Makkah Joint Defense Agreement: Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and Pakistan, news & updates

I believe Israel and Turkey on a path of conflict and the Turkish inroads to Syria is a major Israeli concern--look at what Naftali Bennet says; he is the likely next Israeli PM!
As to Turkey and NATO: I am sure the Turks know that NATO will not come to their defense IF Israel attacks Turkey because NATO is essentially nothing without America. But being part of NATO has modernized not just the Turkish military but also a host of other technologies and business methods. Pakistan too benefited greatly from being in the Western orbit since Pakistan's inception. I saw somewhere even the SSG unit of Pakistani military was started by the Americans and now the SSG is a pride of Pakistan.

Pragmatic nations first build their infra and in today's world, it is obvious to everyone that it is now a Law of the Jungle! Military preparedness is the most important part of geopolitics. Ask the toothless countries how vulnerable they are without a military might. Pakistan, thankfully, is well prepared to face the Law of the Jungle.
If that's the case, it will be the death nail for NATO, and I don't see that happening at all. The US won't allow Israel to attack Turkey.
 
Crying Team

Iran
Israel
India
Greece

So it seems these countries have malicious intentions towards Pakistan, Turkiye, and Saudi Arabia.

This is just a defense agreement... we are not going to attack anyone.
Indians are talking about putting submarines at the Bab Al Mandab to interdict Pakistani and Turkish naval naval vessels assisting Saudis.

Any chance the Saudis can get Oman on board to build a rail and pipeline link from Saudi to Muscat? For Saudis, it would help mitigate the threat of closure of the two waterways, somewhat, into the future.
 
They will keep animosity because these munafiqs “Iranian” will never forget their beating by Rashidun caliphate and ending there empire.. They want to dominate the region even if they need to shake hands with satan, let alone Zionist, knight templars and hindutva regimes..

Nah, we don't look at the old past (Persians), let's look at the future.

For your information, Iranians are not bad people at all. They survived, struggled, and fought well.

Let's get together with all Muslim brothers/sisters please.
 
Crying Team

Iran
Israel
India
Greece
The mere fact that a muslim nation is feeling uneasy about this pact and that too pakistan's neighbour should ring some alarm bells within the policy making circles. Do we not have enough neighbours in both east and west looking to wipe us off the map if given the chance?

Acting unilaterally without paying any heed to the sensitivities of our neighbouring countries then cry crocodile tears is not going to solve our problems.
 
The mere fact that a muslim nation is feeling uneasy about this pact and that too pakistan's neighbour should ring some alarm bells within the policy making circles. Do we not have enough neighbours in both east and west looking to wipe us off the map if given the chance?

Acting unilaterally without paying any heed to the sensitivities of our neighbouring countries then cry crocodile tears is not going to solve our problems.

Iran feels uneasy because they ultimately see Turkiye, Saudi and Pakistan as enemies. But its not our problem to care about what are enemies would like to see us do.

If you look at their history they have allied with the enemies of Turkiye, Pakistan and Saudi. These enemies can be christians and even hindus against Muslims.
 
Ideally, Iran would be part of such an alliance. But alliances are not freebies; they are transactional arrangements built around converging strategic interests. The obvious question, therefore, is: what exactly would Iran bring to the table, and what would Iran expect in return?

More importantly, why would the IRGC agree to enter an unfamiliar security architecture with Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan when there is limited strategic and ideological alignment with some of these countries? Iran has spent decades building an independent security doctrine based on strategic autonomy, asymmetric warfare, missile and drone capabilities, and, most importantly, a network of regional partners and proxies that gives Tehran strategic depth. Joining a formal multilateral alliance could constrain precisely those instruments that have allowed Iran to survive decades of isolation.

So the Iranian question cannot simply be reduced to "Why doesn't Iran join?" The more important question is whether the proposed alliance offers Tehran something sufficiently valuable to compensate for the strategic autonomy it would potentially have to sacrifice.

Then there is the question of deterrence against the United States and Israel.

Has Iran established deterrence? Partially, yes—but the nature of that deterrence is often misunderstood.

