Iran - Israel/US War: Israel-US declare war on Iran, Iran responds

[Shawnee]

Another note:

We have not seen a robotic dog in this war yet. Only robotic armored vehicles or decoys.

Looks like we are not that close to robotic dogs and mules

 

[Solomon2]

Commuters drive past a billboard bearing pictures of Iran’s President Masoud Pezeshkian (2-L), armed forces chief of staff Major General Mohammad Bagheri (L), US President Joe Biden (2-R) and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu (R) in Vali-Asr square in Tehran on October 27, 2024. (AFP)

Analysis: Iran’s options after Israel’s attack, and why none of them are good​

Yaghoub Fazeli, Al Arabiya English

One consequence of the October 7, 2023 Hamas attack on Israel, which sparked the war in Gaza and further tensions across the Middle East, has been the considerable weakening of Iranian deterrence.

In under a year, Israel assassinated several senior Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) commanders, attacked an Iranian diplomatic site, assassinated the leader of Hamas Ismail Haniyeh while he was in the Iranian capital, and killed Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah, a revered figure among Iranian regime supporters, some of whom considered him a candidate for Iran’s next supreme leader.


On Saturday, Iran suffered another serious setback when the conflict reached its own soil – a scenario Tehran has long sought to avoid. In an unprecedented move, Israel overtly attacked military sites, including missile factories, in Iran. The airstrikes killed at least four soldiers and one civilian, according to Iran.

It was the first overt, large-scale attack on Iran by a state actor since the Iran-Iraq war of the 1980s. It was also the most significant operation – whether overt or covert – carried out by Israel against Iran to date.

The Israeli attack “represents the breaking of a major taboo and is a disturbing development that could be a harbinger of more such attacks in the future,” Farzan Sabet, senior research associate at the Geneva Graduate Institute, told Al Arabiya English.

This transition from indirect to direct conflict began with Iran’s unprecedented missile and drone strike on Israel in April, in response to a deadly attack on Iran’s consulate in Damascus, widely attributed to Israel.

Analysts now suggest this shift may have backfired on Iran.

“Iran’s strategic shift in April was always a gamble, and it appears to have backfired. By taking its confrontation with Israel out of the shadows, Iran exposed itself to a conventional military exchange – one where it is at a disadvantage,” Gregory Brew, senior analyst at Eurasia Group, told Al Arabiya English.

After Iran’s April attack on Israel, explosions rocked Iran’s Isfahan province in what was reportedly an Israeli retaliatory strike. Israel did not claim responsibility, while Iran downplayed the incident, and that exchange came to an end.

Then, on October 1, Iran launched another missile barrage against Israel, retaliating for the killings of Nasrallah, Haniyeh and IRGC commander Abbas Nilforoushan.

Israel said that, as in April, most of the approximately 200 missiles Iran fired on October 1 were intercepted.

This time, Israel responded overtly. Israeli jets conducted three waves of airstrikes early on Saturday, targeting missile factories and other sites in Iran’s western regions and near Tehran. Israel declared its operation successful, saying that it achieved all objectives.

Immediately following the attack, Iranian state media downplayed and even mocked the attack, but analysts noted a subtle shift in rhetoric afterward.

“Just looking at Iranian media, it is clear that there is an ongoing debate as to whether and how to respond, but the rhetoric is shifting from downplaying the attack to promising a response,” Michael Horowitz, head of intelligence at Le Beck International, a security and risk management firm based in Bahrain, told Al Arabiya English.

This shift seemed to follow remarks by Iran’s highest authority, Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, whose statements often set the tone for officials and state media. In his first comments on the Israeli strikes, Khamenei said on Sunday that the attack “should neither be downplayed nor exaggerated.”

A handout picture provided by the office of Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei on October 27, 2024, shows him waving before a meeting in Tehran. (Via AFP)
Hours later, Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian vowed that Tehran would deliver an “appropriate response” to Israel’s attack. The next day, Hossein Salami, head of the IRGC, warned of “bitter and unimaginable” consequences for Israel.

Khamenei stopped short of calling for immediate retaliation, but he said that Israel must be made to understand the “power of the Iranian nation.”

The supreme leader’s “choice of somewhat vague and general language likely reflects the fact that the regime has not decided upon a response, and is weighing its options,” Brew explained.

