OPINION
Pulwama â From Bluster to a Whimper
By
Kaiser Tufail
July 10, 2019
Immediately after the Pulwama suicide attack on 14 February 2019, in which a young Kashmiri lad blew himself up killing 40 Indian para-military troops, a cacophony of accusations were hurled against Pakistan. In a purported phone call, the caller claiming to be a representative of the Jaish-e-Muhammad (JeM) an internationally proscribed terrorist organisation was said to have owned up the bombing. Calls for revenge grew by the hour, and it was not long before the Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi allegedly discovered incriminating links and vowed to teach Pakistan a lesson. It seemed that Modi saw punitive action against Pakistan as a key to a landslide victory in the upcoming elections and was, thus, completely blinded to the dangers of escalation of hostilities between the two nuclear-armed neighbours. In all likelihood, Modi also believed or was made to believe that Pakistan did not have the gumption to take on the might and stamina of the Indian military, seemingly buttressed by its madcap media and the rightist supporters.
The Indian repression in Kashmir has seen no let up for over seven decades, with the last ten years having been particularly bloody. Thousands of killings, mass arrests, rapes, kidnappings, use of pellet guns to blind and maim protesters, and gross human rights violations have been the Indian governmentâs despicable methods to respond to the Kashmirisâ right of self-determination. That the right has been enshrined in numerous UN resolutions cuts no ice with an intransigent India. It was in the backdrop of these circumstances that 20-year old Adil Ahmed Dar, who had been humiliated, tortured and illegally detained, decided to take law into his own hands and square off with the so-called law enforcers. Driving a car packed with about 80-100 kilos of explosives, Dar rammed a bus laden with policemen of the Central Reserve Police Force, killing 40 of them. A phone call was opportunely received by Indian intelligence agencies soon after, claiming that JeM had carried out the bombing. The Indian media stirred up a storm in no time, and every Indian bayed for Pakistani blood. Hints of an imminent âsurgical strike,â by India fake and farcical though the previous one in 2016 had been began to make the rounds. The die had been cast, and there was no going back. India failed to provide evidence of Darâs contacts with anyone in Pakistan, either by way of tapped phone calls, physical contact with any Pakistani agents, or material found on his person or from his home indicating any complicity. All that was known about Dar was that he was a home-grown Kashmiri youngster with no outside contacts whatsoever, and that he had been radicalised by the spate of brutalities by the Indian law enforcing agencies. Acting as the judge, jury and executioner, and pandering to the frenzy created by the irresponsible media, Modi declared that Dar had been trained and supported by Pakistani agents. Retribution was, thus, the only option to deter any more âmischiefâ by Pakistan, Modi blustered. It was made clear that India would decide the time and place to administer exemplary punishment to Pakistan.
At 0130 hours (all times PST), on the morning of 26 February, a flight of six IAF Mirage 2000 configured for strike, along with two tied escorts and another four of the same type acting as reserves (or decoys), took-off from their home station at Gwalior. Escorted en route by several more Su-30MKI, the sizeable formation sneaked in from a south-easterly direction for a stand-off attack on a seminary at Jabba village near Balakot town, close to the international border. The Mirage 2000s, which had taken-off from quite a distance, were supported by an Il-78 in-flight refuelling tanker. Two ERJ 145 âNetraâ Airborne Early Warning and Control System (AEWCS) provided surveillance support to the strike package. At about 0245 hours, six Mirages carrying one 900 kg Israeli-origin Spice 2000 bomb each, lobbed them in the autonomous GPS-assisted delivery mode, and broke off immediately. With the bombsâ stand-off range of over 60 km, there was no need to cross into Pakistani territory, as safety of their aircraft was of greater concern, than any qualms about international censure for violating Pakistanâs airspace. In the event, the aircraft did ingress about 10 km into Azad Kashmir, ostensibly to drive home a point that India did not consider it as disputed territory. Traversing about 40 km, five bombs fell in a forested area, a few hundred meters from the intended target, and decimated nothing more than a few pine trees.
