The Egyptian missile program... Time-line

[The SC]

Egypt began its missile journey during the time of the late President Gamal Abdel Nasser in the 1960s..

Among the military projects that Egypt initiated was the construction of the Qahir, Al-Dhafer, Al-Raed, and Al-Raed 25 missiles.

The truth is that the previous two projects were not as serious or as efficient as the media was promoting at the time. For example, the Al-Qahir missile was a projectile weighing 2.5 tons, and it created a hole in medium-hard ground with a diameter of 27 meters and a depth of 12 meters. The amount of displaced dust amounted to about 2,300 cubic meters, and as it appears, the destructive power This weapon is considered wonderful, but the effectiveness of a field weapon is not measured only by the power of destruction. There were fundamental defects in this weapon that make it the closest thing to the slingshot or catapult that were used during the Middle Ages. It was large in size and weight. If it moved, its vehicle moved at a speed of 8-10 kilometers per hour and on smooth or solid ground. If it was fired, it was fired with general guidance, as there is no way to determine the direction other than directing the launcher in the direction of the target. The maximum range it could reach. The range is eight kilometers, and the distance can only be controlled within narrow limits and by raising or lowering the launch angle. The error rate reaches 800 meters..

As for the Al-Dhafer missile, it is the younger brother of the Al-Qahir. It was smaller in size and had a longer range. The Military Technical College developed it so that it can fire four shells at once. It was more accurate than the Al-Qahir, but nevertheless it cannot be considered among the precision weapons. After the modification, it was named after the olive. The modified figs (Al-Qahir) and olives (Al-Zafir) were used as a psychological factor and for deterrence in the 1973 war.

But the actual and serious beginning of the Egyptian missile program was after the Glorious October War and the beginning of the phase of building the Egyptian army, a modern and advanced army.

1975-1976
North Korea requested from Egypt a number of Soviet-made FROG-7B (9M21E Luna-M) artillery missiles, with a number ranging from 24 to 56 missiles (with a range of 80 km).

June 1975
Egyptian Vice President Hosni Mubarak visited France and met with a number of officials there to discuss cooperation in manufacturing aircraft and missiles.

1976
North Korea requested to purchase two Scud-B missiles from Egypt, and then Egypt gave North Korea a number of Scud-B missiles as a gesture of appreciation for its assistance with weapons in the period before the 1973 war, and thus Korea began its program to build Scud missiles.

1976
Egypt began working in the Saqr factory of the Arab Organization for Industrialization, where work began on producing the Egyptian Saqr series of missiles, including the 325mm Sakr-80 missile, to replace the FROG-7 missiles with a range of 80 km.

October 6, 1976
Egypt displayed four Soviet-made Scud missiles for the first time in a military parade to celebrate the third anniversary of the 1973 war.

Late seventies
North Korea began domestic production of AT-3 Sagger ATGMs (anti-tank missiles) and SA-7 Grail SAMs (air defense) by reverse engineering these weapons that it obtained from Egypt in 1974.

1979-1980
North Korea received from Egypt a number of R-17E (Scud-B) missiles, as well as a number of MAZ-543 transporter-erector launchers (TELs) and other equipment.
1980 Egyptian Vice President Hosni Mubarak, after his meeting with North Korean leader Kim Il Sung in January 1980 in Yongyang, signed an agreement for the joint manufacturing and development of missiles, stipulating that Egypt would send Soviet-made Scud-B missiles, their launchers, and other equipment, as Korea increased and developed Its missile facility and the establishment of missile testing areas in accordance with the agreement, although sending such equipment violates the agreements concluded with the Soviet Union.

The beginning of the eighties
According to a CIA report that was published in the media in 1996, it was stated that Egypt, North Korea, and China began to cooperate and work on establishing a missile program, whereby Egypt obtained advanced American equipment and technologies and then transferred them to China, which in turn transferred them to North Korea, where Korea North Korea manufactures its Scud missile program in the Chagang Province area near the Chinese border and then sends them to Egypt. CIA experts believe that Korea is merely a subcontractor for China.

1981
Egypt began sending a shipment to North Korea containing two Scud B missiles, launchers, and other equipment

August 21, 1981
North Korea and Egypt signed an agreement for technological cooperation and exchange

1982-1983
North Korea's attempts to produce Soviet-made R17Es (Scud-Bs) missiles, which it obtained from Egypt, continued by reverse engineering.

January 4, 1982
Military Factory 18, Abu Zaabal, began producing explosives, fuel, and rocket engines.

April 5, 1983
During his visit to Pyongyang, Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak discussed the signing of the extension of cooperation and joint technology transfer between Egypt and North Korea, signed in 1981.
In the 1980s, Egypt signed a licensed manufacturing agreement with North Korea for Scud-C missiles with an approximate range of 310 miles. Thus, Egypt had the ability to strike any point in Israel.

August 17, 1983
Field Marshal Abdel Halim Abu Ghazaleh told the BBC that Egypt had produced its copy of the SA-7 missiles, and that this was Egypt’s first step toward producing guided missiles.

September 6, 1983
Field Marshal Abu Ghazaleh, Minister of Defense and Military Production, visited North Korea with a military delegation.

1984
Iraq began to return to financing Egypt in its military projects, which enabled Egypt to enter the Condor II program project

1984
Iraq agreed to participate in the Condor 2 project, and among the goals was to manufacture a missile that exceeds the capabilities of the Condor 1 project, with a range of at least 150 km, 5 times the distance, using a larger missile and liquid fuel to increase the range. To achieve this, the project required high technologies that might attract attention. The United States and Britain, to avoid this, proposed that the Iraqis use Egypt as an intermediary, as Iraq would transfer its funding for the project through Egypt. Saudi Arabia also participated in the project with an amount of one billion dollars in an account in the Swiss Bank, and accordingly, the German company Messerschmitt-Bölkow-Blohm (MBB) For these generous payments from the participating Arab countries to pay the workers’ money, give them bonuses, and purchase the materials needed to manufacture missiles (the most important thing was to form excellent relationships with networks of arms companies in the world to overcome political obstacles).

1984
Honeywell Control Systems contracted with the Swiss Institute for Advanced Technology (IFAT) to conduct a study for the Egyptian Ministry of Defense regarding the installation of fuel-air explosives (FAEs) for ballistic missiles (the institute was one of the parties that joined the work on the Condor project)

1984
The Egyptian Ministry of Defense asked the American government to purchase the equivalent of 9,000 gas fuel bombs under the pretext of clearing minefields, but the Egyptian request was rejected when the intention to install them on missiles was confirmed (Egypt manufactured them later).

This picture is of an Egyptian fuel air bombs

They differ from ordinary bombs in that they do not use ordinary explosive materials such as TNT, Semtex, or even C4. Rather, they use highly combustible chemical compounds such as acetylene or other ethyl compounds. The basis of their work depends on spreading fuel (fuel spray) over a certain range. It is the first stage, and this is through a simple explosion that leads to its dissemination. After that, a delay fuse is used to ensure that the fuel is spread in the required area. This is followed by another explosion that explodes this fuel spread over a large area of the ground in the air, which raises the temperature and pressure in the atmosphere to very high, as in one of the explosions the temperature may reach more than 2500 degrees Celsius, and this explosion raises the atmospheric pressure of the surrounding area in a destructive way, whether for buildings, armor, individuals, or even shelters.

February 15, 1984
Egypt signed a contract with Switzerland's Consen Group to plan a factory for missile engines as well as conventional missile systems

March 1984
Honeywell Control Systems signed a contract worth $200,000 with the IFAT Institute to prepare a study on adding gaseous fuel bombs as a warhead to ballistic missiles for the benefit of the Egyptian Ministry of Defense. The required specifications were a warhead weighing 400 kg and a volume of half a cubic meter so that it would have the ability to attack vital and fixed targets such as cities and oil refineries. , ports, and military airports. Its accuracy is 0.1 of its range (which is high accuracy), and the funding for the study came from Saudi Arabia.

