Persian Gulf
INT'L MOD
turns out these revolutionaries who chant death to America and Israel for 40 years are actually peace loving doves likes Switzerland. what a big misunderstanding.
Iran - Israel/US War: Israel-US declare war on Iran, Iran responds
- Thread starter Khorasan Black Flags
- Start date
turns out these revolutionaries who chant death to America and Israel for 40 years are actually peace loving doves likes Switzerland. what a big misunderstanding.
StrategicBear
Registered Member
Iran shouldn't have given Russia those Shahed Drones.
Russia and Putin will suffer for their betrayal, now the whole world will be against Russia including their allies. We can still be against the West and Russia at the same time, because they're both White Zionist Imperialists.
vmro
Registered Member
They are already talking several days in a row about mutual support and relationship???...wonder what language they are using for this lovely conversation...
Nuffle
Registered Member
I counted thirty generals and commanders killed:
IRANIAN GENERALS ELIMINATED - Roles, Responsibilities & Operational Impacts:
1st - Lt. Gen. Hossein Salami (assassinated on June 13)
Role: IRGC COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF
Responsibilities:
Supreme command of all IRGC forces (land, air, naval, and paramilitary)
Direction of national strategy and hybrid warfare
Control of the integrated Command and Control (C2) system
Operational Impacts:
Immediate collapse of the chain of command
Widespread disorganization and loss of morale
Severe decrease in response capability on multiple fronts
2nd - Lt. Gen. Mohammad Hossein Bagheri (assassinated on June 13)
Role: CHIEF OF THE JOINT STAFF
Responsibilities:
Inter-service coordination (Artesh, IRGC, Air Force)
Strategic operational planning and integrated logistics
Operational Impacts:
Disarticulation of the joint force effort
Delays in mobilization and synchronization of operations
Exploitable vulnerabilities on frontlines
3rd - Lt. Gen. Gholam Ali Rashid (assassinated on June 13)
Role: COMMANDER, HQ KHATAM AL-ANBIYA
Responsibilities:
Overseeing national strategic and operational planning
Managing electronic warfare and cyber defense
Operational Impacts:
Disruption of integrated defenses
Exposure to cyberattacks and sabotage
Vulnerability of critical infrastructure
4th - Brig. Gen. Gen. Ali Shadmani (Replacement for Lt. Gen. Gholam Ali Rashid) (assassinated on June 17)
Role: STRATEGIC FORTIFICATIONS COORDINATOR/ACTING COMMANDER, CENTRAL HQ Khatam Al-Anbiya
Responsibilities:
Construction and maintenance of bunkers, silos, and defensive infrastructure
Interim maintenance of central command
Operational Impacts:
Vulnerability of critical facilities to enemy attacks
Decreased resilience in prolonged combat
Slow decision-making and command instability
Opportunity for rapid enemy offensives
5th - Brig. Gen. Mehdi Rabbani (assassinated on June 13)
Role: DEPUTY CHIEF OF JOINT OPERATIONS
Responsibilities:
Tactical and logistical coordination in the field
Supervision of troop movements and support
Operational Impacts:
Slow and uncoordinated tactical response
Disruption of resource mobilization and replenishment
Loss of effectiveness in offensive and defensive maneuvers
6th - Maj. Gen. Gholamreza Mehrabi (assassinated on June 13)
Role: DEPUTY CHIEF OF MILITARY INTELLIGENCE
Responsibilities:
Collection and analysis of operational and strategic intelligence
Counterintelligence and operational security
Operational Impacts:
Reduced vigilance and threat prediction
Increased risk of ambushes and surprise attacks
7th - Maj. Gen. Mohammad Kazemi (assassinated on June 15)
Role: IRGC INTELLIGENCE CHIEF
Responsibilities:
Directing espionage and counterinfiltration operations
Managing clandestine intelligence networks
Operational Impacts:
Disruption of the offensive and defensive intelligence network
Increasing vulnerability to enemy infiltration
8th - Maj. Gen. Mohsen Bagheri (assassinated on June 13)
Role: IRGC DEPUTY INTELLIGENCE CHIEF
Responsibilities:
Coordinating special operations, sabotage, and infiltration
Operational Impacts:
Suspension of essential covert missions