Jason Brodsky, policy director at United Against Nuclear Iran (UANI), told Al Arabiya English that Khamenei’s lack of a firm public pledge for retaliation does not mean there will not be one.

“Let’s not forget that after Nasrallah was eliminated, Khamenei never made a firm pledge to respond. But only days later, Tehran attacked Israel again with little notice,” Brodsky pointed out.

Iran’s dilemma​

Iran’s options to respond are few, and none of them are good, analysts say.

Choosing not to respond risks further weakening Iran’s deterrence and credibility and could encourage more Israeli attacks down the line.

If Tehran opts to strike Israel for a third time, it risks a stronger Israeli response, potentially targeting critical infrastructure, such as energy facilities or nuclear sites. Iran’s air defenses, already weakened by Saturday’s strikes, leave it more vulnerable to Israeli attacks.

Israeli Defense Minister Yoav Gallant reinforced this message, saying on Monday that Israel’s recent attack puts Iran at a disadvantage that Israel could exploit in the future.

“You have conducted accurate strikes on their radars and air defense systems, which creates a huge disadvantage for the enemy when we will want to strike later,” a statement released by Gallant’s office quoted him as saying during a meeting with air force chiefs.

This handout picture released by the Israeli army on October 26, 2024, shows an Israeli fighter jet departing a hangar at an undisclosed location in Israel. (AFP)
Some analysts believe that Iran’s earlier missile strikes on Israel were more symbolic than destructive, meant to signal strength without provoking escalation. But even if Tehran had the capability to cause significant harm to Israel, it is unlikely to want to do so. Iran’s leadership prioritizes regime preservation above all else and is cautious of triggering a response that could endanger its survival.

“The Israeli attack on October 26 hints at the possibility that Israel will escalate, if Iran responds,” Horowitz said.

“Israel hit air defenses close to key economic sites, including the Abadan refinery for instance. It also hit a site that was used by Iran for its nuclear program in the past – in what I think is a message to Tehran,” he added.

A middle ground for Iran might involve a “small and largely symbolic” response, perhaps through its regional proxies, to try to “maintain a semblance of deterrence without triggering escalation,” suggested Brew.

Even a limited Iranian response, however, risks further Israeli strikes.

Iran could escalate indirectly by advancing its nuclear program or altering its nuclear doctrine, a step that Iranian officials have previously threatened. However, such actions risk eliciting strong responses from Israel and possibly the US, both of which are staunchly opposed to Iran’s acquisition of nuclear weapons.

Iran could also choose to repeat what it did following Haniyeh’s killing: promise retaliation but not take any action. This approach, however, did not work out well for Tehran, as Israel went on to assassinate both Nasrallah and Nilforoushan shortly afterward, compelling Iran to respond and setting off the current cycle of escalation.

Future dynamics​

The direct confrontation between Iran and Israel suggests overt military exchanges could become a regular feature of their rivalry. However, analysts agree Iran would prefer to avoid this outcome.

“Iran’s advantage is highest when violence is in the gray zone, below the threshold of direct warfare,” said Thomas Juneau, an associate professor at the University of Ottawa in Canada.

“At some point, Iran will want to bring the confrontation back to this level, where its weaknesses are less apparent, and where it can maximize its remaining strengths,” Juneau told Al Arabiya English.

Sabet agreed, saying that Iran would seek to avoid a situation where overt Israeli attacks become normalized.

“Tehran will try to find a way to deter Israel again from conducting such overt attacks, whether that’s through rebuilding the ‘Axis of Resistance’ in the Levant, strengthening its conventional military capabilities, seeking to ‘break out’ or ‘sneak out’ to nuclear weapons, a combination of all of the above, or possibly moving toward a diplomatic resolution of this conflict,” he said.

 

[ToddE]

I presume that Iran won't need another 4-5 years to construct and put into service another Bavar-373 unit.

It does seem like a very long time to get the 2nd unit into place. I know at first you build slowly to learn from initial deployment and to work out a more efficient manufacturing process but that timeframe seems very slow to me.

Hopefully more batteries of Bavar-373 will be in place very soon.

Why Bavar-373 production was delayed deliberately is another story of possible espionage (cant say its true or not). Remember Iran is fighting Mossad, CIA, MI6, BND, etc simultaneously. These people are no stupid poor 3rd world enemy, they are the world's best. Iran is learning and adapting which is why it's being respected at strategic and diplomatic levels now at the global stage.