April 24, 1984
In an official statement by the Egyptian Minister of Defense to the Middle East News Agency, he announced the production of Falcon Eye missiles and that Egypt is on its way to manufacturing long-range missiles.

October 1984
Egypt represented Iraq in signing the Condor 2 project agreement with investments amounting to $3.2 billion, as Iraq financed most of the project, and Egypt and Iraq called it Badr 2000. Messerschmitt-Bölkow-Blohm was the most prominent partner in the project, as it was the one that provided the project with designs and assistance. Technology as well as simulation laboratories and control equipment
The contract stipulated that Egypt and Iraq would obtain 200 missiles for each country, as well as manufacturing techniques and tools, so that each country would manufacture new units.

1985
Egypt and Argentina began their joint efforts in the Condor 2 project, with a range of 1,000 km and a payload of 750 kg.

1985
Honeywell Control Systems has completed the study required by the Egyptian Ministry of Defense regarding gas fuel bombs

1985
Messerschmitt-Bölkow-Blohm (MBB) technicians established Consen Group in Switzerland to carry out the necessary work for the Condor 2 project.

1985-1988
Messerschmitt-Bölkow-Blohm (MBB), which works with Egypt on the missile project, sent a shipment of laboratory equipment and experiments to Egypt.

1985-1988
During this period, Argentina sent solid fuel rocket engines

April 9, 1985
The Argentine President signed Secret Decree No. 604 to document the agreement with Egypt, putting into effect the contracts signed on September 14, 1984, which were signed by the Minister of Economy, Juan Sourrouille, the Minister of Foreign Relations, Dante Caputo, and the Minister of Defense, Raúl Borrás. Based on this decree, Argentina will send 44 engines in addition to Up to 4 test engines to Egypt

Mid-year 1986
MBB-Transtechnica, a subsidiary of Messerschmitt-Bölkow-Blohm, stopped its supplies to the Condor project, and the parent company and the subcontractor company, which was founded by MBB and the Consen Group, developed a project for Egypt for a missile with a range of 120 miles.
October 1986
The first stage of the Condor 2 missile with a range of 500 km was tested

1987
North Korea provided technical support to Egypt to establish a factory to produce the Scud-B missile

1987
Argentina transferred the technology of the Condor 2 project to Egypt as part of the secret agreement concluded between them

August 1987
The Israeli Mossad attempted to photograph a shipment belonging to the Condor 2 project on its way to Iraq from Egypt and transferred the images to Western intelligence.

End of 1987
The United States increased political pressure on Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak to stop the Egyptian missile program, which was rejected

December 21, 1987
The Financial Times published a report entitled Egypt and Argentina in long-range missile plan about Egyptian cooperation with Argentina, where it stated that Egypt and Argentina are cooperating to develop a solid fuel missile with a range of 800 km. Argentina admitted to cooperating under the name of its own space program to launch satellites, and a number of experts stated that they believe Egypt has tested the missile at least once, and the Egyptian efforts are a response to the Israeli Jericho II missile with a range of 750 km. It also mentioned Egyptian-Korean cooperation in developing Scud missiles.

1988
Egypt is developing a solid-fuel missile under the name Vector with a range of 500-600 miles with Argentina as part of the Condor 2 project.

April 1988
The United States imposed sanctions on the company SNIA-BPD (National Industrial Applications Company-Defense Division) due to its relationship with the Condor 2 program, which it later lifted.

May 1988
A car explosion in France is part of the Israeli Mossad’s attempts to obstruct Egypt’s moves to obtain advanced technology for manufacturing missiles from the United States.

May 1988
Egypt and Iraq are developing Scud B missiles to increase their capabilities and range from 200 miles to 310 miles, enabling Iraq to be able to bomb Tehran, through which Egypt obtains experience.

June 24, 1988
4 people were arrested and accused of involvement in smuggling high-tech materials to Egypt, which could be used in the manufacture of advanced missile systems, to be shipped via a C-130 military plane. It contained 430 pounds of carbon fiber, which is a light, heat-resistant material derived from petroleum and is used. In the manufacture of the nose and nozzles of the missiles, the Egyptian-born American scientist represented the American side of the operation with the help of his wife and Colonel Hossam Youssef, who managed the operation from Salburg, Austria, and who could be arrested by the American authorities.

Abdel Qader Helmy cooperated with James Huffman, an American citizen from Ohio, to purchase the required materials and then send them to Biltmore, where Egyptian Air Force Lieutenant Colonel Mohamed Abdallah Mohamed transports the shipments to Egypt. The American authorities arrested Abdel Qader, his wife, Huffman, and Colonel Youssef, while the United States was unable to The United States arrested or indicted Lieutenant Colonel Mohamed as a result of the diplomatic immunity he held, and the United States then convicted Egypt of smuggling materials for its project known as Condor 2 and Condor 3.

June 25, 1988
A military spokesman refused to comment on the arrest of two Egyptian army colonels in the United States for an attempt to smuggle missile technology.

June 28, 1988
Lieutenant Colonel Muhammad Abdullah returned to Egypt

June 29, 1988
The Federal Supreme Jury accused Abdel Qader Helmy, his wife, James Hoffman, and Colonel Hossam Youssef of involvement in smuggling materials used in the manufacture of missiles and smuggling 430 pounds of carbon fiber, which is used in developing the range and payload of missiles and making them invisible to radars. At that time, the assistant military attaché left. Egyptian Abdul Rahim Al-Gohary and Lieutenant Colonel Muhammad United States and returned to Egypt

July 4, 1988
Aviation Week & Space Technology reported that Abdel Qader Helmy asked Greenleaf Corporation to prepare two cone-shaped devices that would be able to withstand a thermal shock of up to 1,400 degrees Celsius for a minute. These specifications are identical to those used in the missile industry.

July 13, 1988
Egypt refused to waive diplomatic immunity for two Egyptian officers whose involvement in the case was proven by Assistant Military Attaché Abdel Rahim El Gohary and Lieutenant Colonel Mohamed.

July 20, 1988
The Argentine Minister of Defense stated that his country did not provide any support to Iraq in manufacturing missiles or in the space field, but he stated that his country is cooperating with Egypt based on a joint agreement two years ago on missiles to launch communications and meteorological satellites.

July 27, 1988
The Argentine Air Force tested the MQ-2 Bigua cruise missile, which Argentina developed in cooperation with Egypt and Iraq.

July 28, 1988
Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak stated that regarding the Egyptian smuggling issue: We did not steal technology from the Americans, we did not spy on their facilities, and we did not steal their documents. The issue is simple, no more than 20 carbon sheets that are used in several industries, despite the great controversy raised by the American press, although it appears that despite This is because such materials cannot be exported outside of America.

July 29, 1988
The Argentine government approved cooperation with Egypt in the field of missiles in the Condor project, and that cooperation between Egypt and Argentina in the field of solid fuel for missiles continued for 5 years, and the Condor project was a stage for a larger project. The second phase, which was called Alacran, was to produce the Alcon missile.

August 20, 1988
The Washington Post published a report on the involvement of Egyptian Defense Minister Field Marshal Abdel Halim Abu Ghazaleh in a smuggling operation of materials related to missile technology.

September 4, 1988
The New York Times published about the involvement of Egyptian Defense Minister Abdel Halim Abu Ghazaleh in the smuggling operation, which was supported by a conversation recorded through eavesdropping, and referred to the minister

September 5, 1988
Israel tried to persuade the United States to bargain with the Egyptians to settle this issue in exchange for ensuring the cessation of production and development of surface-to-surface missiles.

September 5, 1988
An Egyptian security official denied what an Italian newspaper published about the Israeli Mossad booby-trapping and blowing up a car in Cairo in an attempt to obstruct the Egyptian missile program.

September 8-9, 1988
At a meeting in Rome, the United States, Canada, West Germany, Japan, France, and Britain imposed a ban on the Condor 2 program and listed it as a project of concern.

September 24, 1988
The Israeli Mossad detonated a bomb in front of the home of technicians working on the Condor 2 project in Argentina as a form of threat.