[1]
It was propitious that the bombs did not hit the seminary, as it housed a boarding facility for over 200 students aged 8-15 years. The seminary is one of thousands of similar facilities in the country where young children memorise the Holy Quran, a not uncommon practice amongst the faithful.
F-16 and JF-17 fighters on patrol were promptly directed to intercept the intruders, but were restrained by the prevalent rules of engagement from crossing over into enemy territory. Mercifully, there was no loss of lives or property at Balakot as the IAF mission had failed completely. There have been speculations about the cause of the failure, but the most plausible one was proffered by three members of the Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI) viz, Marcus Hellyer, Nathan Ruser and Aakriti Bachhawat. The trio posited that there was a mismatch between the target elevation sensed by the GPS and the orthometric elevation (above mean sea level) as given on aeronautical charts. High resolution satellite images of the bomb impact craters provided by European Space Imaging clearly show that all the bombs missed their targets by similar distances, and in the same direction, indicating a mission planning miscalculation. Apparently the orthometric elevation was in error (less than actual), causing all the bombs to overshoot. PAFâs former Gp Capt Parvez Mahmood, who has extensive experience of interpreting satellite imagery, is of the opinion that, âdetermining a precise 3D point on Earth requires satisfying a lot of variables, so errors similar to the one in the Balakot strike are not unusual.â The option of delivering the bombs in the electro-optically guided mode was not possible due to complete cloud cover and heavy rain in the area for several days. In any case, it was a riskier option as the bombs had to be guided through data link all the way till impact, and would have entailed IAF aircraft getting into the lethal range of Beyond Visual Range (BVR) missiles of PAFâs interceptors.
Immediately after the failed Indian strike, Pakistanis clamoured for revenge as expected, and Prime Minister Imran Khan duly promised it. The dilemma of escalation weighed heavily on the political and military leadership, and there was consensus that the response had to be as measured and controlled as was possible. Even the number of bombs planned for delivery were to be in equal measure. The PAF was well-prepared for a whole range of targeting options, and it settled for a stand-off attack similar to the IAFâs, with the important difference that it would be against military targets in the Poonch-Rajauri-Naushera Sector in Indian Held Kashmir (IHK).
The IAF stood guard on the night of 26 February when the PAFâs riposte was expected. Extensive Combat Air Patrols (CAP) were flown by the IAF, with surveillance support from ground radars, as well as AEWCS. When the PAF did not show up till sunrise of 27 February, the IAF eased off from its highest alert state, and waited for the following night. A pair each of Su-30MKI and Mirage 2000I
[2] were patrolling in IHK area. PAFâs deception worked splendidly when its strike package of four Mirage 5PA/IIIDA of No 15 Squadron and two JF-17 of No 16 Squadron, duly supported by a big swarm of escorts and patrolling fighters
[3] (a mix of F-16A/B and JF-17), cluttered the scopes of IAFâs ground radars at 0920 hours. Working at the rear of the fighter package were PAFâs SAAB Erieye AEWCS aircraft, and the DA-20 Falcon in which electronic warfare wizards sat ready with their arcane tricks.
Two vintage but still quite capable Mirage 5PA, each armed with one H-4 stand-off bomb,
[4] along with two JF-17, each armed with two Mk-83 Range Extension Kit (REK) bombs,
[5] headed towards their respective targets in southern-western IHK. It was a bright and clear morning, with excellent visibility. Each Mirage 5PA was followed by its communication control aircraft, a dual-seat Mirage IIIDA, which was to steer the H-4 after launch through data link, while the JF-17sâ Mk-83 REK were to be launched in the autonomous âfire and forgetâ mode. With the H-4 having a range of over 120 km, and the Mk-83 REK having at least half of that, the bombs offered safety to the launch aircraft as these could be delivered from well inside own territory, and the aircraft could then break off. The Mirage IIIDA control aircraft, however, had to continue flying towards the target, refining the H-4 bombâs flight path till impact. The bomb can be steered with great accuracy, as the high resolution image of the target seen by the bombâs seeker head is constantly relayed to the control aircraft. Since the purpose of the mission was essentially to demonstrate that Pakistan had the resolve, as well as the capability of responding in kind, it was decided that there was no compelling need to pick the front door of a brigade commanderâs office, or the air shafts of soldiersâ bunkers. General area bombing of open spaces in military garrisons near the Line of Control (LOC) in IHK was, therefore, agreed upon.
