Iran - Israel/US War: Israel-US declare war on Iran, Iran responds

[Persian Gulf]

Our administrator decided to lock thread

not me

but it was justified, you need to use high quality official sources, not random instagram or YouTube posts

I don't know mate but it's very possible that Iran can detect yankee F-35 [RQ-170 in 2011 & global hawk in 2019 are two examples that Iran manned down or shot down] with east and shoot them down, if not zionists had entered Iranian air space executed their 3 waves of all out attacks but few kilometers near Iranian borders they are rumors that Iran detected & shot down some of their F-35 and locked on some others and they rapidly changed their ways and just fired missiles while rapidly keeping distance

whether it is possible and whether the video you posted suggests it happened are two very different things

 

[Hack-Hook]

Shooting down couples zionist F-35 & their missiles over Iraq sky , ~40 kms further off Iranian borders:

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That actually is called fake news

 

[Khorasan Black Flags]

not me

but it was justified, you need to use high quality official sources, not random instagram or YouTube posts


whether it is possible and whether the video you posted suggests it happened are two very different things

I know it , you're an international mod

If my video is hard to believe or created by AI, or zionists became very sincere and they didn't execute their 3 waves of attacks you're welcome to believe anyone. Btw I think you most probably agree with mi6 agent scenarios but if you don't agree it's your choice and I respect to your choice even if it's bitter to my taste and untrue

And I also respect your own idea about video

 

[Persian Gulf]

I know it , you're an international mod

If my video is hard to believe or created by AI, or zionists became very sincere and they didn't execute their 3 waves of attacks you're welcome to believe anyone. Btw I think you most probably agree with mi6 agent scenarios but if you don't agree it's your choice and I respect to your choice even if it's bitter to my taste and untrue

And I also respect your own idea about video

even if we assume your video is correct, it doesn't show what you claim it shows, this is the issue

 

[Khorasan Black Flags]

even if we assume your video is correct, it doesn't show what you claim it shows, this is the issue

Forget about what I claim

We hezbollahis are all khali-band

@FUB @Mehdipersian

 

[Mehdipersian]

Forget about what I claim

We hezbollahis are all khali-band

@FUB @Mehdipersian

Every word cannot be confirmed without evidence.

That's why I don't believe most of the Western media's nonsense against Iran

 

[Mehdipersian]

Israel restarted the war against Gaza and killed hundreds of women and children last night.

True promise 3 should be fulfilled as soon as possible, then we will go after Trump.

 

[OldTwilight]

Israel restarted the war against Gaza and killed hundreds of women and children last night.

True promise 3 should be fulfilled as soon as possible, then we will go after Trump.

How , Arabs and Sunnis are acting like whore for USA and Israel and fully support them , what can we do?

Dont get me wrong , I was against for delaying TP 3 for even 1 hour but right now , we can only make nuke ....

I hope Khamenei come to his sense and we go for nukes .... this " Nukes is haram and we won't make nukes " is becoming disgusting ....

 

[Persian Gulf]

How , Arabs and Sunnis are acting like whore for USA and Israel and fully support them , what can we do?

Dont get me wrong , I was against for delaying TP 3 for even 1 hour but right now , we can only make nuke ....

I hope Khamenei come to his sense and we go for nukes .... this " Nukes is haram and we won't make nukes " is becoming disgusting ....

Khamenei did not need to issue his stupid fatwa against nuclear weapons

Khamenei did not need to limit our missile range to 2000km

so many stupid own goals with no benefits

 

[muhammed45]

Khamenei did not need to issue his stupid fatwa against nuclear weapons

Khamenei did not need to limit our missile range to 2000km

so many stupid own goals with no benefits

You are insulting our leader, a man of light, a man of focus, a man of strength and the man of his words.

No need to answer your insults in your way, since i know its because you don't know him.

He issued a fatwa against nuclear weapons because our religion basically opposes mass killing innocent people for no reason. Main purpose of nuclear weapons is compensating error at long distances. This strategy doesn't give a shit that maybe or possibly a kid is walking 50 Km away from your intended target.

Our leader is introducing the real face of prophet Muhammed pbuh to the whole world. In this ideology death is not the end, killing people is not the goal hence we have to die for a good reason remembering that we gonna die anyways. So die for a good reason at least.

Even me was not happy with that fatwa but who am i to understand meaning of light?

