Lt Gen Zakaria has been emphatic that the force is “a strictly conventional force” with a command structure entirely separate from Pakistan’s nuclear forces.
Moreover, the modernisation of systems like the Fatah missile series — whose
fourth iteration was test-fired a fortnight ago — and efforts to improve precision strike capabilities clearly show that conventional missile forces are now being viewed not merely as battlefield assets, but rather strategic instruments in and of themselves.
Dr Rabia Akhtar, a visiting fellow of the Harvard Kennedy School-based Project on Managing the Atom, sees the creation of the National Strategic Command and Rocket Force Command as recognition that “conventional deterrence is becoming increasingly important” and could provide decision makers “a wider range of conventional response options” before reaching the nuclear threshold.
The reasoning is straightforward. If precision conventional systems can deliver calibrated but meaningful military effects, they reduce the requirement for early nuclear signalling and raise the practical threshold for nuclear use.
It also means doctrines framed around tactical nuclear use for battlefield denial may no longer correspond fully to the realities of the evolving battlespace.
Pakistan, therefore, may need to reconsider whether the existing formulation of ‘Full-Spectrum Deterrence’, or for that matter, the “quid-pro-quo plus” approach still reflects the strategic environment of 2026 or whether parts of it belong more to the threat perceptions of the mid-2000s.
Ambassador Zamir Akram, an adviser to the Strategic Plans Division, noted: “Space for conventional warfare has increased and raised the nuclear threshold”.
Yet, he also cautioned that new technologies have created greater “entanglement of conventional and strategic weapons”, making escalation faster and harder to control.
The argument that conventional deterrence needs to be given greater importance does not suggest abandoning nuclear deterrence or pursuing unrealistic conventional parity with India.
Indeed, Pakistan’s nuclear capability remains indispensable as the ultimate safeguard against existential coercion, but there is a growing case for recalibrating the relationship between nuclear and conventional deterrence.
One reason is the growing danger of ambiguity in a battlefield increasingly shaped by speed, automation and dual capable systems. Modern warfare compresses timelines, blurs signalling and increases the risk of misreading intentions. Pakistan’s traditional policy of strategic ambiguity served an important purpose when the objective was to create uncertainty in the adversary’s calculations.