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Instead of being seen as a fugitive from justice, the former Bangladeshi prime minister could present herself as a political leader willing to face trial in her own country.
By Saqlain Rizve
July 14, 2026
In a recent interview with Reuters, Bangladesh’s former Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina announced that she and senior party colleagues plan to return from India to Bangladesh around December.
Hasina’s Awami League (AL) government was ousted from power on August 5, 2024, following weeks of mass protests. Soon after her resignation, she fled Bangladesh for India and has been living there since then.
Hasina was tried in absentia by Bangladesh’s International Crimes Tribunal over the deadly crackdown during the July-August 2024 protests. In November 2025, she was convicted of crimes against humanity under the doctrine of superior command responsibility and sentenced to death. She has rejected the verdict as politically motivated and denied all charges.
Hasina told Reuters that she would surrender before a court despite already being sentenced to death in absentia.
Rumors of her return to Bangladesh have been circulating for several months. This is the first time that Hasina has publicly committed to returning to Bangladesh, giving a timeframe.
Why would a politician voluntarily return to a country where imprisonment or even execution awaits her?
While only Hasina and her innermost circle really know what underlies her decision, the AL’s uncertain future offers one possible explanation. With the party banned, and its senior leaders scattered or in hiding, its future has never been more uncertain.
Hasina may believe that remaining in exile now poses a grave threat to her party’s very survival. Returning home, despite the risks, may offer a better chance of keeping the AL alive. It may also reflect a longer-term concern about the party’s future leadership. Although she has never publicly named a successor, her son, Sajeeb Wazed Joy, is widely regarded by supporters and political observers as her most likely political heir. Preserving a functioning political party may therefore matter not only for Hasina’s own political legacy, but also for any eventual leadership transition within the AL.
Since the mass uprising of July-August 2024 ended Hasina’s 15-year rule, the AL has been banned from political activities and many of its senior leaders have been arrested, driven into hiding or forced abroad.
Meanwhile, Bangladesh’s other political parties have moved on. In February this year, the AL’s longstanding and main political rival, the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP), came to power with a sweeping mandate in general elections. The Jamaat-e-Islami (JI), Bangladesh’s largest Islamist party, emerged as the main opposition party in parliament, and the National Citizen Party (NCP), which was formed recently by students who led the 2024 protests, has emerged a major opposition force.
While in India, Hasina has communicated mainly through online messages. Yet leading a banned political party from exile has clear limitations. In recent interviews, she has urged senior AL leaders to return with her and surrender before the courts. Whether that coordinated return will actually happen remains uncertain, but the appeal sends a message to supporters that the party leadership remains united and has not abandoned the political fight.
Moreover, as long as Hasina remains in India, her opponents can portray her as a fugitive avoiding justice. Returning voluntarily changes that narrative. Instead of being seen as someone hiding abroad, she could present herself as a political leader willing to face trial in her own country.
Hasina has consistently rejected the charges against her, arguing that the cases are politically motivated. Human rights organizations have raised concerns about aspects of the legal proceedings, particularly the decision to put her on trial and sentence her in absentia. At the same time, they have emphasized the importance of accountability for the killings committed during the uprising.
By surrendering, Hasina could change the focus of international attention. The question would no longer only be whether she should face justice, but whether the process itself is seen as fair.
For many Bangladeshis, however, the issue is far less about legal procedure than about accountability. The United Nations estimated that up to 1,400 people were killed during the government’s crackdown on protesters in July and August 2024. For families of those killed, and for many who participated in the uprising, Hasina’s return represents an opportunity for justice rather than political reconciliation. Among those groups, there is little appetite for her political rehabilitation.
The Awami League was banned via an ordinance by Bangladesh’s interim government in May 2025 under the Anti-Terrorism Act, pending the outcome of trials over the 2024 crackdown. The Election Commission subsequently suspended its registration, effectively barring the party from future elections. The ban reflects demands for accountability over the 2024 crackdown.
At the same time, debate continues over whether one of Bangladesh’s largest political parties should remain barred from elections. Hasina herself has hinted that even if she cannot personally return to politics, voters should determine whether the AL has a future. In doing so, she appears to be separating her individual legal fate from the broader political survival of her party.
The BNP itself benefited electorally from the AL ban. Now in power, it faces a dilemma. It has sent mixed signals on how it should deal with the AL. Although the government continues to enforce the ban on the AL, some BNP leaders have argued that it is voters, not political parties, who should decide the AL’s future.
Legally, the BNP government’s position is straightforward. Hasina is a convicted individual who has publicly stated that she intends to surrender. Politically, however, the situation is considerably more complicated.
If she is immediately imprisoned and the legal process proceeds toward carrying out the existing sentence, the government could face increased international scrutiny. It would risk turning Hasina into a political martyr for her supporters, which could become a rallying point for AL leaders, activists and supporters still inside Bangladesh, increasing the risk of political mobilization and public unrest.
