Hopefully Pessimistic
Registered Member
Pakistan should launch a loitering drone and just let it buzz over one of their military bases for hours just for fun before hitting some building
Operation Ghazab Lil Haq (Pakistan - Afghanistan War)
- Thread starter ghazi52
- Start date
Falcon26
Trusted Member
If true, that’s actually even a bigger headache for Pakistan. The implications are grave, to say the least.
Falcon26
Trusted Member
Who’s launching it then? Compromised Pakistanis?
Hopefully Pessimistic
Registered Member
The same TTP militants that have been carrying out attacks in Pakistan, some of them Afghans infiltrating, refugees or local Pakistanis that sympathise with them for religious, tribal or ethnic reasons
MirageV3ff
Registered Member
Exactly. Question remains, from where inside of Pakistan are these drones being launched from and how is it that despite info available on the open source domain, the miscreants haven't been caught by using the supply chain?
If I were a betting man though, I'd expect these drones being launched from Balochistan considering the situation down there.
MNZGamerX
Registered Member
Pakistan’s Military Campaign in Afghanistan Is Here to Stay
Pakistan’s recent strikes signal that it is prepared to take the fight directly to the Taliban leadership’s inner circle if the Taliban regime’s support for anti-Pakistan groups continues.
By Umair Jamal
March 16, 2026
Pakistan’s ongoing military campaign in Afghanistan, which has now stretched into its fourth week, marks a departure from the sporadic border skirmishes between the two countries that defined Islamabad’s relations with the Afghan Taliban regime since their return to power in August 2021. What apparently began as targeted responses to cross-border attacks that Islamabad alleges emerge from Afghanistan has evolved into a sustained campaign, which appears to be aimed at dismantling the Taliban regime’s capacity to shelter and support anti-Pakistan militant networks.
Islamabad has named the ongoing operation “Ghazab Lil Haq,” which means “Rage for the Righteous Cause.” The operation’s scope, intensity, and stated objectives suggest this is no fleeting retaliation but a new doctrinal baseline for dealing with Kabul as part of Islamabad’s new approach to deal with threats posed by the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP).
The ongoing escalation unfolded in stages, and there are reasons to believe that Pakistan’s military campaign may not end anytime soon.
It started when Pakistan conducted airstrikes on TTP and Baloch militant targets on the Afghan side of the border more than three weeks ago. In response, the Afghan Taliban formally announced an offensive against Pakistani positions by framing it as retaliation for those earlier strikes. The Taliban perhaps did not read the mood in Islamabad correctly and calculated that this was just another episode of contained border skirmishes, which they could later celebrate as a victory in the form of another ceasefire.
Islamabad, however, had other plans. It immediately launched its own campaign under Operation Ghazab Lil Haq, which had been in the works for some time. The focus of the operation has been precise. It has targeted arms storage sites, weapons depots, intelligence apparatus, fuel depots, air bases, military headquarters, and other infrastructure that sustains the Taliban regime’s ability to project power and perhaps protect allied groups such as the TTP.
So far, Pakistani forces have relied heavily on the air force for deep strikes. This has been further supplemented by the use of drones and long-range artillery. These standoff capabilities have allowed Islamabad to hit targets across multiple provinces in Afghanistan without committing large ground formations or troops.
The Taliban leadership appears to have been stunned by Pakistan’s response. They are ill-prepared to mount a conventional military response. For instance, the Taliban have attempted to retaliate occasionally by using rudimentary armed drones or by sporadic firing at border posts. These attempts, however, have been met with overwhelming military responses from Pakistan. Clearly, the asymmetry in capability is stark and can be seen from Pakistan’s ability to inflict heavy damage on Taliban military infrastructure. Pakistan has, so far, shown no sign of easing the pace of its attacks or military campaign.
Amid the onslaught, Kabul has signaled a willingness to open dialogue with Pakistan. Moreover, there have been other backchannel efforts, including from China, to start dialogue between the two sides that could lead to another ceasefire. Islamabad, however, appears uninterested in talks at this stage.
Pakistan’s reluctance to enter into dialogue largely stems from its experience with four years of diplomatic efforts that ultimately yielded no results. These efforts failed to get Kabul to change its stance of support for the outlawed TTP and other terrorist groups operating from Afghan soil.
