Interesting development.
To counter it, theoretically 3-4 ways come to mind.
1. Directional jamming
Use phased-array antennas with high-gain beamforming to concentrate RF energy (achieving 20-30+ dB directional gain) directly at the R500 missile guidance, effectively creating power density ratios that overwhelm the CRPA's spatial filtering capabilities through sheer signal strength rather than numerical parity (instead of using 16 vs 16 in theory).
2. GPS spoofing
Exploit the fundamental vulnerability that ground-based transmitters possess orders of magnitude more power than satellite signals at receiver level (-130 dBm typical), enabling signal meaconing(interception and rebroadcast of navigation signals), or seamless takeover techniques where false navigation solutions are injected that the CRPA accepts as legitimate since they can mimic proper satellite geometry and correlation properties, effectively bypassing rather than overpowering the anti-jam features.
Will code-phase manipulation help ?
3. Multi-layered defense architectures
Implement cascaded countermeasures across the engagement timeline:
1. Standoff noise jamming for early-phase degradation,
2. Mid-course spoofing for trajectory deviation,
3. High-power close-in denial jamming in terminal phase,
4. Kinetic intercept as final backup
All this with network-centric coordination between ESM/ELINT sensors, electronic attack assets, and hard-kill systems to dynamically allocate resources and maximize cumulative probability through complementary effects rather than relying on any single defeat mechanism.
The article also mentioned, Terrain contour matching (TERCOM) - as core guidance which works by comparing the missile's altimeter readings of ground elevation with a pre-loaded digital terrain map to correct navigation drift so,
if possible:
1. Alter terrain profiles near critical targets (berms, excavation, artificial features)
2. Create false elevation signatures that corrupt correlation algorithms.
