Iran - Israel/US War: Israel-US declare war on Iran, Iran responds

[Shags101]

US military posts footage of its navy firing on Iranian ship it later seized

* * *

www.timesofisrael.com

So yeah I think shooting at an Iranian civilian ship is showing where trumps mindset is war is about to begin I’m hoping Iran doesn’t wait for the first blow that could come whenever Trump chooses to or unleashes Bibi againim hoping Hezbollah is easy and primed for action

 

[ShapurII]

With Mojtaba Khamenei injured and probably out of decision making, it is likely that there is no one "Iranian government". There are many centers of power vying for influence. Bad enough during peacetime, terrible during war.

The concept of "government" in Iran is different from the US.

The government in Iran refers to the executive body. The head of the Iranian government is the President, who has been Masoud Pezeshkian for the last 2 years and is not going to change for another 2 years.

Mojtaba Khamenei is the Supreme Leader of Iran. His job is to supervise the three bodies of the Iranian system: 1- The Executive Body, 2- The Judiciary Body, 3- The Legislation Body. He isn't directly involved in running the system. He is a Faqih (sort of like Pope in Catholicism) who ensures the system remains in line with the Shariah law and he provides Islamic guidance and a general framework for the country.

In a sense, Mojtaba Khamenei is like King Charles III. He can make the final call when he wants to, but in normal situations, he isn't involved in running the system.

 

[Hassan Al-Somal]

This is from ISW update:

Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Commander Major General Ahmad Vahidi and members of his inner circle have likely secured at least temporary control over not only Iran’s military response in this conflict but also Iran’s negotiating position and approach within the past 48 hours. The IRGC Navy attacked several commercial vessels on April 18 and declared that no vessel of “any type or nationality” is permitted passage through the strait, a reversal of Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi’s announcement on April 17 that the strait was “completely open” to commercial traffic. IRGC-affiliated media also announced on April 18 that Iran has not agreed to participate in another round of negotiations with the United States due to “excessive” US demands. Vahidi and individuals close to him may have effectively controlled the negotiations process throughout the war, which is traditionally a role reserved for political leaders. Vahidi likely intended to impose IRGC oversight over the recent US-Iran talks in Islamabad. The IRGC continued to play an outsized role in Iran’s negotiations after the Islamabad talks. The IRGC’s consolidation of control over Iranian decision-making indicates that the Iranian political officials currently negotiating with the United States do not have the authority to independently determine Iran’s negotiating positions. The IRGC appears to have sidelined more pragmatic figures with whom the United States has negotiated. The IRGC attacked several commercial vessels and halted traffic in the Strait of Hormuz on April 18, likely in order to both gain leverage over the United States and consolidate the IRGC’s control over Iran’s negotiations policy as part of an internally-motivated maneuver. The IRGC likely aims to secure leverage over the United States by halting traffic and driving up shipping and oil prices to impose economic pressure on the United States. The IRGC’s actions are also likely intended to be an internal demonstration of power designed to exhibit the IRGC’s control within the regime, and in particular, its control over Iran’s negotiations policy. The US Navy’s blockade of Iranian ports remains in place as of April 18. US CENTCOM said that it forced two ships to turn around and return to Iran between April 17 and 18. The US Navy has forced 23 ships to turn back since the United States began the blockade. No Iranian vessels have attempted to approach or test the blockade line as of this writing.

Iran Update Special Report, April 18, 2026

Regime institutions aligned with Vahidi are presenting a cohesive front against Araghchi and in support of the IRGC.

understandingwar.org

"The IRGC appears to have sidelined more pragmatic figures with whom the United States has negotiated."

My question is, how does one qualify to be called "pragmatic"? Does it mean the person is pro Western or has connections to the West behind the scene?

That being said, that ISW report forgets Iran has a new supreme leader, and he has the final say on these matters. They, somehow, ignored him in their bogus report.

 

[Shags101]

What!!!! .. ..

Honestly starting to get weird so it’s alright if the world moves freely but Iran can’t Iran was more than willing to allow the ships go through but Trump started this game not trying to be that guy but why does anyone care about Arab “leaders” that are nothing but puppets honestly stooges to be fair I thought MBS was going to have some brass but he’s lining up behind his masters trump and Bibi

 

[EugeneP]

In other words they destroy the ship.