In the past, Pakistan has tried trade incentives, diplomatic backing, direct negotiations, and even mediation involving Qatar, Turkiye, Saudi Arabia, and China to engage the Afghan Taliban over the issue of the TTP. The goal was to persuade the Taliban to sever ties with the TTP and stop allowing the latter to use Afghan soil as a launchpad.
Instead, more than 4,000 Pakistani soldiers have died in attacks linked to Afghan-based militants during the last four years, when diplomacy remained the main means of dealing with Kabul. However, the Taliban’s policy has remained unchanged. The Taliban leadership continues to hedge its bets on the TTP as leverage against Islamabad. The fact that the TTP continues to receive support from the Afghan Taliban to conduct cross-border attacks in Pakistan is well documented and has even been noted by the United Nations in its monitoring reports.
Pakistani leaders appear to have concluded that returning to the negotiating table after every skirmish with the Afghan Taliban simply restores the status quo. The Taliban have repeatedly portrayed ceasefires as victories forced upon Pakistan while they have conceded nothing in return. Moreover, even third-party involvement has failed to extract meaningful behavioral change in Kabul.
For instance, after more than three weeks of active hostilities, Kabul still insists on framing the fighting with Pakistan as a bilateral border dispute rather than acknowledging the militant sanctuaries that triggered it. For Islamabad, this denial only confirms that the Taliban remain unwilling to grasp the seriousness of the situation or the costs they are now incurring. From Islamabad’s perspective, these costs for the Taliban need to be raised further to force the Taliban into changing their approach toward the TTP.
This understanding appears to have hardened into a policy change in Pakistan.
Pakistan’s military campaign on March 14 entered a sharper phase when Pakistani strikes hit a military unit linked to Taliban Supreme Leader Hibatullah Akhundzada in Kandahar. The message from that strike was obvious — Pakistan is prepared to take the fight directly to the Taliban leadership’s inner circle if support for anti-Pakistan groups continues. This was not a reactive move but part of a broader strategic posture that has defined Pakistan’s latest military campaign. Islamabad’s policy is now clear: any future attack inside Pakistan will be answered inside Afghanistan by targeting those who enable the attackers.
The results on the ground point to Pakistan gaining the advantage. Since the operation began, TTP attacks inside Pakistan have dropped noticeably. Moreover, groups that rushed to announce solidarity attacks in support of the Afghan Taliban have so far failed to deliver anything significant.
Pakistani officials see these developments as validation of their policy change. For Islamabad, an intact Afghan military infrastructure near the border has translated directly into more organized and better-supported infiltration routes for militants. By systematically degrading border posts, training facilities and supply lines, Pakistan has disrupted the Taliban’s ability to facilitate cross-border movement with relative impunity.
There appears to be little room for dialogue or ceasefire unless the Taliban are prepared to deliver verifiable concessions, which include either handing over the TTP leadership or dismantling the networks that operate with their tacit approval. Anything short of that will only see the military pressure intensifying in Afghanistan.
It is unlikely that Islamabad is pursuing regime change in Kabul. Pakistan’s approach appears to be more calibrated and limited in scope, at least at this stage. By steadily raising the military costs, the campaign aims to exploit existing fissures among Taliban leaders over differences on the question of relations with the TTP and internal power struggles that have simmered for years. For now, what is clear is that the era when the Taliban could extend safe haven to groups like the TTP without paying a price has ended.
Arguably, Pakistan’s leadership has learned through bitter experience that talks without leverage will not achieve much when dealing with the Afghan Taliban. Whether this new dynamic in the relationship compels a genuine policy shift in Kandahar and Kabul remains to be seen.
Pakistan’s recent strikes signal that it is prepared to take the fight directly to the Taliban leadership’s inner circle if the Taliban regime’s support for anti-Pakistan groups continues.
By Umair Jamal
March 16, 2026
Pakistan’s ongoing military campaign in Afghanistan, which has now stretched into its fourth week, marks a departure from the sporadic border skirmishes between the two countries that defined Islamabad’s relations with the Afghan Taliban regime since their return to power in August 2021. What apparently began as targeted responses to cross-border attacks that Islamabad alleges emerge from Afghanistan has evolved into a sustained campaign, which appears to be aimed at dismantling the Taliban regime’s capacity to shelter and support anti-Pakistan militant networks.
