Good resume of what has occurred in recent days/hours.
"Temporary Victories: The Illusion of Decisiveness and the Fall of the Wager in 36 HoursIn 36 hours, a swift transformation occurred that redrew the balance of power.
The Yemeni government , with strategic support from the Kingdom , regained Hadhramaut and Al-Mahra (with Shabwa isolated), after the Transitional Council refused to withdraw and attempted to impose a fait accompli in coordination with its sponsor, coinciding with Israel's recognition of Somaliland territory. How does one faction desperately threaten the national security of two neighboring countries at the same time, in coordination with non-neighboring states?
Let us go back a bit. The Southern Transitional Council had extended its control over Say'un and Al-Mahra on December 3–4, just hours before Dr. Obeid Al-Qatwani—head of the special committee—arrived in Al-Mukalla to arrange the deployment procedures for the Watar Shield forces. According to human rights and military sources, the limited clashes with members of the First Military Region in Say'un resulted in more than 40 killed, a hundred injured, and about 5,000 displaced, in addition to raids, arrests, and illegal looting operations. As for Al-Mahra, like Sana'a, it adapted quickly in peace.
In this context, President Dr. Rashad Al-Alimi demanded the withdrawal of "incoming" forces from outside the governorate, and keeping the governorate away from the path of escalation, prioritizing Yemeni interests, respecting Yemen's commitment to the security of neighboring countries, and rejecting "unilateral decisions" which he later described as "rebellion against the state" and against the directives of the transitional phase.
However, the head of the Transitional Council, Presidential Leadership Council member Major General Aidarus Al-Zubaidi, first refused to withdraw the forces, relying on Emirati reassurances, and second, a visit to Riyadh for negotiations. As a result, a joint Saudi-Emirati delegation visited Aden on December 12, but left without achieving any significant progress. In response, Al-Qatwani continued consultation and coordination efforts in Hadhramaut calmly, patiently, and openly. During these events, three members of the Presidential Council affiliated with Abu Dhabi aligned with Aidarus, not surprisingly.
On December 27, Saudi Defense Minister Prince Khalid bin Salman renewed the red lines in a statement vigilant over Yemen as a people, land, and system, implicitly granting an unannounced grace period estimated at about 72 hours for positive engagement with the demands and reaching an exit that saves face and preserves what can be preserved of the gains for the Transitional Council and the Emirates together. The Defense Minister is a minister of war and peace, and his statement carries clear and direct deterrent implications.
But the intransigence and escalation continued, so came the coalition's warning "limited" strike in Al-Mukalla on December 30, thereby sending messages to the Transitional Council and the Emirates, targeting military supplies that arrived from Fujairah to support the Transitional Council near the Saudi and Omani borders. That strike represented a shift to hard bargaining and confirmation of a non-negotiable ceiling of demands, in hope of a withdrawal that meets the Yemeni-Saudi-Omani demands. President Al-Alimi also announced, after the continued intransigence, a request for strategic support from the "Coalition to Support Legitimacy in Yemen" to "protect civilians" and restore security and stability, which Riyadh actually agreed to, as it accomplished what President Hadi did not complete: ending the UAE's participation in the coalition and its military presence within 24 hours.
It is a miscalculation and a bet on continued overlooking and adaptation to the fait accompli. But the bet quickly backfired: the Emirates was sidelined "of its own volition," the margin for maneuver narrowed, and the Transitional Council was exposed militarily, thus entering its first decisive battles without air cover.
Amid yesterday's clashes, and with news of the loss of Wadi Hadhramaut, its political intransigence increased, so it lost even Al-Mukalla, which was not part of the demands at the start of the crisis. Thus, the cost of the project to impose hegemony by force rose, and the Transitional Council's future entered a harsher test, politically and on the ground. The Transitional Council's approach was the primary determinant of the expansion of military operations and upcoming targets.
Hours later, Riyadh announced an initiative to hold a comprehensive southern-southern dialogue conference in Riyadh in response to President Al-Alimi's call. Thus, the Southern Transitional Council may attend the southern dialogue as a component, not an exclusive representative; and during that, discussion about its future may open.
Legitimate questions remain: Has the time come to correct the course of the partnership on all levels? Can entry into the southern dialogue occur without implementing all items of the Riyadh Agreement?
And representing entities and individuals with equal weight and in a safe manner for all participants, including those coming from Transitional Council-controlled areas? And creating a possible environment for constructive and fair dialogue? And how can past dialogue experiences be benefited from with weapons, especially the National Dialogue?
As for the big question: How did we get here after ten years? The need is urgent to adopt a new strategic approach that saves Yemen, meets the aspirations of its patient people yearning for just and prosperous peace, and safeguards the security of neighboring countries and international navigation. From here, there must be thinking, review, and reorienting the compass … towards Sana'a!"