Modern cities of 2026 in North Korea

Thank you for your balanced view.

What if a Soviet writer in 1960s come to the US today would write after coming back to his homecountry. He saw filthy streets with millions of semi-starving, homeless people. Drugged-thugs chasing girls on the streets and people using rifles killing each other in the day time. Even in the center of New York, streets are full of trashes and flooding in heavy rain is normal. Not to mention the disgusting things people from a civilized nation would find inside New York metro. People openly poop and urinate on the pavements. Millions died from a pandemic which can easily controlled in the Soviet Union, North Korea or China.

If someone want to see a country via his distorted view to fit his narrative, he would always find things to write about.

I know that the above-mentioned bad things cannot represent America, but all of them are true, recorded by American/Western people and not propaganda. In the meantime, most of what people know about North Korea are from Western propaganda and a lot are clearly fake. They use pictures of the 1994 famine to talk about an imaginary famine today (and even not tried to make the pictures look recent). I have seen they use a dirty Native South American boy, which is totally different racially from North East Asian, to fake a North Korean boy living in poverty.
 
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Believe me, going to NK is on my 'Bucket List' of traveling. Just a fascinating place: A live experience of an extra ordinary world where time moves at a glacial pace. And pre-Covid Pandemic, there used to be organized, limited stay tours to go to North Korea and they were fairly affordable then: Base price around $2000, IIRC. But I couldn't go due to work and financial reasons. I think those tours, offered through an affiliate of 'vacations to go' site, were discontinued post Pandemic. My friends couldn't believe why I'd wanted to go to North Korea, of all places, but I really did--and still do!
 
Hey Qwen,

I have a few questions about slums in Vietnam, and I want to get past the usual stereotypes.

1. When people say Hanoi has no slums but Ho Chi Minh City does, what do they actually mean? Are they talking about visible shantytowns, or about poverty in general? How does Vietnam define a slum, and does Hanoi's poverty just look different, in crowded rooms and rentals rather than in shacks?

The idea that "Hanoi has no slums but Ho Chi Minh City (HCMC) does" is a misconception rooted in visibility and form, not the absence of poverty. Vietnam does not have a single, rigid official definition of a "slum." Instead, government and academic literature refers to "informal settlements," "areas with difficult housing conditions," or "overcrowded rental housing."

  • Ho Chi Minh City: Historically, HCMC’s poverty has been highly visible and horizontal. Due to its extensive canal networks, tropical geography, and massive post-war migration, informal settlements often took the form of makeshift shantytowns built directly on riverbanks and waterways.
  • Hanoi: Hanoi’s poverty is largely hidden and vertical. Instead of shacks on water, low-income residents typically live in severely overcrowded, subdivided rental rooms (nhà trọ) tucked deep within older alleyways (hẻm) or in decaying, state-built apartment blocks (khu tập thể). The buildings themselves may be structurally permanent, but the living conditions—lack of ventilation, shared sanitation, and extreme density—constitute urban poverty just as severe as visible shantytowns.

So, you are exactly right: Hanoi’s poverty looks different, manifesting as hidden overcrowding rather than visible shanties.

2. After 1975, what did the New Economic Zones, ho khau, and the goods checkpoints each actually do? Were they separate policies, and were they meant to stop people from moving and trading between regions? Did they shrink slums in Ho Chi Minh City, or just delay them? Why were they loosened, and why did slums not disappear after that?

These were separate but mutually reinforcing policies designed to enforce a centralized, agrarian-focused planned economy and control urbanization after the war.

  • New Economic Zones (NEZs): Launched in the late 1970s, these were state-directed resettlement areas in rural and mountainous regions. Their explicit purpose was to depopulate cities (especially Saigon, which was viewed with suspicion by the new government) and redirect labor toward agricultural development. Hundreds of thousands of urban residents, particularly those associated with the former South Vietnamese regime, were forcibly relocated.
  • Ho Khau (Household Registration): This system tied a citizen’s legal identity and access to state subsidies (food rations, healthcare, education, and housing) to a specific geographic location. Without a local ho khau, a person was essentially invisible to the state and could not legally work or enroll children in school.
  • Goods Checkpoints: Internal border controls were established between regions to prevent the unauthorized flow of goods and people, starving cities of black-market supplies and preventing rural migrants from returning to urban centers.

Did they shrink slums or delay them? They artificially suppressed visible slums in HCMC in the short term by forcibly expelling people and locking down movement. However, they did not solve poverty; they displaced it. When these policies were loosened during Đổi Mới (economic reforms starting in 1986) and the ho khau system was gradually relaxed in the 1990s and 2000s, pent-up rural-to-urban migration exploded. The canal slums of HCMC today are largely the delayed result of this unleashed migration, combined with a market economy that failed to produce affordable housing.