Iran has certainly demonstrated that it can impose significant costs on an adversary and that attacking Iran is not comparable to conducting a conventional strike against a small, geographically compact state. Iran's enormous territory, population, strategic depth, dispersed military infrastructure and extensive missile and drone capabilities make a prolonged campaign extraordinarily difficult.

But this is not the same thing as Iran possessing the ability to consistently impose a symmetrical military response on the United States or Israel. Iran's deterrence is therefore based less on the ability to defeat either country conventionally and more on the ability to make the costs of a prolonged conflict sufficiently high and unpredictable.

In other words, Iran's geography and strategic depth are themselves deterrent assets.

The US-Israel-Iran confrontation is therefore unlikely to be resolved through a single decisive war. It may increasingly resemble a long-term strategic contest, somewhat analogous to the Syrian experience in the sense that military confrontation, covert action, proxy warfare, sanctions, intelligence operations and periodic strikes can continue for years without producing a definitive strategic settlement.

The United States and Israel may periodically attempt to degrade Iranian missile, nuclear, drone and military infrastructure whenever they believe Iran's capabilities are becoming unacceptable. Iran, meanwhile, will attempt to regenerate those capabilities, improve survivability and develop new means of imposing costs on its adversaries.

That creates a perpetual cycle of degradation, adaptation and regeneration.

And this is precisely where the proposed alliance becomes complicated.

If Iran is brought into a formal security pact, Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan could potentially become indirectly exposed to this confrontation. The alliance could create expectations that these countries support Iran diplomatically, economically, technologically or even militarily whenever Tehran comes under sustained pressure. None of the three is likely to accept an arrangement that automatically obliges them to fight the United States or Israel every time Iran is attacked.

But this is also why we need to stop thinking of alliances exclusively in terms of the traditional "attack one, attack all" model.

A modern strategic partnership does not necessarily require automatic military intervention. The real value can lie in operational expansion, intelligence sharing, logistics, interoperability, defence-industrial cooperation, joint production, technology transfer, supply-chain redundancy and increased survivability of military capabilities.

For example, Iran's experience in developing missiles, drones, asymmetric warfare and military systems under severe sanctions could complement Turkey's increasingly sophisticated defence industry and Pakistan's experience in conventional warfare and strategic deterrence. Saudi Arabia, meanwhile, brings enormous financial resources, energy leverage and access to capital and international markets.

The resulting ecosystem could be considerably more valuable than simply promising to send troops to defend one another.

Iran's experience with Russia should also be a lesson here. Tehran invested considerable strategic value in its relationship with Moscow, including cooperation in drones and other military technologies, presumably expecting reciprocal military, technological and diplomatic support. Yet the relationship demonstrated an uncomfortable reality: great powers rarely enter alliances purely on the basis of friendship or ideological affinity; they act according to their own strategic interests.

Iran therefore has every reason to be cautious about entering another alliance in which it could potentially provide more strategic value than it receives in return.

And then there is the biggest institutional obstacle: the IRGC.

For the IRGC, Iran's regional network is not merely a collection of "proxies" that can be switched on and off. It has become an important component of Iran's national-security doctrine and strategic depth. Hezbollah, Iraqi armed groups, the Houthis and other regional relationships give Tehran mechanisms for projecting influence, deterring adversaries and keeping potential battlefields away from Iran's borders.

A formal alliance with Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan could therefore create uncomfortable contradictions. What happens when Saudi interests conflict with an Iranian partner in the region? What happens when Turkey's Syria policy conflicts with Tehran's? What happens when Pakistan wants to maintain relations with Washington while Iran is engaged in a confrontation with the United States?

These are not theoretical problems. They go directly to the question of whether the alliance could survive its first serious strategic crisis.

The IRGC would therefore have to ask itself a fundamental question: would the alliance enhance Iran's strategic depth or undermine it?

If joining the pact requires Tehran to abandon or substantially restructure its existing regional networks, Iran may see little reason to join. But if the alliance is designed to complement rather than replace Iran's existing strategy, giving Tehran additional economic, technological, diplomatic and military options, then the calculation changes considerably.

