China builds nuclear reactors at unmatched scale while America relearns how. The real competition is who can manufacture and deploy nuclear power fastest.
nationalinterest.org
The Nuclear Race Between the United States and China Is Already Underway
August 27, 2026
By:
Randall Schmollinger
About the Author: Randall Schmollinger
Randall Schmollinger is the CEO of Aule Materials, a company designing software in tandem with partners at the Idaho National Lab for nuclear engineering applications. He holds a BA in computer science from the University at Albany and a master’s in international affairs from Columbia’s School of International and Public Affairs.
China builds nuclear reactors at unmatched scale while America relearns how. The real competition is who can manufacture and deploy nuclear power fastest.
Over the past two decades, the United States has treated nuclear energy as an aging technology in need of preservation. That assumption is now under pressure from an increasingly productive
Chinese nuclear energy sector. Washington and Beijing are now moving away from the stagnation that characterized much of the post-Cold War nuclear industry. China is building reactors at a pace unmatched anywhere in the world, while the United States is attempting to reconstruct an industrial ecosystem that can once again design, finance, regulate, manufacture, and deploy nuclear technology at scale.
This is not a simple energy competition. Nuclear energy is becoming a test of whether two very different economic systems can translate technological ambition into physical industrial capacity. China’s pace of construction is staggering. China currently has 60 operable reactors and 37 reactors under construction, according to
data from the International Energy Agency (
IAEA). The IAEA reports that roughly half of all nuclear capacity under construction worldwide is in China. In 2025, nine of the world’s 10 nuclear construction starts were in China. China’s nuclear generating capacity increased by 76 percent between 2016 and 2024, and the country added another 3.3 gigawatts of capacity in 2025 and the first five months of 2026. The United States, by contrast, has only brought three new reactors online since 1996.
China’s advantage is not simply that Beijing has decided to build more reactors. It has spent years building an industrial system capable of repeatedly building the same kinds of reactors. State-owned enterprises dominate the sector, financing is closely connected to state policy, and reactor design, engineering, construction, manufacturing, and operation are increasingly integrated.
China’s
Hualong One reactor illustrates the strategy. The design has moved from development to serial deployment, with dozens of units in operation or construction. Chinese officials describe Hualong One as a technology with complete domestic intellectual-property rights, while Chinese nuclear companies increasingly market it overseas.
The result is an advantage that is difficult to replicate through research spending alone: learning by doing.
Every reactor China builds generates experience in procurement, construction, component manufacturing, project management, regulation, financing, and workforce development. The next reactor can therefore be built using a supply chain and workforce that were trained by the previous one. This capability matters. Nuclear energy technology is not just another form of electricity generation. A country capable of building nuclear plants at scale possesses expertise across a remarkably broad portion of the industrial economy: heavy manufacturing, metallurgy, electrical systems, advanced materials, construction, nuclear fuel, robotics, engineering software, and complex project management. China appears to understand this and is building its economy with it in mind.
The United States is beginning to respond. The most visible change has been regulatory. In May 2025, President Donald Trump
ordered a wholesale revision of Nuclear Regulatory Commission (
NRC) regulations and set an objective to complete new-reactor licensing within 18 months. The
NRC has subsequently incorporated 12- and 18-month milestones into its licensing schedules and established accelerated reviews for several projects.
The Trump administration has also explicitly connected nuclear deployment to national security. A May 2025 executive
order directed the federal government to accelerate the development, demonstration, deployment, and export of
advanced nuclear technologies and called for greater private-sector investment in the domestic
nuclear industrial base. Another executive order directed the government to expand domestic uranium conversion and enrichment capabilities.
But regulatory reform is only one part of the American response. Private capital is flowing back into nuclear technology. Advanced reactor companies that once operated primarily on government research funding are increasingly attracting venture capital, infrastructure investors, strategic corporate partners, and public-market financing.
TerraPower raised $650 million in 2025 from investors including NVIDIA’s venture arm and HD Hyundai.
X-energy raised $700 million in a 2025 Series D round after an earlier $700 million financing that included Amazon, Ares Management, Jane Street, and other investors. X-energy
subsequently raised more than $1 billion in its 2026 initial public offering.
Technology companies are also becoming important participants in the nuclear renaissance.
Amazon says it invested more than $1 billion across nuclear projects and technologies during 2024 and 2025.
