Sami Hamdi: Bangladesh as the Architect of Rohingya Return

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Sami Hamdi: Bangladesh as the Architect of Rohingya Return | Stream Talk | Dhaka Stream



British journalist and political commentator Sami Hamdi argues that Bangladesh must shift its perspective on the Rohingya crisis from viewing it as a hopeless humanitarian burden to recognizing it as a critical geopolitical opportunity.

The main themes and arguments from Hamdi's discussion are categorized below:

1. Bangladesh as the Historical "Architect"

• A Pattern of History: Hamdi emphasizes that in the 1400s and 1700s, Bengal (modern-day Bangladesh) acted as a safe haven where oppressed people from the Rakhine region could recover, organize, and successfully return home. He insists Bangladesh must reclaim this historical role.
• The Danger of a Passive Approach: Because Bangladesh currently lacks a political roadmap, the United Nations and outside powers are trying to "bully" the country into permanently keeping the Rohingya and granting them citizenship.
• The Threat of Erasure: As the rebel Arakan Army defeats the Myanmar military, both sides are hostile to the Rohingya identity. If Bangladesh does not secure a seat at the peace negotiation table, these two warring factions will agree to a deal that completely excludes the Rohingya from returning home.

2. The Turkish-Syrian Parallel
Hamdi draws a direct parallel to how Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan handled Syrian refugees to expand Turkey's regional influence:

• Investment in People: Unlike Bangladesh's restrictive camp policies, Turkey allowed Syrian refugees access to higher education, healthcare, and space to mobilize. This minimized camp crime and created an educated class of future Syrian leaders who became formidable, Turkish-speaking allies.
• The "Homeland" Myth: Hamdi dismisses the fear that providing for refugees means they will never leave, pointing out that when the opportunity arose, the Syrians did return to their homeland.

3. A Strategic Roadmap and Regional Alliances
Hamdi asserts that Bangladesh has numerous diplomatic options if it utilizes "political imagination":

• The Mecca Alliance Opportunity: He suggests Bangladesh leverage the "Mecca Agreement" (an alliance involving Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Pakistan). Instead of crudely offering its massive population as manpower just to receive Saudi money, Bangladesh should pitch a collective Muslim peacekeeping force to protect Rohingya lands in northern Rakhine State.
• Leveraging China and Global Powers: Since regional Muslim nations (like Malaysia under Anwar Ibrahim) and global players are turning toward Beijing, a unified stance by Bangladesh, Turkey, and Saudi Arabia would force China to accommodate a Rohingya roadmap to maintain its own diplomatic standing.
• Changing the Narrative: International aid has dropped by 75% because donors see the crisis as an endless, bottomless pit. Hamdi states that funding will return once Bangladesh shows a clear political roadmap toward repatriation.

4. Actionable Steps for the Bangladeshi Government

• Empower Rohingya Voices: Bangladesh needs to stop hiding the crisis and instead train Rohingya influencers and leaders. Allowing them to utilize social media to tell their stories directly to the world will shift global public opinion, much like the public response to Gaza.
• A Flagship Win for the New Government: Hamdi notes that complex domestic problems (like corruption and infrastructure) take longer than five years to fix. Championing the Rohingya issue is a golden, time-sensitive opportunity for the new Bangladeshi government to secure a massive international and regional success.

 

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https://www.ohchr.org/en/stories/2026/09/myanmars-rohingya-and-other-minorities-face-renewed-terror-illicit-economies-boom

Myanmar’s Rohingya and other minorities face renewed terror, illicit economies boom​

03 September 2026

A new UN Human Rights report paints a grim picture of Myanmar, nine years after the 2017 military violence against the Rohingya Muslim minority and five years after the military coup. The Office has documented escalating violence against the Rohingya and other minorities alongside a booming, unregulated rare earths mining industry that is devastating the environment and ethnic communities in Kachin and Shan states.
The report, covering June 2025 to May 2026, finds Rohingya civilians were trapped between two armed actors — the Myanmar military and the Arakan Army — which exacerbated protection concerns to unimaginable levels due to airstrikes, arson attacks, displacement and denial of assistance, and systematic abuse and persecution against the Rohingya.

In areas it controls across northern Rakhine, the Arakan Army has mirrored the military's own denial of Rohingya identity — referring to them as "Bengali," a term that casts them as foreign migrants rather than a recognized minority of Myanmar. It also subjected communities to arbitrary arrest, torture, sexual violence, forced labour and land confiscation. Credible local sources indicated 2,353 instances of Rohingya forced labour in northern Rakhine in a single month — January 2026 — including 75 involving children.