October 2, 1988
The Emirati newspaper Al-Ittihad published a report on attempts by Britain and the Mossad to obstruct the Condor 2 project

End of 1988
A bomb exploded near a truck transporting German and Italian technicians to the Egyptian missile factory, Factory 17

October 25, 1988
My lawyer, Abdel Qader Helmy, an American-born Egyptian who works as an engineer at Aerojet Solid Propulsion Company, confirmed in court that Abdel Qader Helmy was recruited by Egyptian Defense Minister Abdel Halim Abu Ghazaleh to transfer missile technology to Egypt, even though the American investigation authorities did not mention him in the investigations. They presented evidence and submitted papers indicating Abdel Halim Abu Ghazaleh’s involvement in the operation and that he met their client twice, once in Cairo in September 1987 and the second in March 1988 in Washington, and he asked Helmy to buy some materials from Egyptian missile programs.

March 3, 1989
Argentina successfully tested the Condor 2 missile with a range of 504 km

April 6, 1989
The Argentine Defense Minister stated during his visit to Israel that Argentina will end its cooperation with Egypt in exchange for an arms deal with Israel.

April 15, 1989
Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak appointed Field Marshal Abu Ghazaleh to an honorary position as Assistant to the President of the Republic and left him to the position of Minister of Defense.

June 9, 1989
In a deal with the prosecution, Abdelkader Helmy pleaded guilty to smuggling prohibited ammunition in exchange for assistance in investigations into Egypt’s attempts to smuggle missile technology from the United States. Abdelkader Helmy revealed the technology transfer ring and admitted to purchasing conical missile noses from Nucermet and Greenleaf Technical Ceramics and microwave antennas. antennas) from Vega Precision Products Inc. and carbon from Kaiser Aerotech. James Hoffman was also commissioned to purchase carbon phenolic, which is used in the manufacture of missile nozzles and nozzles, from Fiberite Corp. of Winona and then sent to Harmon, MD and then shipped to an Egyptian warplane

August 14, 1989
The Italian government has charged nine former employees of the National Industrial Applications Company (SNIA), BPD (Defense Division), with smuggling and selling materials to Egypt, Argentina and Iraq, including components for medium-range missiles.

August 17, 1989
A huge explosion occurred at a missile site in the Al Hillah area, 40 miles south of Baghdad, where improved Scud B and Badr 2000 missiles were being tested in an attempt to modify the explosive head of the missiles. Nearly 700 people were killed in this incident, including Egyptian, Korean and Iraqi experts.

September 1989
Egypt ended its relationship with the Condor 2 project

September 4, 1989
Egypt supplied the Afghan mujahideen with Saqr 30 missiles with a range of 18 miles.

December 6, 1989
Abdel Qader Helmy was sentenced to 46 months in prison and the sum of $358,690 was confiscated, and James Hoffman was sentenced to 41 months. The court had dropped charges of conspiracy and money laundering against Abdel Qader in exchange for a cooperation deal with the American authorities.
The beginning of the nineties
Egypt started Project-T with North Korea to develop a medium-range missile based on the Scud missile, with a range of up to 450 km.

1990
Egypt and China developed the Saqr factory to build new Scud B missiles, along with three other types of surface-to-surface missiles.

1990-1991
North Korea helped Egypt build a Scud-C missile production facility near Cairo at a factory belonging to the Arab-British Dynamics Co.

May 1990
Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak visited North Korea, where he visited Military Factory 125, where Hwasŏng-6 missiles are assembled.

June 14, 1990
The Independent newspaper reported in its report on Egyptian-Chinese cooperation that China will cooperate with Egypt in the production of its ground-to-ground missiles in a deal worth millions of pounds sterling, as it will develop the Saqr factory to produce newer versions of Soviet anti-aircraft missiles, as well as Scud B and Silk Wurm missiles, and three types of Saqr missiles. Development Egypt will be able to double its production of the Silkworm DF-4 and increase its range to 90 miles. It will also begin production of Silkworm DF-5 missiles with a range of 170 miles. In addition, China will supply Egypt with frigates equipped with French automatics and Chinese Styx missiles.

Beginning of 1991
The British government discovered that Arab British Dynamics, of which British Aerospace owns 30%, is currently producing parts for Scud missiles.

April 7, 1991
US Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney said that Egypt is purchasing missile technology from China and other countries

End of June 1991
In the BBC's Panorama investigative program, it was reported that Egypt, through the Arab-British Company, in which Britain owns shares, is developing and manufacturing Scud missiles in cooperation with North Korea, and Egypt will be able to begin producing them within a period of 8 to 12 weeks.

September 2, 1991
The Israeli Gavi Center for Strategic Studies published that Egypt will produce an improved Scud C missile with a range of up to 600 km.

January 29, 1992
The British government is trying to persuade British Aerospace (BAe) to end its ties with British Arab Dynamic Industries, which develops Scud missiles.

February 5, 1992
The head of the US Naval Intelligence Director stated before the Congressional meeting that Egypt had purchased cruise missiles from China

April 1, 1992
British Aerospace (BAe) has agreed to exit the partnership with Egypt in the Arab British Dynamic Industries Company

May 8, 1992
CIA Director Robert Gates said before his meeting with Congress that Egypt's missile facilities may begin operating at any moment.

August 16, 1992
The Bush Sr. administration removed the Condor 2 and the Improved Scud missile projects from the Commerce Department's list of dangerous missile projects after external pressure and the United States was exposed to embarrassment after it removed the Israeli Jericho project from the list.

1993
The Russian Foreign Intelligence Service stated that North Korea is using Egyptian expertise and technologies to develop its missiles, such as carbon, guidance devices, solid fuel, and other technologies that it obtained from cooperation with Britain.

January 18, 1993
Aviation Week & Space Technology reported that a study by the Western European Union (WEU) indicated that Egypt is developing the Badr 2000 Victor missile with a range of 1,200 km, as well as the Scud 100 missile with a range of 600 km, with North Korea.

August 1993
The United Nations Special Mission (UNSCOM) to Iraq discovered three factories producing Badr 2000 missiles similar to the Condor 2 factory in Argentina. Thus, the Badr 2000 missile is a technical derivation of the Condor missile. Two engines were also found with the same serial number as the engines produced in the Condor 2 factory.
The Argentine Ministry of Defense responded by dismantling two engines and sending the parts to Iraq via Egypt during the First Gulf War. It also confirmed that Egypt and Iraq possess identical twins to the ones in Argentina to manufacture the missile and its engine, one of which was found in Iraq.

Argentine Defense Minister Oscar Camilión denied his relationship with these factories and that Argentina did not send any technology to Iraq, but the German partner is responsible, as he confirmed that those responsible and participants in the project are Egyptian and German technicians with experts from Argentina.

August 30, 1993
After the United Nations mission inspected the Falda del Carmen factory in Argentina, the Argentine Minister of Defense confirmed that at least there is a twin factory for this factory in Egypt and another in Iraq, and that the contract stipulated that the engines be sold to Egypt, and that Egypt may have resold them to Iraq.

September 26, 1993
The Argentine Minister of Defense stated that his country sent 13 missile engines to Egypt as part of the Condor 2 project, and he does not know if Egypt sent them to Iraq.

March 11, 1993
Jerusalem Post published a report on the Egyptian army, including the missile program. According to Israeli analysts, Egypt is working with North Korea to develop and improve the range and accuracy of Scud B missiles. Egypt sent Scud B missiles to North Korea in 1981, where Korea produced it by reverse engineering and then improved it into a Scud. C and Scud D with a range of 600 and 1000 km, respectively, are currently available to Egypt. Egypt also obtained assistance from Messerschmitt-Boelkow-Blohm in developing the Condor 2 project. Herbert Krosney said that Egypt’s main goal is to obtain the self-capacity to produce missiles, as Joseph S. Bermudez, a global analyst and consultant, said. Jane's Intel It will not depend on Korea alone, as Egypt wants to build missiles based on its experience in the Condor 2 and with Western technology.