Loss of the advantage of surprise
9th - Brig. Gen. Gen. Hassan Mohaqiq (assassinated on June 15)
Position: Deputy Director of Intelligence, IRGC
Responsibilities:
Data analysis for tactical and strategic decision-making support
Operational Impacts:
Inaccurate information compromises decisions
Delays in adapting the combat plan
10th - Maj. Gen. Mohammad Jafar Asadi (assassinated on June 13)
Position: Deputy Inspector General, Headquarters Khatam
Responsibilities:
Monitoring the execution of orders and military discipline
Operational Impacts:
Increased operational errors and failures
Broken cohesion and increased casualties
11th - Maj. Gen. Mohammad Reza Nasir Bagban (assassinated on June 13)
Role: IRGC FIELD INTELLIGENCE REPRESENTATIVE
Responsibilities:
Direct communication between strategic intelligence and troops on the ground
Operational Impacts:
Noise and delay in the transmission of critical information
Impaired tactical decisions
12th - Brig. Gen. Masoud Shanaei (assassinated on June 13)
Role: IRGC CHIEF OF STAFF
Responsibilities:
Administrative management of command and order flow
Operational Impacts:
Slowed circulation of commands
Fragmentation of operational command
13th - Maj. Gen. Amir Ali Hajizadeh (assassinated on June 13)
Role: COMMANDER, IRGC AEROSPACE FORCE
Responsibilities:
Command of ballistic missile systems and offensive drones
Air defense and strategic deterrence
Operational Impacts:
Loss of long-range strike capability
Critical gaps in air defense
14th - Brig. Gen. Amir Purjodaki (assassinated on June 13)
Role: DEPUTY COMMANDER, IRGC AEROSPACE FORCE
Responsibilities:
Tactical coordination and operational readiness of the aerospace force
Operational Impacts:
Reduced response speed to threats
15th - Brig. Gen. Khosro Hassani (assassinated on June 13)
Role: CHIEF OF AEROSPACE INTELLIGENCE
Responsibilities:
Surveillance and analysis of air threats
Management of radar and warning systems
Operational Impacts:
Failures in interception and defense against air attacks
16th - Brig. Gen. Davoud Sheikhian (assassinated on June 13)
Role: IRGC AIR DEFENSE COMMANDER
Responsibilities:
Control of anti-aircraft systems and integrated defense
Operational Impacts:
Vulnerability of air cover, exposure to attacks
17th - Brig. Gen. Mohammad Baqer Taherpour (assassinated on June 13)
Role: UAV UNIT COMMANDER
Responsibilities:
Operation and coordination of reconnaissance and strike drones
Operational Impacts:
Loss of field intelligence capabilities
Reduction in range and accuracy of tactical strikes
18th - Brig. Gen. Mansour Safarpour (assassinated on June 13)
Role: REGIONAL AEROSPACE COMMANDER (TEHRAN)
Responsibilities:
Air defense of the capital, management of local forces
Operational Impacts:
Exposure of the capital to direct air attacks
Risk of collapse of the political-military command center
19th - Brig. Gen. Masoud Tayeb (assassinated on June 13)
Role: IRGC AEROSPACE DIVISION TECHNOLOGICAL SPECIALIST
Responsibilities:
Weapons technology development and integration
Operational Impacts:
Delay in modernization and technological advantage
20th - Brig. Gen. Javad Jarsara (assassinated on June 13)
Role: AEROSPACE LOGISTICS CHIEF
Responsibilities:
Supply management and operational maintenance
Operational Impacts:
Reduced readiness due to logistical failures
21st - Brig. Gen. Mohammad Said Izadi (assassinated on June 21)
Role: CHIEF OF THE PALESTINIAN SECTION – QUDS FORCE
Responsibilities:
Coordinating support and operations with regional allies (Hezbollah, Ansar Allah, the al-Qassam Brigades, and the al-Quds Brigades)
Operational Impacts:
Weakening proxy warfare power
22nd - Brig. Gen. Behnam Shahriari (assassinated on June 21)
Role: COMMANDER OF UNIT 190 (QUDS LOGISTICS)
Responsibilities:
Managing clandestine weapons routes
Operational Impacts:
Cutting off the flow of weapons and supplies to allies
23rd - Maj. Gen. Amir Mozaffarnia (no date of assassination specified)
Position: CHIEF SPND (NUCLEAR AND BALLISTIC RESEARCH)
Responsibilities:
Development of nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles
Operational Impacts:
Delays in strategic deterrence projects