Let us suppose our missile range is increased to at least 10,000 Km. USA is too big for missiles to be destroyed. This evil entity called USA and its strength will melt away because it cannot stop light by turning its back on it.

Understanding what i said needs belief in good that is why we are called believers.

Don't insult the man you know nothing about.

 

[Tijani]

Khamenei did not need to issue his stupid fatwa against nuclear weapons

Khamenei did not need to limit our missile range to 2000km

so many stupid own goals with no benefits

I fully concur with Muhammed45 on this one. Let's just also look it just from a logical military standpoint. Until recently Iran has had deterrent enough for the US to avoid a hot war against it. That I would say it more than admirable. Iran had its Ukraine moment when almost the whole world supported Saddam's regime in the war of Holy Defence.
Having nukes would've MAYBE achieved the same result but I highly doubt it. Take Russia as an example. Having the largest nuclear weapons arsenal in world hasn't stopped the collective zionist West from openly launching attacks against it by using Ukraine as proxy. The threshold for using nukes is very very very high, unless you're a Satan-worshipping sadistic depraved westerner . Russia has threaten the zionist vassalstates on several occasions to no avail. Iran has also made it abundantly clear, for those who choose to listen, that it will not sit idly by if it is in any way or form attacked by unconventional means.
Concerning the the missile range limit I believe there's never been compelling reasons enough, that would've outweighed the negative economic consequences of of time concerning the economic interactions 0with the eurovassalstates, to justify an increase in missile range. The majority of the military targets of the enemy are well in the range of the 2000 km political limit. If the necessity arises then it's technically very easy for Iran to extend this range, as it has shown on several occasions.
Besides the pure military logic there's the fundamental overriding principle of Deen, As Muhammed45 so eloquently stated. We do not believe in the wholesale murder of the innocent and will never initiate or accept the unjustifiable. Someone earlier today wrote of Khalid Ibn Walid in one of threads today. I refer you to his example concerning an example in conducting warfare.
Death will come to us all and what is important is to die for a just cause and with dignity, if one is blessed with such an opportunity. May Allah (SWT) save us from the death of an old man in his bed! Thank you Muhammed45

P.S. I know I do use insults and do not accept them against anyone and I do not think you intended any personal insult towards our Imam

 

[KHORSHIDSIYAH1488]

Khamenei did not need to issue his stupid fatwa against nuclear weapons

Khamenei did not need to limit our missile range to 2000km

so many stupid own goals with no benefits

I've read the replies here and it seems you @PersianGulf are the only sensible one here. Petty scruples like "Islamic virtue" have no place in the iron laws of realpolitik or the jungle of human interaction.

Khamenei shot Iran in the foot with his fatwa, with his missile limitations, and with his idiotic approach of valuing martyrdom over the desire for our people to live and prosper. The Jews fight to live, to prosper. And they win, and drink the blood of their enemies and marry. Our men fight to die, and seek bliss in the afterlife, in the process losing battle after battle and showing weakness. We need to adopt a mindset of ruthless survival, or we will lose this dear nation our forefathers have shed blood for. We need to value Iranian lives, Iranian birth rates, Iranian youth, Iranian ideals, Iranian land and not piss it up for some nomads who were slaughtered in the desert a thousand years ago.

 

[Khorasan Black Flags]

I've read the replies here and it seems you @PersianGulf are the only sensible one here. Petty scruples like "Islamic virtue" have no place in the iron laws of realpolitik or the jungle of human interaction.

Khamenei shot Iran in the foot with his fatwa, with his missile limitations, and with his idiotic approach of valuing martyrdom over the desire for our people to live and prosper. The Jews fight to live, to prosper. And they win, and drink the blood of their enemies and marry. Our men fight to die, and seek bliss in the afterlife, in the process losing battle after battle and showing weakness. We need to adopt a mindset of ruthless survival, or we will lose this dear nation our forefathers have shed blood for. We need to value Iranian lives, Iranian birth rates, Iranian youth, Iranian ideals, Iranian land and not piss it up for some nomads who were slaughtered in the desert a thousand years ago.

