Many here(in Greece)pointed out that Turkey hurried to sign the Treaty and a few days later,the Houthis started attacks against the Saudis after a long time again. So the question was,aren't they supposed to get involved against the Houthis now? Did Erdogan make a mistake by rushing to do this? Personally(and I think the majority here)don't think Turkey will ever get involved in anything they don't want to. No Saudi or Pakistani will drag them in a war they don't want to participate. Then again,such a treaty,what exactly does it mean,how does it work? Does than mean Saudis will go to war against Greece and Cyprus and attack NATO and EU countries? Will Pakistanis go against Iran for the sake of Saudi Arabia? Will the Saudis mess with Israelis if there's a flare up over Syria?

It's silly. If they had said cooperation in this and this,ok. But clauses like "an attack on one's soil will be considered an attack on all three" is ridiculous. This isn't the Entente.

 

[Watandar]

Many here(in Greece)pointed out that Turkey hurried to sign the Treaty and a few days later,the Houthis started attacks against the Saudis after a long time again. So the question was,aren't they supposed to get involved against the Houthis now? Did Erdogan make a mistake by rushing to do this? Personally(and I think the majority here)don't think Turkey will ever get involved in anything they don't want to. No Saudi or Pakistani will drag them in a war they don't want to participate. Then again,such a treaty,what exactly does it mean,how does it work? Does than mean Saudis will go to war against Greece and Cyprus and attack NATO and EU countries? Will Pakistanis go against Iran for the sake of Saudi Arabia? Will the Saudis mess with Israelis if there's a flare up over Syria?

It's silly. If they had said cooperation in this and this,ok. But clauses like "an attack on one's soil will be considered an attack on all three" is ridiculous. This isn't the Entente.

The only angle of this arrangement that makes sense to me is that Saudis will buy Turkish and Pakistani equipment for use in proxy wars abroad, like the Pakistani armored vehicles and Turkish drones that the Sudanese army now possesses. This way the two MIC's can grow and Saudis will eventually have access to alternative to the US MIC.

The rest of this pact has more holes than Swiss cheese.

 

[mythbuster]

Many here(in Greece)pointed out that Turkey hurried to sign the Treaty and a few days later,the Houthis started attacks against the Saudis after a long time again. So the question was,aren't they supposed to get involved against the Houthis now? Did Erdogan make a mistake by rushing to do this? Personally(and I think the majority here)don't think Turkey will ever get involved in anything they don't want to. No Saudi or Pakistani will drag them in a war they don't want to participate. Then again,such a treaty,what exactly does it mean,how does it work? Does than mean Saudis will go to war against Greece and Cyprus and attack NATO and EU countries? Will Pakistanis go against Iran for the sake of Saudi Arabia? Will the Saudis mess with Israelis if there's a flare up over Syria?

It's silly. If they had said cooperation in this and this,ok. But clauses like "an attack on one's soil will be considered an attack on all three" is ridiculous. This isn't the Entente.

First of all rhetorics aside, there will be no war between Greece and Turkey , both are sensible states and member of NATO...rein in your imaginations ....there will be no war between Turkey and Israel , both of the countries know they have no visible edge against eachother, however if there is a war Saudi Arabia and Pakistan will certainly jump into the fray .. make no mistake about it..... houthis , Hezbollah and Iran are easy targets , any mischief from their side will be get immediate response and they will be tamed ....vast majority of Pakistanis have no love for Iran , though Pakistan will try to avoid war however if Iran attacks Saudi Arabia then all bets are off.

 

[Hakikat ve Hikmet]

That, and I don't trust this Jolani guy, he is former AQ and he represents a ideology that has cause Pakistan immense harm, i don't think we should cozy up to Jolani just yet. Actually we don't even know if he will survive, Israel already once bomb Syrian president palace not long ago, so he is living on borrowed time or as long as he serves the purpose.

Jolani later came under the Turkish Intelligence. Some folks joined AQ due to ideology...

 

[Afif]

It would be interesting to see how pact's cooperation framework develops for defense technology sharing/joint manufacturing.

One thing can be said, if this pact could have happened just a decade earlier, Pakistan and KSA would have benefited a lot more from Turkish MIC and ToT through partnerships in critical projects like medium and long range Air and missile defense, KAAN, high end UAVs, MBTs, missiles. But today Turks has reached critical phases in all those projects with their own funding and R&D works. Turkiye's Advanced defense electronics/subsystems (sensors, AESA radars, EOTS, mission systems, guidance solutions) and high end missiles are in mass production.

They are past the phase where they might needed foreign money to succeed in these endeavours. Of course, money/buy in fron partners can still be valuable as it would bring more revenue and help grow the industry even bigger.

It is very likely that, today ToT from Turkish side for high-end defense technology would be less than what many is expecting here. Nevertheless what comes and potential standardisation and compatibility work to whatever extent is still going to be immensely valuable.

 

[HAIDER]

Saudi don t want Egypt part of this collation , but Turkey wants. Even Trump openly endorse this pact to encourage Egypt to join. According to Saudi analyst , Sisi took 23 billion from Saudi and promise to help in Yemen and Sudan , later he refused to send his army in any war zone. Since then Saudi hate Sisi.
If Kemalist comes in power in Turkey this pact will evaporated.