“Across northern Rakhine, the Arakan Army has perpetrated arbitrary arrests, torture, sexual and gender-based violence, instances of enforced disappearance, forced labour and recruitment, unlawful confiscation of land and residential property, and the destruction of villages, religious and cultural sites, caused renewed Rohingya displacement,” the report states.

“Children are systematically used for labour, with witnesses describing workers as young as six years old clearing jungle, constructing buildings and doing menial work for Rakhine families. In one case, a child was forced to clear bones and skulls of victims of a massacre.”

Attempts at fleeing to seek safety have become increasingly deadly. The report states that 2025 was the deadliest year on record for Rohingya undertaking maritime journeys to seek safety in other countries, with 892 people dead or missing at sea, a toll already being matched in 2026: by May, 4,665 people had attempted the crossing, with 280 reported dead or missing. Those who stay face military blockades that pushed staple food prices up 31 percent between February and May 2026 alone and, by the end of April, nearly 150,000 Rohingya had newly registered as refugees in Bangladesh.

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This report depicts a picture of suffering, misery, and cruelty on multiple levels and across the country that is heartbreaking.

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UN Human Rights Chief, Volker Türk

Illegal mining for rare earths and its consequences​

The report also documents the rapid, unregulated expansion of rare earths mining in Kachin and Shan states — extraction that surged under the control of armed groups including the United Wa State Army following the 2021 coup. Mining sites expanded from 215 pre-coup to 590 by end of May 2026, with trade in these minerals peaking at 1.4 billion US dollars in 2023.

The human cost of that boom, the report finds, falls heaviest on women, workers and local communities. Toxic leaching chemicals — including ammonium sulphate and ammonium chloride — have contaminated waterways with arsenic, cadmium and lead, destabilized mountainsides and triggered fatal landslides; an explosion at one unregulated site in Namhkan township killed roughly 50 people in a single incident on 31 May 2026.

“Environmental contamination impacted maternal and reproductive health, with local documentation efforts confirming sharp surges in miscarriages, severe bleeding during pregnancy, childbirth, or after delivery, and pregnancy complications attributed to heavy metal and chemical exposure,” the report says.

Women are disproportionately exposed, both through contaminated water collection and through what the report describes as institutionalized sexual coercion in mining camps — a practice interlocutors called "Ayaw" (mixed positions) under which job retention was explicitly conditioned on sexual services. Lack of economic opportunities, displacement and forced conscription triggered the influx of women into the mining sector. “This aggravated risks of sexual violence and harassment by supervisors, guards, and militia members who operated with absolute impunity,” the report says.

Migrant workers, meanwhile, face debt bondage, unpaid wages held back for up to a year, and exposure to hazardous chemicals with no training or protective equipment.

“Without knowledge and equipment, interlocutors stated that workers developed symptoms like acute respiratory distress, severe headaches, chemical burns, and gastrointestinal illnesses,” the report states. “Prolonged exposure caused the accumulation of toxic agents, leading to chronic pulmonary, kidney, and liver diseases.”

Toxic wastewater from leaching pools discharged directly into downstream agricultural land also made the soil barren or significantly affected yield and quality, reducing farmers’ incomes, it adds.

Türk’s recommendations call on Myanmar's military and armed actors to end grave violations against civilians, on States to refrain from legitimizing military rule and stop arms supply, and on businesses to ensure due diligence in rare earth supply chains and access to effective remedy.

“I call on all States, companies and investors to undertake serious soul-searching with respect to their actions – or inaction; to ask: is this fair and just for the people of Myanmar? Can the societal and environmental harm of their activities even be reversed? Their own reputations and their credibility are on the line,” he said.

https://www.ohchr.org/en/documents/...-rights-rohingya-muslims-and-other-minorities (Link to 15 page pdf report)

 

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Arakan Army’s ‘Dream State’ And Emerging Security Challenge For Bangladesh - Daily Excelsior

Tajul Islam The Arakan Army (AA), an ethnic armed organization based in Myanmar’s Rakhine State, is seeking to consolidate its influence through more than battlefield gains. Researchers, analysts and people familiar with developments along the Bangladesh-Myanmar border say the...

www.dailyexcelsior.com

Arakan Army’s ‘Dream State’ And Emerging Security Challenge For Bangladesh​

Daily Excelsior​

Aug 27, 2026




Tajul Islam

The Arakan Army (AA), an ethnic armed organization based in Myanmar’s Rakhine State, is seeking to consolidate its influence through more than battlefield gains. Researchers, analysts and people familiar with developments along the Bangladesh-Myanmar border say the group is also using ethnic history, nationalist narratives and the idea of restoring a long-lost Rakhine state to attract young people.

