Pakistan Air Force | News & Discussions

[Pakistanithinktank]

Yes, good ideas, a lot of variables in this, but short term maybe J-10C can be good enough along with KJ-500?
Unsure Western jets are the solution, the whole point of PAF going there is our capability and ecosystem, which is Pakistani/Chinese. GCC have enough western jets and we know there are limits on them regarding radar and missiles. Also remember Arabs now have new respect for Chinese weapons after May 2025

In next 2-3 years what is possible is we create a force dedicated to Saudi/Qatari defence

100 J-10Cs and 8 KJ-500s. This lets us have 36 J-10Cs in Saudi, 36 in Qatar and 28 in reserve for maintenence rotation
3 KJ-500 in Saudi and 3 KJ-500 in Qatar means one in the air 24/7 over both countries, with 2 spare for rotation/reserve to keep airframe fatigue down
Also remember we will need to expand transport and refuller fleet a lot. Right now 20 c-130s and 4 il-76s are nowhere near enough considering our possible future equipments and RSAF tankers not compatible and QEAF does not have any. This will require investment and also we will need to expand transport fleet.
I would add maybe 12 Y-20 tankers and maybe 12 C-390s

All in all you are looking at a massive expansion and massive investment, but this is not beyond the realms of possibility if we have Saudi/Qatari money. In fact I would argue over last 10 years Pakistan Navy has achieved or about to achieve this.

10 years ago we had 6 old Type-21s and 4 average F-22s, 2 very old Agosta 70s and 3 Agosta 90Bs and 8 odd P-3Cs. Now look what PN has added

8 054A/Baburs, 8 Hangors, 4 Yarmooks and 4 ATR-72MPA and 10 Sea Sultan MPA

PN has not only doubled in size on sea, under sea and in the air, but also gone one generation up. If PN can do this, PAF is more then capable of doing it. Let us not forget in 2019, in 2025 and now in Iran-US, it has been PAF that has been at the very forefront and it any confrontation with Israel it will not be Army or Navy but PAF.

PAF needs to radically change. Challenge has now gone way beyond India. When those 20 J-10C pilots went up into Iran along with the Erieye crew you can bet they were briefed on the F-35, the F-16I and the F-15I. You can also bet that was not the last briefing PAF will do on the IDFAF.....

I’ll be honest, this whole “100 J‑10Cs + 8 KJ‑500s + 12 Y‑20 tankers + 12 C‑390s” package sounds less like a defence plan and more like one of those YouTube “PAF 2035 Superpower Fleet” videos. It’s a great wishlist, but that’s exactly what it is, a wishlist. None of it survives even five minutes against Pakistan’s actual economic situation.

Right now Pakistan is struggling to fund basic modernization. Even the JF‑17 Block III rollout is slower than expected because of budget ceilings. The J‑10C induction which is tiny compared to what you’re proposing, required careful sequencing and external financial breathing room. So when people casually throw around numbers like “100 J‑10Cs,” they forget that buying jets is the cheap part. Sustaining them year after year is where the real money goes: fuel, maintenance, depot overhauls, munitions, simulators, hardened shelters, data‑links, technicians, training pipelines, all of that becomes a permanent budget burden.

And that’s the part these fantasy fleet lists skip. Fighter fleets burn money every single day they fly. Ships and submarines don’t. So comparing this to the Navy’s modernization isn’t apples to apples. I am surprised that no one made any comments about this.
The PN’s upgrades were staggered, subsidized, and spread over a decade. What you’re proposing for the PAF is basically building a second air force on top of the first one.

Even the logistics piece...12 Y‑20 tankers and 12 C‑390s is a multi‑billion‑dollar commitment on its own. Pakistan’s transport fleet is already stretched. Adding more aircraft means more pilots, more technicians, more bases, more everything. It’s not “buy and fly.”

And here’s the real point, unless Saudi Arabia and Qatar are paying for the jets, the sustainment, the training, the basing, and the long‑term ecosystem, this plan doesn’t even get off the runway. Pakistan simply cannot absorb this scale of expansion on its own.