We're a massive country with hundreds of underground weapon bases

Google AMAD project, Iranian military nuclear program between 1990's and 2000's

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• The Fourth Nuclear-Weapons-Related Testing Site Located: Another Parchin Site, More Undeclared Nuclear Material Possible

Reports​

The Fourth Nuclear-Weapons-Related Testing Site Located: Another Parchin Site, More Undeclared Nuclear Material Possible​

by David Albright and Sarah Burkhard [1]

September 7, 2022

Executive Summary​

Background

• The Amad Plan was the code name for Iran’s crash nuclear weapons program in the 1990s and early 2000s, documented in the Iranian Nuclear Archive secured by Israel in 2018 and summarized in Iran’s Perilous Pursuit of Nuclear Weapons by David Albright, Sarah Burkhard and the Good ISIS team. The extent to which Iran continued parts of the nuclear weapons program after the Amad Plan ended in 2003 is still not fully known.
• Iran has consistently violated its obligations under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) to cooperate with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and fully account for its past and present nuclear activities.
• The IAEA has publicly discussed four locations where it found evidence of undeclared nuclear material, and it has declared one of these sites a clear nuclear safeguards violation under the NPT. The resolution of the undeclared materials, equipment, and activities at the other three locations awaits truthful answers from Iran.

Findings

• The present report is a technical analysis of Golab Dareh, a test site identified in the Nuclear Archive. This is one of a number of sites associated with explosive testing of nuclear weapons components and the development of associated, high-speed diagnostic equipment. We did not know the exact location of Golab Dareh until recently when we obtained the site’s coordinates from officials knowledgeable about the Nuclear Archive.
• Based on the available information, we conclude that tests using uranium may have taken place at Golab Dareh, another indication that the number of sites involving undeclared nuclear material may be larger than just the four discussed publicly by the IAEA.

Recommendations

• It is critical for the IAEA to continue its investigation of Iran’s violation of nuclear safeguards under the NPT. Absent a marked shift in Iran’s actions, the IAEA Board of Governors should condemn Iran’s non-cooperation and refer the issue to the UN Security Council.
• The United States and Europe should refuse Iran’s demands to end the ongoing IAEA investigation as a condition for a revived nuclear deal under the JCPOA (Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action) framework. The West should instead pressure Iran to cooperate with the IAEA by strengthening sanctions, including so-called snapback sanctions allowed for in case of Iranian non-compliance with the JCPOA.

Golab Dareh Explosive Test Site​

The Parchin complex near Tehran contains another Amad Plan site, Golab Dareh, bringing the total there to three. The newly located site is one of four known sites associated with explosive testing of nuclear weapons components and the development of associated, high-speed diagnostic equipment. We have previously discussed Golab Dareh in our reports and book _Iran’s Perilous Pursuit of Nuclear Weapons,_<a href="https://isis-online.org/isis-report...ar-weapons-related-testing-site-located/8#fn2">2</a> but we did not know its location until recently, when we obtained the site’s coordinates from officials knowledgeable about the Iran Nuclear Archive. Based on the available information, this site may have conducted tests using uranium, another indication that the number of sites involving undeclared nuclear material may be larger than just the four cases discussed publicly by the International Atomic Energy Agency.<a href="https://isis-online.org/isis-report...ar-weapons-related-testing-site-located/8#fn3">3</a>

Purpose

Golab Dareh was one of four identified Amad sites involved in nuclear weapons-related research and development experimentation. Figure 1 shows its location at the Parchin complex, along with the location of the other two nuclear weapons-related sites at Parchin: one is another explosives testing location that included two internal test cell facilities (Taleghan 1 and 2), and the other is the Shahid Boroujerdi underground site that was slated to make weapon-grade uranium cores of nuclear weapons. Figure 2 provides a close-up of the Golab Dareh site as it appeared in March 2004. The site features a large bunker protected by an earthen berm, another smaller bunker, and a rectangular building flanked by a blast deflection wall and berm. The two bunkers and the building are positioned in a triangle. Figure 3 contains a ground image of the main bunker at the site from the Nuclear Archive.

Figure 1. The Parchin military complex hosted three known Amad Plan sites. One, Golab Dareh; two, Taleghan 1 and 2, featuring high explosive test chambers; and three, the Shahid Boroujerdi tunnel complex, slated to make weapon-grade uranium cores of nuclear weapons.

Figure 2. The Golab Dareh site in March 2004 featured a large bunker and a building suitable for nuclear-weapons related testing and developing high-speed diagnostic equipment.

Figure 3. A ground photo from the Nuclear Archive shows the entrance area of the main bunker.

