India - Pakistan conflict analysis - aims, tactics, strategy, results

[Panzerkiel]

I really wish you had been around during the discussion on this between Chausim and myself; it was some years ago, and disappeared with many old files and records.

The terrible heat in Hyderabad has led to me making hit-and-run visits to the study, and to the computer and to this forum but there is a little bit left to be written up, and I hope to do it by tomorrow.

Meanwhile, if you look at the Indo-Chinese conflict of 62, you would not have failed to notice that the situation of the Indian Army in NEFA/Arunachal Pradesh and of the Pakistan Army in Azad Kashmir and the hinterland beyond are almost exactly in parallel, other than some fairly serious differences in logistical capability. So the Indian Army/PLA GF sit on high level plateaux looking down at the Pakistan Army/Indian Army on lower-level plains, with the distance between them covered by heavily-forested ravines and narrow rivers, equally accessible to both sides. The lower level plains are very well connected, the upper level one, in the case of Xijang, is also well-connected because the Chinese worked on it, but it is very badly connected in the Vale, because India never worked on it. About 70 to 80% of the friction in the Vale between the man in the street and the authorities is due to the coming onto common access roads of both very heavy military traffic and civilian commuter traffic.

So whatever the Pakistan Army can do in Kashmir - attack, but attack an enemy that knows how to defend - applies to whatever the Indian Army can do in Arunachal.

These do not apply to Ladakh, where the PLA GF seems to be intent on salami-slicing their way closer to Pakistan Army positions, and XIV Corps doesn't seem to know what to do about it.

keeping in view the present escalation between Chinese and Indians, a bit of 1962....

In 1962 India lost. But it could have won. How?

Simply by refusing to accept the Chinese unilateral cease-fire. Simply by uttering the words “The Government of India is determined to go on fighting till every inch of its soil is freed from enemy occupation.”

But would that not have prolonged the war? A war that we could not have won because India was already defeated?

No. Because with the onset of the hard winter, the Chinese would have had to retire. They could not maintain their troops on the snowy southern side of the Himalayas as they had outrun their communications in their rapid advance into India. Their entire winter policy for Tibet, to this day, calls for leaving the bare minimum forward. and withdrawing the rest to warm, permanent bases’ till the spring. Even in the warm weather they maintain only a third of a unit up a regiment will post a battalion forward, and the rest will remain in comfortable quarters till required.

There was no way in which China could have maintained 20,000 troops inside India through the winter relying on a couple of temporary one-ton roads for supply.

A setback is not a defeat. The Russians retreated one thousand kilometers across their own country suffering the heaviest casualties in the history of war. But they managed to stabilize the front and returned to take Berlin.

A defeat is in the mind--- if you do not give in, you can never be defeated.

The fighting for Thagla Ridge began in September 1962. By the time of the cease-fire, over 36 infantry battalions were in the theatre, the equivalent of four divisions. The Thapar plan for the defence of the Northeast, formulated in 1959, required three divisions for a sure defence of this sensitive area. Now India had the equivalent of four, plus the equivalent of an independent armored brigade waiting on the south bank of the Brahmaputra in case the Chinese crossed into the Indian plains.

The Chinese had perhaps the equivalent of four regiments (one and one-third divisions) against India along the western axis (Bomdila), and elements of a division against the eastern axis (Walong). Moreover, a Chinese division was much lighter in terms of engineers, transport, artillery than its Indian counterpart.

Most important, India had a fine air force of 500 combat aircraft, totally outclassing anything China possessed or anything it could operate out of Tibet.

Even though India had superiority on the ground, it gave in (Nehru again?). And the air force was never used. Why?

Indian Hunters and Gnats would have been more than a match for the Chinese MiG-15s and MiG-17s, and Indian Canberras would have pounded Chinese troops on the ground. Every ton of fuel and ordnance required by the Chinese air force had to be brought across 2000- kilometers of mountain road. IAF operated from large well-connected bases in Eastern India. How long could the Chinese have even flown against IAF, leave alone fight?

IAF, however, was stood down, and the Indian army milled around putting more and more troops into the northeast till, within a year, there were eight large divisions in place.

It is to be accepted that everyone did a bad job before the war and when it broke out. Point is simply this: even after all the setbacks, all the disasters, India could have made a realistic assessment of its adversary, his limits, and own strength. India had only to keep its nerve, or at least recover it after the initial setbacks.

Had the Indian Army been told to go on fighting, it would have done so. After all, death is all a solider faces, and for a soldier there are fates a lot worse than death.

The Indian Army, however, was not told to continue. IAF was not ordered into action. No one ordered the bombing of Lhasa, Gyanste, Shigatse. There was no Lt. Col. Doolittle on Indian side, to make a symbolic—but what a symbol—raid on China . No one determinedly, got together a naval task force to sail off Canton and to lob a few shells at that city (like Pakistan Navy did on Dwarka). Nothing was done, substantial or symbolic, except a grateful acceptance of the ceasefire by a wholly shaken leadership, and by a Nehru so destroyed that he was broken and dead not long after.
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I also think that there is a lot of impact of what happened at top levels to the Indian Army. Let me list them seriatim, solely from the point of view of what happened after the Chinese attacked Tawang.

1. Dalvi and his Brigade fell apart; Dalvi had not stood up very strongly to Biji Kaul, but for a Brigadier to tell a Corps Commander to naff off is not easy, as I hope you will agree.
2. The Div. commander later became an old friend of the Pakistan Army, and contributed his jeep to your War Museum; this was Niranjan Prasad's role in 62, and - wait for this - he survived and went on to be a Div commander in 65.
3. The Corps Commander was a city slicker who had a liking for the rounded phrase, and replied to a sceptical JCO's asking why the Indian Army was down, looking up at the PLA, by pompously proclaiming that while what the JCO was saying was unusual, it was even more unusual to have an officer of his level at the front.
4. Not being used to field conditions, he promptly fell ill, and, without handing over charge, got into hospital in Delhi.
5. He was replaced by Harbaksh, and was galvanised into action by the news, got off his sickbed and charged off to Walong, the other end of NEFA (Arunachal).
6. Harbaksh was asked to let go of IV Corps and take XXXIII Corps instead.
   
