Pakistan Air Force | News & Discussions

[Fatman17]

 

[ghazi52]

 

[Fatman17]

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[jburke]

Unacking Godzilla Voice Recording as Demonstrated by AVM Aurangzeb



Breaking encryption like that used in the Rafale’s SATURN (Second-generation Anti-jam Tactical UHF Radio for NATO) system is theoretically extremely difficult and practically impossible today because of the following:

Encryption Strengths in Aerial Combat Context - Saturn Gen 2 in Rafale

Feature​	Description​
Fast Frequency Hopping (FFH)	Rapid changes in transmission frequency (hundreds/thousands per second) make interception and jamming highly difficult without exact timing and key synchronization.
Voice Encryption (COMSEC)	Typically based on AES-256 or equivalent-grade ciphers in modern NATO systems—military-grade and quantum-resilient at current capabilities.
MIDS (Link 16)	Uses time-division multiple access (TDMA), encryption, and frequency hopping for secure, anti-jam data transmission.
Cryptographic Keys	Managed via secure key distribution protocols (e.g., NATO’s KMI - Key Management Infrastructure); keys are rotated frequently and not stored in plaintext.

​

---

​

What Would Be Required to Break It (Theoretically)
1. Classical Computing Power
To break AES-256 via brute force:

• PAF would need to test 2^256 keys
  Assuming a supercomputer could test 1 trillion (10¹²) keys per second, it would still take: ≈ 1.16×10^58 years
• That is longer than the current age of the universe by many orders of magnitude
  Quantum Computing to Rescue?

Using Grover’s algorithm, a quantum computer can reduce the brute force effort for symmetric encryption:

• AES-256 would effectively become AES-128 in terms of brute-force complexity
• Still requires 2^128 ≈3.4×10^38 operations
• Current quantum machines (e.g., IBM, Google) support ~100–1000 logical qubits with significant noise and error rates.
  
  To break AES-256 with Grover's algorithm:

1. PAF would likely need millions of logical qubits with long coherence times and low error rates, something not available in the next 10–15 years under any realistic roadmap
2. Estimates suggest PAF would need: ~10 million physical qubits
   Fault-tolerant architecture (e.g., surface codes)
   Quantum error correction layers
   A cooled, quantum data center-scale environment (cryogenic hardware at 10–15 mK)

In a theoretical sense, breaking Rafale's encrypted communications mid-battle would require a fault-tolerant, large-scale quantum computer with millions of logical qubits and unrealistic levels of real-time access to both traffic and cryptographic keys. For now, and the foreseeable future, military-grade AES and NATO COMSEC standards remain quantum-resilient in aerial combat scenarios.

Moral of the Story:
Physics defying bullshit, unless this could be achieved by using medieval pseudoscience (remember golden age of science) or divine intervention

 

[Venom]

Unacking Godzilla Voice Recording as Demonstrated by AVM Aurangzeb

View attachment 126786

Breaking encryption like that used in the Rafale’s SATURN (Second-generation Anti-jam Tactical UHF Radio for NATO) system is theoretically extremely difficult and practically impossible today because of the following:

Encryption Strengths in Aerial Combat Context - Saturn Gen 2 in Rafale
View attachment 126787

Feature​	Description​
Fast Frequency Hopping (FFH)	Rapid changes in transmission frequency (hundreds/thousands per second) make interception and jamming highly difficult without exact timing and key synchronization.
Voice Encryption (COMSEC)	Typically based on AES-256 or equivalent-grade ciphers in modern NATO systems—military-grade and quantum-resilient at current capabilities.
MIDS (Link 16)	Uses time-division multiple access (TDMA), encryption, and frequency hopping for secure, anti-jam data transmission.
Cryptographic Keys	Managed via secure key distribution protocols (e.g., NATO’s KMI - Key Management Infrastructure); keys are rotated frequently and not stored in plaintext.

​

---

​

What Would Be Required to Break It (Theoretically)
1. Classical Computing Power
To break AES-256 via brute force:

• PAF would need to test 2^256 keys
  Assuming a supercomputer could test 1 trillion (10¹²) keys per second, it would still take: ≈ 1.16×10^58 years
• That is longer than the current age of the universe by many orders of magnitude
  Quantum Computing to Rescue?

