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The incidents around the Naf River pose an unforeseen threat to Bangladeshi security, one that can’t be solved by introducing more warships.
By Asif Al Hasan and Muhammad Rauhan Rasheed
November 06, 2026
Bangladesh’s foreign policy has long been summed up in a single maxim, “Friendship towards all, malice towards none.” At sea, Dhaka has largely practiced what it preaches. When Myanmar naval vessels escorted survey ships into waters both countries claimed in 2008, Dhaka sent warships. Yet it ultimately chose the courtroom over confrontation, winning its maritime boundary case against Myanmar in 2012. Two years later, in 2014, Bangladesh won arbitration against India on their maritime boundary in the Bay of Bengal. The rulings gave Bangladesh something it had lacked since independence: a legally secure maritime domain, and, with it, a clear reason to build a navy to defend it.
Forces Goal 2030 provided that navy. While recent debate over the plan has centered on the air force’s widening capability gap, the naval side has delivered far more of what it promised. More than 30 new warships have joined the fleet since 2009, along with two refurbished Chinese submarines and a submarine base at Pekua reportedly built for $1.21 billion. After the 2008 standoff with Myanmar, the logic was easy to follow: the likeliest threat at sea seemed to be another state’s navy.
However, the maritime threat that has most directly affected ordinary Bangladeshis has come from an actor Dhaka’s security planners didn’t see coming. On August 8, the Arakan Army detained three Bangladeshi fishermen near Shah Porir Dwip in Teknaf. Eleven days later, a team from Border Guard Bangladesh (BGB) received 24 other fishermen from the group at the zero line of the Naf River; the fishermen had been detained at various times starting in early 2025. According to BGB figures, between January 2025 and August 2026, the Arakan Army detained 434 fishermen, 222 of them Bangladeshi citizens and 212 Rohingya refugees living in Bangladesh, and 86 remained in its custody.
“Fishermen are always living in fear of the Arakan Army,” Abdul Gani, a boat landing committee leader in Shah Porir Dwip, told The Daily Observer.
Quite often, the abducted Bangladeshi fishermen have entered Myanmar waters, incursions that the BGB said were accidental. However, the Arakan Army has violated the border too – in April 2025 it operated inside Bangladeshi waters and seized 23 fishermen off Bangladesh’s Saint Martin’s Island, causing 3,000 fishermen to remain ashore for five days.
Bangladesh has invested heavily in its navy in recent times, which is understandable considering the history of Myanmar and Bangladesh clashes at sea. Dhaka needed to deter Myanmar, with its strong naval capabilities. However, the incidents around the Naf signify that the Bangladeshi navy’s weakness is unlikely to be rectified by introducing more warships in its inventory.
The Arakan Army’s use of fast boats in the shallow, unmarked waters of the Naf River helps explain the navy’s limited role. To counter such incursions, submarines provide little protection. On the other hand, it would be a waste of naval resources to deploy frigates to monitor small boats in a shallow estuary.
The navy could be better deployed with regular patrols, reliable surveillance, and the capacity to intervene rapidly to counter these unlawful activities. The solution lies in increasing the pace at which information reaches the authorities and coming up with a clear chain of command to respond in crises.
When it comes to the Naf River, the responsibility of monitoring coastal waters and protecting Bangladesh’s maritime boundary is under the Coast Guard’s legal responsibility as per the Coast Guard Act of 2016. The issue is that agencies securing the Naf answer to separate chains of command. The Coast Guard is part of the Home Ministry, with all officers and enlisted personnel being seconded from the navy, which is part of the defense establishment. To make matters worse, the BGB is doing what should have been the role of the Coast Guard, as the BGB is taking the lead in securing the release of detained fishermen.
There is reason for some optimism, even if misdirected, because of recent investment in the Coast Guard. Dhaka announced plans to expand the Coast Guard’s manpower with patrol vessels and high-speed boats being procured. Additionally, three surveillance drones have already been inducted. However, this capability boost does not address concerns raised by a serving naval officer in the Navy Journal in 2024, where he described capability development among coastal security agencies as piecemeal, “often resulting in gap or duplication,” and noted that ministries hold data “yet to be integrated for sharing.” That’s a problem not addressed by new gear, as somebody still has to maintain a common operational picture of the NAF and organize the response when fishermen are taken.
Political motivations could also explain why some capabilities have garnered more eyeballs than others. In 2017, then-Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina commissioned the two submarines and inaugurated the Pekua base at an official ceremony in 2023. These projects are visible and politically gratifying, whereas people may have been far less interested in a coastal radar network in Teknaf, and it is relatively harder to champion when the responsibility is split across budgets.