That’s why I keep saying that only realistic path is structural reform at home. My proposal for 34 Economic Zones as second tier of government isn’t some abstract theory, it’s a way to save around $22 billion a year by cutting duplicated provincial bureaucracies and redirecting that money into defense, education, and development. But the problem is, the current system benefits too many entrenched interests. From my perspective, the establishment has no incentive to shrink its own footprint. It’s like a system that keeps feeding on public resources because that’s how it has always operated.

So yes, dreaming about 100 J‑10Cs is fun. I’ve seen these lists on YouTube too, glossy thumbnails, dramatic music, “PAF Future Fleet Revealed.” But unless the financing is real, unless the structure of the state changes, and unless the economic model stops bleeding money, these ideas stay exactly where they are dreams.

Without external funding or internal reform, this isn’t a plan. It’s a fantasy fleet.

 

[Yasser76]

I’ll be honest, this whole “100 J‑10Cs + 8 KJ‑500s + 12 Y‑20 tankers + 12 C‑390s” package sounds less like a defence plan and more like one of those YouTube “PAF 2035 Superpower Fleet” videos. It’s a great wishlist, but that’s exactly what it is, a wishlist. None of it survives even five minutes against Pakistan’s actual economic situation.

Right now Pakistan is struggling to fund basic modernization. Even the JF‑17 Block III rollout is slower than expected because of budget ceilings. The J‑10C induction which is tiny compared to what you’re proposing, required careful sequencing and external financial breathing room. So when people casually throw around numbers like “100 J‑10Cs,” they forget that buying jets is the cheap part. Sustaining them year after year is where the real money goes: fuel, maintenance, depot overhauls, munitions, simulators, hardened shelters, data‑links, technicians, training pipelines, all of that becomes a permanent budget burden.

And that’s the part these fantasy fleet lists skip. Fighter fleets burn money every single day they fly. Ships and submarines don’t. So comparing this to the Navy’s modernization isn’t apples to apples. I am surprised that no one made any comments about this.
The PN’s upgrades were staggered, subsidized, and spread over a decade. What you’re proposing for the PAF is basically building a second air force on top of the first one.

Even the logistics piece...12 Y‑20 tankers and 12 C‑390s is a multi‑billion‑dollar commitment on its own. Pakistan’s transport fleet is already stretched. Adding more aircraft means more pilots, more technicians, more bases, more everything. It’s not “buy and fly.”

And here’s the real point, unless Saudi Arabia and Qatar are paying for the jets, the sustainment, the training, the basing, and the long‑term ecosystem, this plan doesn’t even get off the runway. Pakistan simply cannot absorb this scale of expansion on its own.

That’s why I keep saying that only realistic path is structural reform at home. My proposal for 34 Economic Zones as second tier of government isn’t some abstract theory, it’s a way to save around $22 billion a year by cutting duplicated provincial bureaucracies and redirecting that money into defense, education, and development. But the problem is, the current system benefits too many entrenched interests. From my perspective, the establishment has no incentive to shrink its own footprint. It’s like a system that keeps feeding on public resources because that’s how it has always operated.

So yes, dreaming about 100 J‑10Cs is fun. I’ve seen these lists on YouTube too, glossy thumbnails, dramatic music, “PAF Future Fleet Revealed.” But unless the financing is real, unless the structure of the state changes, and unless the economic model stops bleeding money, these ideas stay exactly where they are dreams.

Without external funding or internal reform, this isn’t a plan. It’s a fantasy fleet.

Not debating at all the economic side, my point was this is what would be needed if we were serious about a presence in the Gulf

 

[Pakistanithinktank]

Not debating at all the economic side, my point was this is what would be needed if we were serious about a presence in the Gulf

Even in this economic crisis, there are strategic openings but only if Pakistan stops reacting and starts planning. One of the biggest shifts coming is the gradual reduction of the U.S. military footprint in the Middle East. Washington’s long‑term focus is shifting toward East Asia and the Indo‑Pacific, where its competition with China is intensifying. The U.S. will keep naval assets in the Gulf to secure shipping lanes, but the era of large, permanent air bases and heavy troop deployments is slowly fading.

