I didn't have my thoughts streamlined when I first made the post and made some additional edits to it while you had replied, so you might want to read the post again because I might have not been cogent in my initial post
As for the power the military holds, I'm not disagreeing on that, but pointing out that the enablers of that power held by the institution is not the institution itself - which makes the problem complex.
Also, in good faith, I'd disagree with your point regarding the job of an analyst to simplify the complex - analysis, as an intellectual exercise, has it's rational foundation set in the abilitiy to understand the complex relationship b/w multiple variables, their co-relationships, and their causal chains (which usually can not be distilled down to single cause in a socio-political context given the interdependency of social groups, social institutions, and social systems)
I read your edited post, and I understand the angle you’re coming from. Yes, power structures are complex and no institution operates alone. Multiple political actors, elites, and interest groups form part of that network I’m not denying that.
But even in a complex system, there is always a central node that sets the actual direction. In Pakistan’s case, that node has remained the same since 1947 the one institution with enough coercive power to override, veto, or reshape every political outcome. When one actor consistently holds the ultimate veto, it becomes the primary driver, even if many other variables exist around it.
This isn’t oversimplification this is identifying the decisive point in the system. A good doctor knows the human body is complex but still diagnoses the root cause. A good analyst understands the many variables but still pinpoints the variable that actually determines the outcome. Complexity doesn’t mean every factor carries equal weight.
And if we look at Pakistan’s history honestly, the pattern is clear. Since independence, the military has ruled directly for decades and indirectly for almost the rest of the time. No elected prime minister has ever completed a five-year term, while every military ruler stayed as long as they wished. Even today, the prime minister is just a civilian face while real authority sits elsewhere. That alone shows which institution has had the longest, most uninterrupted influence.
But the crisis isn’t caused by one institution alone our society has helped create this environment too. We have normalised corruption to the point where we don’t even recognise it as wrong. People proudly take selfies with corrupt officials and post them as if it’s an achievement. The milkman mixes the milk. The cement factory cuts quality. The chili factory adulterates spices. The sugar mills manipulate supply and price. Even within families, brothers deprive sisters of their rightful inheritance.
This moral decline didn’t start today. After 1947, many genuine refugees who lost everything didn’t demand land, but locals filed fake claims and grabbed properties that weren’t theirs. That mindset corruption is fine if it benefits me.has been part of our society for decades. And it has consequences. In a society where corruption is socially acceptable, the most powerful coercive actor automatically gains more influence, because people consistently choose shortcuts instead of principles.
Even at the basic labour level, a mason will drag a one day job into a week if paid daily, but the same mason will finish a three month project in one week if given a fixed contract. That is how deeply corruption is embedded in our behaviour. And when society accepts corruption at every level, it naturally strengthens those who can exploit it at the highest level.
So yes, the system is complex but complexity doesn’t erase the central pivot that consistently determines the country’s direction. And acknowledging that pivot is not being simplistic; it is being honest about what the evidence shows over 75 years.
Only when we correctly diagnose the real disease both institutional imbalance and societal moral decay can we begin to treat it.