The timing makes the pressure worse. Forces Goal 2030 is already finishing out, and Bangladesh’s two submarines received life extension upgrades to 2030, making the decision on replacements or extending them again more imminent. Though Prime Minister Tarique Rahman told journalists in June that “modern, secure, accurate and efficient exchange of ocean-related information” is “closely linked to safeguarding national interests,” it remains an open question as to whether this rhetoric shapes the next plan.
Future naval equipment choices could also have diplomatic implications as Washington has announced plans to supply U.S. and allied systems as options to Chinese gear, while Dhaka and Beijing agreed in June to expand strategic ties, which includes a diplomatic and defense 2+2 dialogue. A new submarine or frigate deal could make headlines beyond Bangladesh’s defense circles, particularly if it results in a new source of supplies. However, Coast Guard ships and coastal radar hold less of this type of significance.
Bangladesh still needs a navy to contain Myanmar’s. Even so, as Forces Goal 2030 winds down, Dhaka could consider reorganizing its allocation of resources to different maritime authorities. The Coast Guard could be tasked with establishing a presence in the estuary, while the navy and BGB could be mandated to send radar footage and intelligence to one another via a mutually agreeable system, supported by sustainable budgets to conduct patrolling and rapid response operations. One model proposed in the Navy Journal is a Maritime Information Coordination Centre, although the author acknowledges disagreements over which institution should lead it. For fishermen, a more conspicuous boundary and inexpensive geolocators could discourage accidental crossings, but markings would need to span the boundary and would have little effect on deliberate crossings.
Better capabilities will only partially address the issue. Though surveillance can locate the fishermen’s boats, Dhaka cannot prevent Arakan Army patrols from detaining them on the other side of the border. “Friendship for all” thus has to be practiced flexibly, as Dhaka lacks the normal state-to-state channels for dealing with a non-state actor. One BGB commander has attributed a higher number of fishermen returning to “professional, cordial, and effective coordinated efforts.” This means, in practice, that the Arakan Army decides when fishermen can go back. Ideally, Dhaka should seek benefits from predictable rules of engagement, such as the sharing of information on arrests and clear criteria for the release of fishermen, without recognizing the Arakan Army. The International Crisis Group recommended that Dhaka step up its engagement with the Arakan Army.
Taking everything into account, now that Bangladesh has settled both of its maritime disputes with Myanmar and India in international courts, the subsequent maritime modernization strategy for strengthening the navy should be mindful of developments on the Naf since the Arakan Army seized the far bank. In the fishing villages of Teknaf, success will be defined by the day that fishermen make it back to port safely without fear.
By Asif Al Hasan and Muhammad Rauhan Rasheed
November 06, 2026
Bangladesh’s foreign policy has long been summed up in a single maxim, “Friendship towards all, malice towards none.” At sea, Dhaka has largely practiced what it preaches. When Myanmar naval vessels escorted survey ships into waters both countries claimed in 2008, Dhaka sent warships. Yet it ultimately chose the courtroom over confrontation, winning its maritime boundary case against Myanmar in 2012. Two years later, in 2014, Bangladesh won arbitration against India on their maritime boundary in the Bay of Bengal. The rulings gave Bangladesh something it had lacked since independence: a legally secure maritime domain, and, with it, a clear reason to build a navy to defend it.
Forces Goal 2030 provided that navy. While recent debate over the plan has centered on the air force’s widening capability gap, the naval side has delivered far more of what it promised. More than 30 new warships have joined the fleet since 2009, along with two refurbished Chinese submarines and a submarine base at Pekua reportedly built for $1.21 billion. After the 2008 standoff with Myanmar, the logic was easy to follow: the likeliest threat at sea seemed to be another state’s navy.
However, the maritime threat that has most directly affected ordinary Bangladeshis has come from an actor Dhaka’s security planners didn’t see coming. On August 8, the Arakan Army detained three Bangladeshi fishermen near Shah Porir Dwip in Teknaf. Eleven days later, a team from Border Guard Bangladesh (BGB) received 24 other fishermen from the group at the zero line of the Naf River; the fishermen had been detained at various times starting in early 2025. According to BGB figures, between January 2025 and August 2026, the Arakan Army detained 434 fishermen, 222 of them Bangladeshi citizens and 212 Rohingya refugees living in Bangladesh, and 86 remained in its custody.
“Fishermen are always living in fear of the Arakan Army,” Abdul Gani, a boat landing committee leader in Shah Porir Dwip, told The Daily Observer.
Quite often, the abducted Bangladeshi fishermen have entered Myanmar waters, incursions that the BGB said were accidental. However, the Arakan Army has violated the border too – in April 2025 it operated inside Bangladeshi waters and seized 23 fishermen off Bangladesh’s Saint Martin’s Island, causing 3,000 fishermen to remain ashore for five days.