   You are aware of all these incidents, and had published Biji Kaul's fictional account of Niranjan Prasad's coolness under fire.
   
   
7. Bogey Sen had gone past his use-by date, and was bumbling around ineffectively, but finally managed to cause serious problems.
8. The DMO, a scheming, thoroughly political Bengali officer, decided to get involved, informed everyone that he had 'cabinet' approval for his thoughts and deeds and plans, and tried to get the retreating units to make a stand at Se La. This landed up in becoming a 3-way tussle between himself, the Army Commander, Eastern Command, and Corps Commander, IV Corps. Nobody won, the jawans lost.
9. There were two Generals Pathania involved, and M. A. S. did the worse damage (M. S. was heading up the newly formed 2 Div in Walong, and messing up over there; the saving grace there was Rawlley, just as the saving grace in Ladakh was 'Teppy' Raina.
10. The ONE Brigadier who was ready to fight from a 'box' (a concept that the British had used in Burma, when over-run by the IJA), Hoshiar Singh, was threatened with court-martial by A. S. Pathania if he didn't abandon Se La and retreat to the plains. He did withdraw, and was ambushed and killed on the way down.

My questions to you follow.

 

[Panzerkiel]

Something which I've been pondering upon...


Keeping in view India's near military history...
And basing upon potential threats.... Like in planning we always say that you have to prepare for the worst... Which in this case is...

An offensive-defensive strategy based threat from Pakistan and China both...

A defensive-defensive strategy based threat from Bangladesh

And multiple threats to its vulnerable long sea coasts and port areas where its precious power projection assets are based

There ought to be separate air, land and sea components for all these threats to INDEPENDENTLY deal with these threats without waiting for or depending upon induction of outside forces. And then there ought to be SEPARATE theatre reserves for offensive or defensive contingencies. And superimposed upon all over this should be the national level reserves of army, navy and air force.

Example... Eastern Command forces have a big role to play against any offensive in the West.... What if some situation along Bangladesh or Siliguri ties them up? No offensive in the West then?

They against China... Same question... Are the already placed forces enough to ward off the worst of Chinese threat or potential threat? Or forces are inducted here as well to even out the odds?

Then the sea coast, sea flanks.... What if we see a permanent deployment of Chinese amphibious forces at some port in Arabian sea? Won't India be forced to permanently detach potent forces to defend the probable landing beachhead sites.

Isn't this what is happening to India right now? India voices its intentions to go for GB and AK... And then a small incursion by PLA along LAC almost off balances it.

Best deployment of forces must be like... A potent defensive posture to deal with Chinese while simultaneously retaining the capability to go across against Pakistan....which is not the case right now.

I believe that.... Of all the force tiers.... Tactical, operational, theatre and strategic... Some where, something is missing at a tier....

More thoughts might follow....

 

[Panzerkiel]

Music to my ears.

Unfortunately, today these views can be expressed only in think-tanks in Delhi, and those are rarely consulted, being left to take up propaganda against the rivals of the ruling party.

What you have articulated is that the resources and capabilities for dealing with Indian threats and potential threats need to be concentrated into 'theatres', and that all three military arms need to be combined within these theatres, as far as management is concerned. For instance,

• China
  • Northern Command, from Leh to Bareilly
  • Central Command, from Bareilly to Kishanganj
  • Eastern Command, from Kishanganj to Tezpur
  • North-Eastern Command, from Tezpur to Walong
  • Island Command, Andaman & Nicobar Islands
  • Far Eastern Command, South Pacific Ocean
• Bangladesh
• Myanmar
• Indian Ocean
• Pakistan

On a careful working, it is possible to keep the head-count to reasonable limits, if not actually reduce them; the presence of the border forces is a factor, as they are about a platoon to every 3 kms in the west, two platoons to every 3 kms in the north. Unfortunately, we have to drop our obsession with aircraft carriers, and we need around 300 ships to give us coastal defence (in depth, including a land-based component attached to the maritime defences, and a long-range strike capability in the air), command over economic resources and sea lines of communications in the east, the south and the west, and war-fighting capabilities in the far east and in the west. Other requirements, such as anti-piracy patrolling, sea denial in the east and in the west, and amphibious capabilities, or expeditionary capabilities, are strictly secondary and must not be even thought of unless the basics have been met.

There is a real problem with the Air Force, and that has to be resolved on priority. The Navy needs re-orientation and a weaning away from their dreams of projecting national strength through carrier-borne aviation, together with a renewed focus on defending Indian sovereignty in the short-range, medium-range and the long-range. The Army needs to become specialist Armies, mission-oriented rather than formation oriented, and without the integumen of the old regiments, free of them without discarding them.

There may be a penalty to be paid for balancing forces; the head-count for the Air Force may treble from 140,000 to over 400,000, and the head-count for the Navy may be forced up from around 70,000 to over 300,000. This does not include production capacity.

Most of all, if nothing else happens, if the present rate of road-building and infrastructure development are continued, and if Logistics becomes a central military function common to all services, along with (electronic) Communications and Medical Support, we have overcome some of the obstacles of the past.

Discussions that mirror the days gone by.. nostalgic and hopeful.

However that citation for the Wg. Cdr will never be without doubt especially for those with greater ties to the military on this side. But then false claims have been made by PAF personnel in previous wars although for the Wg Cdr it seems to be more a case of fait accompli from the “new reich” in India - hopefully the next elections change things for the better.