With the defense budget going three times, I think IADS, Missile/Space program will go rapidly. The nuclear program will probably be modernized IMO as well even if the doctrine in nuclear ambiguity like Israel itself. Lets not forget the IRIAF both manned and unmanned.

 

[ToddE]

Commuters drive past a billboard bearing pictures of Iran’s President Masoud Pezeshkian (2-L), armed forces chief of staff Major General Mohammad Bagheri (L), US President Joe Biden (2-R) and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu (R) in Vali-Asr square in Tehran on October 27, 2024. (AFP)

Analysis: Iran’s options after Israel’s attack, and why none of them are good​

Yaghoub Fazeli, Al Arabiya English

One consequence of the October 7, 2023 Hamas attack on Israel, which sparked the war in Gaza and further tensions across the Middle East, has been the considerable weakening of Iranian deterrence.

In under a year, Israel assassinated several senior Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) commanders, attacked an Iranian diplomatic site, assassinated the leader of Hamas Ismail Haniyeh while he was in the Iranian capital, and killed Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah, a revered figure among Iranian regime supporters, some of whom considered him a candidate for Iran’s next supreme leader.


On Saturday, Iran suffered another serious setback when the conflict reached its own soil – a scenario Tehran has long sought to avoid. In an unprecedented move, Israel overtly attacked military sites, including missile factories, in Iran. The airstrikes killed at least four soldiers and one civilian, according to Iran.

It was the first overt, large-scale attack on Iran by a state actor since the Iran-Iraq war of the 1980s. It was also the most significant operation – whether overt or covert – carried out by Israel against Iran to date.

The Israeli attack “represents the breaking of a major taboo and is a disturbing development that could be a harbinger of more such attacks in the future,” Farzan Sabet, senior research associate at the Geneva Graduate Institute, told Al Arabiya English.

This transition from indirect to direct conflict began with Iran’s unprecedented missile and drone strike on Israel in April, in response to a deadly attack on Iran’s consulate in Damascus, widely attributed to Israel.

Analysts now suggest this shift may have backfired on Iran.

“Iran’s strategic shift in April was always a gamble, and it appears to have backfired. By taking its confrontation with Israel out of the shadows, Iran exposed itself to a conventional military exchange – one where it is at a disadvantage,” Gregory Brew, senior analyst at Eurasia Group, told Al Arabiya English.

After Iran’s April attack on Israel, explosions rocked Iran’s Isfahan province in what was reportedly an Israeli retaliatory strike. Israel did not claim responsibility, while Iran downplayed the incident, and that exchange came to an end.

Then, on October 1, Iran launched another missile barrage against Israel, retaliating for the killings of Nasrallah, Haniyeh and IRGC commander Abbas Nilforoushan.

Israel said that, as in April, most of the approximately 200 missiles Iran fired on October 1 were intercepted.

This time, Israel responded overtly. Israeli jets conducted three waves of airstrikes early on Saturday, targeting missile factories and other sites in Iran’s western regions and near Tehran. Israel declared its operation successful, saying that it achieved all objectives.

Immediately following the attack, Iranian state media downplayed and even mocked the attack, but analysts noted a subtle shift in rhetoric afterward.

“Just looking at Iranian media, it is clear that there is an ongoing debate as to whether and how to respond, but the rhetoric is shifting from downplaying the attack to promising a response,” Michael Horowitz, head of intelligence at Le Beck International, a security and risk management firm based in Bahrain, told Al Arabiya English.

This shift seemed to follow remarks by Iran’s highest authority, Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, whose statements often set the tone for officials and state media. In his first comments on the Israeli strikes, Khamenei said on Sunday that the attack “should neither be downplayed nor exaggerated.”

A handout picture provided by the office of Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei on October 27, 2024, shows him waving before a meeting in Tehran. (Via AFP)
Hours later, Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian vowed that Tehran would deliver an “appropriate response” to Israel’s attack. The next day, Hossein Salami, head of the IRGC, warned of “bitter and unimaginable” consequences for Israel.

Khamenei stopped short of calling for immediate retaliation, but he said that Israel must be made to understand the “power of the Iranian nation.”

