kubotabx23
Registered Member
He's likely a Gen Z kid and/or a faux online Pakistani.
Pakistan-Af: Operation Khyber Storm
- Thread starter side-winder
- Start date
- Status
He's likely a Gen Z kid and/or a faux online Pakistani.
RescueRanger
Meme Lord
@Signalian
--
Conflict tracking & analysis complete with escalation and de-escalation outcomes
--
Since mid-2024–2025 Afghanistan remains a major source of illicit opiates and other contraband; trans-border smuggling routes through Pakistan (Khyber, Balochistan/Makran, and Sindh coast) continue to be exploited by criminal networks and sometimes taxed/leveraged by local armed actors.
[Source: https://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/WDR_2025/WDR25_B1_Key_findings.pdf?]
Cross-border militant violence has increased in 2025 with high-profile ambushes and clashes in frontier areas, highlighting an upsurge in capability and activity by groups such as TTP and other insurgents operating along/from Afghan border areas. Islamabad has publicly blamed sanctuaries across the border; Kabul faces international pressure to act.
[Source: https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-...ved-attack-that-killed-11-soldiers-2025-10-10]
The drug economy remains a major enabler — rising opium/heroin prices and high profits create powerful incentives for smuggling and corruption that indirectly sustain militant logistics. UNODC and other agencies note sharply elevated prices and continued flows.
[Source: https://www.unodc.org/documents/crop-monitoring/Afghanistan/Afghanistan_Drug_Insights_V4.pdf]
Current Picture - factual anchors:
Recent violence: Pakistani forces reported operations after an ambush that killed soldiers in early October 2025; security operations and cross-border rhetoric have intensified. [Source: https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-...ed-attack-that-killed-11-soldiers-2025-10-10/]
Narcotics context: UNODC’s 2025 reporting documents continued dominance of Afghan opiates in regional trafficking, with higher prices increasing smuggling incentives; Pakistan remains a major transit route. [Source: https://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/WDR_2025/WDR25_B1_Key_findings.pdf]
Insurgent landscape: TTP has re-emerged as a major national security threat inside Pakistan, while ISIS-K and various local networks remain active in the border region—multiplicity of actors complicates attribution of attacks and links to smuggling networks. [Source: https://acleddata.com/report/battle-borderlands-tehreek-i-taliban-pakistan-challenges-states-control]
Key drivers:
Economic incentives from illicit economies — record/high opium and heroin prices create financial rewards for smugglers and intermediaries; proceeds can be taxed/used by armed groups. [Source: https://unis.unvienna.org/unis/pressrels/2025/unisnar1495.htm]
Security vacuums and sanctuary dynamics — porous border areas, uneven control, and local alliances enable militant groups to regroup and operate across the frontier. Recent spikes in attacks indicate these sanctuaries are being exploited.[Source:https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-...ved-attack-that-killed-11-soldiers-2025-10-10]
Organizational overlap — criminal smuggling networks, patronage networks, and some militant groups have transactional relationships (safe passage, finance, logistics). This blurs lines between pure “criminal” and “terrorist” flows. [Source:https://www.state.gov/wp-content/up...otics-Control-Strategy-Volume-1-Accessible.pd]
Regional geopolitics — shifting diplomatic relations (e.g., greater external engagement with Kabul) and interstate tensions affect cooperation on border control and counterterrorism.[Source: https://apnews.com/article/india-afghanistan-taliban-muttaqi-899bac27dee2422e88a54372bdd9efaa]
Timeline and Evidence:
Heat Mapping:
Historic Trend analysis:
Analysis:
Although terrorist attacks were recorded in all four provinces and the federal capital
in 2024, over 95% of them were concentrated in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and
Balochistan.
Khyber Pakhtunkhwa recorded the highest number of terrorist incidents in the country in 2024, with 295 attacks that also included five sectarian-related attacks. These attacks claimed 509 lives and left 517 others injured.
Compared to the previous year, the number of terrorist incidents in the province increased by 69%, while fatalities rose by 21%. This indicates that militants not only escalated the frequency of their attacks but also carried out more intense and high-impact attacks during the year under review.
Most of the terrorist activity in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa was concentrated in six southern
districts—North and South Waziristan, Bannu, Tank, Lakki Marwat, and Dera Ismail
Khan—which collectively accounted for 171 attacks, or 58% of the total incidents in
the province.
Other significant hotspots included Bajaur, with 34 attacks largely attributed to the Islamic State Khorasan Province (IS-K), and the provincial capital, along with the neighbouring Khyber district, which together witnessed 36 attacks.
Overall, terrorist activity was reported in 22 districts across Khyber Pakhtunkhwa in
2024. Security and law enforcement personnel, particularly from the army and police,
were the primary targets, accounting for over 68% of the total reported attacks in the
province.
