The assumption here is that this pact only works through kinetic action.
I don't know why we buy the hasbara so readily that no immediate fire and brimstone equates to some sort of strategic loss.
There are probably other levers to try pulling first against the Houthis, especially with all parties being acutely aware that a fight against a group of rebellious Muslims, and an irregular force at that, is a challenge nobody should consider taking on lightly.
There's a reason Pakistan and Turkiye met. And there are different ways to deal with different dilemmas, some public, some not so public. Horses for courses, one may argue.
I would give this time to pan out....and be thankful that a major conflagration is still being averted. KSA itself is not touched. Technically, the conditions (we know of) to trigger kinetic action are not met yet. That's as good a reason as any to seek a bloodless solution.
Best response so far brother.
I'm not sure why people assumed that the Houthis taking over additional parts of Yemen would automatically trigger a full-scale invasion of Yemen by Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and Türkiye.
Did that happen between 2015 and 2025? No.
The Houthis will continue to be bombed, which is exactly what is happening now. With Iran under a US naval blockade, any Iranian resupply to the Houthis is also likely to become more difficult. Ultimately, the Houthis are having to fight with the ammunition and weapons already available to them, along with whatever they can continue to manufacture or obtain locally.
11/09/2026:
Houthis claim 2 Saudi airstrikes hit Mokha airport in southwestern Yemen: Anadolu Ajansi
12/09/2026:
Iraq removes Maysan operations commander after attacks on Saudi Arabia: Saudi Gazette
Now compare this with Afghanistan.
After the Afghan Taliban took over Afghanistan in August 2021, Pakistan spent years condemning Kabul, warning the Taliban about the TTP and demanding action against militants operating from Afghan territory.
Then, in October 2025, Pakistan carried out relentless strikes on all major Afghan cities that included Kabul and Kandahar. The same pattern was repeated on a much larger scale in March 2026, when Pakistani aircraft again struck targets in Kabul and Kandahar.
So the lesson from Pakistan's experience with the Taliban is pretty straightforward: years of warnings and diplomatic pressure do not necessarily mean a country will launch an immediate ground invasion. It can spend years applying pressure, conducting limited strikes and then escalate dramatically when it decides its security interests require it.
That is why I don't understand the assumption that the current Houthi advances automatically mean Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and Türkiye should launch a full-scale invasion of Yemen.