That shift creates a vacuum and vacuums in geopolitics never stay empty.

Pakistan can use this moment to position itself as a security partner of choice for GCC states, especially Saudi Arabia and Qatar. If Islamabad negotiates smartly, it can secure Gulf financing for a structured airpower modernization program, additional J‑10C squadrons and potentially around 18 J‑35A units to build a credible long‑term deterrent. This isn’t fantasy, it’s about aligning Pakistan’s strengths with GCC needs at a time when the U.S. is stepping back.

But none of this works unless Pakistan stabilizes its own neighborhood. Many analysts argue that Pakistan, with support from China and Russia, will eventually need to help shape a more predictable relationship with Afghanistan. Without a stable western border, no long‑term economic or security strategy survives. Beijing and Moscow already have their own interests in Afghan stability, so Pakistan isn’t alone in wanting a workable framework.

On the eastern front, the India‑Pakistan issue won’t magically disappear. Some analysts have pointed out that any realistic long‑term settlement over Kashmir resembles elements of the Musharraf‑era proposals, demilitarization, self‑governance mechanisms, and phased normalization. Whether that ever materializes is a political question, but the point is, the region’s major disputes will eventually require structured, negotiated outcomes, not endless stalemates.

And this leads to a question that bothers many observers. Is Pakistan’s current military leadership even willing to consider something like the Musharraf‑era proposals? Some analysts argue that if the Kashmir issue were ever resolved through a negotiated framework, the traditional security narrative and the institutional relevance built around it, would change significantly. Whether that creates hesitation or simply caution is a matter of debate, but the concern exists.

This brings us back to Pakistan’s internal structure. My proposal for 34 Economic Zones could save around $22 billion a year by eliminating redundant provincial bureaucracies and redirecting those funds toward defense, energy, and industrial growth. But the problem is systemic too many entrenched interests benefit from the current setup. It feels like a system that keeps draining public resources because that’s how it has always operated.

So yes, the U.S. drawdown is coming. Yes, GCC states will need new security partners. Yes, Pakistan can leverage China, Russia, and regional diplomacy to stabilize its borders. But none of it matters unless Pakistan reforms itself enough to seize the moment.

This isn’t about dreams. It’s about recognizing that the geopolitical map is shifting and deciding whether Pakistan wants to be shaped by it, or shape part of it.

 

[Fatman17]

Not debating at all the economic side, my point was this is what would be needed if we were serious about a presence in the Gulf

We are a defensive airforce and military in general.

 

[Yasser76]

We are a defensive airforce and military in general.

Yes, but that may well change in the future, J-35 is ideally optimised for strike...

 

[Fatman17]

Yes, but that may well change in the future, J-35 is ideally optimised for strike...

We will always have a numbers problem. Our airforce has always been a 1:2 or more ratio underdog but we have overcome this deficit with our pilot training and skills. This will remain the reality. 20-25 front line squadrons.

 

[Ali_Baba]

I’ll be honest, this whole “100 J‑10Cs + 8 KJ‑500s + 12 Y‑20 tankers + 12 C‑390s” package sounds less like a defence plan and more like one of those YouTube “PAF 2035 Superpower Fleet” videos. It’s a great wishlist, but that’s exactly what it is, a wishlist. None of it survives even five minutes against Pakistan’s actual economic situation.

Right now Pakistan is struggling to fund basic modernization. Even the JF‑17 Block III rollout is slower than expected because of budget ceilings. The J‑10C induction which is tiny compared to what you’re proposing, required careful sequencing and external financial breathing room. So when people casually throw around numbers like “100 J‑10Cs,” they forget that buying jets is the cheap part. Sustaining them year after year is where the real money goes: fuel, maintenance, depot overhauls, munitions, simulators, hardened shelters, data‑links, technicians, training pipelines, all of that becomes a permanent budget burden.