Cross referencing the above attacks with most likely smuggling routes based on data provided by UNODC:
The above schematic is very important to provide a quick snapshot of the main transit and interdictions routes from cross-border smuggling routes - it is also the main route for movement of terrorists into Pakistan.
Borders are managed by "two nations" - Afghanistan as a state has the responsibility to manage her side of the border, a task her "government" has failed at multiple times as the officials inside Kabul do not recognise the Durand line nor the Pakistan/Afghanistan border.
Based on demands by Islamabad they are two main models to be examined here in examining any conflict between Pakistan and Afghanistan:
Likelihood based on Analysis from Brookings: Low-Moderate (Source: https://www.brookings.edu/articles/the-talibans-three-years-in-power-and-what-lies-ahead)
What would Scenario B look like: continued Afghan denials, limited or symbolic actions, constrained enforcement in border areas, and TTP continues to operate with some sanctuary/access to Afghan territory.
Likelihood based on historic monitoring and reporting: Moderate-High - Reasoning: current reporting and repeated cycles of accusation/limited cooperation point to this being the baseline trajectory. (Source Cited: https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024...ns-ties-with-the-afghan-taliban-turned-frigid)
Second-order effects & risks:
Escalation: Pakistan may increase unilateral military actions (air or cross-border strikes), raising the risk of a sustained cross-border confrontation. (Source: https://warontherocks.com/2025/03/decoding-pakistans-2024-airstrikes-in-afghanistan)
Regional consequences: Increased instability may draw in China (protecting projects/ nationals), or see international pressure on Afghanistan; refugee flows or cross-border displacement could rise. (Source: https://www.congress.gov/crs-product/R45122)
TTP consolidation: Continued safe haven enables TTP to recruit, plan larger attacks, and potentially coordinate with other militant groups, raising the long-term threat level. (Source: https://acleddata.com/report/battle-borderlands-tehreek-i-taliban-pakistan-challenges-states-control)
Escalation Trigger timeline:
0–3 months: Status quo continues; occasional big attacks in Pakistan draw loud diplomatic protests. Islamabad signals readiness for action; Kabul issues denials. (Baseline seen repeatedly through 2024–2025 reporting).
3–9 months: If external pressure + incentives rise (or a political decision in Kabul), limited cooperation or targeted Afghan actions may appear (Scenario A partial realization). Otherwise, continued tit-for-tat (Scenario B).
9–18 months: Path diverges: successful Afghan sustained action could reduce attacks and open security channels; failure or persistence of status quo increases risk of sustained Pakistani unilateral measures and regional friction.
^ We are here!
Key triggers for widening escalation:
1. A major inside-Pakistan attack with high civilian or foreign national casualties — raises pressure for drastic action.
2. A sudden policy pivot within the Taliban leadership
^ We are here!
--
Conflict tracking & analysis complete with escalation and de-escalation outcomes
--
Since mid-2024–2025 Afghanistan remains a major source of illicit opiates and other contraband; trans-border smuggling routes through Pakistan (Khyber, Balochistan/Makran, and Sindh coast) continue to be exploited by criminal networks and sometimes taxed/leveraged by local armed actors.
[Source: https://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/WDR_2025/WDR25_B1_Key_findings.pdf?]
Cross-border militant violence has increased in 2025 with high-profile ambushes and clashes in frontier areas, highlighting an upsurge in capability and activity by groups such as TTP and other insurgents operating along/from Afghan border areas. Islamabad has publicly blamed sanctuaries across the border; Kabul faces international pressure to act.
[Source: https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-...ved-attack-that-killed-11-soldiers-2025-10-10]
The drug economy remains a major enabler — rising opium/heroin prices and high profits create powerful incentives for smuggling and corruption that indirectly sustain militant logistics. UNODC and other agencies note sharply elevated prices and continued flows.