I don't understand why the captain of a container ship decided to have his ship destroyed/seized instead of just turning around. The two ships yesterday obeyed IRGC order to turn around and saved themselves. What sense does it make for a civilian vessel to challenge a warship?

 

[TallarnDesertRaider]

There is something wrong with our cruise missile stockpile. We probably haven't produced them in thousands. Otherwise, I do not see why we haven't already thrown hundreds of AshCMs at the USN. We could even use the Persian Gulf missile. One of the US vessels was about 200 kilometers away from our shore recently. Completely within our firing range.

We haven't heard a lot about our cruise missiles so far. Sure, it's harder to catch a cruise missile attack on camera, since most of our intelligence comes via HUMINT from online videos, but there hasn't been much information released on any such attacks so far.

I'll refer to Simplicius' breakdown of ASMs/ASBMs:
Re: ASMs:
>The largest misconception most laymen make is that anti-ship operations consist of simply firing some kind of missile into the ocean and that missile somehow magically finding the aircraft carrier on its own and striking it, despite the fact that the target carrier is potentially hundreds of miles away over the horizon—which is the key point.
>During the Cold War, the doctrinal theory behind anti-ship operations, specifically against large surface ships and carrier groups, centered around having major airborne reconnaissance assets which are used as the marking vehicles to illuminate the target via radar, and guide the missile to the target.
>[...]
>Once their Kh-22 missiles were launched, the planes would still need to provide some level of mid-course guidance for the missiles, which means staying in the air and locked on to the target ships.
>[...]
>Granted, these missiles also have the ability to reach a general area via INS (Inertial Navigation System) and can begin scanning for targets independently after that. But this poses several problems.

>Firstly, if allowed to scan for random targets on its own, the missile is not guaranteed to hit the exact ship you want it to hit
>[...]
>And by the way, that is being generous with a Mach 1 missile: most anti-ship missiles do not even approach Mach 1 speeds; for instance, US’s Harpoon at Mach 0.70, Ukraine’s Neptune (subsonic), Iran’s Qader and Ra’ad missiles both at Mach 0.80, etc. One of the reasons the Soviet Kh-22 was so revolutionary and feared was that it was nearly hypersonic at Mach 4.6+, but that is not a feat most nations can repeat.
>[...]
>Most of these [ISR] drones do not even have the range to go that far out because they are controlled via ground control station not satellite—which limits their range essentially to radio horizon, which often tops out at 50-150km max, depending on altitude, topography, etc.

RE: ASBMs:
>So, what’s the problem? Firstly, Iranian anti-ship ballistics appear to have a ~300km range.
>[...]
>Iran would not launch directly from the shore itself which is already under overwatch of various US strike systems. The Iranian launcher may be pushed something like 50-150km inland, if not more.
>[...]
>So, could Iranian ASBMs potentially hit a US carrier? They suffer from the same issue of terminal guidance: lacking a dedicated active tracking platform, they would resort to discriminating targets autonomously

Obviously he's talking about carriers as that was the hot subject when he wrote it, but the general gist is still applicable. Without active guidance and target discrimination (which would definitely be a problem if you're firing at ships interdicting tankers), the killzone is more or less just the immediate area of the Strait, maybe in the Gulf, but nowhere else.
I would say the whole subject more or less returns to what I was musing about some days ago, i.e. weaponizing the tankers. Place soldiers or assets on these ships to either directly target enemies attempting to land via helicopter or provide targeting data to onshore drones missiles. But both have tremendous implications on shipping in general.

 

[EugeneP]

"The IRGC appears to have sidelined more pragmatic figures with whom the United States has negotiated."

My question is, how does one qualify to be called "pragmatic"? Does it mean the person is pro Western or has connections to the West behind the scene?

That being said, that ISW report forgets Iran has a new supreme leader, and he has the final say on these matters. They, somehow, ignored him in their bogus report.

I think in this context, they are referring to Foreign Minister Araghchi who agreed to remove strait blocking as issue of contention. Since that is a problem that affects the whole world except U.S., he thought that will give Iran diplomatic advantage from international community. But IRGC views it as losing the only trump card Iran has in any negotiation.