And that’s the part these fantasy fleet lists skip. Fighter fleets burn money every single day they fly. Ships and submarines don’t. So comparing this to the Navy’s modernization isn’t apples to apples. I am surprised that no one made any comments about this.
The PN’s upgrades were staggered, subsidized, and spread over a decade. What you’re proposing for the PAF is basically building a second air force on top of the first one.

Even the logistics piece...12 Y‑20 tankers and 12 C‑390s is a multi‑billion‑dollar commitment on its own. Pakistan’s transport fleet is already stretched. Adding more aircraft means more pilots, more technicians, more bases, more everything. It’s not “buy and fly.”

And here’s the real point, unless Saudi Arabia and Qatar are paying for the jets, the sustainment, the training, the basing, and the long‑term ecosystem, this plan doesn’t even get off the runway. Pakistan simply cannot absorb this scale of expansion on its own.

That’s why I keep saying that only realistic path is structural reform at home. My proposal for 34 Economic Zones as second tier of government isn’t some abstract theory, it’s a way to save around $22 billion a year by cutting duplicated provincial bureaucracies and redirecting that money into defense, education, and development. But the problem is, the current system benefits too many entrenched interests. From my perspective, the establishment has no incentive to shrink its own footprint. It’s like a system that keeps feeding on public resources because that’s how it has always operated.

So yes, dreaming about 100 J‑10Cs is fun. I’ve seen these lists on YouTube too, glossy thumbnails, dramatic music, “PAF Future Fleet Revealed.” But unless the financing is real, unless the structure of the state changes, and unless the economic model stops bleeding money, these ideas stay exactly where they are dreams.

Without external funding or internal reform, this isn’t a plan. It’s a fantasy fleet.

Yes, procurement is expensive, but Pakistan does need to revaluate the threats and the capability required to meet those threats.

The Pakistan Army right now is far too large for what Pakistan needs, and it should be reduced in size to fund the expansion of the Pakistan Airforce as the Airforce is better capable of neutralising the military threat to Pakistan.

A stronger air force negates, and destroys all Indian plans. We have seen this many times now.

The days of lining up 500k soldiers on one side, and 1 million on the other to do battle is over in age of nuclear weapons.

 

[PakAl]

Yes, procurement is expensive, but Pakistan does need to revaluate the threats and the capability required to meet those threats.

The Pakistan Army right now is far too large for what Pakistan needs, and it should be reduced in size to fund the expansion of the Pakistan Airforce as the Airforce is better capable of neutralising the military threat to Pakistan.

A stronger air force negates, and destroys all Indian plans. We have seen this many times now.

The days of lining up 500k soldiers on one side, and 1 million on the other to do battle is over in age of nuclear weapons.

A full blown war between Pakistan and India will need millions of soldiers. Do we have enough missiles to fight a war for many months, we will likely run out, in the long term it will end up being an infantry type of war like Russia Ukrainian war.

 

[Ali_Baba]

A full blown war between Pakistan and India will need millions of soldiers. Do we have enough missiles to fight a war for many months, we will likely run out, in the long term it will end up being an infantry type of war like Russia Ukrainian war.

We either recognise that with 2 nuclear powers, there is no full war anymore, only conflicts and skirmishes or that we recognise the nuclear deterrence is a hoax and prepare for full war as you say. Do we have MAD in the south Asian context? That is my point from my perspective.

 

[bravo_1]

 

[kimjongun]

View attachment 194669

so that means HAVA SOJ is in the pipeline..

 

[Pakistanithinktank]

Yes, procurement is expensive, but Pakistan does need to revaluate the threats and the capability required to meet those threats.

The Pakistan Army right now is far too large for what Pakistan needs, and it should be reduced in size to fund the expansion of the Pakistan Airforce as the Airforce is better capable of neutralising the military threat to Pakistan.