This is why I think the most realistic model is not an immediate NATO-style Muslim military alliance. It would probably have to begin as a strategic cooperation framework: intelligence sharing, joint defence production, military exercises, drone and missile technology cooperation, secure supply chains, energy cooperation, financial mechanisms, coordinated diplomacy and perhaps eventually some form of collective-security guarantee.

Over time, successful cooperation could create enough mutual dependence to evolve into something much deeper.

The irony is that Iran may actually be one of the most valuable members of such an arrangement precisely because it is the country that has spent decades developing capabilities outside the Western security architecture. But that same history also makes Iran one of the most difficult countries to integrate into a conventional alliance.

So the challenge isn't simply convincing Iran to join.

The challenge is designing an alliance that Iran has a strategic reason to join without requiring it to abandon the very security architecture that allowed it to survive in the first place.

And unless that equation is solved, a Turkey-Saudi-Pakistan-Iran alliance will remain an attractive idea on paper but an extremely difficult institution to operationalise in reality.
I just want to say this is the best post in the whole thread. Thank you. I have bookmarked it so I can absorb it in full detail.
 
Remember Egypt collects a yearly stipend because of tiny country next door. Enough to justify the massacre and genocide of millions. T
When you have wars with the jews 6 times like Egypt come and lecture me bro about the yearly stipend.
we've lose thousands and thousands of our men for the palestinian cause and for our country , when we fight israel we fight america also , even in 1956 we had to fight 3 countries (israel, uk and france).

so spare me of your lectures bro.

UAE is nothing comapred to israel.
 
Never the less some

Call it whatever you like but some adjustments in foreign policies will have to be made if pact is meant to be something which can unify than some old romances and ties with west has to be cut off before they ask anything from Iran to act reasonably, why should they?
The notion that Iran has to worry about Saudi is not a serious one is it?

If ever ther was a window In the last century this was it, the Saudis didn't do anything active.

They are in fact worried because they have more comfort and wealth to protect

Pakistan poses no threat, in fact Iran owes Pakistan a bit

.so where is the rational basis unless you want to be hegemonic?

If they feel strategically restricted well that's the game, then curb the ambitions, no?
 
Crying Team

Iran
Israel
India
Greece

So it seems these countries have malicious intentions towards Pakistan, Turkiye, and Saudi Arabia.

This is just a defense agreement... we are not going to attack anyone.
Yea more or less looking like this
 
Acting unilaterally without paying any heed to the sensitivities of our neighbouring countries then cry crocodile tears is not going to solve our problems
It works both ways


Let's do the accounting on who is paying heed and end the debate?
 
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Saudi zionists are the most untrustworthy allies, Turkey is the only trustable ally for Pakistan, Egypt is not independent enough. No alliance of such benefits Pakistan, will Saudis back Pakistan against India? Dream on.
Keep your bad mouth for yourself..and swallow these small facts:

Who previously saved Pakistan and stood with it in all its economic, political and military crises? Kingdom of Saudi Arabia

Who stood up to the world at that time, challenged everyone, and made Pakistan's nuclear program see the light? Kingdom of Saudi Arabia

Who helped Pakistan during the 1971 war of secession between Pakistan and India and sent naval forces to it? Kingdom of Saudi Arabia

King Faisal directed Saudi military students in Pakistan to join the army

He directed Royal Saudi Air Force squadrons to defend Karachi

What else do you want?
 
When you have wars with the jews 6 times like Egypt come and lecture me bro about the yearly stipend.
Lecture?
Is that what you got out of it?
Listen, you brought up the tiny entity shtick. Who's the bigger one here... Egypt, right? So, you're admitting losing to the tiny entity and eating a stripend from not one but two tiny entities.

Pakistan is many times smaller than India... should Pakistan start running a similar shtick? Or is it the turn of tiny entities?

we've lose thousands and thousands of our men for the palestinian cause and for our country , when we fight israel we fight america also , even in 1956 we had to fight 3 countries (israel, uk and france).

so spare me of your lectures bro.

UAE is nothing comapred to israel.

So, thaaat is why you can't do the right thing anymore... exhausted or was the stipend enough?

The other one has over $30 billion in Egypt... don't disregard them like that... or does it have anything to do with how tiny hats manage it?
 

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