March - April 1996
In a CIA report, it was stated that between March and April, North Korea sent seven ships loaded with equipment and materials used in manufacturing Scud C missiles as part of the agreement signed in the 1980s between Egypt and North Korea. The shipments contained steel plates and support equipment, in addition to what was announced by the Korean media. It contains missile engines and guidance systems, as Egypt used the information and technology it obtained from the Condor 2 project in the 1980s to develop a missile called Vector with an approximate range of 744 miles, and Korea helped Egypt produce mobile platforms for Scud-C TELs (Transporter-Erector- Launchers) also assisted in producing a model with a range of 450 km under the name Project 21 June 1996
An American official said that the United States sent a diplomatic protest to Egypt against the backdrop of North Korea sending missile manufacturing shipments to Egypt, and that US Secretary of State Warren Christopher is likely to discuss the matter with Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak when he visits next Wednesday. Reports stated that the shipments sent to Egypt included Steel plates and a number of equipment. One of the shipments that was in April was so large that Egypt was searching for a cargo ship large enough to accommodate it. Nicholas Burns, spokesman for the US State Department, stated that the Secretary of State would not discuss the matter with Mubarak during his visit, but he stated that the reports about the transfer process were very serious. Which may contribute to the process of weapons proliferation will be taken into consideration, which if confirmed by the facts will seek to impose sanctions on Egypt.

June 24, 1996
The official Israeli Channel 1 mentioned in an episode entitled Israel under threat from Egyptian Scuds that the Egyptian missiles are directed at Israel in the event that things deteriorate.

June 27, 1996
In response to Israeli calls against Egypt as a result of Korean shipments to Egypt, the Egyptian ambassador to Israel stated that possessing missiles and modern weapons is a legitimate right for Egypt to strengthen its defense capabilities and protect peace gains. He also added that he was surprised by the Israeli reaction regarding the matter while the Hebrew state possesses weapons of mass destruction and refuses to sign an agreement. Preventing the spread of nuclear weapons, while an Israeli analyst in the Yedioth Ahronoth newspaper said that Egypt had the ability to strike any place in Israel from the Canal Zone.

June 27, 1996
Israeli Defense Minister General David Ivri met with CIA Chief John Deutsch in Paris to discuss Egyptian missiles and their relationship with North Korea.

June 29, 1996
In a statement by the Egyptian Defense Minister regarding the issue of missiles, Field Marshal Hussein Tantawi said that peace is a strategic choice for Egypt, but continuing to develop our armed forces is the only way to deter those who plan to attack us, and improving the combat capabilities of our forces is also the only way to convince our friends and enemies that we are ready to protect our national security.

June 30, 1996
Egyptian Air Force Commander Abdel Hamid Shehata stated that Egypt is arming its forces with modern missile systems to confront advanced offensive weapons, such as ballistic missiles, for example.

July 23, 1996
The Egyptian President stated that the Jewish community in the United States is using the issue of the Scud arms deal to embarrass Egypt and that the shipment is spare parts for Scud missiles that Egypt purchased from the Soviet Union in March 1973.

August 22, 1996
Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak stated that Scud missiles have been owned by Egypt since 1973 and do not violate international law, and that he cannot remove the missiles in the possession of the armed forces unless this applies to all countries in the region.

October 6, 1996
In his comment on the Israeli and American accusations against Egypt regarding North Korean shipments to Egypt: There are cards in politics called pressure cards, but they do not anger me or hide me, and it is not possible to talk about missiles or ignore Israel’s nuclear capability. If we want peace, there must be equality in solving problems.

September - October 1996
The Wisconsin Project, which specializes in combating weapons of mass destruction, published a report on the Egyptian missile program
It was mentioned that Egyptian-North Korean cooperation raises concerns for American officials, so Egypt has the ability to build its own version of the Scud B, with the ability to carry biological and chemical weapons with a range of up to 300 km. It has also developed more advanced Scud C missiles to threaten all neighboring countries such as Israel, Syria, Sudan and Libya.

While American officials were ignoring American intelligence reports about the Egyptian effort with North Korea that has been ongoing for more than 15 years, and that it is far from developing missiles because Egypt is an allied country, its own copies of various Scud B missiles are now coming out of its factories.

The report mentioned the stages of growth of the Egyptian missile program, mentioning the first Egyptian attempts in the 1960s with the Al-Dhafir, Al-Qaher, and Al-Raed missiles, which failed for many reasons, including the lack of guidance systems and technology and widespread administrative failure in the project, which ended completely after the 1967 war. Since 1972, Egypt has sent Egyptian technicians for training in the Soviet Union. Missile guidance systems and obtained Frog missiles with a range of 70 km, and before the October War it obtained Scud missiles with the ability to strike Israeli sites in Sinai.

Since the beginning of the eighties, Egypt began its real effort in the project of building missiles, and built its huge network to collect information and technology around the world, and began sending a number of equipment and Scud B missiles to North Korea to conduct experiments there, gain experience, and evade international sanctions.

Egypt also started the Condor 2 project with Argentina and with funding from Iraq, where Egypt provides technological support and conducts experiments in Argentina.

In parallel with the two projects, Egypt began building its European network of companies that secretly deal with it to obtain advanced Western technology in order to test and develop it in its projects with North Korea and Argentina. It dealt with giant European companies in armament technology, such as Consen, SNIA-BPD, and the French company Sagem, as well as Messerschmitt. The German company MAN, in addition to 20 other European companies such as Delta Consult, Ifat, Desintec, Condor Projeckt, and Aerotec, was managed by the German company Boelkow-Blohm in the process of designing the Condor missiles.

In addition to the European network, Egypt began establishing its network to purchase technology in the United States and revealed its links by arresting the Egyptian-born American scientist Abdul Qader Helmy, who was recruited by Field Marshal Abu Ghazaleh and was arrested in an attempt to smuggle materials related to missile systems via an Egyptian C-130 military plane. The Egyptian officers were not arrested or tried, as they took refuge in the Egyptian embassy and adhered to the diplomatic immunity granted to them, and then returned to Egypt.

Abdel Qader Helmy and his American partner, James Hoffman, were tried and sentenced to 46 months in prison, in addition to a fine of 350 thousand dollars, in addition to the surrender of one million dollars that he had obtained from Egyptian intelligence through Switzerland. The operation was large and complex, and Field Marshal Abu Ghazaleh was dismissed for causing the group to be exposed when he spoke on a phone. The network is not secured and the call was recorded

The Condor 2 project was stopped after American pressure on Argentina to abandon the project. At that time, Egypt obtained from Argentina the technology for the project and the construction of the necessary facilities on its territory. Despite this incident, the Egyptian missile program continued at the same pace, as Egyptian-Iraqi cooperation continued in developing missiles based on the gains of the Condor project. 2 Egyptian scientists worked side by side with Iraqi scientists until the Second Gulf War

To date, Egyptian-North Korean cooperation continues. Last June, a US intelligence report stated that Egypt had obtained 7 shipments of missiles, including equipment and technical parts, from North Korea. Egypt’s current goal is to build its own version of Scud C missiles with a range of 600 km. If Egyptian-Korean cooperation continues in the same way, At the beginning of the new century (in the year 2000), Egypt will obtain Nodong missiles with a range of 1,200 km (and this actually happened)

Second half of 1996
In his report to the US Congress, the Director of US Intelligence stated that Egypt had obtained equipment for Scud missiles from Russia and North Korea.

End of 1996
The Swiss authorities stopped a shipment of parts of Scud missiles on their way to Egypt. According to what was stated by Urs von Daeniken, head of the Federal Police, the shipment was stopped at Zurich Airport after the Federal Police learned of its content. The papers stated that the shipment consisted of parts of bulldozers, but parts of Launching platforms for the BM-21 missiles used by the Egyptian army, and it is likely that they came from the Korean Arms Industry Department, coming from China to Egypt.