Another aspect which was highlighted by a SOCOM friend of mine is the mentality of officers being rolled out from the IA in join training - “arrogant and argumentative” for a Black cat group versus “attentive to criticism” for A SSG group. This is perhaps one of the major factors leading to 26th versus 27th February and contrats opposite to what was known of Indian military attitudes prior to the new millennium.
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The entire episode had to be dressed up. The past loyalties and personal connections with an older and much respected senior had to be accommodated. The citation is not something that any sensible Indian will comment on, in public.

As for the second observation, we are breeding too many Arnab Goswamis in uniform, and the presence of our own miniature G. D. Bakshi as an expert commentator in Republic TV doesn't help. Maroof Raza has now been displaced by his Sanghi equivalent. This is indeed a 180 degree change.

A very old member, Sr. Nair, made a telling observation; he pointed out that most of the social media garbage - most, but not all - is generated in the north. We have lost an entire generation. He concluded with the soothing thought that these immature idiots would grow and mature in due course of time, but that sadly seems to be whistling past the graveyard.

 

[Panzerkiel]

In short, maybe, Indians are trying to achieve opposite of TOO LITTLE, TOO LATE... Which is... Too much in a very short time.... Once this occurs, then the gaps widens between mass and quality.... And battlefield performance suffers, and then reluctance for prolonging a tactical action for own desired results creeps in... 27 Feb may fit in here.... Indians failed to use their one, ultimate trump card which is superiority in numbers.... Even if IAF had lost a couple maybe, but then following it, the skies should have been filled with IAF aircraft for potential fighter sweeps and CAPs busting.... But IAF showed no inclination of pressing their quantity advantage.....

Again.... Brings us to the same thing.... India always feels reluctant to bring in its quantity advantage... Maybe it tries for QUALITY advantage like USA does, but then Indians don't have this corresponding military assets to match their doctrine.... Yet.

Aircraft carriers ... Yes.... In my opinion, Indians may require atleast 4 carriers each on both coasts.... With one in maintenance and 3 in seas.....and with them the usual paraphernalia of subs, ASW, AA and anti surface frigates, destroyers, replenishment oilers, minesweepers etc.... And then what use are these Carrier Battle Groups if you do not have big massive amphibious forces to land on enemy coast....

. By not presenting a potent amphibious threat, Indian CVBGs maybe nothing but potential targets for PAF and PLAF.

 

[Panzerkiel]

In short, maybe, Indians are trying to achieve opposite of TOO LITTLE, TOO LATE... Which is... Too much in a very short time.... Once this occurs, then the gaps widens between mass and quality.... And battlefield performance suffers, and then reluctance for prolonging a tactical action for own desired results creeps in...

I really wish (in an abstract sense) it were not you saying this.

27 Feb may fit in here.... Indians failed to use their one, ultimate trump card which is superiority in numbers.... Even if IAF had lost a couple maybe, but then following it, the skies should have been filled with IAF aircraft for potential fighter sweeps and CAPs busting.... But IAF showed no inclination of pressing their quantity advantage.....

I have an alternative explanation for this - underpreparedness.

We simply jumped the gun.

The massive holes in structure and in process that showed up were deeply disappointing. At the structural level,

• We effectively have no AD system in place; the PAF can walk in, position itself 20 to 50 kms inside its own air space and blow up anything at all that they want. Or, perhaps, we have the AD, but not the will to use it, especially against aircraft within their own air space and doing no harm until they squeeze the button.
• We went into the operation with no defence against the incremental range of the PAF air to air missiles. This is unbelievable.
• We have no additional air bases in the north to supplement Srinagar, and that frankly seems to be insufficient.

In terms of process,

• Why were we not ready for the inevitable retaliatory strike? It is true that the retaliation could have happened anywhere at all, but given Pakistan's consistent line of defining Kashmir as a disputed area and as a legitimate combat zone, surely the first piece of Band Aid should have been applied there?
• Where were the AWACS in support, and where were they if not in the sky? What is the point of acquiring all this glistening new machinery unless they are of use?
• Do we have anything like a standard operating procedure to cope with jamming, and had we done any physical or electronic simulations of combat with jamming and electronic warfare, AND anti-electronic warfare, as factors?
• Who planned the defence and stayed hands on, on the 27th? It is dismaying to see TV interviews of a Ground Controller; she did her best, but against jamming and against a pilot who seems to represent the worst of an already difficult lot, she was clearly out of her depth.

As you said, TOO MUCH TOO SOON.

Again.... Brings us to the same thing.... India always feels reluctant to bring in its quantity advantage... Maybe it tries for QUALITY advantage like USA does, but then Indians don't have this corresponding military assets to match their doctrine.... Yet.

Ouch.

Aircraft carriers ... Yes.... In my opinion, Indians may require atleast 4 carriers each on both coasts.... With new in maintenance and 3 in seas.....and with them the usual paraphernalia of subs, ASW, AA and anti surface frigates, destroyers, replenishment oilers, minesweepers etc.... And then what use are these Carrier Battle Groups if you do not have big massive amphibious forces to land on enemy coast....

. By not presenting a potent amphibious threat, Indian CVBGs maybe nothing but potential targets for PAF and PLAF.
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The quick and dirty figure was 9, but not of equal size. Frankly, what we need for the Bay of Bengal are very small ones of the size of the original Vikrant, between 15,000 to 25,000 MT displacement, with two squadrons on board. What we need in the Arabian Sea has to rival a medium-sized US carrier, on non-nuclear propulsion. For the southern reaches of the Indian Ocean, perhaps the same. But in terms of numbers, for each Carrier Battle Group on active duty at sea, there has to another retiring to base or venturing out, and there has to be a third undergoing major refit. So, three in each area, but - the good news - not of uniform size, now the bad news, if different, then demanding diversity of naval aircraft; and then the worst news - all of these vulnerable to a single cruise missile out of a swarm, fired from a platform well outside the range of a carrier's strike aircraft, 'sighted' by an innocuous offshore patrol vessel lurking near the battle group.