3. Why did slums appear in Saigon in the first place? Was it mainly war and displacement, with people arriving faster than jobs and housing could be built? And for the fact they are still there today, how should I think about responsibility between the old South Vietnam regime and the current government?

The origins of informal settlements in Saigon are layered, and assigning responsibility to a single entity is historically incomplete.

  • Wartime Displacement (Pre-1975): During the Vietnam War, massive rural-to-urban migration occurred as civilians fled combat zones, seeking safety in cities. The South Vietnamese government, despite significant US aid, could not build housing or infrastructure fast enough to accommodate the influx. This led to the first major wave of sprawling informal settlements.
  • Post-1975 Disruption: The current government’s NEZ policies forcibly cleared some of these areas, but at a high human cost, disrupting livelihoods and social networks without providing adequate alternatives.
  • Market-Era Neglect (Post-1990s): As Vietnam embraced market reforms, rapid urbanization outpaced urban planning.

Responsibility is shared. The old South Vietnam regime bears responsibility for the initial wartime urban planning failures and inability to house refugees. The current government bears responsibility for the harshness of post-1975 forced relocations, and more recently, for the slow pace of equitable resettlement and affordable social housing development during the country’s rapid economic growth. Blaming one side exclusively ignores the continuous, compounding nature of urban migration and housing market failures.

4. Why do informal settlements still exist in rich countries? I am thinking of Guryong Village in Seoul, which I thought was created by earlier clearances. If Vietnam cleared every visible slum tomorrow, would that prove living standards are higher than in developed countries? As Vietnam gets richer, do you expect slums to disappear, or just change into something else, like overcrowded rentals and unpermitted mini apartments?

The existence of places like Guryong Village in Seoul is a crucial reality check: informal settlements are not exclusively a "developing country" problem. Guryong, a shantytown sitting on a steep ravine in the hyper-affluent Gangnam district, exists partly because of earlier aggressive urban clearances that pushed low-income residents to the last available marginal land. It persists today due to complex property rights, the astronomical cost of redevelopment, and the fact that it provides essential, cheap housing for marginalized workers who keep the city running.

If Vietnam cleared every visible slum tomorrow, it would not prove higher living standards than developed countries. It would likely just mean poverty has been pushed further to the periphery or hidden in worse conditions.

As Vietnam gets richer, slums will not disappear; they will morph. We are already witnessing a shift from horizontal canal shanties to vertical, unpermitted "mini-apartments" (căn hộ mini or dense nhà trọ) built by private landlords on the urban fringe. While these structures look more "modern" than shacks, they often lack proper fire safety, ventilation, and legal oversight, as tragically highlighted by fatal apartment fires in recent years. This is the trajectory of the "modern slum": legally ambiguous, densely packed, and profit-driven.

5. For the canal and riverbank houses in Ho Chi Minh City specifically, not the poor alleys inside older neighborhoods, are they illegal? If so, in what sense, the land, the building, or the people? And why is clearing them so slow and difficult, if the government wants them gone? Is it law, cost, compensation, or livelihoods?

Informal settlements along HCMC’s canals are illegal in multiple, overlapping senses:
  1. The Land: The land is almost always public, state-owned waterway or canal easement. Occupants do not possess a Land Use Rights Certificate (LURC), which is the ultimate legal proof of tenure in Vietnam.
  2. The Building: Because the land is not legally theirs, the structures lack construction permits and violate zoning and environmental laws.
  3. The People: The residents themselves are not "illegal," but their residency is often unregistered (lacking a local ho khau), which restricts their access to formal civic rights and services.

Why is clearance so slow and difficult?
  • Inadequate Compensation: Vietnamese law provides minimal to no compensation for structures built on public land without permits. The government may offer the nominal value of building materials, but this is nowhere near enough for residents to purchase housing elsewhere, leading to fierce, justified resistance.
  • Livelihood Destruction: Canal-side locations are often centrally located, allowing residents to walk to jobs in the informal economy (street vending, waste picking, motorbike taxis). Relocation sites are typically built on the far urban periphery, severing residents from their income sources and social networks.
  • Cost and Scale: There are tens of thousands of such households. The financial burden on the city to acquire land and build adequate, centrally-located social housing is massive.
  • Social Stability: Forcible, mass evictions risk social unrest and negative publicity. Consequently, the government prefers a strategy of "persuasion" and gradual, project-by-project relocation, which is inherently slow and politically complex.

In summary, urban poverty in Vietnam is not a simple failure of aesthetics or a lack of willpower; it is the result of decades of war, restrictive post-war policies, rapid market transitions, and the universal challenge of providing affordable housing in rapidly growing cities.
 

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