[6] It was expected that this âabundance of restraintâ would prevent mass carnage in the Indian military garrisons, which could otherwise lead to a chain of escalatory actions, and spiral into a very dangerous all-out war under a nuclear overhang.
When the PAF struck the garrisons within 36 hours of IAFâs abortive air strike at Balakot, it came like a âshot across the bowâ and had the desired sobering effect on the Indian military commanders.
[7] General Bipin Rawat, the Indian Chief of Army Staff, was forced to take a pause from his regular harangue about sorting out Pakistan. Unsurprisingly, he has not uttered any more threats to Pakistan, ever since.
PAFâs approaching strike force had, meanwhile, rung frantic alarms on the Indian air defence radars, and patrolling fighters were directed to intercept them. Struggling to sift through the degraded communications environment, IAF fighters were unable to understand the instructions of their air defence controllers. An F-16 pair led by Sqn Ldr Hasan Siddiqui of the elite Combat Commandersâ School, was vectored towards two approaching IAF fighters flying in an extended trail formation. The very long range at which the adversary aircraft appeared on the F-16 radar scopes suggested that these were big targets, most likely Su-30MKI. After sampling the target data and confirming valid firing parameters, Hasan let go an AIM-120C (AMRAAM)
[8] at 0936 hours, and promptly announced âFox Three,â the brevity code for an active radar-guided missile launch. Missile flight data fed back to the F-16 fire control computer in real-time, seemed to indicate that the missile had made its mark. Whether the Su-30 had met a violent end, or was damaged and landed back, or the aircrew had been able to kinetically defeat the missile altogether, remains moot. Hard evidence in the form of aircraft wreckage, or details of aircrew casualties, has not been available so far. Debris of the AIM-120C missile was, however, picked up and displayed on Indian television in a ludicrous tri-services press conference, as the IAF brass unsportingly complained about PAF using F-16s in what was actually a telling response to its own aggression.
Soon after the shoot-out, all hell broke loose in the Indian camp, as revealed by radar and VHF radio monitoring. In the ensuing confusion, the Terminal Air Defence Unit at Srinagar Air Force Station reported a slow speed radar contact heading towards it. As leaked reports suggest, the contact was taken for a hostile Unmanned Aerial Vehicle, and the Chief Operations Officer ordered it to be shot down. At 0940 hours, an Israeli-origin Spyder surface-to-air missile was launched, but its target turned out to be an IAF Mi-17 V-5 helicopter belonging to the Srinagar based No 154 Helicopter Unit. The helicopter crashed near Budgam, and six aircrew, along with a civilian on the ground, lost their lives in a case of morale-shattering fratricide.
Meanwhile, higher in the skies, the sole Su-30 remaining in the area flew helter-skelter, something quite baffling, considering that these are multi-crew fighters endowed with very powerful radars, and were armed to the teeth with an array of eight R-77 BVR and R-73 dogfight air to air missiles each. The Su-30 abruptly called âBingoâ (low on fuel) and exited the area at high speed after only 25 minutes of flight, despite having an endurance of at least two hours while on routine air patrols. As per radio monitoring, it transpired that the two Su-30s had earlier failed to synchronise their data links, and both aircraft had been unable to provide any mutual support by way of radar data sharing.
In the on-going fracas, the leader of the Mirage 2000 formation on patrol also seemed overwhelmed by the pugnacious PAF fighters milling around, and called out that his airborne intercept radar, along with that of his wingman, had gone bust. It is noteworthy that F-16s had picked up the tell-tale transmission âchirpsâ of the apparently serviceable Mirage 2000 radar on their threat warning systems, a short while earlier. In the desperate situation that was developing, an IAF radar controller was heard calling out to the leader, âConfirm you can employ your missiles without the radars?â On hearing a reply in the negative, the controller pulled back the Mirage patrol well out of the active zone, and ordered ground scrambles to tackle a full squadron strength of menacing PAF fighters.