It just isn't worth it.

 

[Panzerkiel]

You are right... Unpreparedness of IAF last February...
To put in tangible terms...
None of the PAF assets.... Fighter, fighter escorts, EW, strike.... None of them were procured the previous day... I mean their capabilities are well known to everyone... Latest being thy block 52s which are also many years old now....
Peace time is always used to analyze opponent's capabilities based on his held assets.... And then comparing own capabilities based on own asset , plans and contingencies are made.... There must be something wrong in the peacetime operational planning process of IAF....

and then, on the ultimate day in February..... How come they didn't think of any retaliation from a country you have just bombed, a country which is your declared enemy, fought so many wars with...

Is there a lack of C2 In IAF.... I mean once the PAF comes in, IAF interceptors go up on their own, Phalco comes and bugs out leaving everyone to PAF mercy, no SAR for the downed pilot... SAR would have required maybe Garuds standing by along with helis and fighter aircraft to provide top cover..... That Mi 17 shot down, again flying in a hot environment on its own....lack of situational awareness of Ground based AD elements since they didn't know who's in the air at the moment....... List goes on...

It all brings to one thing... Atleast.... On the Indian side... There was no ONE person who had the complete picture of the battlefield, both land and air.... If there were one, then this litany of mistakes would have been avoided...

 

[Panzerkiel]

That's it.

I believe that there should have been local commanders in different zones empowered to coordinate integrated responses.

One input that is frankly unsatisfactory is that the AOC-in-C was just about being transferred. That is not much consolation; we cannot ask the PAF or the PLA AF to wait for our transfers to be complete and the incumbents to be in place and sufficiently briefed to be able to do their jobs. That seems to indicate that there is no continuity, and that the reporting level is quite paralysed during this transition.

Regarding the Air Rescue, we performed like the Keystone Cops. Believe me, no civilian project would have gone into action with such unpreparedness.

Yeah... Frankly, AO in C absence should not have been an issue....
On the battlefield, the peacetime planning and training speaks out on behalf of the Commander.... If the outcome is favorable, then it's good.... If outcome is bad enough, then it means bad peacetime planning and no Commander on ground to correct it.... Even if the Commander may be physically available, but then he cannot correct the loopholes of a bad plan during a fluid battle...

On a lighter note, I used to enforce my General Managers' leave opportunities, because it was only when they were away that I could assess how good a system they had built. If it could not function without them, they would return to a very demanding few weeks of very interactive system-building!

The best team I had ran AS/400 programming for a famous logistics company. I was gobsmacked when, soon after joining, I was given their Black Book; they had a better operations manual than their clients had, an operations manual ABOUT THEIR CLIENTS' OPERATIONS. It was a $5.0 million dollar a year client, some 20 years ago, so this was very reassuring.

Then due to circumstances beyond my control - I was then posted abroad - they were decapitated. According to reports from the site people, they carried on without missing a beat. They were cropped a second time; the second echelon went. They performed just as well. A third, and then a fourth time followed.

This was the best team I have ever been associated with. Truly amazing.

In defence, similar things happened, but it is difficult to discuss those. There is an interesting story behind the five letter org. that you noticed, @Nilgiri, and it is connected to the Egyptians. It was stymied because of the most extraordinary reason, one that I cannot bring myself to mention on this forum.

.... Which means that India, as yet, may not be able to achieve her political and military aims due to on going expansion, transitions, an economy incapable of sustaining a LONG war which is the only option in which superiority of numbers can be explored...

But then where is the problem? Because there is someone who just can't judge that what he's aiming for, can't be achieved and sustained.

Bluntly, this is the problem, both in the civilian leadership and the military. It hurts to have it highlighted so starkly, but this is exactly where the problem is.I am sure that my political views are not influencing my judgement on this one.

@jbgt90

I personally have a feeling there was already stuff going on that disguised where PAF was gonna do something....starting right from after balakot happened (and IAF may have engaged in the same just before balakot to achieve a similar goal). Mock attacks, feints and more activity in general....like a disturbed hornet nest to provide cover for the final action time and place. All with knowledge of what various radars and sensors (on the other side) will likely show the opponent (and impress counter action and card-showing from him...or lull into false sense of security etc)....having modelled and trained on your own radar and sensor systems well beforehand. There was probably a few ladders to pick from already done by PAF's best, given the aptitude I have seen from just you here.

I don't agree.

This was a leadership failure. It simply means that our military leadership in the IAF hasn't figured out how to manage through a series of discrete state changes, opposed by changes in the adversary profile as well. The IAF was not in suspended animation; it was supposed to be, and is, an organisation tasked to meet certain national objectives. These change, but usually not abruptly. Some exigency might arise - Balakot - and the organisation needs to be able to cope with this seamlessly. In fact, it should be designed to cope with these, not to have to take them up as exceptions.

My feeling is that this was at the Air Commodore/ Air Marshal level, nothing to do with higher echelons EXCEPT THAT WHEN THINGS GO WRONG, IT IS ALWAYS THE HIGHER ECHELONS WHO ARE RESPONSIBLE FOR THINGS GOING WRONG.

The failure to verify the re-engagement of the IFF system, thanks to which the chopper was shot down, seems to point to some very weak leadership at that level. the Air Commodore/ Air Marshal level.

We won't be told any of this as its very classified stuff I would imagine.

The issue is the aggressor always has the initiative compared to the defender who must cover all bases and thus spread/hedge and not really have the same counter-initiative force, and in a one-off that counts for a lot.

There is also the different narratives of what exactly happened, which I wont go into, because that's all worn me out long ago.