The supreme leader’s “choice of somewhat vague and general language likely reflects the fact that the regime has not decided upon a response, and is weighing its options,” Brew explained.

Jason Brodsky, policy director at United Against Nuclear Iran (UANI), told Al Arabiya English that Khamenei’s lack of a firm public pledge for retaliation does not mean there will not be one.

“Let’s not forget that after Nasrallah was eliminated, Khamenei never made a firm pledge to respond. But only days later, Tehran attacked Israel again with little notice,” Brodsky pointed out.

Iran’s dilemma​

Iran’s options to respond are few, and none of them are good, analysts say.

Choosing not to respond risks further weakening Iran’s deterrence and credibility and could encourage more Israeli attacks down the line.

If Tehran opts to strike Israel for a third time, it risks a stronger Israeli response, potentially targeting critical infrastructure, such as energy facilities or nuclear sites. Iran’s air defenses, already weakened by Saturday’s strikes, leave it more vulnerable to Israeli attacks.

Israeli Defense Minister Yoav Gallant reinforced this message, saying on Monday that Israel’s recent attack puts Iran at a disadvantage that Israel could exploit in the future.

“You have conducted accurate strikes on their radars and air defense systems, which creates a huge disadvantage for the enemy when we will want to strike later,” a statement released by Gallant’s office quoted him as saying during a meeting with air force chiefs.

This handout picture released by the Israeli army on October 26, 2024, shows an Israeli fighter jet departing a hangar at an undisclosed location in Israel. (AFP)
Some analysts believe that Iran’s earlier missile strikes on Israel were more symbolic than destructive, meant to signal strength without provoking escalation. But even if Tehran had the capability to cause significant harm to Israel, it is unlikely to want to do so. Iran’s leadership prioritizes regime preservation above all else and is cautious of triggering a response that could endanger its survival.

“The Israeli attack on October 26 hints at the possibility that Israel will escalate, if Iran responds,” Horowitz said.

“Israel hit air defenses close to key economic sites, including the Abadan refinery for instance. It also hit a site that was used by Iran for its nuclear program in the past – in what I think is a message to Tehran,” he added.

A middle ground for Iran might involve a “small and largely symbolic” response, perhaps through its regional proxies, to try to “maintain a semblance of deterrence without triggering escalation,” suggested Brew.

Even a limited Iranian response, however, risks further Israeli strikes.

Iran could escalate indirectly by advancing its nuclear program or altering its nuclear doctrine, a step that Iranian officials have previously threatened. However, such actions risk eliciting strong responses from Israel and possibly the US, both of which are staunchly opposed to Iran’s acquisition of nuclear weapons.

Iran could also choose to repeat what it did following Haniyeh’s killing: promise retaliation but not take any action. This approach, however, did not work out well for Tehran, as Israel went on to assassinate both Nasrallah and Nilforoushan shortly afterward, compelling Iran to respond and setting off the current cycle of escalation.

Future dynamics​

The direct confrontation between Iran and Israel suggests overt military exchanges could become a regular feature of their rivalry. However, analysts agree Iran would prefer to avoid this outcome.

“Iran’s advantage is highest when violence is in the gray zone, below the threshold of direct warfare,” said Thomas Juneau, an associate professor at the University of Ottawa in Canada.

“At some point, Iran will want to bring the confrontation back to this level, where its weaknesses are less apparent, and where it can maximize its remaining strengths,” Juneau told Al Arabiya English.

Sabet agreed, saying that Iran would seek to avoid a situation where overt Israeli attacks become normalized.

“Tehran will try to find a way to deter Israel again from conducting such overt attacks, whether that’s through rebuilding the ‘Axis of Resistance’ in the Levant, strengthening its conventional military capabilities, seeking to ‘break out’ or ‘sneak out’ to nuclear weapons, a combination of all of the above, or possibly moving toward a diplomatic resolution of this conflict,” he said.

Misinformation alert, propoganda article full of made-up Israeli "sources", published on Saudi state-run propoganda channel. What can go wrong?

 

[Solomon2]

Misinformation alert, propoganda article full of made-up Israeli "sources", published on Saudi state-run propoganda channel. What can go wrong?

No Israeli sources in article.
Is your problem the content, the poster, or both?

