Pakistan Constitutional Amendments:

Goenitz said:
Lastly, China prospered when it decentralised its economy in the 1970s and 1980s under Deng Chao's era. Similarly, India did in 92 under M. Singh.
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Exactly! There is absolutely NO link between the kind of political system in place and the country’s economy. Even authoritarian regimes can do good economically if their economic policies are sound—which simply ain’t the case for Pakistan. 🙄
 
Toxic said:
Fauje@ts are uniquely disgusting creatures, In a way they are similar to MAGA Republicans in the US, they are Ok with being fu@ked as long it owns PTI supporters or anyone that is not a fauje@t same way How MAGA zombies are ok with Trump doing whatever as long as "it owns the libs" Even if they are getting fu@ked in process, If tomorrow El sisi 2.0 orders them to eat his shit spit and piss Fa@jeets will gladly say "YES SIR!".
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Stop lifting Imran's balls daily - they will not get you anywhere.
 

Bill for 27th Constitutional Amendment presented in Senate for voting amid opposition’s uproar, walkout​


News Desk | Amir Wasim
November 10, 2025

The bill for the 27th Constitutional Amendment was passed in the Senate on Monday as opposition benches caused a ruckus around the seat of Law Minister Azam Nazeer Tarar.

Senate Chairman Syed Yousaf Raza Gilani, presiding over the proceedings, read out the amended clauses one by one for voting as members of the opposition continued their protest against the controversial bill and staged a walkout. Meanwhile, Humayun Mohmand, along with a few other PTI senators, stayed back to continue chanting slogans against the government and its coalition partners.

Earlier today, a joint meeting of the Senate and the National Assembly’s law and justice standing committees — boycotted by the opposition — approved the 27th Constitutional Amendment bill with minor changes. Senate Standing Committee of Law and Justice Chairman Farooq H. Naek presented a report on those before the Upper House.
Earlier in the day, Naek tabled the report in the Senate. Following that, Chairman Gilani asked for the opposition members to be called to the house as well, pointing out that Naek would now elaborate on the reporting.
 
Naek told the house that the joint committee deliberated on the bill for two days and made “many changes”.

Sharing further details, he said the bill proposed the establishment of a Federal Constitutional Court (FCC), which the committee “unanimously” approved with some changes to the relevant clause.

Outlining those changes, he said there would be equal representation of all provinces in the FCC, and it would also include a representative from the Islamabad High Court.

Moving on to the second change, he said the initial draft of the bill stated that a judge could be nominated for the FCC after serving on the high court for seven years. The committee reduced this qualification merit for the FCC from seven to five years, he added.

Naek further said that the committee also agreed that if an appointment was made to the FCC from among sitting Supreme Court judges, the inter-se seniority of the appointee would remain the same as at the time of the appointment. However, in the case of a fresh appointment of a lawyer or a high court judge, the seniority would be reckoned from the date on which they would assume office.

Moreover, he continued, if multiple judges would take the oath on the same day, their seniority would be determined on the basis of their age.

He added that the Judicial Commission of Pakistan (JCP) was reconstituted under the 26th Constitutional Amendment, with the speaker being authorised to nominate a woman or a non-Muslim candidate to become a member.
 

How many votes are required?​

A constitutional amendment requires a two-thirds majority in both houses of Parliament. So when the bill is put to the vote in the Senate, which comprises 96 members, it will require the backing of at least 64 senators.

The ruling coalition has 65 votes in the Senate, with the PPP’s 26, PML-N’s 20, Balochistan Awami Party’s four, Muttahida Qaumi Movement’s three, Awami National Party’s three, one each of the National Party, Pakistan Muslim League-Quaid and seven from independent lawmakers.

However, this does not guarantee the approval of the amendment bill in the Senate as these votes also include those of Gilani, who cannot cast his vote being the Senate chairperson, and PML-N’s Irfan Siddiqui, whose vote cannot be ensured as he is hospitalised.

Following its approval by the Senate, the bill will also have to be voted on in the National Assembly (NA), which is also scheduled to meet at 4:30pm today.

In the 336-member NA, the ruling coalition does enjoy a two-thirds majority. It has 233 members while the opposition holds 103. Within the coalition, the PML-N has 125 seats, PPP 74, MQM-P 22, PML-Q five, Istehkam-i-Pakistan Party four, and PML-Z, Balochistan Awami Party, and National Peoples Party one seat each.
 

Approval by parliamentary committees​

The bill, which was tabled by Law Minister Azam Nazeer Tarar in the Senate on Saturday amid outcry from the opposition and hours after getting the federal cabinet’s nod, aims to set up a federal constitutional court and grant lifetime status to the field marshal rank.

On Sunday, a joint meeting of the Senate and the National Assembly’s law and justice standing committees had approved the 27th Constitutional Amendment bill with minor changes amid a boycott by the opposition.

Deputy Prime Minister Ishaq Dar, who also attended the meeting, said all key amendments, including changes to Article 243, which provides that the federal government “shall have control and command of the armed forces” and pertains to the military command structure, were amicably approved by both committees.

Senator Naek, who was presiding over the meeting, said the bill was adopted with minor changes. He said that the committees empowered him and the law minister to make a couple of amendments.

The committees, however, deferred the Muttahida Qaumi Movement’s (MQM) proposal, seeking to amend Article 140 that pertains to local governments, as well as the Awami National Party’s (ANP) recommendation for changing the name of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa.

The ANP had submitted a proposal to rename the province by removing ‘Khyber’, arguing that Khyber was a district and other provinces did not include district names in their titles. Likewise, the Balochistan National Party’s proposed amendment to increase the province’s seats in Parliament was also deferred.