You qualified your observation by referring to the situation as a one-off, but it is still objectionable. Does that mean that there is NO defence possible? That horse won't run.

I have just got a caution (not a warning), and am feeling gutted. I'll be back in an hour.

 

[Panzerkiel]

A word about AD as well....

Fighting an air war with hot AD assets on ground requires precise coordination, good C2, complete picture of battlefield, hard training... And what not..

Very few countries have the requisite practical experience of this.... In my opinion Soviets and Russians have to their intense cold War experience, and North Vietnam which faced the US Air might.... And maybe Yugoslavia in the late 90s during the NATO bombing.... Egyptians and Syrians as well....

Rest all countries, Pakistan and India included.... Despite having potent AD weapons, do not have the requisite experience and knowhow of operating in a dense air environment..... And then, obviously, fearing fratricide, they normally allow one of them, either air force or AD elements, to engage.

 

[Panzerkiel]

With the indulgence of other contributors, the analysis of the lessons learnt from 1947-48 is being concluded here. First, with regard to the original actions, what were the take-aways? Second, what are the logistics and infrastructural failings shown by these actions? Third, in what ways might the Indian Army re-think the way it fights wars, after looking at solely the actions of 1947-48?

The mutiny of the Gilgit Scouts, led by the British citizen, Major Alexander Brown, in August 1947 (?), and their seizing control of Gilgit, ambushing and neutralising State Forces, and attacking down the roadways into Baltistan and onwards into Ladakh (Leh); they were supported by lashkars deputed to their support, but quickly dispensed with; they were opposed by the State Forces that held out in Skardu for a year without relief and reinforcement, and by the regular Indian Army, that opened up Zoji La, relieved Leh and re-captured Kargil.

So far we looked at the account narrated by @PanzerKiel in terms of the uprising of the Sudans, their capture of Muzaffarabad and Rajauri, their siege of Poonch, their declaration of independence, their feting of the tribal lashkars passing through to Baramula, and the armed insurgency that they waged against the Kashmir State Forces, later, against the Indian Army.

The third pulse was the Gilgit Scouts actions, that took them, on foot, all the way to Leh.

What emerges from this third 'pulse' is that a cutting edge formation that outruns its logistics has in reality achieved nothing; all of its glorious gains must be given up before too long. The Scouts and their associated troops marched uphill to Skardu, a march of nearly 200 kms on foot, and uphill 700 metres, from 1500 metres above sea level to 2230 metres above sea level. After this march, completed in 10 days' time, they besieged Skardu.

Skardu had been reinforced at the last moment by a Major in the State Forces service from his original location at Leh, and around 200 others. They travelled from Leh to Skardu, around 300 kms, in the dead of winter, over roads that were tracks and were not considered motorable. This garrison held out for six months; during this entire period, there were attempts to relieve the garrison, but it is difficult to believe that any effort was made that could have overcome the fairly modest resources of the besiegers. At the end, the garrison surrendered; the Major (promoted Lt. Col.) was kept alive due to his personal sporting relationship with General Gracey, and the others were executed.

The point is that there was no attempt at reinforcing this besieging group during the siege, and after the siege, opposing forces reached only as far as Kargil, so there was never anything to shake the hold of the Scouts on Skardu.

The Scouts had divided themselves into three columns, Ibex, Tiger and Eskimo. I am confused about the role of Major Jarral who has been mentioned on PDF; my information says that he was posted to command Tiger Force to capture Gurez, but that on Gurez falling to the Indian Army, this column retreated to Minimarg. If he was involved so heavily in the capture of Zoji La and its defence, he must have been in charge of Eskimo Force.

To get back to the narrative, the Indian Army managed to air transport Stuart tanks up to Srinagar in dismantled condition,assemble them, and then make their precarious way along the very difficult track from Sonamarg to Zoji La. (to be cont.)

What has emerged from the close look at operations in Kashmir in 1947-48 are these three very broad-brush conclusions, that are so broad as to offer few or no operational guidelines specific to the sector; however, for whatever they are worth, they seem to be

1. What the Indian Army has been doing in the eastern sector is as applicable, if not more, in the equally mountainous and equally thickly forested slopes of the Vale of Kashmir and its outer slopes. It needs to hone its small-unit jungle- and mountain-warfare skills. In addition, it must allow the border guards to shoulder their share of the burden, and withdraw a few kilometres. This will allow them to reduce their numbers, once released from the mechanical coverage of the entire frontage, but will demand the equipment for very quick, very strong reactions.
2. It need not worry about irregulars; it should continue to worry about regulars dressed and deployed as irregulars. That is now part of the DNA of the force that they oppose, and they need to address this issue firmly.
3. It needs to drastically improve its logistics, and ensure that all roads are 'redundant'; there must always be two, preferably even three ways to get from A to B, throughout the sector.

That touches upon, but does not focus upon the very serious role that logistics plays in this sector, where troops are at the end of a very long line of communications, and even the slightest dislocation can give rise to sleepless nights for the commanders.

In general, a useful approach to logistics will be to build circular roads around the Vale at contour lines at increasing heights. This will reduce a substantial amount of friction between civilians and the military convoys that seek to share the existing roads; these run right through thickly populated areas, and the security measures taken during convoy passage do not find friends anywhere in the Vale.

That is within the Vale. Outside it, there need to be more of the road-building that is mentioned so frequently nowadays: the Durbok-Shyok-Daulat Beg Oldie road, for instance, but many more like it. There is automatically a need to build in two other features - one is a close vigilance over these roads, to stop Lawrence of Arabia theatrics, and the second is very careful joint planning with ecological experts. Even a cursory look at the map will reveal that there are serious economies to be achieved.

• Manali to Dras via Keylong is 564 kms; Dalhousie to Dras, as the crow flies, is 210 kms.;
• Kishtwar to Dras is hardly 120 kms.
• Manali to Kargil is 500 kms.; as the crow flies, it is 275 kms.