24th Brig. Gen. Mohammad Taghi Yousefvand (assassinated on June 23)
Role: BASIJ INTELLIGENCE CHIEF
Responsibilities:
Internal surveillance and repression
Operational Impacts:
Increased risk of internal insurrections
25th - Gen. Meysam Rizvanpour (assassinated on June 23)
Role: BASIJ DEPUTY COMMANDER (SOCIAL AFFAIRS)
Responsibilities:
Mobilization and indoctrination of the civilian population
Operational Impacts:
Declining morale and popular support for the war effort
26th - Brig. Gen. Seyed Mojtaba Moeinpour (assassinated on June 23)
Role: CHIEF OF STAFF, IRGC ALBORZ
Responsibilities:
Tactical command and regional logistics oversight
Operational Impacts:
Weakening of the regional operational structure
27th - Brig. Gen. Mojtaba Karami (assassinated on June 23)
Role: DEPUTY COMMANDER, IRGC ALBORZ
Responsibilities:
Regional tactical command and maneuvers
Operational Impacts:
Loss of regional rapid reaction capability
28th Brig. Gen. Akbar Enayati (assassinated on June 23)
Role: ALBORZ IDEOLOGICAL CONTROL
Responsibilities:
Maintaining political and doctrinal stability
Operational Impacts:
Growing internal resistance and instability
29th - Gen. Alireza Lotfi (assassinated on June 23)
Role: CHIEF POLICE INTELLIGENCE (SAFA/FARAJ)
Responsibilities:
Urban security, repression, and social control
Operational Impacts:
Facilitating insurgencies and demonstrations
30th - Brig. Gen. Abbas Nouri (assassinated on June 13)
Role: Deputy Commander, Logistics, IRGC Southwest
Responsibilities:
Supply chain management in the conflict zone
Operational Impacts:
Collapse of frontline logistics support
The assassinated commanders divided by functions:
HIGH COMMANDS AND STRATEGY
1st - Ten. Gen. Hossein Salami
2nd - Ten. Gen. Mohammad Hossein Bagheri
3rd - Ten. Gen. Gholam Ali Rashid
4th - Brig. Gen. Ali Shadmani (replacement of Gholam Ali Rashid)
5th - Brig. Gen. Mehdi Rabbani
INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY
6th - Maj. Gen. Gholamreza Mehrabi
7th - Maj. Gen. Mohammad Kazemi
8th - Maj. Gen. Mohsen Bagheri
9th - Brig. Gen. Hassan Mohakek
10th - Maj. Gen. Mohammad Jafar Asadi
11th - Maj. Gen. Mohammad Reza Nasir Bagban
12th - Brig. Gen. Masoud Shanaei
AEROSPACE FORCE AND AIR DEFENSE
13th - Maj. Gen. Amir Ali Hajizadeh
14th - Brig. Gen. Amir Purjodaki
15th - Brig. Gen. Khosro Hassani
16th - Brig. Gen. Davoud Sheikhian
17th - Brig. Gen. Mohammad Baqer Taherpour
18th - Brig. Gen. Mansour Safarpour
19th - Brig. Gen. Masoud Tayeb
20th - Brig. Gen. Javad Jarsara
QUDS FORCE (EXTERNAL OPERATIONS)
21st - Brig. Gen. Mohammad Said Izadi
22nd - Brig. Gen. Behnam Shahriari
RESEARCH, MILITIA AND DOCTRINE
23rd - Maj. Gen. Amir Mozaffarnia
24th - Brig. Gen. Mohammad Taghi Yousefvand
25th - Gen. Meysam Rizvanpour
REGIONAL COMMANDS
26th - Brig. Gen. Seyed Mojtaba Moeinpour
27th - Brig. Gen. Mojtaba Karami
28th - Brig. Gen. Akbar Enayati
POLICE AND INTERNAL SURVEILLANCE
29th - Gen. Alireza Lotfi
LOGISTICS AND INFRASTRUCTURE
30th - Brig. Gen. Abbas Nouri
4th - Brig. Gen. Ali Shadmani
Do you have this same list? Also, would you be able to tell me the names of the 15 dead nuclear scientists?
Nuffle
Registered Member
My friend, to counter this coalition with nuclear weapons alone, no conventional power would come close to matching the military might of this joint alliance that Iran would face.
Mighty_Dragon_Strike
Trusted Member
looks very active planning!
like taking feedback and then giving orders who to execute!
enemy had the complete control.
so, how many resignations?!
tsunset
The Legend
We can say whatever we want but coming back and reorganizing from this huge disaster in only 6 hours was a miracle, i honestly thought Iran was going to surrender after that
Nuffle
Registered Member
Israel has put into practice the concept of long-range maneuver that underpins its interwar campaign, known as MABAM. Conceived in 2013 to counter Iranian consolidation in Syria, MABAM combined precision fires, multispectral intelligence, and calculated-risk diplomacy to shorten future wars. In June 2025, this architecture allowed the Israeli General Staff to neutralize deep Iranian targets without deploying ground forces across the border.