May 1997
A CIA report on its second page stated that Egypt had requested from North Korea spare parts and guidance and control equipment for its Scud C missiles.

August 22, 1997
An American official stated that North Korea has exported approximately 370 Scud missiles to Arab countries and has the capacity to produce 150 missiles per year.

August 28, 1997
Turkish Deputy Prime Minister Bulent Ecevit announced that the Egyptian ship that was searched in the Sea of Marmara was found to contain parts of missile and nuclear components.

October 21, 1997
North Korean defector Colonel Choi Ju-Hwal, who fled to South Korea in 1995, confirmed in his testimony before the US Congress that Egypt and North Korea are working together to develop and build missiles.

The first half of 1998
In a US intelligence report, it confirmed the continuation of Egyptian-Korean cooperation in the missile field

March 27, 1998
The Washington Times, citing the Pentagon, reported that Egypt currently possesses a new missile with a range of 425 miles under the name Vector.

April 7, 1998
The director of the Swiss Federal Police, Urs Von Daeniken, stated that the shipment that his forces stopped in 1996 was of parts of Scud B missiles from North Korea and via China, where they seized two shipments at Zurich Airport, which were falsely labeled as a shipment of parts for bulldozers and machinery. The supplier was a North Korean arms company and the recipient was a company. An Egyptian woman linked to the production of chemical and biological weapons, which raised suspicions

April 9, 1998
The Egyptian ambassador to the United Nations stated during his visit to Switzerland regarding the statements of the Swiss police chief that it was the first time he heard about the matter and he was surprised by its excitement and how an operation took place in 1996 and the matter has not been closed yet.

April 12, 1998
Egypt summoned the Swiss ambassador to Egypt to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to discuss the statements of the Federal Police Director regarding Egypt

June 5, 1998
In a press interview with Field Marshal Abu Ghazaleh, the former Defense Minister, a country like Egypt does not need to use nuclear attack capabilities as the only deterrent against an Israeli attack, but the presence of long-range missiles with high accuracy and an efficient warhead capable of deterrence does not achieve a level of terror for Israel like what the inaccurate Scud missiles did. When it went down there in 1991

July 1998
A US intelligence report stated on its second page that Egypt obtained ballistic missile technology and related equipment from North Korea in shipments in 1997.

July 31, 1998
Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak said that he was surprised by reports that Egypt was manufacturing Scud missiles while other countries in the region had missiles with a higher range.

September 4, 1998
The Pentagon stated that Egypt obtained a support services laboratory for the Space and Missile Intelligence Command from Sparta Inc, worth $42 million.

February 1999
In a published US intelligence report, it was stated that Egypt continues to produce and develop Scud B and Scud C missiles. It is also developing two-stage missiles, short-range missiles, and the Vector missile. Egypt is also interested in producing medium-range missiles. In the first half of 1998, Egypt continued to obtain technologies and components for ballistic missiles from North Korea as part of a long-term program of cooperation..

March 23, 1999
The US State Department has imposed sanctions on three Egyptian companies on charges of transferring dual-use technologies and equipment to North Korea, namely the British Arab Dynamics Industries Company and the Helwan and Qader Factory. US and Israeli intelligence reported that Egypt had transferred technologies obtained from the Condor 2 project.

Mid 1999
US Secretary of Defense William Cohen will discuss Egyptian-North Korean cooperation regarding the missile issue, as US and Israeli intelligence reports confirmed that Egyptian weapons factories supply components and materials to North Korea.

July 1999
North Korea sent Egypt a shipment of special steel used in missile applications through a Chinese company via Hong Kong

August 13, 1999
The Washington Post published a report under the title “Losing the Battle on Arms Control,” where it stated, quoting the CIA, that Egypt is still working on transferring missile technology and working to develop it.

August 13, 1999
The Jerusalem Post reported in a report entitled “Is Egypt the new enemy?” that Egypt possesses a brigade of Scud B missiles and another brigade of Frog-7 missiles, as well as a possible brigade of Scud C missiles.

February 23, 2000
Various American and Israeli intelligence reports stated that Egypt owns a number of companies that work to obtain Western technologies and then send them to North Korea, where they prepare them and then return them to Egypt again in the form of advanced missile equipment for Egypt’s medium-range missile program. Israeli sources reported that Egypt possesses missiles. Scud with a range of 500 km, as well as different versions of Scud B missiles as a result of cooperation and joint development with North Korea

November 2000
Sources in the US Congress stated that Egypt began the second phase of its medium-range missile program, where it produced ten missiles and obtained their engines from North Korea.

March 9, 2001
A US intelligence report stated that Egypt is still continuing its program with North Korea to develop and produce missiles in an ongoing relationship for more than 20 years.

March 15, 2001
Egypt obtained guidance systems through German companies in ongoing Egyptian attempts to complete its medium-range missile program, as Egypt purchased components from German companies as a front in February and again the previous year, as European intelligence and the United States tracked shipments from Germany to Japan, but the shipment suddenly disappeared!!

Egypt sent shipments to North Korea for experiments and development, and then they were sent to Egypt, where they failed to track them.

The Egyptian steps come to complete its missile program in cooperation with North Korea, which includes several programs, including Project T with a range of 450 km, the Badr missile with a range of up to 900 km, and Project Vector with a range of up to 1,200 km.

The Badr missile is based on the old Condor project, which the United States pressured Argentina to stop at the beginning of the nineties, but Egypt continued the project in cooperation with North Korea, along with the rest of the other projects, where Egypt obtains Arab technologies and then sends them to North Korea, where reverse engineering and the necessary modifications are carried out.

Egyptian-Korean cooperation in the missile program has continued for more than 20 years, and Egypt has sought Western expertise and European companies due to the lack of Korean experience in developing solid fuel missile engine technologies.

Egypt seeks help from German companies that it was unable to identify until 1994. Since last year, Egypt has renewed relations with German companies once again, and the German authorities are not aware of the Egyptian movements.

Hosni Mubarak's regime aims to reach a two-stage solid fuel missile, and American intelligence sources confirmed that Western intelligence offices are trying to track developments in the Egyptian program and its relations with German companies.

These movements confirmed the statements of Egyptian military leaders that Egypt will strengthen its capabilities and training to increase readiness for battle.

Field Marshal Hussein Tantawi said that we do not call for war, but rather it constitutes a deterrent force against any enemy that tries to attack our great nation.

April 27 - 30, 2001
During his visit to Russia, sources said that the Egyptian President is interested in developing medium-range missiles and is likely to discuss with his counterpart Vladimir Putin regarding the development and manufacture of medium-range missiles. They reported that Mubarak skipped the scheduled visit to a Russian missile factory after the official protest of the US government, but he left the visit on the agenda.

May 14, 2001
Middle East Newsline reported, citing European and American intelligence sources, that Egypt is still continuing its missile program and is obtaining equipment from North Korea via Germany to develop the Project-T missiles with a range of 450 km, the Badr 2000 with a range of 900 km, and the Vector missile with a range of 1,200 km.

June 2001
Arms Control published in its report on Egypt that Egypt has the following missiles in service: Scud B with a range of 300 km and a weight of 1000 kg of explosives, Project-T with a range of 450 km and a payload of 985 kg. They were manufactured locally in cooperation with North Korea, as well as Scud C missiles with a range of 550 km and a payload of 600 kg. It is also developing Victor missiles in cooperation with North Korea

June 18, 2001
A US government official stated that Egypt intends to purchase about 50 engines for the Korean Nodong missiles, as it obtained most of its components during its long cooperation with North Korea, and that the United States is trying to prevent this deal and will raise the matter in dialogue with Egyptian officials.

June 21, 2001
In a meeting with Egyptian Foreign Minister Ahmed Maher, US Secretary of State Colin Powell expressed that the Bush administration is concerned about cooperation with North Korea and what is related to Egypt’s intention to buy 50 engines for the Korean Nodong missiles. Despite this, Minister Ahmed Maher responded that cooperation with Korea has ended.