One can go on and on, but this will offer a quick heads-up into the role of communications in the supply chain.

With that, it is time to look afresh at the Indian Army and its role in future, specifically in the boundaries of the old state of Jammu and Kashmir. (to be cont.)

Or shall we take on 1965 now...what do you think?

I will finish in two small posts, of which one is already up.

Maj Jarral was there at Zoji La during the first phase of INdian attacks, he was then rotated.

I see. That makes sense of the whole thing.

To sum up, IAF may be regarded at highly unbalanced......I mean they may have lot many fighters to show off, but then they do not have the corresponding number of EW / support aircraft to synergize the effects of all these assets and bring the strength of IAF on the battlefield.

My take is that they haven't put their toys together into an integrated battle management system. All these gadgets and facilities have to be used. Now. Instead, people have procured these, and are now sitting in talk shows on television explaining what these weapons do.

What we had was more than enough to cover the ground of the entire episode.

[/quote]Pulwama incident happened on 14 Feb, IAF went in on 26.....i mean IAF had fully 11 days to prepare the response, and prepare for PAF response as well....one wonders what they were doing for all these 11 days.[/QUOTE]

:hitwall::hitwall::hitwall::hitwall::hitwall::hitwall:

Now I can't add anything to this, so I will go on to general 'prognosis' for the Indian Army, based solely on this one narrative, and about the general backbone that logistics provides, but after I go and fetch my vital medicines; I have already missed two medication times.

Coming to the last point relating to 47-48, what should the Indian Army be looking at, given these memories and war histories?

1. The present division of responsibility between XIV, XV and XVI Corps is all right, BUT your #77 made a very fundamental point: we cannot switch formations from one end to the other. So XIV Corps has to be detached from Northern Command, and attached to a different Theatre, running from
   1. Daulat Beg Oldie to Bareilly in UP, from
   2. Bareilly to Kishanganj in Bihar, from
   3. Kishanganj to Tezpore in Assam, and from
   4. Tezpore to Walong (not really; the correct point of assembly and coordination should be Dibrugarh or Jorhat)
2. XV and XVI Corps need to take stock, and use their paramilitary front rank effectively, to release regular troops from duty on the borders guarding lines and boundaries. There is no space to dwell on this in this summary.
3. Northern Command, with these two Corps, needs to identify missions that it will seek to execute at appropriate times, both in war-time and in the conditions of low-level conflict that prevail during peace-time.
   1. These might include the expansion of the footprint forward of Turtuk;
   2. The constant vigilance over Haji Pir Pass, whose recapture can make a significant difference in reducing vulnerability of the sector;
   3. The sealing off of the Akhnoor salient;
   4. The dog that barked at night.
4. These objectives cannot be met by putting together an ad-hoc force at short notice, but must be a thoroughly well-planned exercise, with ample options for the event that for each mission, the PA will throw a spanner in the works as soon as it possibly can.

With that, I put myself at the disposal of the contributors to move on to the 1965 conflict.

 

[Panzerkiel]

I would like to spend two posts on some associated issues relating to the 1965 conflict.

First, in this post, the conflict in the Rann of Kutch, and its implications. In the next, Operation Gibraltar and its implications. As always, as suggested, the main focus of the analysis will be what lessons may be drawn from the events described by the Indian Army.

The Rann of Kutch
According to the records of the British administration, the 23,000 odd sq. kms. of the Rann of Kutch belonged to Kutch; in pre-independence days, there was no dispute. In 1956, Pakistan tried to set up a post at Chhad Bet, but was dissuaded and withdrew. The Indians put in a company of policemen; the Gujarat policemen are not renowned for taking on heavy duties, and they treated the assignment as a necessary evil, to be suffered and to be left behind once the transfer to the next group was done.

Now that a test run was desired, it was felt that this would be ideal, for two reasons:

1. It was as far away from Kashmir as could be imagined, being itself a dry arm of the sea that was inundated during the monsoons.
2. It was close to Pakistani resources in Sind, and far from Indian resources in Gujarat.

In those halcyon days, there was in fact no patrolling of this border, none at all.

Events moved quickly. The policemen on the Indian side were lethargic; so the Indus Rangers, their counterparts, built a road 2.5 kms inside the claimed Indian boundary line. This was discovered in January 1965 (what would have happened if it was not discovered is a matter for very amusing speculation). The opposite numbers met; far from withdrawing from patrolling the road, the Pakistani representative protested against Indian policemen coming up to the ruins of Kanjarkot on their patrols. The two sides disagreed; the Rangers occupied Kanjarkot. The Government of Gujarat got involved and protested, but to no avail; the Rangers cleaned up and fortified Kanjarkot. As a measure of prudence, the Indians put in a contingent of CRPF armed policemen, strengthened Chhad Bet, and sought to establish more posts on the boundary. Also, 31 Brigade was moved up, from Dhrangadhra to Bhuj.

On the 9th of April, the one of the new Indian police posts was shot up. The balloon was up. Event followed event in quick succession, and as is usual for Indo-Pakistani conflict, everything was over in three weeks, from 9th April to 1st May.

On the 10th, talks were proposed, but without vacation of occupied territories; on the 19th, the Indian Army took out the sector from the Area Command, HQ Maharashtra and Gujarat, and put Maj. Gen. P. O. Dunn in charge of 31 Brigade and 50 (Ind.) Para Brigade. These two brigades were supposed to cover 230 kms of boundary!

General Dunn was informed about Pakistani Army troop movements on the night of the 20th/21st April; this was the 8th Infantry Division reinforced by two regiments of armour. When Dunn asked for reinforcements, Southern Command agreed, but the GoI, advised in that direction by the COAS, refused to escalate or to be diverted. The Pakistani attack, led by Eftekhar Janjua, did well, and pushed out a number of police outposts, and came up to the defensive line of the Indian regulars. At this stage, a ceasefire was agreed upon.