 

[MihanDefender]

The reason for the failure of Israel's attack on Iran, according to the MI6 agent

An unknown defense system locked the fighters!

Alastair Crook, diplomat and former British MI6 agent:
The Israeli planes, which were supposed to destroy the air defense with long-range missiles in the first stage, did not even reach seventy or one hundred kilometers from Iran's borders.

So what happened? It seems that first of all they were locked by another missile defense system and were afraid to continue and then called off the attack and fired their long range missiles.

 

[UKBengali]

Why Bavar-373 production was delayed deliberately is another story of possible espionage (cant say its true or not). Remember Iran is fighting Mossad, CIA, MI6, BND, etc simultaneously. These people are no stupid poor 3rd world enemy, they are the world's best. Iran is learning and adapting which is why it's being respected at strategic and diplomatic levels now at the global stage.

With the defense budget going three times, I think IADS, Missile/Space program will go rapidly. The nuclear program will probably be modernized IMO as well even if the doctrine in nuclear ambiguity like Israel itself. Lets not forget the IRIAF both manned and unmanned.

I think the story is closer to Iran having to go slow due to the fact they did not want to mass produce when they needed to learn and refine from intial production system, refining the production process for a new SAM and of course deliberate sabotage from the Zionists and their allies.

Iran is sure to now be able to bring on new batteries much quicker as even with sabotage it would have worked out ways to at least mitigate the effects and so speed up production.

 

[UKBengali]

The reason for the failure of Israel's attack on Iran, according to the MI6 agent

An unknown defense system locked the fighters!

Alastair Crook, diplomat and former British MI6 agent:
The Israeli planes, which were supposed to destroy the air defense with long-range missiles in the first stage, did not even reach seventy or one hundred kilometers from Iran's borders.

So what happened? It seems that first of all they were locked by another missile defense system and were afraid to continue and then called off the attack and fired their long range missiles.

Several western or neutral youtube channels have commented on the "surprise" performance of Bavar-373. The unknown system was probably Bavar-373.

 

[Lulldapull]

Targets were struck with precision and damaged, that is clear. What is less clear is what was actually at those targets and damaged/destroyed (given Iran claims it had advance warning and moved most key assets to safety, and satellite imagery does not indicate massive secondary explosions) and what impact that will have on Iran.

View attachment 75838

Rocket fuel mixers are just like those readymade concrete mixers on trucks. Rotate slowly and mix the ingredients whilst the machinery is earthed. Even if they were destroyed, which I seriously doubt, yous looking at $10k each in cost.

Clunky old machinery no?

 

[Hassan Al-Somal]

Their propaganda seems to have an effect on their political leaders, it seems.

 

[Liquidator]

Commuters drive past a billboard bearing pictures of Iran’s President Masoud Pezeshkian (2-L), armed forces chief of staff Major General Mohammad Bagheri (L), US President Joe Biden (2-R) and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu (R) in Vali-Asr square in Tehran on October 27, 2024. (AFP)

Analysis: Iran’s options after Israel’s attack, and why none of them are good​

Yaghoub Fazeli, Al Arabiya English

One consequence of the October 7, 2023 Hamas attack on Israel, which sparked the war in Gaza and further tensions across the Middle East, has been the considerable weakening of Iranian deterrence.

In under a year, Israel assassinated several senior Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) commanders, attacked an Iranian diplomatic site, assassinated the leader of Hamas Ismail Haniyeh while he was in the Iranian capital, and killed Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah, a revered figure among Iranian regime supporters, some of whom considered him a candidate for Iran’s next supreme leader.


On Saturday, Iran suffered another serious setback when the conflict reached its own soil – a scenario Tehran has long sought to avoid. In an unprecedented move, Israel overtly attacked military sites, including missile factories, in Iran. The airstrikes killed at least four soldiers and one civilian, according to Iran.

It was the first overt, large-scale attack on Iran by a state actor since the Iran-Iraq war of the 1980s. It was also the most significant operation – whether overt or covert – carried out by Israel against Iran to date.

The Israeli attack “represents the breaking of a major taboo and is a disturbing development that could be a harbinger of more such attacks in the future,” Farzan Sabet, senior research associate at the Geneva Graduate Institute, told Al Arabiya English.

This transition from indirect to direct conflict began with Iran’s unprecedented missile and drone strike on Israel in April, in response to a deadly attack on Iran’s consulate in Damascus, widely attributed to Israel.

