Fatman17
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As Shkvarevsky noted in an interview to the BBC Ukrainian Service, published four months after this incident, the effective operations to counter cruise missiles and drones depend on the quality of support provided by the GCI officer who monitors the overall radar picture and vectors fighter pilots to their targets. The MiG-29’s own radar, when working against low-altitude targets (i.e. in the look-down/shoot down mode) could provide multiple returns and the missile launch against the designated target is carried out only upon confirmation issued by the GCI officer who guides the pilot to the target to be engaged.
Other Ukrainian fighter pilots, such as Andriy Pilshchykov, callsign ‘Juice’, have also tended to comment in their interviews that it is next to impossible to achieve a radar lock-on on low-flying cruise missiles. As a result, all successful intercepts of such targets have been facilitated by utilising their aircraft’s infrared search-and-track (IRST) sensors.
A fully armed MiG-29 undergoes servicing in a hardened aircraft shelter, well-protected from Russian retaliatory strikes, April 2023 Ukrainian Air Force
The third known fighter loss during a territorial air defence mission to counter a drone raid was reported on March 28, 2023. A Su-27 crashed in a combat mission when intercepting drones or cruise missiles, killing the pilot, Maj Denis Kirilyuk.
There is another important lesson learned from the UkrAF fighter operations, valid also for the helicopter and strike branches. It relates to the great contribution provided by retired aircrews with significant expertise and experience, who voluntarily returned to active service shortly before or soon after the outbreak of war, ready and willing to fly combat missions or participate in the accelerated training of new pilots.
Losses record
In total, during combat operations in the first 13 months of war, the UkrAF’s fighter fleet attrition accounted for no fewer than 23 aircraft lost in combat (in air combat with manned jets, intercepts of cruise missiles and drones and in addition to ground strike and SEAD/DEAD missions). This figure includes 15 MiG-29s and eight Su-27s.
As many as 20 pilots were declared lost which is an alarmingly high ratio of pilots killed in action. Most of the shot downs happened at low or ultra-low level, with the UkrAF fighters taking hits from air-to-air and surface-to-air missiles fitted with powerful warheads. Analysis of the Ukrainian fighter losses in the initial 13 months of war, using open-source information, tend to suggest that friendly fire was the most likely cause for the loss of at least three MiG-29s and five Su-27s, claiming the lives of seven pilots.
The chaotic air defence operations in the opening days of the Russian invasion, when the UkrAF fighter force and GBAD networks had no reliable-functioning command-and-control system, led to several high-profile fratricide engagements, claiming at least two Su-27s. One of these, flown by Maj Dmitry Kolomiets, was gunned down on the first day of war in the Khmelnitsky region, a location which is otherwise some distance from the war zones (situated some 170nm to the southwest of Kyiv), with no reported operations of Russian aircraft at the time. As a result, the shoot down remains a mystery and the most likely cause for it is friendly fire from the ground. The second Su-27 was gunned down over Kyiv, with this accident also believed to have been the result of ground-based friendly fire, in the early hours of February 25, 2022, claiming the life of Col Oleksandar Oksanchenko.
The UkrAF MiG-29 fleet at the outbreak of war numbered about 30 aircraft kept in operational conditions, and later on the size increased due to supplies from Poland and Slovakia (a total of 27 aircraft but not all of these were handed over in airworthy condition) in addition to the return to service of a number of grounded airframes Ukrainian MoD
On February 26, another UkrAF Su-27 was found crashed in the Kropivnitsky region with the pilot, Maj Stepan Choban, declared killed in action. This is a location in the central part of the country (some 130nm to the southeast of Kyiv), where no Russian air activity had been reported at the time. It is noteworthy that a MiG-29 pilot from the 40th BrTA, 1st Lt Andriy Gerus, claimed he shot down a Russian Il-76MD airlifter in the same area and the same night, but no evidence has been found to confirm this claim. It is highly possible that Maj Choban’s ill-fated Su-27 had been the MiG-29’s target in this BVR engagement.
Another Su-27 was reported downed by friendly fire in Orekhovo area on June 5, 2022, not far from the front line, killing the pilot, Lt Col Dmitry Fischer from the 831st BrTA.
So, this could be another important lesson learned, referring to the excessive losses due to friendly fire inevitably happening in the fog of war, mostly due to unreliable IFF systems employed by the Ukrainian military and a lack of co-ordination between the fighter and GBAD units – this being valid for the operations in depth of the country and for the engagements in the front line areas. And this conclusion is true not only for the Ukrainians, but also for the Russian air arm, which has also suffered from significant fratricide.
As of mid-April 2024, the list of the confirmed UkrAF fighter fleet combat losses accounted for more than 40 MiG-29s and Su-27s, according to the data published by the open-source intelligence site Oryx, complemented with additional research by the author. Analysing all the attrition data available in the open sources could lead to the conclusion that no fewer than 20 MiG-29s and 12 Su-27s were lost in combat, taking hits in the air, while between ten and 15 more airworthy aircraft were taken out by Russian missile and loitering munition strikes on the ground. As many as 22 fighter pilots (nearly 70 per cent of the aircrews of downed aircraft) were declared killed in action in all types of combat missions flown by the MiG-29s and Su-27s. It is also believed that between 20 and 30% of the total UkrAF fighter force losses were inflicted by friendly fire.