June 21, 2001
Middle East Newsline published simultaneously with the visit of Egyptian Foreign Minister Ahmed Maher, citing sources in the American government, that Maher is not the appropriate person to talk to regarding the missile issue and Egypt’s intention to buy engines for Nodong missiles. It was reported that a number of members of Congress are threatening to cut off aid to Egypt if the deal is completed. The Korean report mentioned the presence of about 300 North Korean experts in Egypt working on developing missiles

June 24, 2001
The Egyptian Minister of Foreign Affairs rejected reports published about Egypt's development of medium-range ballistic missiles

9- 13 July 2001
A secret delegation from the Egyptian Ministry of Defense was in Washington to discuss matters related to its cooperation with North Korea in the field of missiles, where the team provided satisfactory answers to the United States

July 26, 2001
In a hearing in the US Congress, Congressman Brad Sherman asked US Assistant Secretary of State William Burns about Egypt’s possession of a Nodong missile with a range of 800 miles, which William Burns did not deny, but asked to discuss the matter in a closed hearing.

August 9, 2001
Egypt assured US officials that Egypt's missile program will remain within acceptable limits and does not include developing copies of Nodong missiles with North Korea.

October 2, 2001
Egyptian Minister of Industry Mostafa Al-Rifai announced that the Tantalam mineral had been discovered in the eastern desert in the Abu Diab region, which is used in the manufacture of missiles and aircraft engines.

November 27, 2001
Commenting on the reports that were circulating that Egypt agreed to purchase Nodong missiles from North Korea, an American official stated that we must hear from Egypt a comment on this news.

November 27, 2001
The US Congress began an investigation into whether Egypt obtained Nodong missiles or not.

January 14-22, 2002
A delegation from the US Congress met with Egyptian Defense Minister Hussein Tantawi, and the leader of Egypt denied any cooperation with North Korea. Tantawi’s statements contradict what was confirmed by secret US intelligence reports, and the statements of Tantawi and Mubarak regarding cooperation with North Korea are false.

February 6, 2002
In his testimony before the Senate Intelligence Committee, North Korea is still exporting ballistic missiles and equipment, and that Egypt is the main recipient.

April 1, 2002
In a report by the CIA under the title “Egypt is key missile customer of N. Korea,” Egypt is one of North Korea’s largest clients in missile cooperation, and that North Korea will export missile parts and equipment to Egypt this year, including Taepodong-1 missiles.

April 25, 2002
Both Japan and South Korea stated that North Korea is suffering from difficulties in sending missile shipments to Egypt due to the international blockade, but shipments are still continuing through Pakistan and China to Egypt.

May 30, 2002
Egypt obtained and purchased 24 Nodong medium-range missiles (1,200 km), which poses a threat to Israel, and Egypt has the ability to strike Israel with chemical or biological weapons from anywhere in Egypt.

The Senate had appreciated the Bush administration's warning of Egypt's efforts to obtain Nodding missiles from North Korea after numerous secret reports from US intelligence, which stated that Egypt had obtained the missiles last year 2001 and that the current shipment was for missile engines.

June 5, 2002
The United States discovered that Egypt had received a shipment of 50 engines for Nodong ballistic missiles, and it monitored the arrival of a shipment of 24 engines to Egypt at the end of 2001, which it described as a slap in the face of everyone who participated in stopping Egyptian cooperation with North Korea, as Egypt pledged not to obtain Nodong missiles nor Its engines but it got both!!

June 22, 2002
In the city of Bratislava in Slovakia, a North Korean couple was arrested. They were purchasing dual products for military/civilian use from Russia, China, and Belarus and then shipping them to the Egyptian Qadir Military Factory. The couple, Kim Kum Jin and Ri Sun Hui, were driving a black Mercedes and living in a luxury apartment in Bratislava and integrated into the neighborhood, who were discovered to be high-ranking agents in Bureau 39, the secret arm of the Workers' Party that rules North Korea, led by Kim Jong Il.

June 27, 2002
At a US Congressional hearing, Lt. Gen. Ronald Kaddish accused Egypt of possessing Nodong, but he said that it is better to discuss the matter in a closed session, and he said that Egypt is an ally and that is enough. 'Egypt is an ally and that's it.'

September 10, 2002
The Associated Press reported in a report that Egypt is among 16 countries - other than the major nuclear countries - that possess missile capabilities and technologies capable of carrying nuclear weapons.

February 12, 2003
In a report by the Geostrategy-Direct Center for Strategic and Intelligence Studies, Egypt has for years been participating with several countries in its projects for weapons of mass destruction and missiles, such as Iraq and North Korea, and the problem lies in the inability of American intelligence to uncover these programs and know their details.

Egypt has invented methods of deception and concealment that are superior even to North Korea, and many of its missile programs and weapons of mass destruction are based in the Western Desert, where it has built a series of tunnels along the Egyptian-Libyan border. These tunnels hide the process of developing and manufacturing missiles with North Korea from the eyes of American and Israeli spy satellites. At a depth of up to 1,300 feet, it cannot be destroyed by even American tactical bombs.

June 3, 2004
Turkish Minister of State Kursad Tuzmen said that there are ongoing investigations into the shipment of missiles, communications devices, and platforms for the missiles that were found on a cargo ship heading from Ukraine to Egypt, which stopped in Istanbul to refuel, and which it claimed was a shipment of spare parts.

June 5, 2004
Turkish Foreign Minister Abdullah Gul stated that Egypt acknowledged its ownership of the missile shipment coming from Ukraine and that his country is communicating with the Egyptian and Ukrainian authorities in this regard.

November 11, 2005
In a statement by the new Chief of Staff, Sami Annan, Egypt may consider adding long-range missiles to its military arsenal.

September 2, 2006
The Turkish authorities discovered that the shipment, which Turkey recently stopped after information from the Israeli Mossad, was a shipment of weapons for Egypt, which consisted of parts and spare parts for Egyptian SAM missiles as part of an Egyptian contract with Russia. September 2, 2010.

A report by the Janz Intelligence Center revealed one of the Egyptian sites for developing and testing Egyptian missiles in an area west of Cairo in an area called Jabal Hamza.

The Center stated in a report that Egypt is one of the oldest and first developing countries in possessing and developing ballistic missiles, despite the ambiguity, extreme secrecy, and lack of available information about the program.

As for the location of Jabal Hamza, It was established in the 1950s and is 62 km northwest of Cairo, but what is new is what was revealed by the DigitalGlobe and GeoEye satellites.

Most of the constructions began in the mid-2000s, and there has been a significant increase in the volume of construction and equipment work at the site since 2007, with the construction of serious sites nearby, including a new missile testing area and buildings for preparation and development of missiles.

Throughout this period, Egypt was able to build its missile capabilities with different weapons and various ammunition through the efforts of the heroes of the Armed Forces and General Intelligence, which worked hard to build networks for collecting information and technology in Europe, North Korea, and the United States. The continuous attempts of American Intelligence and the Israeli Mossad to obstruct or find out the details of this program failed, and Egypt escaped most of the attempts to impose sanctions on it or its companies and managed the diplomatic game brilliantly, and the general intelligence networks were able to carry out the tasks assigned to them with distinction. The armed forces confirmed that Egypt has a shield and a sword that protects it from every enemy or hater.,All of the above is a small part of the truth, and what is hidden is greater. These are not my words, but they are the words of all the American intelligence reports on the Egyptian program.


*** Development of the Condor-II missile
Daniel Burns, who on April 18, 1991, shed light on the Egyptian missile program.
Burns held talks with Helmy Abdel Qader, an Egyptian rocket scientist
The American who helped Cairo obtain the equipment and materials needed for a missile called Condor-II. The missile was a joint project between Egypt, Argentina and Iraq.