Analysts now suggest this shift may have backfired on Iran.

“Iran’s strategic shift in April was always a gamble, and it appears to have backfired. By taking its confrontation with Israel out of the shadows, Iran exposed itself to a conventional military exchange – one where it is at a disadvantage,” Gregory Brew, senior analyst at Eurasia Group, told Al Arabiya English.

After Iran’s April attack on Israel, explosions rocked Iran’s Isfahan province in what was reportedly an Israeli retaliatory strike. Israel did not claim responsibility, while Iran downplayed the incident, and that exchange came to an end.

Then, on October 1, Iran launched another missile barrage against Israel, retaliating for the killings of Nasrallah, Haniyeh and IRGC commander Abbas Nilforoushan.

Israel said that, as in April, most of the approximately 200 missiles Iran fired on October 1 were intercepted.

This time, Israel responded overtly. Israeli jets conducted three waves of airstrikes early on Saturday, targeting missile factories and other sites in Iran’s western regions and near Tehran. Israel declared its operation successful, saying that it achieved all objectives.

Immediately following the attack, Iranian state media downplayed and even mocked the attack, but analysts noted a subtle shift in rhetoric afterward.

“Just looking at Iranian media, it is clear that there is an ongoing debate as to whether and how to respond, but the rhetoric is shifting from downplaying the attack to promising a response,” Michael Horowitz, head of intelligence at Le Beck International, a security and risk management firm based in Bahrain, told Al Arabiya English.

This shift seemed to follow remarks by Iran’s highest authority, Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, whose statements often set the tone for officials and state media. In his first comments on the Israeli strikes, Khamenei said on Sunday that the attack “should neither be downplayed nor exaggerated.”

A handout picture provided by the office of Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei on October 27, 2024, shows him waving before a meeting in Tehran. (Via AFP)
Hours later, Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian vowed that Tehran would deliver an “appropriate response” to Israel’s attack. The next day, Hossein Salami, head of the IRGC, warned of “bitter and unimaginable” consequences for Israel.

Khamenei stopped short of calling for immediate retaliation, but he said that Israel must be made to understand the “power of the Iranian nation.”

The supreme leader’s “choice of somewhat vague and general language likely reflects the fact that the regime has not decided upon a response, and is weighing its options,” Brew explained.

Jason Brodsky, policy director at United Against Nuclear Iran (UANI), told Al Arabiya English that Khamenei’s lack of a firm public pledge for retaliation does not mean there will not be one.

“Let’s not forget that after Nasrallah was eliminated, Khamenei never made a firm pledge to respond. But only days later, Tehran attacked Israel again with little notice,” Brodsky pointed out.

Iran’s dilemma​

Iran’s options to respond are few, and none of them are good, analysts say.

Choosing not to respond risks further weakening Iran’s deterrence and credibility and could encourage more Israeli attacks down the line.

If Tehran opts to strike Israel for a third time, it risks a stronger Israeli response, potentially targeting critical infrastructure, such as energy facilities or nuclear sites. Iran’s air defenses, already weakened by Saturday’s strikes, leave it more vulnerable to Israeli attacks.

Israeli Defense Minister Yoav Gallant reinforced this message, saying on Monday that Israel’s recent attack puts Iran at a disadvantage that Israel could exploit in the future.

“You have conducted accurate strikes on their radars and air defense systems, which creates a huge disadvantage for the enemy when we will want to strike later,” a statement released by Gallant’s office quoted him as saying during a meeting with air force chiefs.

This handout picture released by the Israeli army on October 26, 2024, shows an Israeli fighter jet departing a hangar at an undisclosed location in Israel. (AFP)
Some analysts believe that Iran’s earlier missile strikes on Israel were more symbolic than destructive, meant to signal strength without provoking escalation. But even if Tehran had the capability to cause significant harm to Israel, it is unlikely to want to do so. Iran’s leadership prioritizes regime preservation above all else and is cautious of triggering a response that could endanger its survival.

“The Israeli attack on October 26 hints at the possibility that Israel will escalate, if Iran responds,” Horowitz said.

“Israel hit air defenses close to key economic sites, including the Abadan refinery for instance. It also hit a site that was used by Iran for its nuclear program in the past – in what I think is a message to Tehran,” he added.