A stronger air force negates, and destroys all Indian plans. We have seen this many times now.

The days of lining up 500k soldiers on one side, and 1 million on the other to do battle is over in age of nuclear weapons.

When people talk about reducing the size of a large land army and shifting resources toward other forces, they’re usually responding to three realities:

1. Modern threats are no longer land‑centric
Most countries today face:

• maritime security challenges
• economic chokepoint vulnerabilities
• coastal infrastructure risks
• illegal trafficking and smuggling
• disaster‑response needs
• cyber and air‑based threats

Large infantry formations are less relevant for these missions.

2. Maritime forces protect economic lifelines
For any country with:

• major ports
• sea trade routes
• offshore energy
• coastal population centers

…the Navy, Marines, and Coast Guard become the first line of protection.

A single port shutdown can cost more than a brigade of infantry ever could.

3. Modernization requires shifting, not expanding budgets
Defense budgets are finite. If a country wants:

• better airpower
• stronger naval presence
• more capable coast guard
• amphibious response units

…it usually has to rebalance, not simply add more.

What reducing army size could achieve (in theory)
If a country chose to reduce its land forces, the freed‑up resources could be redirected to:

Navy

• more patrol vessels
• better anti‑submarine capability
• improved maritime domain awareness
• modern frigates or corvettes

Marines

• rapid‑response amphibious units
• coastal defense batteries
• special operations integration

Coast Guard

• expanded coastal patrol
• anti‑smuggling operations
• search and rescue
• port security

Air Force (indirectly)
A smaller army reduces long‑term pension and salary burdens, freeing funds for:

• air defense
• ISR
• fighter modernization
• drones and long‑range strike

But here’s the catch, Rebalancing is not just a military decision. It requires:

• political will
• institutional alignment
• long‑term planning
• economic stability

Large armies often have deep administrative, social, and economic roles. Downsizing them is complex and sensitive.

While the logic of shifting toward maritime and airpower is strong, the implementation depends on national priorities, economic capacity, and strategic consensus.

Bottom line
From a purely strategic and resource‑allocation perspective, many analysts argue that.

• modern threats favor airpower and maritime forces,
• large land armies are less central than they were in the 20th century,
• and rebalancing can create a more efficient, modern force structure.

But whether a country chooses to do that depends on far more than military logic alone.

 

[Corax]

When people talk about reducing the size of a large land army and shifting resources toward other forces, they’re usually responding to three realities:

1. Modern threats are no longer land‑centric
Most countries today face:

• maritime security challenges
• economic chokepoint vulnerabilities
• coastal infrastructure risks
• illegal trafficking and smuggling
• disaster‑response needs
• cyber and air‑based threats

Large infantry formations are less relevant for these missions.

2. Maritime forces protect economic lifelines
For any country with:

• major ports
• sea trade routes
• offshore energy
• coastal population centers

…the Navy, Marines, and Coast Guard become the first line of protection.

A single port shutdown can cost more than a brigade of infantry ever could.

3. Modernization requires shifting, not expanding budgets
Defense budgets are finite. If a country wants:

• better airpower
• stronger naval presence
• more capable coast guard
• amphibious response units

…it usually has to rebalance, not simply add more.

What reducing army size could achieve (in theory)
If a country chose to reduce its land forces, the freed‑up resources could be redirected to:

Navy

• more patrol vessels
• better anti‑submarine capability
• improved maritime domain awareness
• modern frigates or corvettes

Marines

• rapid‑response amphibious units
• coastal defense batteries
• special operations integration

Coast Guard

• expanded coastal patrol
• anti‑smuggling operations
• search and rescue
• port security

Air Force (indirectly)
A smaller army reduces long‑term pension and salary burdens, freeing funds for:

• air defense
• ISR
• fighter modernization
• drones and long‑range strike

But here’s the catch, Rebalancing is not just a military decision. It requires:

• political will
• institutional alignment
• long‑term planning
• economic stability

Large armies often have deep administrative, social, and economic roles. Downsizing them is complex and sensitive.