If, on the other hand, authorities appear to delay proceedings or soften their approach, they risk criticism from victims’ families and opposition political parties like JI and NCP, which view accountability for the 2024 killings as non-negotiable.
Both outcomes carry political costs.
Hasina’s return could galvanize her supporters, even as it triggers counter-protests from groups that led the uprising. This could lead to a sensitive security situation in Bangladesh, far more serious than any other it has experienced in recent years.
The AL, meanwhile, appears to be pursuing a longer-term strategy. It is not looking to return to power soon. At present, simply surviving as a political organization is enough. By placing Hasina back at the center of national politics, even from a prison cell, the party may hope to prevent organizational collapse and keep its remaining supporters united.
It could also be argued that Bangladesh’s democracy cannot be fully competitive while one of its largest parties remains excluded.
Yet returning to Bangladesh is only one part of the challenge.
Several Bangladeshi political analysts argue that the AL cannot simply return to politics; it must accept responsibility for its ouster from power. As long as the party remains reluctant to acknowledge public anger over authoritarian governance, corruption allegations, and the violence surrounding the 2024 uprising, rebuilding broader public trust is likely to remain difficult.
History suggests that exile is rarely a permanent political strategy. Many ousted leaders have eventually returned home, believing they could achieve more from prison or even at great personal risk than from safety abroad.
Thailand’s former Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra returned in 2023 after 15 years in self-imposed exile, knowing he would be imprisoned on corruption convictions. He was arrested on arrival in Bangkok, but was subsequently released on parole, remaining an influential but controversial political figure.
Pakistan’s former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto returned from exile in 1986 to challenge General Zia-ul-Haq’s military dictatorship. Her homecoming helped revive the Pakistan People’s Party, culminating in its 1988 election victory. Years later, she went into self-exile following corruption allegations and returned again in 2007 despite repeated assassination warnings. Her homecoming procession survived a suicide attack, but she was assassinated just over two months later.
However, in Hasina’s case, the situation is even more precarious. Unlike Bhutto, she would return to a country where her party is banned from political activity due to the 15 years of autocratic rule, enforced disappearances, corruption and finally the killings during the uprising. Unlike Thaksin, she faces not prison time but a death sentence.
Whether Hasina returns or not, her announcement has already shifted the debate from her exile to the future of the AL itself. Hasina’s homecoming, if it happens, will show whether accountability, political competition, and the rule of law can coexist after one of the country’s most turbulent phases.
By Saqlain Rizve
July 14, 2026
In a recent interview with Reuters, Bangladesh’s former Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina announced that she and senior party colleagues plan to return from India to Bangladesh around December.
Hasina’s Awami League (AL) government was ousted from power on August 5, 2024, following weeks of mass protests. Soon after her resignation, she fled Bangladesh for India and has been living there since then.
Hasina was tried in absentia by Bangladesh’s International Crimes Tribunal over the deadly crackdown during the July-August 2024 protests. In November 2025, she was convicted of crimes against humanity under the doctrine of superior command responsibility and sentenced to death. She has rejected the verdict as politically motivated and denied all charges.
Hasina told Reuters that she would surrender before a court despite already being sentenced to death in absentia.
Rumors of her return to Bangladesh have been circulating for several months. This is the first time that Hasina has publicly committed to returning to Bangladesh, giving a timeframe.
Why would a politician voluntarily return to a country where imprisonment or even execution awaits her?
While only Hasina and her innermost circle really know what underlies her decision, the AL’s uncertain future offers one possible explanation. With the party banned, and its senior leaders scattered or in hiding, its future has never been more uncertain.
Hasina may believe that remaining in exile now poses a grave threat to her party’s very survival. Returning home, despite the risks, may offer a better chance of keeping the AL alive. It may also reflect a longer-term concern about the party’s future leadership. Although she has never publicly named a successor, her son, Sajeeb Wazed Joy, is widely regarded by supporters and political observers as her most likely political heir. Preserving a functioning political party may therefore matter not only for Hasina’s own political legacy, but also for any eventual leadership transition within the AL.
Since the mass uprising of July-August 2024 ended Hasina’s 15-year rule, the AL has been banned from political activities and many of its senior leaders have been arrested, driven into hiding or forced abroad.
Meanwhile, Bangladesh’s other political parties have moved on. In February this year, the AL’s longstanding and main political rival, the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP), came to power with a sweeping mandate in general elections. The Jamaat-e-Islami (JI), Bangladesh’s largest Islamist party, emerged as the main opposition party in parliament, and the National Citizen Party (NCP), which was formed recently by students who led the 2024 protests, has emerged a major opposition force.
While in India, Hasina has communicated mainly through online messages. Yet leading a banned political party from exile has clear limitations. In recent interviews, she has urged senior AL leaders to return with her and surrender before the courts. Whether that coordinated return will actually happen remains uncertain, but the appeal sends a message to supporters that the party leadership remains united and has not abandoned the political fight.
