Time is no longer on Russias side and analysts are finally catching on.
The Russia–Ukraine war has entered a new phase
Western officials are reportedly
puzzled by the sudden wave of Russian drone and fighter incursions into their airspace. They should not be. Russia’s actions are the logical result of four wider developments that are reshaping its calculus. The first three are policy choices of America, Europe and China. The fourth is Russia’s own deteriorating domestic condition. Russia’s response has ushered in a new and more dangerous phase of its war in Ukraine.
Deteriorating conditions, growing disquiet
Firstly, United States President Donald Trump’s return to the White House in January 2025 initially raised Kremlin hopes that his stated goal of ending the war quickly could be used to engineer a decisive shift in favour of Russia and a split in transatlantic relations. Despite intensive diplomatic efforts, culminating in the Alaska summit in August 2025, Russia has failed to achieve this. Although America made unilateral concessions – abandoning demands for an immediate ceasefire and dropping threats of new sanctions – it has not decisively broken with Ukraine or Europe. Trump has uttered harsh words about Russian President Vladimir Putin for the first time and continues to provide weapons – now sold, not given – to Ukraine. Nine months of turbulent diplomacy have realised neither Russia’s greatest hopes nor Europe’s deepest fears.
Secondly, Europe is stepping up. At the June 2025 NATO summit, member states agreed to
spend 5% of GDP on defence by 2035. Since Europe’s total GDP is ten times larger than Russia’s, this represents a huge increase in military capability. The EU is also intensifying pressure on Russia’s economy. So far this year, it has adopted four new sanctions packages – the fastest rate since 2022 – and is close to agreeing a fifth. This will be the
19th such packagesince Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Most significantly, the EU is now working on an
ambitious plan to provide a €140 billion reparation loan to Ukraine using frozen Russian Central Bank assets. If agreed, this will keep Ukraine afloat and enable it to fight for the next two to three years, while alleviating the burden of support on European taxpayers.
Thirdly, China has tilted more decisively towards Russia. In 2024, NATO designated it a ‘decisive enabler’ of Russia’s war due to its sale of military and dual-use goods and complicity in massive sanctions evasion. Last month, Beijing
finally agreed to build the Power of Siberia 2 gas pipeline. Russia had been begging it to do so for years. When completed, it will more than double Russia’s pipeline gas exports to China.
The fourth factor is Russia’s domestic condition. Like two blades of a pair of scissors, war and sanctions are cutting ever deeper into its economy, distorting the financial system and eroding productive capacity. Russia’s real interest rates are now the highest in the world. The labour market faces record shortages. The civilian economy is
stagnant. The main driver of growth is war production, demand for which will only rise as Russia’s huge equipment stockpiles are exhausted. Yet Putin told his Military Industrial Commission last month that defence production was ‘
at maximum capacity’. Compounding these problems, Ukraine’s potent attacks on oil refineries are now causing
significant disruption to Russian civilian life.
All this is instilling disquiet. The complacency that swept elites two years ago – when growth was strong, sanctions seemed survivable and Ukraine’s counter-offensive had failed – is gone. Instead, there is growing anxiety, alarm and even plans for ‘
escape routes from the country if everything falls apart’. Last month, Dmitry Kozak, a Putin confidant since the 1990s who argued against Russia’s invasion,
resigned as deputy head of the Presidential Administration. The mood even among ‘Z-bloggers’, the online influencer-enthusiasts of the war, has also darkened in the face of military setbacks.
Inevitable escalation
The strategic context of the war is thus shifting. Russia’s summer offensive has failed at enormous cost in troops. Its diplomatic strategy for America has fallen short. It faces a slow tsunami of European defence spending and growing strains at home. China will ramp up military supplies but, not until at least 2030, the new gas purchases that could sustain Russia’s dwindling finances. This support not only emboldens Russia to take greater risks but impels it to do so. A defeat would devalue Russia as a partner and shift the balance of influence in their relationship even further towards Beijing.
In short, time may no longer be on Russia’s side. The balance of material and technological potential vastly favours its adversaries. Russia can now prevail only if it prevents them from turning their collective latent strength into usable superiority by undermining their resolve. This compels it to accelerate its theory of victory – to grind down Ukraine militarily and outlast the West politically – before the window for winning closes forever. For this reason, Russia is now inflicting record drone and missile attacks on Ukrainian cities to wear down morale and resistance, and is carrying out unprecedented incursions and sabotage operations to deter and divide Europe.
Russia’s behaviour will inevitably grow more risky and aggressive unless it faces unacceptable costs. The question is whether Europe will demonstrate, not only in word but deed, that it is ready to impose these. Failure to do so will merely postpone, not avert, confrontation. To fear escalation is to invite it.