Using Grover’s algorithm, a quantum computer can reduce the brute force effort for symmetric encryption:

• AES-256 would effectively become AES-128 in terms of brute-force complexity
• Still requires 2^128 ≈3.4×10^38 operations
• Current quantum machines (e.g., IBM, Google) support ~100–1000 logical qubits with significant noise and error rates.
  
  To break AES-256 with Grover's algorithm:

1. PAF would likely need millions of logical qubits with long coherence times and low error rates, something not available in the next 10–15 years under any realistic roadmap
2. Estimates suggest PAF would need: ~10 million physical qubits
   Fault-tolerant architecture (e.g., surface codes)
   Quantum error correction layers
   A cooled, quantum data center-scale environment (cryogenic hardware at 10–15 mK)

View attachment 126788

In a theoretical sense, breaking Rafale's encrypted communications mid-battle would require a fault-tolerant, large-scale quantum computer with millions of logical qubits and unrealistic levels of real-time access to both traffic and cryptographic keys. For now, and the foreseeable future, military-grade AES and NATO COMSEC standards remain quantum-resilient in aerial combat scenarios.

Moral of the Story:
Physics defying bullshit, unless this could be achieved by using medieval pseudoscience (remember golden age of science) or divine intervention

The PAF AVM did not claim to have broken a specific encryption. He said the IAF pilots made the same mistake from 2019 of not using secure comms and called them ‘slow learners’.

 

[jburke]

The PAF AVM did not claim to have broken a specific encryption. He said the IAF pilots made the same mistake from 2019 of not using secure comms and called them ‘slow learners’.

Secure comms is by default in Rafale or as a matter of fact in any aviation SDR platform - it is a no brainer!

 

[Dreamer]

Secure comms is by default in Rafale or as a matter of fact in any aviation SDR platform - it is a no brainer!

Who's to say the PAF didn't obtain the recording through 'other' means?

They have done their job, i.e. shooting down Rafales, reveal the recording for the world to hear, etc. Figuring out the HOW, is your headache. Keep at it.

 

[Venom]

Secure comms is by default in Rafale or as a matter of fact in any aviation SDR platform - it is a no brainer!

It is there if you use it. You always have the option to be dumb and use unsecured comms for military ops.

 

[jburke]

Who's to say the PAF didn't obtain the recording through 'other' means?

They have done their job, i.e. shooting down Rafales, reveal the recording for the world to hear, etc. Figuring out the HOW, is your headache. Keep at it.

1 Rafale was shot using HQ9 SAM. Highly likely in a hugely contested environment - no big deal. PAF could not produce an iota of evidence themselves by way of releasing J10C AESA radar tracks locking and killing Rafale!

 

[jburke]

It is there if you use it. You always have the option to be dumb and use unsecured comms for military ops.

Nothing is unsecure by default setting and there is no override. Ask the PAF F-16 operators, it is the same case. Aurangzeb was bluffing and playing Lollywood stuff. This is PAF's professionalism!

 

[Yasser76]

Nothing is unsecure by default setting and there is no override. Ask the PAF F-16 operators, it is the same case. Aurangzeb was bluffing and playing Lollywood stuff. This is PAF's professionalism!

OK, so now we do not believe our own ears or an AVM, but your "theories".

Cope harder Rakesh, Aditya, Sachin, Sumeet, Sharma or whatever your name is

 

[TAC]

View attachment 126090
15 Sqn credited with 6 IAF kills

Cobras were also a key part of Swift Retort, at the time with their Mirages. Patches in top right of this tribute to that operation / slapping of nation….

 

[Yasser76]

Cobras were also a key part of Swift Retort, at the time with their Mirages. Patches in top right of this tribute to that operation / slapping of nation….

Now taken over from 9 Sqd as most prestigous PAF unit I think

 

[Fasbre2]

Nothing is unsecure by default setting and there is no override. Ask the PAF F-16 operators, it is the same case. Aurangzeb was bluffing and playing Lollywood stuff. This is PAF's professionalism!

New joiner/ monkey bot, with a name like Burke no need to reply.. idiot doesn’t realise berk is slang for stupid/dumb…