A middle ground for Iran might involve a “small and largely symbolic” response, perhaps through its regional proxies, to try to “maintain a semblance of deterrence without triggering escalation,” suggested Brew.

Even a limited Iranian response, however, risks further Israeli strikes.

Iran could escalate indirectly by advancing its nuclear program or altering its nuclear doctrine, a step that Iranian officials have previously threatened. However, such actions risk eliciting strong responses from Israel and possibly the US, both of which are staunchly opposed to Iran’s acquisition of nuclear weapons.

Iran could also choose to repeat what it did following Haniyeh’s killing: promise retaliation but not take any action. This approach, however, did not work out well for Tehran, as Israel went on to assassinate both Nasrallah and Nilforoushan shortly afterward, compelling Iran to respond and setting off the current cycle of escalation.

Future dynamics​

The direct confrontation between Iran and Israel suggests overt military exchanges could become a regular feature of their rivalry. However, analysts agree Iran would prefer to avoid this outcome.

“Iran’s advantage is highest when violence is in the gray zone, below the threshold of direct warfare,” said Thomas Juneau, an associate professor at the University of Ottawa in Canada.

“At some point, Iran will want to bring the confrontation back to this level, where its weaknesses are less apparent, and where it can maximize its remaining strengths,” Juneau told Al Arabiya English.

Sabet agreed, saying that Iran would seek to avoid a situation where overt Israeli attacks become normalized.

“Tehran will try to find a way to deter Israel again from conducting such overt attacks, whether that’s through rebuilding the ‘Axis of Resistance’ in the Levant, strengthening its conventional military capabilities, seeking to ‘break out’ or ‘sneak out’ to nuclear weapons, a combination of all of the above, or possibly moving toward a diplomatic resolution of this conflict,” he said.

Don't worry son

Iranian dick is going to pound you again soon. Learn to enjoy it.

 

[Alter_Ego]

If you look at immigration in the US, the overwhelming majority of the immigrants are not well-educated. The ratio of talented, highly intelligent people to poor, average people from underdeveloped countries that immigrate to the US is pretty bad for the US economy. That's why people are electing someone like Trump.

The US was always like that.
" Give me you poor and hungry...." or so goes an old US saying.
European emigrants were mostly outcasts, peasants, destitutes, who moved to the US to get to hold on some "free" land.

But that was when it was mostly white immigrants. The tune has changed now.
Lets face it, Trump have support for his anti immigration rhetoric because section of white americans dont want immigration of poor brown people.

 

[MihanDefender]

Several western or neutral youtube channels have commented on the "surprise" performance of Bavar-373. The unknown system was probably Bavar-373.

and you have this mod here that thinks Bavar 373 is not operational lol

 

[UKBengali]

and you have this mod here that thinks Bavar 373 is not operational lol

2019-2020 seems to be date of service depending on which source you read.

It is fully operational but the problem is that Iran cannot build them fast enough to provide the coverage it needs. I read somewhere that Iran was targeting 2030 for full and comprehensive deployment of Bavar-373 to all sites that need it.

Another theory is that Iran may potentially have prioritised the Khordad MRSAM as that came into service at the same time and they have around a dozen in service now. Build 2 more batteries of Bavar-373 or 6 of Khordad may have been a choice that Iran was faced with and decided to go with 6 of Khordad maybe.

 

[Liquidator]

Damn. That means that reasonable jews are getting out of Israel and perverted and criminals ones are living and coming there. What a country!!!

It's unfortunate I have to resort to such cheap shots....know that my beef is with zionists only.

I acknowledge there are peace loving Jews both orthodox and secular.

Breaking the Silence › The Organization

Breaking the Silence is an organization of veteran soldiers who have served in the Israeli military since the start of the Second Intifada and have taken it upon themselves to expose the public to the reality of everyday life in the Occupied Territories. We endeavor to stimulate public debate...

www.breakingthesilence.org.il

Zionists do seem to have an obsession with sodomy against Palestinians specifically. We refer to the footage of a Palestinian male prisoner gang raped by Israeli prison guards who later died from his injuries.

We refer to the subsequent freeing of said guards plus a debate within Israel itself around the permissibility of rape against native semitic Palestinian.

We also refer to Epstein, a likely MOSAD operation.