 

[Hassan Al-Somal]

I'll refer to Simplicius' breakdown of ASMs/ASBMs:
Re: ASMs:
>The largest misconception most laymen make is that anti-ship operations consist of simply firing some kind of missile into the ocean and that missile somehow magically finding the aircraft carrier on its own and striking it, despite the fact that the target carrier is potentially hundreds of miles away over the horizon—which is the key point.
>During the Cold War, the doctrinal theory behind anti-ship operations, specifically against large surface ships and carrier groups, centered around having major airborne reconnaissance assets which are used as the marking vehicles to illuminate the target via radar, and guide the missile to the target.
>[...]
>Once their Kh-22 missiles were launched, the planes would still need to provide some level of mid-course guidance for the missiles, which means staying in the air and locked on to the target ships.
>[...]
>Granted, these missiles also have the ability to reach a general area via INS (Inertial Navigation System) and can begin scanning for targets independently after that. But this poses several problems.

>Firstly, if allowed to scan for random targets on its own, the missile is not guaranteed to hit the exact ship you want it to hit
>[...]
>And by the way, that is being generous with a Mach 1 missile: most anti-ship missiles do not even approach Mach 1 speeds; for instance, US’s Harpoon at Mach 0.70, Ukraine’s Neptune (subsonic), Iran’s Qader and Ra’ad missiles both at Mach 0.80, etc. One of the reasons the Soviet Kh-22 was so revolutionary and feared was that it was nearly hypersonic at Mach 4.6+, but that is not a feat most nations can repeat.
>[...]
>Most of these [ISR] drones do not even have the range to go that far out because they are controlled via ground control station not satellite—which limits their range essentially to radio horizon, which often tops out at 50-150km max, depending on altitude, topography, etc.

RE: ASBMs:
>So, what’s the problem? Firstly, Iranian anti-ship ballistics appear to have a ~300km range.
>[...]
>Iran would not launch directly from the shore itself which is already under overwatch of various US strike systems. The Iranian launcher may be pushed something like 50-150km inland, if not more.
>[...]
>So, could Iranian ASBMs potentially hit a US carrier? They suffer from the same issue of terminal guidance: lacking a dedicated active tracking platform, they would resort to discriminating targets autonomously

Obviously he's talking about carriers as that was the hot subject when he wrote it, but the general gist is still applicable. Without active guidance and target discrimination (which would definitely be a problem if you're firing at ships interdicting tankers), the killzone is more or less just the immediate area of the Strait, maybe in the Gulf, but nowhere else.
I would say the whole subject more or less returns to what I was musing about some days ago, i.e. weaponizing the tankers. Place soldiers or assets on these ships to either directly target enemies attempting to land via helicopter or provide targeting data to onshore drones missiles. But both have tremendous implications on shipping in general.

But somehow the Ansarallah (aka Houthis) in Yemen was targeting the USS Harry S. Truman AC when it was 800 KMs away in Northern Red Sea. And according to US military leaders, the Ansarallah in Yemen converted ballistic missiles to anti-Ship missiles.

Now, couldn't IRGC increase the range of their anti-Ship missiles like the Yemenis did? Remember, the IRGC were the people who assisted the Yemenis to develop their missile capabilities.

 

[lightning f57]

This is not good for Iran's reputation or image..since it is imposing a blockade on the whole world's economy..while the US is imposing a blockade only on Iran!

Your reporting seems to be one sided, oh well.

 

[925boy]

Yes brother. Inevitabe. I am certain Pakistan has prepared adequately all these years.

Regarding this that you said - "We could settle some nasty scores on behalf of billions of people."- well, one can argue your best chance was to join in when iran was fighting against US and Israel for 40 days.

 

[Ali_Baba]

Iran vows retaliation after Trump says US took control of Iranian ship

Official IRNA news agency says US announced talks date to pressure Iran after Trump threatens to 'blow up' Iran.

aje.news

>> tit for tat response of some type on the cards?

 

[Persian Gulf]

 

[EugeneP]

But somehow the Ansarallah (aka Houthis) in Yemen was targeting the USS Harry S. Truman AC when it was 800 KMs away in Northern Red Sea. And according to US military leaders, the Ansarallah in Yemen converted ballistic missiles to anti-Ship missiles.