Islamabad has named the ongoing operation “Ghazab Lil Haq,” which means “Rage for the Righteous Cause.” The operation’s scope, intensity, and stated objectives suggest this is no fleeting retaliation but a new doctrinal baseline for dealing with Kabul as part of Islamabad’s new approach to deal with threats posed by the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP).
The ongoing escalation unfolded in stages, and there are reasons to believe that Pakistan’s military campaign may not end anytime soon.
It started when Pakistan conducted airstrikes on TTP and Baloch militant targets on the Afghan side of the border more than three weeks ago. In response, the Afghan Taliban formally announced an offensive against Pakistani positions by framing it as retaliation for those earlier strikes. The Taliban perhaps did not read the mood in Islamabad correctly and calculated that this was just another episode of contained border skirmishes, which they could later celebrate as a victory in the form of another ceasefire.
Islamabad, however, had other plans. It immediately launched its own campaign under Operation Ghazab Lil Haq, which had been in the works for some time. The focus of the operation has been precise. It has targeted arms storage sites, weapons depots, intelligence apparatus, fuel depots, air bases, military headquarters, and other infrastructure that sustains the Taliban regime’s ability to project power and perhaps protect allied groups such as the TTP.
So far, Pakistani forces have relied heavily on the air force for deep strikes. This has been further supplemented by the use of drones and long-range artillery. These standoff capabilities have allowed Islamabad to hit targets across multiple provinces in Afghanistan without committing large ground formations or troops.
The Taliban leadership appears to have been stunned by Pakistan’s response. They are ill-prepared to mount a conventional military response. For instance, the Taliban have attempted to retaliate occasionally by using rudimentary armed drones or by sporadic firing at border posts. These attempts, however, have been met with overwhelming military responses from Pakistan. Clearly, the asymmetry in capability is stark and can be seen from Pakistan’s ability to inflict heavy damage on Taliban military infrastructure. Pakistan has, so far, shown no sign of easing the pace of its attacks or military campaign.
Amid the onslaught, Kabul has signaled a willingness to open dialogue with Pakistan. Moreover, there have been other backchannel efforts, including from China, to start dialogue between the two sides that could lead to another ceasefire. Islamabad, however, appears uninterested in talks at this stage.
Pakistan’s reluctance to enter into dialogue largely stems from its experience with four years of diplomatic efforts that ultimately yielded no results. These efforts failed to get Kabul to change its stance of support for the outlawed TTP and other terrorist groups operating from Afghan soil.
In the past, Pakistan has tried trade incentives, diplomatic backing, direct negotiations, and even mediation involving Qatar, Turkiye, Saudi Arabia, and China to engage the Afghan Taliban over the issue of the TTP. The goal was to persuade the Taliban to sever ties with the TTP and stop allowing the latter to use Afghan soil as a launchpad.
Instead, more than 4,000 Pakistani soldiers have died in attacks linked to Afghan-based militants during the last four years, when diplomacy remained the main means of dealing with Kabul. However, the Taliban’s policy has remained unchanged. The Taliban leadership continues to hedge its bets on the TTP as leverage against Islamabad. The fact that the TTP continues to receive support from the Afghan Taliban to conduct cross-border attacks in Pakistan is well documented and has even been noted by the United Nations in its monitoring reports.
Pakistani leaders appear to have concluded that returning to the negotiating table after every skirmish with the Afghan Taliban simply restores the status quo. The Taliban have repeatedly portrayed ceasefires as victories forced upon Pakistan while they have conceded nothing in return. Moreover, even third-party involvement has failed to extract meaningful behavioral change in Kabul.
For instance, after more than three weeks of active hostilities, Kabul still insists on framing the fighting with Pakistan as a bilateral border dispute rather than acknowledging the militant sanctuaries that triggered it. For Islamabad, this denial only confirms that the Taliban remain unwilling to grasp the seriousness of the situation or the costs they are now incurring. From Islamabad’s perspective, these costs for the Taliban need to be raised further to force the Taliban into changing their approach toward the TTP.
This understanding appears to have hardened into a policy change in Pakistan.
Pakistan’s military campaign on March 14 entered a sharper phase when Pakistani strikes hit a military unit linked to Taliban Supreme Leader Hibatullah Akhundzada in Kandahar. The message from that strike was obvious — Pakistan is prepared to take the fight directly to the Taliban leadership’s inner circle if support for anti-Pakistan groups continues. This was not a reactive move but part of a broader strategic posture that has defined Pakistan’s latest military campaign. Islamabad’s policy is now clear: any future attack inside Pakistan will be answered inside Afghanistan by targeting those who enable the attackers.