Bangladesh has invested heavily in its navy in recent times, which is understandable considering the history of Myanmar and Bangladesh clashes at sea. Dhaka needed to deter Myanmar, with its strong naval capabilities. However, the incidents around the Naf signify that the Bangladeshi navy’s weakness is unlikely to be rectified by introducing more warships in its inventory.
The Arakan Army’s use of fast boats in the shallow, unmarked waters of the Naf River helps explain the navy’s limited role. To counter such incursions, submarines provide little protection. On the other hand, it would be a waste of naval resources to deploy frigates to monitor small boats in a shallow estuary.
The navy could be better deployed with regular patrols, reliable surveillance, and the capacity to intervene rapidly to counter these unlawful activities. The solution lies in increasing the pace at which information reaches the authorities and coming up with a clear chain of command to respond in crises.
When it comes to the Naf River, the responsibility of monitoring coastal waters and protecting Bangladesh’s maritime boundary is under the Coast Guard’s legal responsibility as per the Coast Guard Act of 2016. The issue is that agencies securing the Naf answer to separate chains of command. The Coast Guard is part of the Home Ministry, with all officers and enlisted personnel being seconded from the navy, which is part of the defense establishment. To make matters worse, the BGB is doing what should have been the role of the Coast Guard, as the BGB is taking the lead in securing the release of detained fishermen.
There is reason for some optimism, even if misdirected, because of recent investment in the Coast Guard. Dhaka announced plans to expand the Coast Guard’s manpower with patrol vessels and high-speed boats being procured. Additionally, three surveillance drones have already been inducted. However, this capability boost does not address concerns raised by a serving naval officer in the Navy Journal in 2024, where he described capability development among coastal security agencies as piecemeal, “often resulting in gap or duplication,” and noted that ministries hold data “yet to be integrated for sharing.” That’s a problem not addressed by new gear, as somebody still has to maintain a common operational picture of the NAF and organize the response when fishermen are taken.
Political motivations could also explain why some capabilities have garnered more eyeballs than others. In 2017, then-Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina commissioned the two submarines and inaugurated the Pekua base at an official ceremony in 2023. These projects are visible and politically gratifying, whereas people may have been far less interested in a coastal radar network in Teknaf, and it is relatively harder to champion when the responsibility is split across budgets.
The timing makes the pressure worse. Forces Goal 2030 is already finishing out, and Bangladesh’s two submarines received life extension upgrades to 2030, making the decision on replacements or extending them again more imminent. Though Prime Minister Tarique Rahman told journalists in June that “modern, secure, accurate and efficient exchange of ocean-related information” is “closely linked to safeguarding national interests,” it remains an open question as to whether this rhetoric shapes the next plan.
Future naval equipment choices could also have diplomatic implications as Washington has announced plans to supply U.S. and allied systems as options to Chinese gear, while Dhaka and Beijing agreed in June to expand strategic ties, which includes a diplomatic and defense 2+2 dialogue. A new submarine or frigate deal could make headlines beyond Bangladesh’s defense circles, particularly if it results in a new source of supplies. However, Coast Guard ships and coastal radar hold less of this type of significance.
Bangladesh still needs a navy to contain Myanmar’s. Even so, as Forces Goal 2030 winds down, Dhaka could consider reorganizing its allocation of resources to different maritime authorities. The Coast Guard could be tasked with establishing a presence in the estuary, while the navy and BGB could be mandated to send radar footage and intelligence to one another via a mutually agreeable system, supported by sustainable budgets to conduct patrolling and rapid response operations. One model proposed in the Navy Journal is a Maritime Information Coordination Centre, although the author acknowledges disagreements over which institution should lead it. For fishermen, a more conspicuous boundary and inexpensive geolocators could discourage accidental crossings, but markings would need to span the boundary and would have little effect on deliberate crossings.
Better capabilities will only partially address the issue. Though surveillance can locate the fishermen’s boats, Dhaka cannot prevent Arakan Army patrols from detaining them on the other side of the border. “Friendship for all” thus has to be practiced flexibly, as Dhaka lacks the normal state-to-state channels for dealing with a non-state actor. One BGB commander has attributed a higher number of fishermen returning to “professional, cordial, and effective coordinated efforts.” This means, in practice, that the Arakan Army decides when fishermen can go back. Ideally, Dhaka should seek benefits from predictable rules of engagement, such as the sharing of information on arrests and clear criteria for the release of fishermen, without recognizing the Arakan Army. The International Crisis Group recommended that Dhaka step up its engagement with the Arakan Army.
Taking everything into account, now that Bangladesh has settled both of its maritime disputes with Myanmar and India in international courts, the subsequent maritime modernization strategy for strengthening the navy should be mindful of developments on the Naf since the Arakan Army seized the far bank. In the fishing villages of Teknaf, success will be defined by the day that fishermen make it back to port safely without fear.