[Source: https://www.unodc.org/documents/crop-monitoring/Afghanistan/Afghanistan_Drug_Insights_V4.pdf]
Current Picture - factual anchors:
Recent violence: Pakistani forces reported operations after an ambush that killed soldiers in early October 2025; security operations and cross-border rhetoric have intensified. [Source: https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-...ed-attack-that-killed-11-soldiers-2025-10-10/]
Narcotics context: UNODC’s 2025 reporting documents continued dominance of Afghan opiates in regional trafficking, with higher prices increasing smuggling incentives; Pakistan remains a major transit route. [Source: https://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/WDR_2025/WDR25_B1_Key_findings.pdf]
Insurgent landscape: TTP has re-emerged as a major national security threat inside Pakistan, while ISIS-K and various local networks remain active in the border region—multiplicity of actors complicates attribution of attacks and links to smuggling networks. [Source: https://acleddata.com/report/battle-borderlands-tehreek-i-taliban-pakistan-challenges-states-control]
Key drivers:
Economic incentives from illicit economies — record/high opium and heroin prices create financial rewards for smugglers and intermediaries; proceeds can be taxed/used by armed groups. [Source: https://unis.unvienna.org/unis/pressrels/2025/unisnar1495.htm]
Security vacuums and sanctuary dynamics — porous border areas, uneven control, and local alliances enable militant groups to regroup and operate across the frontier. Recent spikes in attacks indicate these sanctuaries are being exploited.[Source:https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-...ved-attack-that-killed-11-soldiers-2025-10-10]
Organizational overlap — criminal smuggling networks, patronage networks, and some militant groups have transactional relationships (safe passage, finance, logistics). This blurs lines between pure “criminal” and “terrorist” flows. [Source:https://www.state.gov/wp-content/up...otics-Control-Strategy-Volume-1-Accessible.pd]
Regional geopolitics — shifting diplomatic relations (e.g., greater external engagement with Kabul) and interstate tensions affect cooperation on border control and counterterrorism.[Source: https://apnews.com/article/india-afghanistan-taliban-muttaqi-899bac27dee2422e88a54372bdd9efaa]
Timeline and Evidence:
Heat Mapping:
Historic Trend analysis:
Analysis:
Although terrorist attacks were recorded in all four provinces and the federal capital
in 2024, over 95% of them were concentrated in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and
Balochistan.
Khyber Pakhtunkhwa recorded the highest number of terrorist incidents in the country in 2024, with 295 attacks that also included five sectarian-related attacks. These attacks claimed 509 lives and left 517 others injured.
Compared to the previous year, the number of terrorist incidents in the province increased by 69%, while fatalities rose by 21%. This indicates that militants not only escalated the frequency of their attacks but also carried out more intense and high-impact attacks during the year under review.
Most of the terrorist activity in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa was concentrated in six southern
districts—North and South Waziristan, Bannu, Tank, Lakki Marwat, and Dera Ismail
Khan—which collectively accounted for 171 attacks, or 58% of the total incidents in
the province.
Other significant hotspots included Bajaur, with 34 attacks largely attributed to the Islamic State Khorasan Province (IS-K), and the provincial capital, along with the neighbouring Khyber district, which together witnessed 36 attacks.
Overall, terrorist activity was reported in 22 districts across Khyber Pakhtunkhwa in
2024. Security and law enforcement personnel, particularly from the army and police,
were the primary targets, accounting for over 68% of the total reported attacks in the
province.
Cross referencing the above attacks with most likely smuggling routes based on data provided by UNODC:
The above schematic is very important to provide a quick snapshot of the main transit and interdictions routes from cross-border smuggling routes - it is also the main route for movement of terrorists into Pakistan.
Borders are managed by "two nations" - Afghanistan as a state has the responsibility to manage her side of the border, a task her "government" has failed at multiple times as the officials inside Kabul do not recognise the Durand line nor the Pakistan/Afghanistan border.
Based on demands by Islamabad they are two main models to be examined here in examining any conflict between Pakistan and Afghanistan:
- Scenario A: Strong Afghan action against TTP
- Scenario B: Afghanistan maintains the status quo
Likelihood based on Analysis from Brookings: Low-Moderate (Source: https://www.brookings.edu/articles/the-talibans-three-years-in-power-and-what-lies-ahead)
What would Scenario B look like: continued Afghan denials, limited or symbolic actions, constrained enforcement in border areas, and TTP continues to operate with some sanctuary/access to Afghan territory.
Likelihood based on historic monitoring and reporting: Moderate-High - Reasoning: current reporting and repeated cycles of accusation/limited cooperation point to this being the baseline trajectory. (Source Cited: https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024...ns-ties-with-the-afghan-taliban-turned-frigid)
Second-order effects & risks:
Escalation: Pakistan may increase unilateral military actions (air or cross-border strikes), raising the risk of a sustained cross-border confrontation. (Source: https://warontherocks.com/2025/03/decoding-pakistans-2024-airstrikes-in-afghanistan)
Regional consequences: Increased instability may draw in China (protecting projects/ nationals), or see international pressure on Afghanistan; refugee flows or cross-border displacement could rise. (Source: https://www.congress.gov/crs-product/R45122)
TTP consolidation: Continued safe haven enables TTP to recruit, plan larger attacks, and potentially coordinate with other militant groups, raising the long-term threat level. (Source: https://acleddata.com/report/battle-borderlands-tehreek-i-taliban-pakistan-challenges-states-control)
Escalation Trigger timeline:
0–3 months: Status quo continues; occasional big attacks in Pakistan draw loud diplomatic protests. Islamabad signals readiness for action; Kabul issues denials. (Baseline seen repeatedly through 2024–2025 reporting).