Now, couldn't IRGC increase the range of their anti-Ship missiles like the Yemenis did? Remember, the IRGC were the people who assisted the Yemenis to develop their missile capabilities.

Targeting is different from hitting. Houthis might have targeted the ship, but the target never became aware of it to engage in any defensive action. Which likely means the missiles went somewhere else.

 

[ShapurII]

I'll refer to Simplicius' breakdown of ASMs/ASBMs:
Re: ASMs:
>The largest misconception most laymen make is that anti-ship operations consist of simply firing some kind of missile into the ocean and that missile somehow magically finding the aircraft carrier on its own and striking it, despite the fact that the target carrier is potentially hundreds of miles away over the horizon—which is the key point.
>During the Cold War, the doctrinal theory behind anti-ship operations, specifically against large surface ships and carrier groups, centered around having major airborne reconnaissance assets which are used as the marking vehicles to illuminate the target via radar, and guide the missile to the target.
>[...]
>Once their Kh-22 missiles were launched, the planes would still need to provide some level of mid-course guidance for the missiles, which means staying in the air and locked on to the target ships.
>[...]
>Granted, these missiles also have the ability to reach a general area via INS (Inertial Navigation System) and can begin scanning for targets independently after that. But this poses several problems.

>Firstly, if allowed to scan for random targets on its own, the missile is not guaranteed to hit the exact ship you want it to hit
>[...]
>And by the way, that is being generous with a Mach 1 missile: most anti-ship missiles do not even approach Mach 1 speeds; for instance, US’s Harpoon at Mach 0.70, Ukraine’s Neptune (subsonic), Iran’s Qader and Ra’ad missiles both at Mach 0.80, etc. One of the reasons the Soviet Kh-22 was so revolutionary and feared was that it was nearly hypersonic at Mach 4.6+, but that is not a feat most nations can repeat.
>[...]
>Most of these [ISR] drones do not even have the range to go that far out because they are controlled via ground control station not satellite—which limits their range essentially to radio horizon, which often tops out at 50-150km max, depending on altitude, topography, etc.

RE: ASBMs:
>So, what’s the problem? Firstly, Iranian anti-ship ballistics appear to have a ~300km range.
>[...]
>Iran would not launch directly from the shore itself which is already under overwatch of various US strike systems. The Iranian launcher may be pushed something like 50-150km inland, if not more.
>[...]
>So, could Iranian ASBMs potentially hit a US carrier? They suffer from the same issue of terminal guidance: lacking a dedicated active tracking platform, they would resort to discriminating targets autonomously

Obviously he's talking about carriers as that was the hot subject when he wrote it, but the general gist is still applicable. Without active guidance and target discrimination (which would definitely be a problem if you're firing at ships interdicting tankers), the killzone is more or less just the immediate area of the Strait, maybe in the Gulf, but nowhere else.
I would say the whole subject more or less returns to what I was musing about some days ago, i.e. weaponizing the tankers. Place soldiers or assets on these ships to either directly target enemies attempting to land via helicopter or provide targeting data to onshore drones missiles. But both have tremendous implications on shipping in general.

Wrong analysis, I think.

@Persian Gulf and @Immortals are probably better at this topic. So, they can correct me if I'm wrong.

But Iran has both AShBMs and AShCMs. Iran's Persian Gulf missile is a solid-fueled ballistic missile that uses INS with IR/EO sensors in the terminal phase. It's probably been equipped with satnav too, but I'm not sure about that. It has been tested against a replica of an aircraft carrier with success previously. Although, the replica didn't enjoy the agility of a US aircraft carrier. So, that's clearly a weakness that can render it useless in real warfare. Its maximum speed is estimated at 4 Mach, and its operational range has recently been extended to 700km.

Iran also has a handful of cruise missiles with anti-ship capabilities. Probably the best one is Abu-Mahdi CM. It is a subsonic missile with a range of 1,000 km, but if fired in large numbers, it may have a chance. After all, there's always quality in large quantity.

If Iran fires, say 100-150 cruise missiles and 5 PG missiles at a carrier, then maybe it can work. Who knows?

 

[Hassan Al-Somal]