The issue is becoming increasingly relevant for Bangladesh because the AA’s activities are no longer confined to Myanmar. Allegations have emerged that Rakhine youths from Bangladesh’s Chittagong Hill Tracts and Cox’s Bazar have established links with the organization, with some reportedly joining its armed ranks. Intelligence assessments cited by local sources suggest that more than 800 people holding Bangladeshi national identity documents may have joined the AA, although the precise figure is difficult to independently verify. Some are reportedly serving as fighters and, in a few cases, commanders.

What was once viewed largely as a conflict inside Myanmar is therefore developing into a broader security concern for Bangladesh. For years, many Bangladeshis paid little attention to the AA’s activities in Rakhine State or around the Thanchi border area of Bandarban. Even communities living close to the border often had limited understanding of the objectives behind the organization’s armed struggle.

The situation changed significantly after the AA began making substantial battlefield gains against Myanmar’s military. Many in Bangladesh initially viewed those developments positively, hoping that the weakening of Myanmar’s military would create an opportunity for the repatriation of Rohingya refugees who have been living in Bangladesh.

Instead, the humanitarian situation has become more complicated. The AA has been accused of committing serious abuses against Rohingya civilians as it has expanded its territorial control in Rakhine. Thousands of Rohingya have reportedly fled renewed violence and crossed into Bangladesh, further reducing hopes for an early and sustainable repatriation process. Rohingya representatives have described the situation as a continuation of persecution, but with a different actor at the forefront.

Mohammad Rafiqul Islam, a 39-year-old Rohingya youth leader living in Leda camp in Teknaf, told media outlets that the Rohingya had suffered destruction at the hands of Myanmar’s military in 2017 and were now facing attacks and dispossession amid the AA’s expansion. He argued that while the earlier violence focused heavily on destroying homes and property, the current danger increasingly involves direct threats to civilian lives.

The emergence of Rohingya armed groups fighting alongside Myanmar’s military against the AA has added another dangerous dimension to the conflict. Some Rohingya fighters have reportedly been captured by the AA, deepening the cycle of violence between the two communities. Despite allegations of growing AA activity among sections of the Rakhine population in Bangladesh, the issue has received comparatively limited public attention.

Researchers and security analysts believe the organization is attempting to cultivate support through a combination of ethnic identity, historical narratives and the promise of a future Rakhine homeland. An example that attracted attention was the reported celebration of Shangrai, the Rakhine New Year festival, by armed AA-linked individuals in the border areas of Bandarban. Another group was reportedly seen celebrating the festival at a residential hotel near Laldighi in Cox’s Bazar town. Reports of armed men participating in cultural celebrations highlighted how the political and social networks associated with the Rakhine community can extend beyond Myanmar’s borders.

The significance of such activities goes beyond cultural celebration. Security analysts say that ethnic and cultural networks can provide an environment in which political narratives and recruitment messages are circulated. There are also allegations that some local political figures in Cox’s Bazar and the Hill Tracts have maintained contacts with individuals associated with the AA. These allegations require independent investigation and verification, but their emergence illustrates the growing complexity of the issue.

The AA’s appeal among some Rakhine youths is closely connected to a historical narrative of a once-powerful Rakhine kingdom. The idea has been promoted in books and public discussions that portray Rakhine as having an ancient civilization and a distinct political identity that was gradually destroyed by outside powers.

Researchers believe that the AA’s recruitment strategy should not be understood solely in military terms. The organization’s political messaging and historical narratives may be equally important in mobilizing young people.

The present crisis also has deep historical roots. During the Second World War, the political and military alignments of different communities in Burma contributed to violent conflict between Rakhine Buddhists and Rohingya Muslims. The Rohingya largely supported the British, while sections of the Rakhine community aligned with Japanese forces. Weapons supplied to opposing sides contributed to communal violence and massacres. The events of that period left deep scars and helped establish a pattern of mistrust that has persisted for generations.

The historical memory of that conflict continues to influence contemporary narratives on both sides. For the Rohingya, the history reinforces fears that territorial control by Rakhine armed forces could lead to further displacement. For Rakhine nationalists, however, historical grievances are often presented as evidence of a long struggle for political autonomy. The competing narratives make reconciliation particularly difficult.

For Bangladesh, the AA presents a complicated diplomatic dilemma. Myanmar’s government regards the organization as a rebel force. At the same time, the AA has emerged as a powerful territorial actor in large parts of Rakhine. As a result, Bangladesh cannot simply ignore the organization if it wants to address the Rohingya crisis.

The AA’s rise has created a fundamental problem for Bangladesh’s Rohingya policy. Even if Bangladesh reaches an understanding with Myanmar’s central authorities, meaningful repatriation will remain extremely difficult if the AA controls the territory to which refugees are expected to return. This has led some experts to argue that Bangladesh may eventually have to establish some form of communication with the AA, despite its status as a non-state armed organization.