While the logic of shifting toward maritime and airpower is strong, the implementation depends on national priorities, economic capacity, and strategic consensus.

Bottom line
From a purely strategic and resource‑allocation perspective, many analysts argue that.

• modern threats favor airpower and maritime forces,
• large land armies are less central than they were in the 20th century,
• and rebalancing can create a more efficient, modern force structure.

But whether a country chooses to do that depends on far more than military logic alone.

Congratulations, you're well versed in ChatGPT.

 

[Fatman17]

Congratulations, you're well versed in ChatGPT.

Be nice

 

[puttputt]

Wow, never knew we received over a quarter of all Mirage 3/5s ever made....

I wish we had made the jump to producing the Mirage 3NG (fly-by-wire upgrade of the Mirage 3/5) locally. It would've given us a very good multirole fighter platform (Cheetah-level) to operate in the 1990s and 2000s until the JF-17 emerged. In fact, it would've given us the space to develop the JF-17 to B3+ standards from the start.

I’ll be honest, this whole “100 J‑10Cs + 8 KJ‑500s + 12 Y‑20 tankers + 12 C‑390s” package sounds less like a defence plan and more like one of those YouTube “PAF 2035 Superpower Fleet” videos. It’s a great wishlist, but that’s exactly what it is, a wishlist. None of it survives even five minutes against Pakistan’s actual economic situation.

Right now Pakistan is struggling to fund basic modernization. Even the JF‑17 Block III rollout is slower than expected because of budget ceilings. The J‑10C induction which is tiny compared to what you’re proposing, required careful sequencing and external financial breathing room. So when people casually throw around numbers like “100 J‑10Cs,” they forget that buying jets is the cheap part. Sustaining them year after year is where the real money goes: fuel, maintenance, depot overhauls, munitions, simulators, hardened shelters, data‑links, technicians, training pipelines, all of that becomes a permanent budget burden.

And that’s the part these fantasy fleet lists skip. Fighter fleets burn money every single day they fly. Ships and submarines don’t. So comparing this to the Navy’s modernization isn’t apples to apples. I am surprised that no one made any comments about this.
The PN’s upgrades were staggered, subsidized, and spread over a decade. What you’re proposing for the PAF is basically building a second air force on top of the first one.

Even the logistics piece...12 Y‑20 tankers and 12 C‑390s is a multi‑billion‑dollar commitment on its own. Pakistan’s transport fleet is already stretched. Adding more aircraft means more pilots, more technicians, more bases, more everything. It’s not “buy and fly.”

And here’s the real point, unless Saudi Arabia and Qatar are paying for the jets, the sustainment, the training, the basing, and the long‑term ecosystem, this plan doesn’t even get off the runway. Pakistan simply cannot absorb this scale of expansion on its own.

That’s why I keep saying that only realistic path is structural reform at home. My proposal for 34 Economic Zones as second tier of government isn’t some abstract theory, it’s a way to save around $22 billion a year by cutting duplicated provincial bureaucracies and redirecting that money into defense, education, and development. But the problem is, the current system benefits too many entrenched interests. From my perspective, the establishment has no incentive to shrink its own footprint. It’s like a system that keeps feeding on public resources because that’s how it has always operated.

So yes, dreaming about 100 J‑10Cs is fun. I’ve seen these lists on YouTube too, glossy thumbnails, dramatic music, “PAF Future Fleet Revealed.” But unless the financing is real, unless the structure of the state changes, and unless the economic model stops bleeding money, these ideas stay exactly where they are dreams.

Without external funding or internal reform, this isn’t a plan. It’s a fantasy fleet.

The fantasy fleet isn't even that good.

It should've been 4 A330 MRTTs, 12 Erieye-ERs mounted to E195/E2 plus 28 C390s, duh.