Google has entered a power-purchase agreement supporting deployment of Kairos Power’s advanced reactors in Tennessee, while
Microsoft has signed a long-term agreement supporting the restart of the former Three Mile Island Unit 1.
This private demand is strategically significant. For decades, nuclear development in the United States suffered from a disconnect between technological development and a customer willing to pay for the resulting electricity. The growth of
data centers and artificial intelligence (
AI) has created a new class of extremely large electricity customers that value reliable, carbon-free generation and are willing to enter long-term commercial arrangements.
The United States is also rebuilding something less visible but potentially just as important: its nuclear workforce.
The Department of Energy (
DOE) estimates that the
existing nuclear fleet employs approximately 100,000 people and that the industry could require roughly 375,000 workers by 2050 if advanced reactors commercialize at scale. In 2026, DOE awarded more than $49.7 million to ten
university-led nuclear safety and workforce-development projects. Separate DOE funding has supported university nuclear infrastructure, research, fellowships, training, and industry partnerships.
The significance of these programs goes beyond filling vacancies. Nuclear expertise is accumulated through institutions. Universities train engineers. National laboratories develop technology and testing capabilities. Utilities train operators. Manufacturers develop specialized processes. Regulators acquire technical expertise. And companies learn how to turn reactor designs into manufacturable products.
That institutional ecosystem is precisely what the United States lost during decades of limited nuclear construction.
America does not need to adopt China’s economic model to compete with China, but it does need to reproduce the industrial effects that China’s model has generated.
The United States has several advantages. It has deep private capital markets, world-class universities, globally competitive technology companies, a large installed nuclear fleet, sophisticated engineering firms, and decades of nuclear research infrastructure. It also has a large ecosystem of entrepreneurial companies pursuing radically different reactor designs.
China has advantages of its own: centralized decision-making, enormous infrastructure-construction capacity, state-owned enterprises capable of absorbing large amounts of capital, and an established supply chain that is already producing reactors repeatedly.
Which system can most effectively enable repeat deployment at scale is still an open question. The objective should not simply be to produce one successful American advanced reactor. It should be to produce the second, third, tenth, and hundredth reactor more quickly and cheaply than the first.
This is where American policy should become more ambitious. The United States should measure nuclear competitiveness not primarily by the number of reactor concepts receiving federal grants, but by whether it is rebuilding the capacity to manufacture and deploy reactors. Regulatory reform should therefore be paired with investment in domestic nuclear fuel, component manufacturing, construction capacity, engineering education, testing infrastructure, and standardized reactor designs.
The government should also think carefully about nuclear exports. China has already demonstrated that a domestic nuclear construction program can become an export industry. Beijing’s nuclear companies increasingly promote Chinese reactor technology abroad, while China’s state-backed industrial ecosystem gives foreign customers a relatively integrated package of financing, construction, equipment, and technology.
The United States should be competing for those markets—not simply because reactor exports generate revenue, but because nuclear infrastructure creates long-term technological and
diplomatic relationships.
Countries that buy reactors do not merely buy electricity generators. They build relationships with reactor vendors, fuel suppliers, engineering companies, regulators, training institutions, and maintenance providers. Nuclear exports can therefore create decades-long strategic partnerships.
The United States should not assume that private markets alone will produce this outcome. Nor should it assume that the government can simply dictate an industrial winner. The more promising American model is a partnership between private capital and technological competition operating within a government-created industrial strategy.
The emerging nuclear renaissance suggests that this model may be possible. Capital is returning. New reactor designs are advancing. Universities are rebuilding nuclear programs. Regulators are being pushed to move faster. Utilities and technology companies are signing long-term commitments. Federal agencies are once again treating nuclear technology as an element of national security.
Momentum is not the same thing as victory. China has spent years building a nuclear manufacturing machine while the United States is still rebuilding one. The strategic competition will ultimately be decided less by which country announces the most ambitious reactor design than by which country can turn engineering knowledge into physical infrastructure at scale.
For the United States, nuclear energy therefore represents something larger than a source of electricity. It is a test of whether the country can once again translate technological leadership into industrial power. The race has already begun.
Fox News correspondent Christina Coleman takes a closer look at the United States’ push for nuclear fusion, an extremely powerful energy source with the potential to be limitless, on 'Special Report.'
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