3–9 months: If external pressure + incentives rise (or a political decision in Kabul), limited cooperation or targeted Afghan actions may appear (Scenario A partial realization). Otherwise, continued tit-for-tat (Scenario B).
9–18 months: Path diverges: successful Afghan sustained action could reduce attacks and open security channels; failure or persistence of status quo increases risk of sustained Pakistani unilateral measures and regional friction.
^ We are here!
Key triggers for widening escalation:
1. A major inside-Pakistan attack with high civilian or foreign national casualties — raises pressure for drastic action.
2. A sudden policy pivot within the Taliban leadership
^ We are here!
RescueRanger
Meme Lord
I agree with you, I think most of us are in agreement there.
Watandar
Trusted Member
The strategic failure of Project Taliban , though entirely predictable, has shocked many in Pakistan and caused nervous breakdowns. Its why you are seeing which foul and racist language used against Afghans, Pakhtuns, Baloch, Tajiks etc. Don't be affected by that and put such wackos on Ignore list.
The schadenfreude in Afghanistan today over the Pakistan-Taliban divorce must be absolutely massive.
RescueRanger
Meme Lord
I apologise for someone having said that, as a Pakistani I am sorry - because most people are new on this forum, this will be the first time they are interreacting with you and are suffering from hypertension due to too much salt in their diet and too much rhetoric.
God bless you bro, stay safe and stay blessed.
Ghaznavi101
Registered Member
No need to apologize for some one else. I have massive respect and love for you brother.
airhead
Registered Member
I think this is a mistake. Americans tried this and so did the Soviets and look what happened at the end..got their asses handed to them. This just does not work and rallies the avg guy to become your enemies and brings them closer to India. This has got failure written all over it
Ghaznavi101
Registered Member
The first project in 96 or 2021?
Never will I ever use that German? Word again but boy oh boy. It's a blessing from the almighty.
Again, unfortunately this is not the end of Taliban though.
PrinceofPersia
Registered Member
Problem is analysis is met with thread ban or message deletion by cynical Mods.
Pakistani jets struck Noor Wali Mehsud's car in late evening. Few hours later, there are multiple audio recording released in Noor Wali Mehsud's voice.
ISI channels get activated and start blaming AI ?. Come on AI .. that too in Afghanistan, in the middle of night ?.
As for Wikipedia, any Tom, Dick and Harry can edit it. The editors are all volunteers.
Now comes thread ban for me. Why ?. This is PDF, where ISI narratives prevail, over common sense.
imadul
Elite Member
Nine lives of army mess baked terrorists.
Tariq Habib Afridi
Registered Member
Please check below twitter links where local in afridi language says that it was a jet almost 3 different people in three different videos saying same the it was jet at around 2am they targetted two houses. see below all twitter links. i tried to find one more video where a young man in afridi accent of pashto saying there were only two person from the family lives others all lost their lifes which has more than 10 children and women. the two saved person was not at home and was for the work outside the village.
12 children, six women and one man, all family members of local elder Khiyal Akbar
10 bachay aur aik aurat iss video main wo afridi main bata raha
https://x.com/sohailnoorkhan/status/1970007172068335694
another person saying in pashto two houses were hit at around night 2am..all women and children in those houses are all dead..
for air attack proof please see these below two twitter videos one is from local tirah elected MPA
https://x.com/sohailnoorkhan/status/1970325770720682169
https://x.com/sohailnoorkhan/status/1970198635271827471
sohail khan the nominated CM
https://x.com/SohailAfridiISF/status/1969988585249276009
https://x.com/SohailAfridiISF/status/1970125863804121215
RescueRanger
Meme Lord
Bro,
Thank you for your post. Not sure who thread banned you. But when we say analysis we usually refer to sourced and referenced works.
So you can say xyz happened based on (source) and then comparing similar strikes from similar jets in so and so battle we should expect to see 000" seat of blast/crater/conflagration etc...
Discussing payloads, flight times, tactical options, outcomes etc.
This was the kind of analysis many of us were used to on the old forum. Sadly posts have deminished here as older more experience members have retired from the community.
The younger generation equally bright and brilliant prefer to post videos of someone else's take which are often curated to suit that presenters narrative and often will not cite reference material.
As for any moderation action. As a rule we do not allow discussion of moderation actions in threads you can raise complaints in the dedicated complaints section which is known as GHQ.
Hope this helps.
313Ghazi
Elite Member
Its not the same. Why?
We wont be occupying enemy territory. We won't have long supply lines they can target. We stick to our side of the border and fight.
ARMalik
Trusted Member
So they could see Jets which were flying miles high in the sky at 2am in complete darkness?? They must have have Superman's eyes.
pashtunkoum
Registered Member
Really dissapointed to see the news of women and children. How we can we support this yet criticize Israel. Two brotherly nations must always resolve the issues with cooperation and talks.
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