Earlier in the day, ANP’s Hidayatullah Khan told reporters that the committee had sought time until Monday to decide on his party’s suggestion for changing the name of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa.

Meanwhile, the law minister told reporters it was decided that provinces would be taken into confidence on changing KP’s name.
 

Analysis: One chief to rule all military services​

Article 243 overhaul marks a leap towards military centralisation and consolidation of uniformed supremacy.

Blair Sajjad Syed
November 9, 2025

The proposed 27th Constitutional Amendment, which would overhaul Article 243 and recast Pakistan’s military command hierarchy, is the most ambitious restructuring effort in decades and perhaps the most contentious as it collides with entrenched institutional cultures and the fragile equilibrium between civilian and military power.

Its implementation may prove far more difficult than its drafters imagine. The plan collides with entrenched institutional cultures, long-standing inter-service rivalries, and the delicate balance between civilian oversight and military autonomy that has, at least in theory, defined Pakistan’s power structure since 1973.

At the heart of the bill lies the deceptively simple premise of modernising defence coordination by creating a Chief of Defence Forces (CDF) and abolishing the office of the Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee (CJCSC).

But in practice, the reform would elevate the army chief to a constitutionally enshrined position of supremacy — combining operational command with overarching control of all services.

Article 243 overhaul marks a leap towards military centralisation and consolidation of uniformed supremacy
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For over four decades, the CJCSC has served as the symbolic head of the armed services, designed to ensure coordination among the Army, Navy, and Air Force.

In practice, the role remained largely ceremonial, with the army — for over two and a half decades — reluctant to rotate it to other branches.

The proposed amendment would dissolve the post entirely on Nov 27, 2025, coinciding with the retirement of the current CJCSC, Gen Sahir Shamshad Mirza, and make the chief of army staff concurrently the Chief of Defence Forces — placing all three services under his authority.

Former human rights minister and defence academic Dr Shireen Mazari highlights an ambiguity left unaddressed in the bill.

“With the end of the CJCSC position, would the joint chiefs of staff committee also be dissolved?” she asks.

If so, which forum would replace it for coordination among the three services though the CJCSC’s ineffectiveness is well known.

The supporters of the legislation argue that the change will streamline decision-making and enhance unified command.
 
critics see it as institutional capture. “By placing an army officer as the Chief of Defence Forces with authority over the Air Force and Navy, the proposed system invites institutional imbalance and potential disaster,” warns retired Lt Gen Asif Yasin Malik, a former defence secretary.

“This amendment appears tailored to benefit a specific individual rather than to strengthen the defence structure,” he adds.

The criticism cuts to the core of the country’s military culture — the deep-seated rivalries among the Army, Air Force, and Navy, each guarding its operational turf and doctrine.

The Air Force and Navy have long resisted attempts to subordinate their autonomy under land-centric command.

Harmonising these distinct traditions — air power’s rapid, decentralised decision cycles versus the army’s hierarchical chain of command — has historically been the Achilles’ heel of every “joint” reform effort.

A critical question under the new system is who would control transfers, postings, and promotions in the Air Force and Navy.

Would the two service chiefs readily cede that authority? Dr Mazari cautions that if promotions in the Air Force and Navy were to be decided by an army-origin CDF, it “could lead to festering resentments and affect morale in the long run”.
 
“Under the proposed arrangement, would such dissent, and the powerful response it ensured, even be possible?” he asks pointedly.

Perhaps the most controversial innovation lies in the clauses granting life-long constitutional protection to officers elevated to five-star ranks — field marshal, marshal of the air force, or admiral of the fleet.

These officers would “retain rank, privileges and remain in uniform for life”, removable only through impeachment under Article 47 and protected by immunities “similar to those enjoyed by the president” under Article 248, applied mutatis mutandis.

The language is designed to legalise the extraordinary promotion of Gen Asim Munir to field marshal following the India-Pakistan confrontation in May this year.

What looks ceremonial on paper, however, amounts to a permanent legal armour around an unelected officeholder — “a parallel authority insulated from the very rule of law it is sworn to defend”, as one constitutional lawyer puts it, asking not to be named.

Such provisions blur the line between honour and power.

“Even in the United States, the chairman of the joint chiefs does not wield absolute powers,” notes Lt Gen Malik.

“Creating lifetime immunities for military officers upends the very idea of civilian supremacy”. The supporters of the amendment, including government ministers, argue the changes merely formalise existing practices.

Yet the bill remains ambiguous about the tenure of the service chiefs.
 
Minister of State for Law and Justice Barrister Aqeel Malik told reporters that there was “no need for a fresh notification” on the army chief’s tenure, since existing legal provisions already establish a five-year term under the Army Act as amended by the 26th Constitutional Amendment.

But such reassurances overlook a deeper concern, which is that the proposed amendment will move the defence management from statute to constitutional entrenchment, making future civilian corrections exponentially harder.

Military affairs expert Muhammad Faisal, a doctoral researcher in Sydney, sees the bill as “the first phase” of a broader restructuring.

“There could be more updates coming with changes in the Army Act and NCA Acts to reflect new proposals,” he says.

“This could also lead to the restructuring of strategic forces, currently administered by three services separately, into a unified single command.”

That trajectory — toward centralisation rather than coordination — captures the tension at the heart of Pakistan’s military politics. Every attempt at “jointness” risks hardening into hierarchy because institutional habits and prestige are resistant to reform.

The stakes are profound. The country’s Constitution has endured repeated experiments in balancing military power and civilian authority.

A Chief of Defence Forces position can be created, as many democracies have done, through statutory reform subject to parliamentary review.
 
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