Frogen
Registered Member
I don’t think China is particularly bothered by U.S. sanctions on Iran — at least not behind the scenes. After all, the daughter of Huawei’s founder was held under house arrest in Canada for two years due to Huawei’s dealings with Iran’s telecom system. That alone shows China is willing to take certain risks and face Western backlash when the cooperation with Iran serves its interests.
But like any rational actor, China’s cooperation with Iran has to be mutually beneficial. If the risks outweigh the potential gains, China may very well choose not to take on excessive political cost.
It’s also worth mentioning that Iran only restored diplomatic ties with Saudi Arabia in 2023. Before that, any close cooperation with Iran not only risked friction with the West, but also could have been misunderstood or viewed unfavorably by other Sunni-majority countries in the region.
From a Chinese perspective, both China and Russia have, in the past, made suggestions regarding Iran’s military development. But Iran seems to have strong confidence in its own defense capabilities. In fact, during the 2024 Xiangshan Forum, Iran’s Chief of Staff, Habibollah Sayyari, said in an interview with Chinese reporters: "Iran's domestic weapons fully meet our needs. Our systems are increasingly diverse. We've repeatedly said that we and other regional countries can guarantee the region's security. There's no need for outsiders to get involved." That says a lot about Iran’s lack of urgency when it comes to deeper military cooperation.
As for your point about Trump tweeting that China could buy oil from Iran — I think you're reading way too much into it. Trump said a lot of things on Twitter that didn’t reflect actual policy. No serious strategist would base national-level judgments on his tweets alone.
In fact, Trump threatened in March this year to impose a 25% tariff on all countries importing oil from Venezuela. And yet, according to a Reuters report from early June, Venezuela’s oil exports to China actually rose in May — around 584,000 barrels per day, up from 521,000 in April. Global exports remained steady at about 779,000 bpd. This shows that China, using tactics like obscuring the source, trans-shipping, and re-labeling, not only maintained but even increased its intake of Venezuelan oil.
The global strategic landscape has changed. Trump slapped tariffs on practically everyone, and at one point, U.S.–China tariffs reached over 100%. Do you really think China still loses sleep over U.S. tariffs? Not to mention China holds leverage with rare earth exports.
So rather than saying China is afraid of U.S. economic retaliation, I’d argue the more decisive factor is whether the partnership with Iran is truly profitable or strategically beneficial for China. After all, Russia has already been sanctioned to the extreme by the West — yet even Russia’s cooperation with Iran has remained limited.