Burns added that he learned information from Abdul Qader Helmy, including:
- Iraq and Saudi Arabia’s financing of the Condor-II missile program
- Egyptian efforts to develop a nuclear warhead, including purchasing uranium from France
- Development of the Scud missile between Egypt and North Korea
- President Hosni Mubarak knew about the Condor-II missile program and the fact that he approved it in 1984
- Modification of the Scud missile and the SS-10 missile

http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/7206187/print/1/displaymode/1098


Burns testified about conversations he had with Abdelkader Helmy, an Egyptian-American rocket scientist who had pleaded guilty to helping Cairo obtain equipment and material for the Condor-II missile.. In his testimony, Burns said Helmy discussed several projects with him including: "the modification of the SCUD and SS-10 missile."

Some discussions took place with the Egyptian scientist Abdel Qader Helmy about the Egyptian missile program. These discussions during the investigation touched on several aspects, including what he mentioned about Egypt’s obtaining Scud missiles and SS 10 missiles..

These are long-range missiles that exceed 12,000 kilometers, and the source explicitly mentioned them as SS-10 missiles.

This goes with my assessments that Egypt has taken possession of all the designs of the North-Korean Ballistic missiles and their warheads including the miniaturized Hydrogen bomb warhead..

 

[The SC]

The American intelligence services submitted a report after the overthrow of the deposed Hosni Mubarak warning of Egypt’s persistence in military nuclear testing and calling for an increase in American aid provided to Egypt as an incentive to abandon its nuclear ambitions.

A state of fear prevails regarding the next president and his intellectual affiliation, which prompted President Obama to confirm that Masdar is a strategic ally of America and that American aid will continue.

An official source said that Egypt obtained nuclear weapons technology and the necessary materials from China, North Korea and Pakistan. They said that the Mubarak regime also sought to develop strategic weapons other than nuclear (biological and chemical), as Egypt had not signed a treaty banning the development of Biological weapons. He also admitted that the United States government knew about those experiments and reports from 1986 and Egypt’s secret program to develop nuclear weapons, but decided not to disclose this in order to preserve the strategic relations between Egypt and America and Egypt’s important role in the Middle East, which cannot be America has the right to lose him if it enters into direct hostility with Egypt, after pledges from the ousted president not to continue these experiments, but the situation has changed now with the lack of clarity in the vision of the new president of Egypt.

The report mentioned that Egypt had also carried out 16 secret nuclear tests since 1990. Many doubts were raised and investigations were conducted by the Nuclear Energy Authority headed by (Egyptian Mohamed ElBaradei) from 2003 to 2010 about those 16 tests and also about the discovery of enriched uranium in northern Egypt. It urged The Egyptian government requested to disclose these data and allow the inspectors to carry out their work transparently, and Egypt continued to deny it as usual, while some pressure was applied and the investigations were closed.

Despite the nuclear activity in the experiments, there was an effort from another direction by the American scientist of Egyptian origin, Abdel Qader Helmy, who created a spy network to steal American missile technology and present it to Egypt. Egypt subsequently leaked this information to Iraq, Argentina, and North Korea.

The CIA said in a 1989 report that the completion of the Condor missile project, the Egyptian version of the North Korean Nongong, had become a possibility.

In the overall investigations with scientist Abdel Qader Helmy, he mentioned that Egypt and North Korea had reached advanced stages in the Condor missile project, in addition to the participation of Egypt and Pakistan in uranium enrichment activities. He said that there is a director of the Egyptian nuclear project supervising the manufacture of an atomic bomb there, in addition to a separate Egyptian development program. About the Pakistani, and after a while the American scientist of Egyptian origin returned to deny everything he mentioned in his initial confessions to investigators, and he was sentenced to 45 months in prison.

The report also revealed that the United States has been aware of Egypt’s activities for a long time, but Egypt’s role in maintaining peace in the Middle East and combating terrorism has been kept silent. A congressional expert said that Egypt was given preferential treatment over all other Arab countries due to its important role in maintaining peace in The Middle East, which was the reason why America overlooked many Egyptian violations..

They added that an intense state of fear is prevailing among American circles now, as Egypt has the capabilities and facilities that make it capable of producing a nuclear bomb, as well as missiles that exceed 1,000 km in a very short period without difficulty, in addition to what it already possesses.


Source: different sources

In March 2004, US and British intelligence officials reported on evidence found that Libya traded nuclear and missile expertise with Egypt. It appeared that Egypt could been using Libya as a way-station for obtaining nuclear and missile technology and components from North Korea. The allegations were based on CIA satellite photographs..

​

North Korea 'has miniature nuclear warhead'​

It is certain that unconventional warheads, whether nuclear, chemical or biological, are available in Egypt..

But it is a weapon that cannot be really used; it is a deterrent and threat only. It will prevent the USA from blatantly interfering with its spoiled Israel in the event of any clash with Egypt, as happened in 1973.. but then the Russians have sent a few nukes and based them near Cairo.. Today Egypt has an independent prerogative..

In fact, there is no winner or loser when using nuclear weapons, that is why it is mostly a deterrent..

 

[The SC]

North Korea sent leading missile engineers and technicians to Egypt in 2001 to conduct the experiments, the officials said..They said North Korea, deemed as having the capability of producing missiles with a range of at least 5,000 kilometers, was trying to demonstrate the feasibility of No-Dong technology and components for Egypt's medium-range missile program..

 

[The SC]

US Pershing_II

China DF-15B (in the middle)..A and C on the sides

The range of the Chinese missile is 900 km, two stages, solid fuel (quick preparation speed, unlike liquid fuel in the American Pershing_II missile)..

Condor II

 

[The SC]

Summarizing the main topic and focusing on some points
We can divide the Egyptian missile program into two major eras:

1- The era before the 1967 setback
It is mainly characterized by an attempt to show off muscles in the media, and a rapid and ill-considered jump to achieve results, without clear program parameters.

2- The era after the 1967 setback
This stage was characterized by a logical proposal to build a real power for Egypt based on science and the possession of technology

Here we must point out a man who was not mentioned in the topic, who is the late Lt. General Saad al-Din El-Shazly. I refer here to his memoirs in which he shed light on Egypt’s relationship with North Korea. We did not send Scud missiles to Korea in the seventies like this without there being men like the late Saad al-Din El-Shazly, who paved the way for strong relations with a high degree of privacy, until the situation reached the conclusion of a cooperation agreement and technological and technical exchange between Egypt and Korea later.

Egypt, in the post-setback stage (after 1967), was interested in being a country that manufactures missiles, and not just a country that owns some missiles. We find, for example, on January 4, 1982, that Egypt entered the line of producing explosives, fuel, and rocket engines, transforming it into a participant in the industry.

Hence the year 1984 is considered a pivotal year in the Egyptian missile program. Here it becomes clear that the project was well thought out and planned over a wide range, taking into consideration that Egypt would be a center into which Eastern expertise would flow, as we mentioned above. Then, in this year, the project would crystallize with the intervention of Western expertise. Represented by Argentina’s participation in the Condor II project, which is the same time in which the depth of Arab-Arab cooperation between Egypt, Iraq and Saudi Arabia also appeared. We also find that in the same year a different tactic appeared, which was the establishment and formation of a network of Western companies working in the Egyptian missile program. The number of companies exceeded twenty companies

Then we come to 1986.. bringing great success to the hardworking people in the Condor II project..

1987
The year in which the main goal appears, which is technology transfer..

1988
It appears that the Condor II project is nothing but a laboratory for hatching terrifying projects in their time. Here, Egypt begins developing a solid-fuel missile under the name Victor as part of the Condor II project, and then succeeds in testing a cruise missile under the name MQ2-Bigua, developed by Argentina in cooperation with Egypt and Iraq.

June 24, 1988
A new part appears.. After the network of companies working for the benefit of the program, another level appears, which is the network of individuals recruited by Egypt. This appears to be to move the missile project to a level beyond what Egypt’s partners and those working with it in the program expected. “The Abdel Qader Helmy case.”
Egypt aspires to a missile with stealth specifications..

March 3, 1989
The Condor II missile was completely successful, with a range of 504 km..

The eighties end and a new phase begins

The nineties stage

Project-T

After digesting the Argentina phase, Egypt begins another project with Korea, in addition to China’s role, which no one was able to fully monitor. For a country like China, it is impossible for its role to stop at being merely a station..