The Amad Plan conducted at least 41 tests at this site between September 2002 and April 2003. Figure 4 is from a translated table from the Amad Plan, found in the Nuclear Archives, tabulating the number of tests at the four main nuclear weapons-related testing locations over this seven-month period. The other three test locations are Taleghan 1 and 2 at Parchin, featuring two high-explosive test chambers; the Sanjarian site with two more chambers, called Upper and Lower Nour-Abad;<a href="https://isis-online.org/isis-report...ar-weapons-related-testing-site-located/8#fn4">4</a> and the Marivan outdoor testing site.<a href="https://isis-online.org/isis-report...ar-weapons-related-testing-site-located/8#fn5">5</a> (Three tests were conducted under project name Pour Midani, which is excluded here because the tests were related to explosive yield measurements vital for testing underground a finished nuclear explosive device.<a href="https://isis-online.org/isis-report...ar-weapons-related-testing-site-located/8#fn6">6</a>) The table lists a total of 189 tests at these four sites over that seven-month period, of which about 20 percent were conducted at Golab Dareh. This fraction should not be seen as indicating the relative importance of the testing campaigns at Golab Dareh compared to the other sites, but it does show that Golab Dareh was an active Amad Plan testing site.

As we reported earlier, according to senior Israeli officials knowledgeable about the Nuclear Archive, this site was involved in equation-of-state experiments, including metal flyer plate and velocity experiments. It was also involved in testing photodiodes. A few examples of photodiode tests are mentioned in the Institute study on Sanjarian. A photodiode converts a light signal to a current, thus, these tests may be related to developing fast diagnostic capabilities where light from an explosion is detected in a photodiode and subsequently recorded.

 

[Khorasan Black Flags]

Flyer plate experiments involve slamming together materials at tremendous velocities, using gases or propellants, generating high temperatures and pressures, permitting measurements of the hydrodynamic behavior of materials upon impact. High-speed diagnostic equipment monitors the impact. Such equation-of-state experiments would be necessary in the design of an implosion-type nuclear weapon, the Amad Plan’s choice, where the experiments would be generating high temperature and pressure data important to refining nuclear weapons codes. In a nuclear weapons program like Iran’s, with a weapon design based on weapon-grade uranium, such experiments would have involved natural uranium metal.

Based on archive information, Iran had a “1 Mbar gun” which is likely the device used to conduct the equation-of-state experiments at Golab Dareh. Preliminary experiments with the gun, likely involving associated diagnostic equipment, were conducted at Sanjarian. Figure 5 is an archive photo showing the gun that may have been used to propel the flyer plate, suggesting the experiments used propulsion methods rather than gases. The firing system involved propellant and a firing mechanism using the properties of a flat distributor (the channels in the distributor have been obscured digitally in the photo). This initiation method was pioneered by the ex-Soviet nuclear weapons expert Vyacheslav Danilenko. A larger, hemispherical variant was used for initiating the high explosives in the nuclear weapons.
 

Figure 4. Translation of a Nuclear Archive table documenting the number of tests across the Amad Plan’s nuclear weapons development testing sites over a seven-months period from March 2002 to April 2003.

Figure 5. A gun system, with propellant, used to fire flyer plate. Image from Nuclear Archive.

Details of the Site

The Golab Dareh site is small and surrounded by other military facilities in the southern part of the Parchin complex. It is not located in or near the Tehran district carrying the same name. It does not appear to have its own security perimeter and it does not appear to have been destroyed or dismantled, at least not to an extent visible in available satellite imagery, as of August 2022. The coordinates for the site are 35.49548N , 51.74423E.

The site consists of one main bunker with an L-shaped earthen berm, and a second, smaller bunker. Based on its adjacency to the other structures, a rectangular flat-roofed building appears to be part of the site. It features a probable vent on the roof, and a blast deflection wall that is backed by an earthen berm on the east end of the facility. Given the layout of this facility, it is likely that the building was designed for some form of hydrodynamics testing, likely involving the gun device described above.

The triangular arrangement between the secondary bunker, the main bunker and the building indicates that the smaller bunker could have served as a control bunker. Further, a semicircular object is visible near the smaller bunker, which could be for storage.

The ground image of the main bunker from the Nuclear Archive, when compared with another ground image found on suSPNDed.org, provides enough indicators to assess that they are likely the same bunker (see Figure 6), and that the main bunker is about twice the height of an average person, or roughly 3.5 meters tall. Both images show stacks of sandbags around the bunker entrance. The second, probable ground image not only shows the sandbags, but, in addition, holes in the bunker lining, assessed as probable explosive testing ejecta divots.

