Umm.. forward observation officers (FOO) have always been an integral part since the beginning.. proving their worth since 65.
Also on a side note PAF won't be in any position to provide CAS.
AO/FOO same role different title. However, for those interested, in PA, an Artillery Observer usually is used to imply an NCO/JCO and Forward Observer Officer is usually used to imply a Commissioned Officer, however it's interchangebale. While you are correct to point out AO/FOO role being there since 1947 (Royal Artillery Inheritance),
however, the point I made was the change in the role from conventional to modern, and the authority of FOO. Conventionally, AO/FO were largerly reserved as Divisional Troops, and while they would accompany Infantry or Armor units/regiments/comapny/squadron/platoon - their operations were largely limited to the Brigade level operations and that too limited to Area Suppression and Denial, and Sustained Fire (Artillery Barrage). FOO could only
Request Artillery Fire but not
Authorize it which rested with senior commanders stationed at Field Direction Center. Up until 2004/5 that is how they were being used but it wasn't much effective in achieving operational goals. Post 2005/6, this was largely changed, especially during Operation Rah-e-Rast, where FOOs were implicitly
Authorized to call in Artillery Fire. Though the order to gun positions was communicated by the Battery Commander, the FOOs implicit authorization meant that troops on ground would get
Guaranteed Fire. The tactics were also changed from Direct/Indirect Sustained Fire to more Precision Strike and Close Support. This level of integration greatly shaped the operational efficiency of Battalion and Company level operations during WoT. As for the Air Force, the provision was there. AFLO/ALO of the rank of Commodore were stationed in Corps HQ. However, requesting Air Support was and still remains a lenghty procedure within the chain of command, and most often was denied by Air Force, not because they were ill-equipped, but because the operations weren't integrated and planned jointly at highest levels of inter-services commands that would take into account the Air Force operational nuances. The newer structure for the militay with a unified and integrted operational command can resolve these issues, however that largely depends on how the military is reorganized, as mentioned
"Theaterization" or "
BCTs".
PAF can't operate with a theatre level doctrine.
Arguable. While the operational independence and flexibility of Air Force is limited in Theaterization, it is a bit of stretch to say that "PAF can't operate", I mean there are certain drawbacks if PAF's assets are permanently stationed into various Theatres Commands which certainly makes it difficult for PAF given its limited resources/assets, but anyhow, I don't know if you read my further post on this but I have mentioned this issue already and hence also explained why I'd favor the BCT paradigm instead of Theaterization -
BCT maintains Air Force's operational independence and flexibility.
CDF will be from army... Corps commanders his own - what if he again decides not to share his plans with the other forces.
Haha, are you asking if I'll hold myself accountable if that happens? Anyhow, it is a legit concern and has multiple underlying presumption. You are right to point out the risk that is inherently associated with power, but then again are you raising this concern from a
Moral Standpoint or Utilitarian? For now I'll keep the underlying presumption under the umbrella of
"Illegitimate Use of Power" and keep it separate from the
"Moral Argument". From the standpoint of Illegitimate Use of Power, can power be practically separated from the risk of exploitation? For example, prior to 27th Ammendment, President of Pakistan was the supreme commander of the entire military, can't a President in cahoots with Service Chief/s do the same? Were the Attock Conspirators highest commanders of their respective services (core plotter being a Squadron Leader)? The risk of Exploitation is inherent to Power - and so when faced with such a dilemma - an informed decision is made based on the assessment whether the benefits outweigh the risks or not. A unified command decreases the exploitation of power (in the context of the specific example you asked for) because with being a singular commander there is a lessar need to mask and manipulate since every asset is at your disposal. A singular command also means singular accountability.
So, while there is always a risk for mad ambition, the risk of blindsighting other forces is reduced under a singular command, and the benefit of integrated military operations certainly outweigh the risk of such exploitation (which will always be there when it comes to power, be it at any level).
PAF has always been aggressive, PA not so... Putting a leash on our most capable fighting force?
I agree with PAF being aggressive, and that is how any Air Force should operate. However, assuming that CDF structure inherently puts a leash on PAF operational mindset is a
logical leap. While it certainly is one of the possibilities, establishing it a priori is simply an insecurity. I have already mentioned, that CDF restructuring can only work if the military is reorganized altogether, preferably as per BCT paradigm (to keep PAF's independence and flexibility intact) - let's wait for things to fold before we jump the gun, no?
Also all this is operational stuff, what does it have to do with constitutional protection etc.
Haha, something tells me that you didn't read my entire position because I have already mentioned that the
Constitutional Immunity is a plainly a political power move for self preservation and I completely disagree with provision of such immunity. However, one should separate the wheat from chaff, no?
The immunity is for one person, the benefits of integration is for the entire military, and like you said, "operational stuff" doesn't have anything to do with "constitutional protection". Moreover, the constitutional immunity only applies to "lawful actions" - which is the gray area - and can most certainly be exploited. For example, lawfully the constitutional immunity doesn't apply to subverting Article 6 (martial law) but then again I think we both know how the gray area can be exploited i.e. "done for national security as per the lawful responsibility of CDF".
Also what does te CDF know about air force/navy their capabilities, what are his extra credentials, qualifications for this so called synergism
I'd say out of all the points you have raised this is the most intuitive yet weakest. The National Security and War Course (NSWC) that is required to be qualified for 2-Star and above ranks is an inter-services course i.e. officers from all 3 services attend it together as batch mates, and the course specifically includes joint/integrated operational training. So, an Army General knows enough about AF and Navy to be a Strategic Commander, the Operational and Tactical perhaps not so much, and this goes in triangulation meaning PAF and PN officers also know enough to be Strategic Commanders (in this case CDF).
However, the more potent argument is Why an Army General alone can be CDF? We can discuss that in another post, I have already written too much for one past haha.
However, heads up, I'd say CDF should be on rotation and limited to Strategic Planning only. While the constitution has now granted operational command to CDF as well, that command should also have anchors in operational input of Field Commanders all the way down the hierarchy by tweaking the PAA.
The question here is if we are resistant to an idea because it is inherently flawed or because we dislike the person bringing about the change.
Appologies in advance for a long post but there were too many questions and points to answer and adress