The lessons learnt:

1. All parts of the border, including the international border, are negotiable, according to Pakistan;
2. The PA will fight behind irregulars or paramilitary until positions have been firmed up, and then intervene decisively with its regular troops;
3. It is unsafe to assume that a particular limited conflict will remain a limited conflict; at the very moment that FM Ayub Khan was speaking of living '...as good neighbours...' and of the need for the two countries to '... direct their resources and develop their economies in peace...', plans were being finalised for the follow-on campaigns.
4. As early as April 1965, India had clearly indicated her intention to open up the entire border if attacked very hard at any one point. Taking Shastri's statement as mere bluffing obscured the expansion of Operation Grand Slam by the Indian side when the pressure grew too high, and the thrusts launched towards Sialkot and Lahore respectively.
5. There is insufficient defensive resource in the Southern Rajasthan-Gujarat areas, against a serious Pakistani push.

 

[Panzerkiel]

Operation Gibraltar
This might be considered the second phase of a two-, possibly three-phase campaign launched by Pakistan. While the attack in Kutch might be considered the first, the trial run, this was the second, and it should have gained victory, if the assumptions of the planners had been correct. They were not.

The matter was extremely simple; a mix of regulars and irregulars would be injected into Indian administered J&K, and would mix with the people and create violent protests against the Indian Army, and that Army, facing a mass uprising, would vacate Kashmir, allowing for its reversion to its proper administration. As we all know, this did not work. There were a variety of reasons; the Kashmiri populace was not interested, and was not as disaffected as they should have been, the Indian Army was far more vigorous in its counter-insurgency role (as it was initially thought to be) than had been anticipated, and 33,000 over 7,000 commandoes (in the Boer War sense) were not enough to take on an Army Corps. The lessons learnt are simple, and repetitive; many of these were learnt in the earlier 47-48 conflict. For what they are worth, here they are:

1. The Pakistan Army has an irresistible urge to use irregulars. This is in its DNA, rather, in the national DNA. The very birth of Pakistan was marked with tremendous violence, and the new nation-state had been born in a welter of blood, suffering according to some authorities twice as many casualties as they inflicted.
2. Again, during the battle for Kashmir in 47-48, irregulars were used because the regulars had not been released for deployment.
3. The Indian Army, within Kashmir, was too strong then to be defeated in open battle.
4. [ed.] However, it suffered a number of casualties from ambushes and surprise attacks and had to divert resources to deal with the menace.
5. [ed.] XV Corps did not have sufficient reserves to absorb these urgent needs.
6. [ed.] As XVI Corps did not exist, the diversion of resources to the Valley substantially weakened the strength available at Akhnoor to ward off any major thrust, such as Grand Slam.
7. The Indian Army inflicted a couple of major blows in its counter-insurgency sweep, most particularly the recapture of the Haji Pir Pass.
8. Logistics continued to be the Achilles Heel of the Indian forces in the Valley and in Ladakh.

With the failure of Operation Gibraltar, General Akhtar Hussain Malik's 'Plan B' came into play; that was code-named Operation Grand Slam. This event, and its consequences, are what constitute the bulk of the conflict of 1965, to which the Rann of Kutch incident and Operation Gibraltar were preliminaries.

Operation Grand Slam and its ramifications
While there is already a brilliant summation available, in this and succeeding linked posts, an account of events subsequent to Operation Gibraltar will be presented. This account will consist of the following:

1. Operation Grand Slam - the attack on Akhnoor-Chhamb-Jaurian;
2. NORTHERN COMMAND
   1. Operations of Indian XI Corps
      1. 15th Inf. Div.
      2. 7th Inf. Div.
      3. 4th Mtn. Div.
   2. Operations of Indian I Corps
      1. 6th Mtn. Div.
      2. 14th Inf. Div.
      3. 26th Inf. Div.
3. SOUTHERN COMMAND
   1. Operations south of I Corps
4. Naval Operations: The PN at Dwarka

As usual, this will try to eschew an hour-by-hour narrative, and focus on the lessons learnt by the Indian Army during the conflict, thereafter, at the level of the entire set of events, an analysis of logistics requirements and an assessment of Indian Army needs in future, in the light of these events.

 

[Panzerkiel]

Op Gibralter, well its effects...

Bulk of the Indian Army was engaged around Jura and Bedori Bulges which had already been reduced. Indian attention was fixed on these sectors thats why their commanders completely failed to detect the buildup for Grandslam (despite being warned by UN observers at the last moment). Thats why Indians were unable to disconnect themselves from the north, this allowed Grandslam the success it had.

On 1 Aug 65, there was a meeting at Srinagar in which COAS IA, GOC WC, GOC 15 Corps were there.
There main three points were...
IA over extended on CFL
Low standard of police bns in Kashmir
Ineffective Home Guard Organization.

The first news of Gibralter infiltration was received by IA on 5 Aug 65, once Salahuddin force was discovered at Dara Kasi and Nusrat was detected in Mendhar.

68 Brigade, the reserve of 15 Corps was moved to Tanmarg, no ther troops were readily available, less 4 J&K Militia units.
Can be judged from the fact that 4 Sikh LI was in Ambala, was alerted and then hastily air lifted to Srinagar.
Therefore, IA took some time to be effective.

On 8 Aug, Indian Def Secretary recommended Martial Law in state, however, Comd 15 Corps told him that he was confident of handling the situation.


Maj achievement of Gibralter forces include...

E/Nusrat mounted a daring attack against 4 Kumaon, in which 4 Kumaon lost its CO as well.

Salahuddin force managed to infiltrate till suburbs of Srinagar.