The precise location of the equation-of-state experiments is difficult to determine. Two sites are possible–the main bunker faced with a berm or the slightly longer nearby building with a blast deflection wall and berm at its east end. Either location could be capable of conducting such tests, where impact debris must be contained, but a building can provide a more controlled laboratory environment.

The site underwent substantial changes between the first available Google Earth image, dated July 2002, and the next available from March 2004. Between the two dates, the building and the blast protection wall were added. Further visible changes occurred around 2009, when an earthen berm was added perpendicular to the main bunker. Additional minor changes were also noted between 2011 - 2012.

Figure 6. Probable ground photo of the Golab Dareh main bunker. Source: suSPNDed.org.

Iran | countries | Institute for Science and International Security

<h2>For more in-depth ISIS analysis of the Iranian nuclear<br> issue, visit <a href=

isis-online.org

 

[Persian Gulf]

Analysis of Operation True Promise II (new satellite imagery - see next post):

Summary:

• 36 impacts recorded at Nevatim base.
• 10-14 impacts recorded in Tel Nof. Still no high resolution satellite imagery was released for Tel Nof.
• 3-4 impacts near Tel Aviv (1 hit the side of a road, 1 hit 500m from Mossad HQ, 1 supposedly hit a school).
• 1-2 in Gaza (Netzarim axis from video footage).
• we have visual evidence of at least 50-55 impacts / 180 missiles = c. 30% penetration rate for TP2 (compared to c. 10% for the ballistic missiles used in TP1).
• however, almost half of these missiles wildly missed the target. only a small number impacted something accurately (a building, a runway). only 3 buildings were seriously damaged/destroyed (2 in Nevatim and 1 in Tel Nof).
• Higher missile penetration rate in TP2 (30%) vs TP1 (10%) likely due to combination of Iran using newer missiles and Israel choosing to prioritise protection of population centres over air bases.

Nevatim Air Base - 36 impacts:

• 20 impacts in the north part of the base (where F-35 jets are housed), and 16 impacts in the south part of the base. of these 36 impacts, 13-14 were very far off target (35-40%), the other missiles had an average accuracy of 70-80m. (This makes sense: CEP measures the probability that a missile will impact within x m CEP of the target 50% of the time.)
• of the remaining 'reasonably accurate' 22 impacts, 16/22 hit runways or access roads (or very close to them). only 4 directly hit a building, 2 of these causing severe damage (non-concrete AWACS shelter in south and a large building in the north), 1 causing limited damage and 1 causing very limited damage (to a concrete F-35 shelter).
• the impacts on the runways were ineffective, causing relatively small impact craters <10m and repaired within a few hours.
• South of base (16 impacts): 7 of these were very far off target, 7 hit runways or access roads, 1 hit the AWACS hangar (non-concrete) and caused severe damage to 2 hangars (famous image), 1 hit a building but caused limited damage. Observation towers and Wing of Zion shelter were not hit at all, unfortunately. Cluster munitions may have been more effective here as the impact radius of the impacted warheads was < 10 metres. Strong missed opportunity to damage IAF's capabilities.
• North of base (20 impacts): 6 of these were very far off target, 9 hit runways or access roads or close to them, 3 missiles impacted close to F-35 and AWACS shelters but missed (by 10-100m), 1 direct hit on F-35 concrete shelter (very limited damage), and 1 direct hit on a large building, which was totally destroyed.

Conclusions

• IRGC overwhelmed Israeli air defences, forcing Israel to prioritise defence of population centres over military targets
• IRGC intended to inflict major damage at Israeli air bases in TP2, but the missiles were unable to achieve these goals due to insufficient accuracy and low destructive capability against hardened shelters.
• IRGC threats to destroy enemy air bases are currently not credible due to need for <10m CEP precision at 1500km range, a very difficult capability that the IRGC-ASF does not yet seem to possess with its MRBM (with 70-80m CEP)
• Cluster munitions may have fared better for large dispersed targets.
• Heavier warheads with more efficient explosives and improvements in RV guidance systems are required. Improvements in target selection and methods could result in greater success (e.g., destroying observation centres and important shelters).
• Better targets for Iran's MRBM arsenal (with a 70-80m CEP) require less dispersion or concentrated attack on a smaller number of targets.