Other Ukrainian fighter pilots, such as Andriy Pilshchykov, callsign ‘Juice’, have also tended to comment in their interviews that it is next to impossible to achieve a radar lock-on on low-flying cruise missiles. As a result, all successful intercepts of such targets have been facilitated by utilising their aircraft’s infrared search-and-track (IRST) sensors.
The third known fighter loss during a territorial air defence mission to counter a drone raid was reported on March 28, 2023. A Su-27 crashed in a combat mission when intercepting drones or cruise missiles, killing the pilot, Maj Denis Kirilyuk.
There is another important lesson learned from the UkrAF fighter operations, valid also for the helicopter and strike branches. It relates to the great contribution provided by retired aircrews with significant expertise and experience, who voluntarily returned to active service shortly before or soon after the outbreak of war, ready and willing to fly combat missions or participate in the accelerated training of new pilots.
Losses record
In total, during combat operations in the first 13 months of war, the UkrAF’s fighter fleet attrition accounted for no fewer than 23 aircraft lost in combat (in air combat with manned jets, intercepts of cruise missiles and drones and in addition to ground strike and SEAD/DEAD missions). This figure includes 15 MiG-29s and eight Su-27s.
As many as 20 pilots were declared lost which is an alarmingly high ratio of pilots killed in action. Most of the shot downs happened at low or ultra-low level, with the UkrAF fighters taking hits from air-to-air and surface-to-air missiles fitted with powerful warheads. Analysis of the Ukrainian fighter losses in the initial 13 months of war, using open-source information, tend to suggest that friendly fire was the most likely cause for the loss of at least three MiG-29s and five Su-27s, claiming the lives of seven pilots.
The chaotic air defence operations in the opening days of the Russian invasion, when the UkrAF fighter force and GBAD networks had no reliable-functioning command-and-control system, led to several high-profile fratricide engagements, claiming at least two Su-27s. One of these, flown by Maj Dmitry Kolomiets, was gunned down on the first day of war in the Khmelnitsky region, a location which is otherwise some distance from the war zones (situated some 170nm to the southwest of Kyiv), with no reported operations of Russian aircraft at the time. As a result, the shoot down remains a mystery and the most likely cause for it is friendly fire from the ground. The second Su-27 was gunned down over Kyiv, with this accident also believed to have been the result of ground-based friendly fire, in the early hours of February 25, 2022, claiming the life of Col Oleksandar Oksanchenko.
On February 26, another UkrAF Su-27 was found crashed in the Kropivnitsky region with the pilot, Maj Stepan Choban, declared killed in action. This is a location in the central part of the country (some 130nm to the southeast of Kyiv), where no Russian air activity had been reported at the time. It is noteworthy that a MiG-29 pilot from the 40th BrTA, 1st Lt Andriy Gerus, claimed he shot down a Russian Il-76MD airlifter in the same area and the same night, but no evidence has been found to confirm this claim. It is highly possible that Maj Choban’s ill-fated Su-27 had been the MiG-29’s target in this BVR engagement.
Another Su-27 was reported downed by friendly fire in Orekhovo area on June 5, 2022, not far from the front line, killing the pilot, Lt Col Dmitry Fischer from the 831st BrTA.
So, this could be another important lesson learned, referring to the excessive losses due to friendly fire inevitably happening in the fog of war, mostly due to unreliable IFF systems employed by the Ukrainian military and a lack of co-ordination between the fighter and GBAD units – this being valid for the operations in depth of the country and for the engagements in the front line areas. And this conclusion is true not only for the Ukrainians, but also for the Russian air arm, which has also suffered from significant fratricide.
As of mid-April 2024, the list of the confirmed UkrAF fighter fleet combat losses accounted for more than 40 MiG-29s and Su-27s, according to the data published by the open-source intelligence site Oryx, complemented with additional research by the author. Analysing all the attrition data available in the open sources could lead to the conclusion that no fewer than 20 MiG-29s and 12 Su-27s were lost in combat, taking hits in the air, while between ten and 15 more airworthy aircraft were taken out by Russian missile and loitering munition strikes on the ground. As many as 22 fighter pilots (nearly 70 per cent of the aircrews of downed aircraft) were declared killed in action in all types of combat missions flown by the MiG-29s and Su-27s. It is also believed that between 20 and 30% of the total UkrAF fighter force losses were inflicted by friendly fire.
Topics
Read more about- Ukraine Russia Conflict
- Mikoyan-Gurevich MiG-29 Fulcrum
- Sukhoi Flanker
- Ukrainian Air Force (UkrAF)
- AirForces Monthly June 2024