Moreover, as long as Hasina remains in India, her opponents can portray her as a fugitive avoiding justice. Returning voluntarily changes that narrative. Instead of being seen as someone hiding abroad, she could present herself as a political leader willing to face trial in her own country.
Hasina has consistently rejected the charges against her, arguing that the cases are politically motivated. Human rights organizations have raised concerns about aspects of the legal proceedings, particularly the decision to put her on trial and sentence her in absentia. At the same time, they have emphasized the importance of accountability for the killings committed during the uprising.
By surrendering, Hasina could change the focus of international attention. The question would no longer only be whether she should face justice, but whether the process itself is seen as fair.
For many Bangladeshis, however, the issue is far less about legal procedure than about accountability. The United Nations estimated that up to 1,400 people were killed during the government’s crackdown on protesters in July and August 2024. For families of those killed, and for many who participated in the uprising, Hasina’s return represents an opportunity for justice rather than political reconciliation. Among those groups, there is little appetite for her political rehabilitation.
The Awami League was banned via an ordinance by Bangladesh’s interim government in May 2025 under the Anti-Terrorism Act, pending the outcome of trials over the 2024 crackdown. The Election Commission subsequently suspended its registration, effectively barring the party from future elections. The ban reflects demands for accountability over the 2024 crackdown.
At the same time, debate continues over whether one of Bangladesh’s largest political parties should remain barred from elections. Hasina herself has hinted that even if she cannot personally return to politics, voters should determine whether the AL has a future. In doing so, she appears to be separating her individual legal fate from the broader political survival of her party.
The BNP itself benefited electorally from the AL ban. Now in power, it faces a dilemma. It has sent mixed signals on how it should deal with the AL. Although the government continues to enforce the ban on the AL, some BNP leaders have argued that it is voters, not political parties, who should decide the AL’s future.
Legally, the BNP government’s position is straightforward. Hasina is a convicted individual who has publicly stated that she intends to surrender. Politically, however, the situation is considerably more complicated.
If she is immediately imprisoned and the legal process proceeds toward carrying out the existing sentence, the government could face increased international scrutiny. It would risk turning Hasina into a political martyr for her supporters, which could become a rallying point for AL leaders, activists and supporters still inside Bangladesh, increasing the risk of political mobilization and public unrest.
If, on the other hand, authorities appear to delay proceedings or soften their approach, they risk criticism from victims’ families and opposition political parties like JI and NCP, which view accountability for the 2024 killings as non-negotiable.
Both outcomes carry political costs.
Hasina’s return could galvanize her supporters, even as it triggers counter-protests from groups that led the uprising. This could lead to a sensitive security situation in Bangladesh, far more serious than any other it has experienced in recent years.
The AL, meanwhile, appears to be pursuing a longer-term strategy. It is not looking to return to power soon. At present, simply surviving as a political organization is enough. By placing Hasina back at the center of national politics, even from a prison cell, the party may hope to prevent organizational collapse and keep its remaining supporters united.
It could also be argued that Bangladesh’s democracy cannot be fully competitive while one of its largest parties remains excluded.
Yet returning to Bangladesh is only one part of the challenge.
Several Bangladeshi political analysts argue that the AL cannot simply return to politics; it must accept responsibility for its ouster from power. As long as the party remains reluctant to acknowledge public anger over authoritarian governance, corruption allegations, and the violence surrounding the 2024 uprising, rebuilding broader public trust is likely to remain difficult.
History suggests that exile is rarely a permanent political strategy. Many ousted leaders have eventually returned home, believing they could achieve more from prison or even at great personal risk than from safety abroad.
Thailand’s former Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra returned in 2023 after 15 years in self-imposed exile, knowing he would be imprisoned on corruption convictions. He was arrested on arrival in Bangkok, but was subsequently released on parole, remaining an influential but controversial political figure.
Pakistan’s former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto returned from exile in 1986 to challenge General Zia-ul-Haq’s military dictatorship. Her homecoming helped revive the Pakistan People’s Party, culminating in its 1988 election victory. Years later, she went into self-exile following corruption allegations and returned again in 2007 despite repeated assassination warnings. Her homecoming procession survived a suicide attack, but she was assassinated just over two months later.
However, in Hasina’s case, the situation is even more precarious. Unlike Bhutto, she would return to a country where her party is banned from political activity due to the 15 years of autocratic rule, enforced disappearances, corruption and finally the killings during the uprising. Unlike Thaksin, she faces not prison time but a death sentence.
Whether Hasina returns or not, her announcement has already shifted the debate from her exile to the future of the AL itself. Hasina’s homecoming, if it happens, will show whether accountability, political competition, and the rule of law can coexist after one of the country’s most turbulent phases.
