Z-10 ME/P News, Updates

[Michael]

These days drones have taken pretty much every role of attack helicopter

At this very moment, China is intensifying its efforts to build "air assault brigades." Within these new types of combined-arms units, armed attack helicopters serve as a vital aerial force.

Had Russia possessed such "air assault brigades," the outcome of the assault on Antonov Airport might have been entirely different.

Thirty Z-10ME attack helicopters would roughly equate to the strength of two attack battalions within one of the air assault brigades currently being developed by the PLA Ground Force (PLAGF). Naturally, these PLAGF air assault brigades also incorporate a wide array of other helicopter types and military equipment.

As things stand, there are still many missions that unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) cannot perform—human personnel remain essential.

 

[studsmart]

Personally, what do you think? Do you believe that PA should have gotten or in the future get 30-60 more Z-10s or are 30 enough?

My take is PAA needs up to 100 of Z10ME2 in a single configuration to be effectively operated round the clock, and all operations are supported by drones and surveillance.

 

[Signalian]

Personally, what do you think? Do you believe that PA should have gotten or in the future get 30-60 more Z-10s or are 30 enough?

Depends how PA wants any formation like brigade or Division or Corps to function.

Provide 15 x Gunships to 1st armored Division and 0 x Gunships to 6th Armored Division. Who will have an increase in firepower, more probability of success, and minimize losses to ground troops ? 1st Armored Division, right.

Now take another scenario. Total gunships are 30. PA deploys 12 out of 30 gunships with COIN formations in Baluchistan. After 2-3 years, all 12 are lost or 7 are lost while PA recalls 5. That leaves 18 x gunships if all 12 are lost. Now think about PA options:
1. There are no replacements for lost gunships. COIN Ops will suffer.
2. numbers have come down to 18 which were planned to be used in a conventional war against Indian Army.
3. what if original numbers were 48 or 60, not 30. That would have provided more flexibility. Lesser the numbers, lesser the deployment options. The remaining 18 will be then be used sparingly and reserved for something catyastrophic.

 

[Mrc]

At this very moment, China is intensifying its efforts to build "air assault brigades." Within these new types of combined-arms units, armed attack helicopters serve as a vital aerial force.

Had Russia possessed such "air assault brigades," the outcome of the assault on Antonov Airport might have been entirely different.

Thirty Z-10ME attack helicopters would roughly equate to the strength of two attack battalions within one of the air assault brigades currently being developed by the PLA Ground Force (PLAGF). Naturally, these PLAGF air assault brigades also incorporate a wide array of other helicopter types and military equipment.

As things stand, there are still many missions that unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) cannot perform—human personnel remain essential.

Those are initial numbers for a fast evolving platform. Not the final number by any stretch of imagination

 

[Michael]

Those are initial numbers for a fast evolving platform. Not the final number by any stretch of imagination

You need to adopt a different way of thinking.

The old, war-oriented mindset is no longer applicable.

 

[BlueMarlin]

The Chinese are now working on a true heave weight attack helicopter, the z21 based on the z20.

i suspect the production line is running dry, same thing happened with the j10's and the type 54a's. anyone see a pattern

wont be surprised if they got a deal on these.

 

[Blain2]

Depends how PA wants any formation like brigade or Division or Corps to function.

Provide 15 x Gunships to 1st armored Division and 0 x Gunships to 6th Armored Division. Who will have an increase in firepower, more probability of success, and minimize losses to ground troops ? 1st Armored Division, right.

Now take another scenario. Total gunships are 30. PA deploys 12 out of 30 gunships with COIN formations in Baluchistan. After 2-3 years, all 12 are lost or 7 are lost while PA recalls 5. That leaves 18 x gunships if all 12 are lost. Now think about PA options:
1. There are no replacements for lost gunships. COIN Ops will suffer.
2. numbers have come down to 18 which were planned to be used in a conventional war against Indian Army.
3. what if original numbers were 48 or 60, not 30. That would have provided more flexibility. Lesser the numbers, lesser the deployment options. The remaining 18 will be then be used sparingly and reserved for something catyastrophic.

I would think the long range FPV and Loitering drones will probably also start changing the way employment of PAA assets is considered.

If news reports are correct, there is a 100,000 FPV attack drone order for joint production with the Turks in addition to more loitering munitions.

Depending on the timing of induction, this could lift a significant load off combat helicopters in conventional anti-armor role. Not suggesting that helis will be replaced entirely but this space is evolving very fast. I think in the Ukraine-Russian theater, Heli vs. FPV strikes are easily at a 1:n ratio if not more [with n representing tens (and possibly hundreds) of strikes by FPVs].

I personally feel PAA has gone slow on purpose with the inductions given the major rethink going on globally (and certainly in GHQ) on employment of manned rotary aircraft in interdiction roles and combat drones.

 

[Michael]

i suspect the production line is running dry, same thing happened with the j10's and the type 54a's. anyone see a pattern

According to current information, the PLAAF has indeed long since ceased procurement of the J-10C fighter jet. At present, the Chengdu Aircraft Corporation (CAC) produces only the J-10CE variant, which is intended for the export market.

China continues to manufacture Type 054A frigates, even while simultaneously producing the newer Type 054B frigates. The two classes share a common fundamental architecture, allowing for the interchangeability of many components.

Meanwhile, Chinese shipyards are also constructing a large number of maritime law enforcement vessels for the China Coast Guard, which are developed based on the hull design of the Type 054A frigate.

I would think the long range FPV and Loitering drones will probably also start changing the way employment of PAA assets is considered.

If news reports are correct, there is a 100,000 FPV attack drone order for joint production with the Turks in addition to more loitering munitions.

Depending on the timing of induction, this could lift a significant load off combat helicopters in conventional anti-armor role. Not suggesting that helis will be replaced entirely but this space is evolving very fast. I think in the Ukraine-Russian theater, Heli vs. FPV strikes are easily at a 1:n ratio if not more [with n representing tens (and possibly hundreds) of strikes by FPVs].

I personally feel PAA has gone slow on purpose with the inductions given the major rethink going on globally (and certainly in GHQ) on employment of manned rotary aircraft in interdiction roles and combat drones.

Small multi-rotor UAVs and FPV drones are indeed playing a pivotal role in reshaping the nature of modern warfare. However, they cannot entirely replace the function of helicopters—just as they cannot fully supplant the role of tanks.

Faced with this new paradigm of combat, traditional helicopters and tanks are, in fact, undergoing an evolution.

It is important to note that these conventional platforms are evolving, not disappearing.

The design philosophy for fourth-generation tanks has already begun to incorporate adaptive changes to counter the threat posed by small multi-rotor UAVs and FPV drones. As for helicopters, while there is little publicly available information, it is safe to assume that engineers are actively working on solutions.

BTW.
NORINCO Group (China North Industries Group Corporation) recently unveiled a "handheld anti-drone terminal for individual soldiers." Slightly larger than a typical smartphone, it ranks among the most compact anti-drone products currently available. It is capable of effectively countering FPV (first-person view) drones and small multi-rotor UAVs—systems often derived from or based on civilian drone technology.