The Inter-war Campaign - Wikipedia
I never thought this could have been executed so easily against Iran.
Xerxes22
Registered Member
Did she sleep with Zarif and Rouhani? Zarif must have begged her to roleplay as a mossad agent dominating him whilst not knowing she already is one. And Rouhani the scumbag twat with that stupid turban must have asked for her to strangle him semi conscious with the turban whilst roleplaying a negotiation scenario.
Nuffle
Registered Member
According to TRADOC, the Iranian defense concept is a mosaic that disperses launchers in tunnels in the Zagros Mountains, seeking to deplete enemy intelligence capabilities. This concept outlines an architecture where the territory is sectioned into self-sufficient blocks, each equipped with tactical command centers, mobile Fateh-313 missile launchers, Bavar-373/Raad-2 SAM batteries, and Electronic Warfare Platoons, all dispersed in mountain tunnels and urban areas. This fragmentation transforms high-value strategic targets into multiple low-value targets, forcing the attacker to consume large volumes of precision munitions.
The operational objective of this mosaic is to dilute the adversary's technological superiority, as it is believed that any invading coalition would face elongated supply lines, suffer from saturation ballistic fire, and electronic warfare, while the local population would provide masking and legitimacy to the defenders, which would increase the political and logistical cost of a ground intervention.
Israel undoubtedly managed to degrade the Iranian IADS and missile force (it did not completely eliminate the threat), but only through a joint operation from within Iran aligned with the IAF's kinetic capabilities.
What I observed closely in the Iranian responses is that, as a result of the Israeli attacks, Tehran had to reroute a convoy carrying military materials to some military organizations. This resulted in some bridges and highways being damaged in the attacks. This led to longer routes, extending the total route by over 700 km, adding 18 hours to the SAM system replacement time. Thus, it became clear that Iran's patchwork defense possesses long and vulnerable interior lines, susceptible to kinetic attacks.
This episode revealed that long ground supply chains and the reliance on proxies for visual confirmation constitute exploitable vulnerabilities for disinformation campaigns, especially when the opponent dominates target processing.
Hack-Hook
INT'L MOD
she portrayed herself as a revolutionary not a reformist. but that's beside the point , if you look at them they rare just a big happy family together
by the way in list of the name two name show itself and they are not reformist.
but who care , the issue show infiltration happened in in Iran and how IRIB point at wrong direction and try to tell people if they remove whatsapp every thing will be solved
Liquidator
Trusted Member
Care to explain why you take American and Israeli claims at face value despite theirs devious designs and always ridicule what Iran says?
BigMela2onin
Registered Member
Araghchi said the sites were destroyed so in this case Iran agrees with Trump.
BigMela2onin
Registered Member
Maybe the goal should be to stop being conquered like the historical examples you provided.
Blowing up buildings is not deterrence when US is footing 100% of the bill. And no, IR is foolish, do not expect them to be more brutal or less likely to hold back in the next round, these people are mentally deficient and incapable of learning or adaptation.
vmro
Registered Member
Last of the conquest is near millennium old, Iran even in modern iteration is among the oldest countries in the world...and of course, few nations were able to avoid European colonial destiny...veeery few....
So it is hard to find that Iran is an example of an easy-to-conquer nation, far from it...
I am avoiding commenting on the Iranian internal system, it's obvious that some conceptual changes are almost impossible to avoid at some point in the future... but this is a period of national unity with the people in the leading role as a clear and active voice to the leadership...
That was an unbeatable combination during this 12-day conflict...so national integrity is kept by the nation itself... and that was just presented by the Iranian people in a real-life tough situation...
Then, IR should have to go through deep self-reflection and get a national dialogue for the next postulates of the country... I think that without effective Axis existence, the main foreign concept of IR is not realistic, and that would be necessarily changed to adapt to the new geopolitical reality...
My personal opinion is that only Yemenis should be preserved as strategic partners, but as close nations and then religiously close people...and Iran with this step will preserve its importance on a wider scale and ensure new opportunities to build up its influence...
Considering the age of the Leader, I think that everyone will avoid eventual internal turbulence, and waiting for natural incoming changes...
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