 

[_Arabia_]

Saudi don t want Egypt part of this collation , but Turkey wants. Even Trump openly endorse this pact to encourage Egypt to join. According to Saudi analyst , Sisi took 23 billion from Saudi and promise to help in Yemen and Sudan , later he refused to send his army in any war zone. Since then Saudi hate Sisi.
If Kemalist comes in power in Turkey this pact will evaporated.

What a bunch of nonsense.

KSA did not give any money to Egypt. Those were loans that Egypt is paying back or have paid back already.

KSA has not been investing much in Egypt because the Egyptian military regime is running Egypt down to the ground.

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UAE was/is more active recently.

Rest of your unfounded nonsense is just that. Saudi Arabian and Egyptian foreign ministers have been meeting a lot lately.

KSA and Egypt are mostly on the same side in Sudan (government) and instability in Sudan impacts Egypt far more than it does KSA.

Egyptian contribution in Yemen was always almost non-existent.

They have a very bad experience with Yemen.

North Yemen civil war - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

26.000 Egyptian soldiers died in Yemen. It left a permanent scar and that military intervention was/is known as Egypt's Vietnam.

90% of all of Yemen is controlled by the Yemeni government and they will deal with the Houthi terrorist cult as they are doing successfully currently.

Thread 'Yemen Civil War News and Discussion.. an evolving situation'

Dec 16, 2023

https://twitter.com/centcom/status/1736035863849824595?s=46&t=1FKqbpkO8Da7_SuOad5WHw

• F-22Raptor
• Replies: 3,815
• Forum: Middle East & Africa

KSA/other Arabs are not going to die for Yemenis who afterwards will create another civil war in a long list of civil wars since Yemen appeared on a map in 1990 as a unified country.

Much more likely for KSA to annex Hadhramaut - East, South and central Yemen. Locals and most Yemenis would give their right and left legs to join/merge with KSA tomorrow if given the chance. Many intellectuals, tribal leaders, politicians, clerics, businessmen, cultural personalities etc. are openly advocating for merging with KSA in places like Hadhramaut.

Lastly this "alliance" does not need any new members. First it must demonstrate its value, which will take years, and demonstrate whether it will be another alliance in a long list of failed alliances in the Muslim world.

First you need to build a strong foundation and once that is done you can invite others/allies/potential partners for mutual benefits.

 

[Oscar]

It would be interesting to see how pact's cooperation framework develops for defense technology sharing/joint manufacturing.

One thing can be said, if this pact could have happened just a decade earlier, Pakistan and KSA would have benefited a lot more from Turkish MIC and ToT through partnerships in critical projects like medium and long range Air and missile defense, KAAN, high end UAVs, MBTs, missiles. But today Turks has reached critical phases in all those projects with their own funding and R&D works. Turkiye's Advanced defense electronics/subsystems (sensors, AESA radars, EOTS, mission systems, guidance solutions) and high end missiles are in mass production.

They are past the phase where they might needed foreign money to succeed in these endeavours. Of course, money/buy in fron partners can still be valuable as it would bring more revenue and help grow the industry even bigger.

It is very likely that, today ToT from Turkish side for high-end defense technology would be less than what many is expecting here. Nevertheless what comes and potential standardisation and compatibility work to whatever extent is still going to be immensely valuable.

They still have to reach the phase where they are enough of a "alternate" arsenal to wean off the Ikhwan from throwing money into western equipment.

At this point - while more recent generations are being more critical - the overall attitude is you can have a superior system from Turkiye and the western guy can come in with a half baked brochure - the Ikhwan will go "Mumtaz, Mumtaaz!" and spend 4 times the money.

 

[Owaiz]

Pakistan's current most powerful dictator in chief perhaps the most powerful in it's history is shia

I believe he is quite flexible on that count. He is Shia in Teheran , Salafi in Riyadh and who knows what in DC and Tel Aviv.

 

[_Arabia_]

I believe he is quite flexible on that count. He is Shia in Teheran , Salafi in Riyadh and who knows what in DC and Tel Aviv.

Islam itself originates in modern-day KSA and all its main sects are native to modern-day KSA and to this very day found within local native communities in KSA.

I don't know of a single Muslim country anywhere in the world that has native Shafi'i, Hanball, Maliki, Hanafi, Ja'fari, Ismaili and Zaydi minorities. In next door Oman you have the Ibadis - the only ones missing within KSA.

Salafi is a umbrella term that does not mean much nowadays. Not to mention that Hanbalis are a minority overall in KSA.

Wahhabism was mainly a socio-political movement rather than a religious (Hanbali) movement during the First Saudi State almost 300 years ago in mainly Najd. The movement has undergone several changes (political) in the past 300 + years. Nowadays the only thing that remains is mostly the orthodox Hanbali practices that characterized its religious nature.

Hanbali school - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

In short, KSA is a Sunni Muslim majority nation (85-90%) and Islamic in nature but all the other Muslim minorities face no restrictions and have their own local clergy, practices etc.

But the official clergy (Hanbali), rightly so in my eyes, is openly against Shirk, Bid'ah and other non-Islamic practices that have no relationship to the Qur'an or the Sunnah of the Prophet (saws).