The security consequences of the conflict are also visible along the Bangladesh-Myanmar border. Cross-border smuggling has become another major concern. Fertilizer and other goods are reportedly being illegally transported from Bangladesh into Rakhine, while yaba and other illicit drugs move in the opposite direction. The flow of yaba has already caused severe social and law-enforcement problems in Bangladesh. At the same time, allegations that smuggled materials are being used in the manufacture of explosives or landmines raise an even more immediate threat to border communities.

Landmines and unexploded ordnance in and around the conflict zone have caused casualties among civilians and border residents. People who lose limbs or suffer permanent injuries face consequences that extend far beyond the immediate conflict. (IPA ).

 

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Here is the complete, comprehensive list of the smaller ethnic groups in Chittagong Districts Bangladesh, arranged strictly in order of descending population size.

1. Chakma
• Estimated Population: ~483,000 (The largest group)
• Primary Location: Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT) Valleys (Rangamati and Khagrachari)
• Actual Migration Timeline: 500 to 800 years ago (13th–15th Century CE)
• Historical Context: Genetically Tibeto-Burman, their ancestors migrated northwest out of modern Myanmar (Arakan/Chin states) into the river valleys of the CHT. Over centuries of proximity to the lowland plains, they adopted an Indo-Aryan-influenced language that phonetically mirrors the Chittagonian dialect of Bengali.

2. Marma
• Estimated Population: ~224,000
• Primary Location: CHT Valleys and Ridges (Bandarban and Khagrachari)
• Actual Migration Timeline: 300 to 500 years ago (15th–17th Century CE)
• Historical Context: They share an identical genetic, cultural, and linguistic core with the Rakhine. They represent the descendants of Arakanese imperial garrisons, administrators, and soldiers who retreated into the high CHT hills after the Mughal Empire smashed the Kingdom of Mrauk U and captured Chittagong in 1666. The historic Mughal Bengal border extended all the way south to the Kaladan River; the British later engineered the modern border at the Naf River, creating the geopolitical fracture that directly underpins the modern Rohingya crisis.

3. Tripuri
• Estimated Population: ~112,000
• Primary Location: CHT (Khagrachari) and Plainland Frontiers (Comilla, Chandpur)
• Actual Migration Timeline: 1,500 to 2,000 years ago (~1st–5th Century CE)
• Historical Context: Part of the Tibeto-Burman (Bodo-Garo) linguistic wave, they filtered south from southwestern China via the Brahmaputra Valley, settling the hilly peripheries of eastern Bengal. While the Tripuri are a much earlier migrant group than both the Chakma and Marma, they are still relatively recent compared to the ancient Austroasiatic baseline.

4. Mro (Mru)
• Estimated Population: ~51,000
• Primary Location: Deep, high-altitude ridges of the Southern CHT (Bandarban)
• Actual Migration Timeline: 600 to 900 years ago (12th–15th Century CE)
• Historical Context: They form one of the oldest Tibeto-Burman segments in the CHT, completely distinct from the later Arakanese imperial waves (Marma). They were pushed northward out of the Arakan hills by the expanding state systems of early Burmese and Arakanese kingdoms. They are recognized by anthropologists as one of the most culturally conservative highland groups in the subcontinent, fiercely preserving their animist/totemic cosmologies (Torai) and rejecting linguistic assimilation.

5. Rakhine
• Estimated Population: ~15,000
• Primary Location: Coastal plains of Cox’s Bazar, Patuakhali, and Barguna
• Actual Migration Timeline: 240 years ago (Late 18th Century, specifically 1784 CE onwards)
• Historical Context: They share an identical core identity with the modern Rakhine of Myanmar. Following the violent Burmese conquest of the Kingdom of Mrauk U in 1784 by King Bodawpaya, thousands of Rakhine fled state-sponsored terror by boat across the Bay of Bengal. They made landfall on the uncultivated, forested coastal flats of southern Bengal. British administrators utilized them to clear the dense mangrove forests of the Sundarbans peripheries, turning them into frontier agriculturalists.

6. Bawm
• Estimated Population: ~13,000
• Primary Location: High ridges of the Southern CHT (Bandarban District)
• Actual Migration Timeline: 300 to 500 years ago (16th–18th Century CE)
• Historical Context: Part of the Kuki-Chin-Mizo ethnic cluster, their ancestors inhabited the Chin Hills of Myanmar and the Lushai Hills of Mizoram. They were driven westward into the rugged, high-altitude ridges of the CHT due to inter-tribal warfare and territorial pressures. Unlike valley-dwelling groups (Chakma/Marma) who integrated economically with lowland traders, the Bawm utilized their rugged terrain to remain highly isolated until British administrative interventions in the 19th century.