We notice in this era more focus on factories and facilities in Egypt. China is developing the Saqr Military Factory and then building a facility to produce Scud C by the Koreans, in addition to continuing the policy of a successful corporate network and entering into partnerships with European companies such as Arab British Dynamics.

July 1999
Beginning at the end of the nineties, we find the path of the journey with Korea and China changing to become reciprocal and tending to end in Egypt. In the beginning, it was from Egypt to China, then Korea, to do reverse engineering. Then we often find it from Korea back to Egypt, and this indicates that Egypt has become a Center of gravity in manufacturing and development to accumulate experience and knowledge..

July 26
News of Egypt’s possession of the Nodong, and the following year, Egypt will obtain the Taepodong
"The Taepodong-2 is a three stage, liquid-fueled, militarized version of North Korea’s Unha-3 satellite launch vehicle. While the Unha-3 is intended to place satellites into orbit, the Taepodong-2 carries a reentry vehicle for a military payload. It has an estimated range of 10,000 km with a 1,000 kg payload."

September 10, 2002 Confirmation that Egypt possesses the capabilities and technology of missiles capable of carrying nuclear weapons.

2007
Entering further into the circle of secrecy and the beginning of a new episode of the Egyptian missile program series, “The Beginning of the Expansion and Development of the Jabal Hamza Site”..

Egypt’s missile program is extremely secretive which makes it difficult to know what’s going on.

 

[The SC]

Sissi: we have a very strong army, the biggest in the middle east, and no one can confront us directly..

We are hiding everything..so people around won't say that we are boosting..

 

[HAIDER]

@GoMig-21 @The SC

https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP89S01450R000200210001-2.pdf

 

[GoMig-21]

@GoMig-21 @The SC

https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP89S01450R000200210001-2.pdf

Very cool that you found this. Funny it has all the intelligence lingo in the entire transcript. You know how intelligence agencies never like to use certainties as predictions, only probabilities and if you skim through that entire thing and try to pick out how many times it says the word "probably", it's over 100 times loool.

And this is declassified because it's basically up until 2012 or thereabouts. From what we know has happened with Egypt's ballistic program since is that it's been ramped up 5-fold. Renovated & expanded and "probably" lol even new underground existing facilities and new rockets and testings etc. Beyond Argentina, I bet North Korea has a huge, dark behind the scenes role in this.

 

[Sami_1]

The Egyptian missile program has multiple accounts. The matter is not only about preparing missiles or their specifications, but rather about many different matters.

Egypt produced solid fuel missiles, starting with the FROG-7/LUNA missile, with a range of 150 km, with 288+ missiles in the 1980s. 1988
The SAKR-80 missile has a range of 90 kilometers and a destructive warhead of 200 kilograms in 1990.

1992 was the first acquisition of the DF-15/M9 missile
Exports were made to Syria and Egypt. It is believed that Egypt transferred the CONDOR II missile technologies to China in exchange for purchasing cheaper and less expensive missiles, because the Condor 2 program cost $800 million with numbers not exceeding 200 missiles, and there had to be an alternative that would achieve the quantitative goal.

The cheap solution was the M9 missile, and Egypt did not stop producing liquid fuel missiles, perhaps until 2005.
In 1999, the Russians presented a program to develop SCUD-B missiles with an accuracy level of 50 meters and were exported to many Arab countries, including Syria.

Egypt, as a result of its experience with ballistic missiles, was fully aware that the effect of these missiles was limited, such as the destructive capacity of a 1,000-kg conventional destroyer head.
Therefore, Egypt is focusing its attention on increasing the destructive capacity of missiles and increasing accuracy
In 2017, Egypt had a LUNA missile replacement program and a SCUD-B/C missile replacement program.

Many stories are spreading about the SAKR-100/120/365 missiles. No one knows exactly their specifications, but this does not mean denying their existence.
Since 2003, Egypt has not announced a program to develop 122 mm missiles. The program did not stop developing the Shahab version with separate laras and the guided versions, and also increasing the range and accuracy did not stop. It is very normal for the range of SAKR-45 missiles to exceed a range of 70 or even 100 kilometers. Commercial copies exported to countries are sold with a range of 52 km. Kilometers of Serbian missiles recently. Some may see this missile as simple, but you are talking about annual stocks that increase by 30,000 missiles every year over the course of 50 years. Therefore, it becomes an essential element when it has higher capabilities, equivalent to larger caliber missiles and different applications such as separate warheads to increase accuracy and a variety of guided warheads to increase missiles. The best version similar to the Ground Launched Small Diameter Bomb and a parallel version of the Russian TOS missiles
Coming to the point of the cost factor, it is very easy for Egypt to obtain from Russia 100-200 SS-26 ISKANDER missiles for an amount of 500-750 million dollars, but these are not the real needs, which may reach 1,000 missiles.
So the alternative was the Chinese M20 missile with locally produced versions with ranges of 100-200-300-400-500 and with different destroyer warheads and anti-ship ballistic versions or an anti-radar version. This is a realistic solution and also low-cost and inevitable because it is the only one that can be implemented.


China is playing on the factor of providing low-priced weapons according to the budgets of countries that are acceptable to it, and this is what is actually done. China exported its version to Turkey and Belarus as an export missile.

These missiles are not the complete information, rather what is leaked, but they are not the entirety of things. As long as China exports the DF-21 missile to countries such as Saudi Arabia, then it is available for export to larger regional powers as well, as well as the DF-16 missile. These weapons give China influence over the countries from which it imports weapons and huge arms export numbers. China and China have countries that give them weapons that are not acceptable for export to other countries. China, for example, offered Egypt the production of the Type-99 tank, which it did not allow other countries to export due to Egypt’s requirements for advanced tanks to suit the levels of threats that suit the Egyptian army and its requirements.

We come to the most important points

In 2011, America and Europe implemented a temporary arms embargo on Egypt
Egypt's tendencies in 2012 to contract new batches of ballistic missiles. As the West implemented an embargo on Egypt, Egypt expanded its acquisition of weapons from the East to compensate for the shortage of advanced fighter jets and their ammunition.
In 2013, when the Obama administration imposed an embargo on Egypt and even stopped delivering previously contracted weapons and fighters, the Egyptian response was to criticize various Russian deals and even increase previous weapons stocks. Larose developed Egypt’s obsolete weapons of all types that Egypt had previously obtained and the Russians provided Egypt with weapons production programs. There are even weapons under development for Egypt to participate in, and the nature of the Egyptian military does not like to take risks in developing weapons and spending on them.

Therefore, the ballistic missile program received a major boost in the years 2012 and 2017.
For many reasons, there are countries that have entered the ballistic missile club and are considered regional competitors, and their media is hostile to Egypt, especially the period between
2013-2023 Like Türkiye and even countries like South Korea, these matters are under the calculations of the balance of power in the Middle East.

https://www.iiss.org/de-DE/online-a...after-half-a-century-egypts-scuds-soldier-on/

Restrictions on fighter jets are increasing. There is a hunger for more ballistic missiles, programs to reduce costs and increase numbers, and there are matters that must be studied.
We come to what is more important than ballistic missiles, which is rocket artillery
America has restricted Egypt from obtaining MLRS systems in the quantities it desires, even though Egypt has its own local copies on transport vehicles. Now, Egypt believes that the most effective missiles are those with the largest calibres, 300/400 mm.
Why did Egypt negotiate with Belarus over the POLONIZ systems, with Ukraine over the Vilkha system, with Brazil over the ASTROS II/III systems, and with China over the A-200/300 systems?
The matter is simple to Gayo. It is Egypt’s desire to produce a low-cost, high-performance system with diverse capabilities in large quantities and by transferring technology.
Egypt was not satisfied with the Chinese WS-2D missiles, even if it obtained 100+ Russian-Ukrainian war platforms. This trend and the importance of possessing rocket artillery in huge quantities has proven correct.