The results on the ground point to Pakistan gaining the advantage. Since the operation began, TTP attacks inside Pakistan have dropped noticeably. Moreover, groups that rushed to announce solidarity attacks in support of the Afghan Taliban have so far failed to deliver anything significant.
Pakistani officials see these developments as validation of their policy change. For Islamabad, an intact Afghan military infrastructure near the border has translated directly into more organized and better-supported infiltration routes for militants. By systematically degrading border posts, training facilities and supply lines, Pakistan has disrupted the Taliban’s ability to facilitate cross-border movement with relative impunity.
There appears to be little room for dialogue or ceasefire unless the Taliban are prepared to deliver verifiable concessions, which include either handing over the TTP leadership or dismantling the networks that operate with their tacit approval. Anything short of that will only see the military pressure intensifying in Afghanistan.
It is unlikely that Islamabad is pursuing regime change in Kabul. Pakistan’s approach appears to be more calibrated and limited in scope, at least at this stage. By steadily raising the military costs, the campaign aims to exploit existing fissures among Taliban leaders over differences on the question of relations with the TTP and internal power struggles that have simmered for years. For now, what is clear is that the era when the Taliban could extend safe haven to groups like the TTP without paying a price has ended.
Arguably, Pakistan’s leadership has learned through bitter experience that talks without leverage will not achieve much when dealing with the Afghan Taliban. Whether this new dynamic in the relationship compels a genuine policy shift in Kandahar and Kabul remains to be seen.
Pakistan’s Military Campaign in Afghanistan Is Here to Stay
Pakistan’s recent strikes signal that it is prepared to take the fight directly to the Taliban leadership’s inner circle if the Taliban regime’s support for anti-Pakistan groups continues.
thediplomat.com
hasssanali8998
Elite Member
Manzoor pashteen leader of pashtun tahafuz movement says:
"On the 28th of Ramadan, the t*errorist Punjabi colonialists (Pakistan) carried out a t*errorist airstrike on a hospital in Kabul, in which hundreds of innocent civilians under treatment were martyred and many others were injured.
We stand with our Afghan people against this painful incident."
"On the 28th of Ramadan, the t*errorist Punjabi colonialists (Pakistan) carried out a t*errorist airstrike on a hospital in Kabul, in which hundreds of innocent civilians under treatment were martyred and many others were injured.
We stand with our Afghan people against this painful incident."
Hakikat ve Hikmet
VIP Member
If not directly from Ukraine, you can get it via the Turkish route....
flyingorca
SpeedLimited
Terrorists attacks on Pakistan since 2000.
Blueishere
Registered Member
Inshallah 2026 will be different, it must.
Pakistan Space Agency
Elite Member
He says this after every strike, but the Afghan Taliban have imposed war on Pakistan since coming to power in August 2021.
It's only that we have finally decided to hit them back after exhausting all our diplomatic efforts.
Master Chief
Trusted Member
I do doubt that a hospital was struck.
Have you seen any psychiatrist or nurse or anyone in a lab coat being pulled from the rubble or giving an interview? Wouldn't al jazeera urgently interview a hospital director in this scenario, as we see happen when hospitals in Gaza are struck by Israeli missiles? Is there even a single mangled wheelchair in the footage?
Happy to be proven wrong. But I don't think I will be.
Pakistan Space Agency
Elite Member
Terrorist attacks were the lowest in 2018, and since then they've just been rising.
Pakistan Space Agency
Elite Member
If they confront any of the organisations like TTP, then TTP will launch a war against them and try to take over Afghanistan.
There are loads and loads of terror outfits currently operating in Afghanistan, and the Afghan Taliban fears it will lead to a civil war if they went against all of them.
That was the Taliban excuse for 5 years until Pakistan started questioning why were Afghan Taliban fighters embedded within the TTP and attacking Pakistan.
Master Chief
Trusted Member
TTP immediately stated they would "respond" to the Kabul airstrike, as per a Kamal Hyder report on AJ (he is a veteran journo who still carries some respect and credibility in my opinion, unlike his employers!).
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