Gaznavi force, the most successful of Gibralter forces..almost got Ramban bridge....gained complete control of Budil area till it was ORDERED to exfil on 27 Sep.

G/Nusrat, the most successful of Nusrat forces, ambushed lead unit of 52 Mountain Brigade (3 Rajputana), killing 71 soldiers....captured Mandi

Meanwhile, Indians had increased artillery fire across CFL....GOC 12 Division asked for 4 Corps Artillery...this w to be first of its many successful actions....

On 15 Aug, 4 Corps Artillery opened up a well planned, surprise artillery fire plan which hit Indian 191 Brigade O Group, wounding many and killing the brigade commander, Brig B F Masters...Brigade ammo dump was also destroyed, IA abandoned Palanwala post due to artillery fire....lot may other losses due to artillery fire.

It is also pertinent to mention that till the end, Indians failed to open the Uri Poonch road which was one of their main aims in Bedori....


Overall

Losses in Jura and Bedori were negligible when compared with gains in Munawar gap by Grandslam..These losses were expected due to bad troops to space ratio in 12 Division...
however, these losses were still within the limited laid down by Pak GHQ.

In the end, IA committed more forces against Jura and Bedori, while having nothing to counter any Pak thrust towards Akhnur...Two IA brigades had already been pulled out of Jammu...so IA was playing almost as per the needs of Gen Akhtar Malik, GOC 12 Division...

In fact, the full value of Gibralter was have been encashed only after capture of Akhnur, once 12 and 7 Division would have veered towards Naushara and Jammu....if this would have happened, there would have been no Operation Nepal by Indian 1 Corps.

 

[Panzerkiel]

@Panzerkiel

If I have understood you correctly, far from being the wipe-out that is reported in most accounts, the different units of the Gibraltar forces caused casualties in Indian Army formations, tied them down and distracted their attention sufficiently to allow preparations for Grand Slam to go forward with little or no warning.

Is that it?

About the Uri-Poonch Road, how far did it lie from the Haji Pir Pass?

I take it that the conclusions from these are that

1. If GOC 12th Div had not been transferred in the middle of the engagement, Pakistani forces would have penetrated further, faster;
2. If the Indian XI Corps and I Corps had not intervened, the Jammu-Naoshera-Rajauri was lost, and the Jammu-Srinagar road was as good as lost.

This is attested from the fact that Grandslam wasnt concieved at the spur of the moment, it was a properly planned operation. Its success was complemented by effects of Gibralter.

I hear you saying that there was a material effect of Gibraltar in softening up the front for Grand Slam.

It lies east of Haji Pir Pass, however, since regular PA units were manning the ridges overlooking the road, no movement on it by IA was possible. Road was No Man's Land.

Interesting. So much of the heart-sickness at returning Haji Pir Pass was misplaced; although it was plugged as a conduit for passage of irregulars, its capture did not still enable passage between Uri and Poonch, as might have been hoped.

Yes, the change of command was one bad bungle-up.

For that, I would refer you to the quip by M. J. Akbar, an observant Muslim.

Your second point is also true......otherwise doesnt it seem to you strange the hurried fashion in which 1 Corps and 11 Corps were launched.

I hope the urgency with which IA opened up along the International Border on 6 Sep is a bit clear now.

Much, much clearer now.

• First, PA troops, because of Gibraltar or in any case, were on top of the ridges along the line Uri-Poonch and perhaps further down south towards Rajauri (these were old battlegrounds from 47-48).
• Second, there was sufficient dislocation and uproar so that all reserves - specifically, Corps reserves of XV Corps - were diverted to suppress them. You have mentioned that two brigades were diverted from Jammu to work with XV Corps on suppressing the attacks by Gibraltar Force contingents.
• Third, the Haji Pir Pass was recaptured, but not the ridges to north and south, and this led to the Uri-Poonch road still being unpassable.
• Fourth, there was nothing but 191 Brigade left to stop 12th Division's main attack, and that comprised of 3rd Mahar, 16th SLI and 15th Kumaon (not 8th Kumaon), as well as 9 Punjab, also 14th Field Artillery and a troop of 39th Medium Artillery.

So it was not an under-strength Brigade with which Harbaksh faced 12th Div., it was a line-up from which two other brigades had been subtracted, and could not be brought back in time.

Most educative. Thank you very much.

@jbgt90

I know what you are going through, but you MUST keep up with this thread.

 

[Panzerkiel]

@PanzerKiel

If I have understood you correctly, far from being the wipe-out that is reported in most accounts, the different units of the Gibraltar forces caused casualties in Indian Army formations, tied them down and distracted their attention sufficiently to allow preparations for Grand Slam to go forward with little or no warning.

This is attested from the fact that Grandslam wasnt concieved at the spur of the moment, it was a properly planned operation. Its success was complemented by effects of Gibralter.

@PanzerKiel


About the Uri-Poonch Road, how far did it lie from the Haji Pir Pass?

It lies east of Haji Pir Pass, however, since regular PA units were manning the ridges overlooking the road, no movement on it by IA was possible. Road was No Man's Land.

@PanzerKiel

I take it that the conclusions from these are that

1. If GOC 12th Div had not been transferred in the middle of the engagement, Pakistani forces would have penetrated further, faster;
2. If the Indian XI Corps and I Corps had not intervened, the Jammu-Naoshera-Rajauri was lost, and the Jammu-Srinagar road was as good as lost.

Click to expand...

Yes, the change of command was one bad bungle-up.

Your second point is also true......otherwise doesnt it seem to you strange the hurried fashion in which 1 Corps and 11 Corps were launched.

I hope the urgency with which IA opened up along the International Border on 6 Sep is a bit clear now.

 

[RescueRanger]

@Joe Shearer sir you need to make a comeback. We miss your wisdom and polite mannerism.